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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
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http://www.archive.org/details/belgiandocuments01grel 



BELGIAN DOCUMENTS 



BELGIAN DOCUMENTS 

(BELGISCHE AKTENSTUCKE) 
A COMPANION VOLUME TO "THE CRIME" 

BY 

DR. RICHARD GRELLING 

Author of "J* accuse" 



TRANSLATED BY 

ALEXANDER GRAY 



Die ich rief, die Geister 
Wbrd' ich nun nicht ios. 



HODDER AND STOUGHTON 

LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO 

MCMXIX 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

Introduction 1-6 



CHAPTER I 

THE BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 

The external defects of the reports — Time, place and 
number — The writers of the reports — The Intervals — 
The Bosnian Crisis — The Anglo-German negotiations 
for an understanding — Haldane's visit to Berlin — A 
missing report from Greindl — Greindl's successor, 
Baron Beyens — Resume of the external defects of the 
collection 7-71 

The internal defects of the reports — The personal position 
of the Belgian reporters — The German diplomatists' 
" love of truth " — Belgium, a common object of plunder 
— The legend of the Anglo-Belgian offensive alliance . 71-82 

What should the reports prove ? What do they really 
prove ? — Do the reports prove the existence of a war- 
like aggressive conspiracy on the part of the Entente 
Powers ? — What is meant by the " Isolation of Ger- 
many " ? — The fear of Germany — The pacific character 
of the English Government — France's love of peace — A 
crushing document of guilt — Russia's love of peace — 
The purpose of the Triple Entente : the maintenance of 
peace — The aggressive conspiracy of Reval ? — The Ger- 
man chauvinists — The Morocco conflict, 1911 — Atti- 
tude of the Entente Powers during the Bosnian annexa- 
tion crisis and during the Balkan War — The German 
Military Law and the French Three Years Law . . 83-167 

The method and the result of my investigation — A state of 

tension is not equivalent to war 167-177 



vi CONTENTS 

CHAPTERJII 

PAGE 

THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 

A. Belgian Grey Book I — The German ultimata to Bel- 
gium — Belgium and the guaranteeing Powers — The 
suspected consignment of corn 178-189 

B. ' Belgian Grey Book II — Before the Austrian ultimatum 

— After the Austrian ultimatum — After the outbreak of 
the Austro-Serbian War — After the German ultimata, — 
After the outbreak of the European War — Prussian- 
German war law — France and Belgian neutrality . . 189-242 

CHAPTER III 

BARON BEYENS' BOOK: "GERMANY BEFORE 
THE WAR" 

Deceptions and disillusionments — Opinions and views in 
Germany — Aims of the German war of aggression — 
The German Military Law and the French Three Years 
Law : the falsification of dates — The world war for the 
purposes of booty and conquest — The Crown Prince — 
The Triple Entente a defensive alliance — The German 
"Revenge for Agadir ! " — The Emperor William his 
own Chancellor — Bethmann and Jagow — War intriguers 
in Germany — The Bosnian annexation crisis — Count 
Berchtold — The " week of tragedy "—Belgian neu- 
trality — Belgium, a country subject to Parliamentary 
control — Belgium's "faithlessness" — The Belgian 
Military Law — The bargaining on the subj ect of Belgium 
— The menace to Holland — A. letter of King Albert — 
Belgium dies but does not surrender — The chief actors 
in the drama 243-295 



CHAPTER IV 
Concluding observations 296-301 



BELGIAN DOCUMENTS 



INTRODUCTION 

The unflagging search through the archives at Brussels 
conducted by the German authorities has been crowned 
by an extraordinary degree of success, and indeed ever 
since the beginning of the war a kind fortune has favoured 
the German Government beyond the measure of their 
deserts in the discovery of valuable material. 

After the letter, dated July 30th, 1914, from B. de 
PEscaille, the Belgian Charge d' Affaires in Petrograd, 
had been intercepted by a remarkable accident which I 
have fully discussed in J'accuse (p. 256), there were dis- 
covered in Brussels the famous documents containing 
reports of conversations between Belgian and English 
military officers in 1906 and 1912, out of which the attempt 
has been made to construe the Anglo-Belgian conspiracy 
of aggression. These documents also I have already 
subjected to strict examination in J'accuse (p. 213 et seq.) 
and The Crime (Vol. I, p. 420 et seq.). 

The above discoveries date from the year 1914. The 
year 1915 was, however, much more productive. The 
archives of the Belgian Foreign Office, which were strangely 
and imprudently left behind by the Belgian Government 
in Brussels, were rummaged through, and in the process 
there were found a great many reports from Belgian 
Ambassadors to the Government in Brussels. These were 
first of all published separately, and were later collected 
in a volume under the title Belgian Documents 1905-1914 
(Berlin, Ernst Siegfried Mittler & Son). 

This publication provided, as they say, meat and drink 
to the voluntary and involuntary defenders of the German 

VOL. IV B 



2 THE CRIME 

Government. All those who had undertaken the thankless 
task of demonstrating the German Government's innocence 
of this war threw themselves with a veritable voracity on 
these Belgian ambassadorial reports, and wherever the 
heralds of the German war of defence make their voice 
heard, their appeal is accompanied by, and based on, a 
reference to those Belgian Diplomatists who long years 
before the war had branded the policy of encirclement 
initiated by King Edward, who had exalted to the heavens 
the Germari 1 love of peace, and had already in anticipation 
ascribed to the Entente Powers the guilt of a future 
European war. 

In their introduction to the collected documents the 
German Government have sounded the leitmotiv for this 
hymn of defence. They ascribe to the Belgian ambassa- 
dorial reports " an unusual interest as a ' source ' for the 
antecedents of the war," they praise this " objective 
diplomatic account of international politics before the 
outbreak of the war " and see in it " material in arraign- 
ment of the policy of the Entente Powers . . . than which 
nothing more annihilating can be imagined . . . With 
great penetration the Ambassadors recognised at a very 
early date how the peace of the world, guaranteed for 
decades by the Triple Alliance, was imperilled by the 
political efforts of the Entente." 

There then follows, still as an ostensible resume of the 
Belgian ambassadorial reports, the familiar litany regard- 
ing " England's jealousy " of Germany's industrial and 
commercial development, the " menacing increase of 
French chauvinism," " Isvolsky's ambition and rage for 
revenge, as well as the Pan-Slav Press with its hostility 
to Germany," etc. In contrast to these, " the German 
Emperor's love of peace " and " the pacific tendencies 
of German policy and the great patience of Germany in face 
of the provocations of England and France " are empha- 
sised and extolled. 

This underlying motive, designed to accuse the Entente 
Powers and at the same time to defend the Central Powers, 
is to be found everywhere in Pan-German literature years 
before the war, and in a stronger form after the outbreak 



INTRODUCTION 3 

of the war. There is not a thought or a phrase contained 
in the German Government's introduction to their publica- 
tion from the Belgian archives, which had not for years 
been used and abused as a cliche in the Pan-German Press. 
For the German Defenders of the Fatherland (seated at 
the writing-table) the novelty of the documents and the 
profit to be derived from them are confined to the fact 
that they now believe, or profess to believe, that they 
hear in the mouth of neutral diplomatic observers a con- 
firmation of their accusations against the Entente Powers — 
a confirmation which they have now endeavoured to 
exploit in a truly usurious manner. It does not matter what 
book one opens in the German or pro-German literature 
of the war : every writer who has taken as his task the 
defence of Germany and Austria, those innocent victims 
of a ruthless attack, produces columns of extracts from 
the Belgian ambassadorial reports, which are brought 
to an end with the triumphant exclamation : Here 
are the guilty placed in the pillory ; by their criminal 
policy England, Russia, and France provoked the 
war ; Germany and Austria are innocent of the catas- 
trophe. 

A book written in the French language under the title 
La Verite, from the pen of an alleged Frenchman, which 
seeks, as a kind of pendant to J'accuse, to hold up to 
the French Government and their Allies the chronicle of 
their offences, discusses in its 137 pages almost nothing 
but the Belgian ambassadorial reports ; in other words 
it confines itself to the more remote antecedents of the 
war, and with the nimbleness of a conjurer glides over the 
immediate antecedents, the critical days from July 23rd 
to August 4th. If this is what occurs in a French pamphlet, 
it is easy to imagine the way in which German writers 
turn the Belgian documents to advantage. We have 
elsewhere seen that Schiemann in his Slanderer, written 
against J'accuse, discusses the more remote antecedents 
of the war alone, because these can be twisted about and 
tampered with to any extent with the help of quotations, 
snippets, anecdotic accounts of plots hatched at royal 
visits, secret ministerial discussions, naval manoeuvres, 
etc., but that on the contrary he disposes in a few sub- 

B 2 



4 THE CRIME 

sidiary sentences of the history of the twelve critical 
days, which permits and demands a close and accurate 
study of the documents. From the very beginning of the 
war there existed in German apologetic literature, as 
may well be understood, a tendency to place in the fore- 
ground the more remote and obscure past on which it was 
more difficult to throw light, and to allow the clear, 
unambiguous present which permitted no misunderstand- 
ing to fade as far as possible into the background. When 
Schiemann wrote his Slanderer pamphlet, the isolated 
publications from the Belgian archives had scarcely 
begun ; he was therefore compelled to support his accusa- 
tions against the Entente Powers by drawing on the 
collection of snippets which he himself had kept for years. 
To-day the German Government have bounteously spread 
the table for all these purveyors of arguments from the 
past ; they need only stretch out their hands and among 
the 119 courses represented by the Belgian ambassadorial 
reports they will always find the tit-bit which they just 
happen to need to prove what they are at the moment 
concerned to demonstrate. 



In view of this situation, it appears to me inadmissible 
to pass over the Belgian ambassadorial reports more or 
less in silence, as is done by the greater part of the Entente 
Press. Arguments are never met by being ignored. 
On the contrary, the other side is furnished with the plea 
that silence is preserved because of the realisation of the 
justice of the arguments which cannot be refuted. In 
failing to discuss the Belgian ambassadorial reports, 
or in not according them the treatment which their impor- 
tance merits, we should be open to the same charge as 
was rightly brought against the German Government, when 
they suppressed the Tsar's despatch of July 29th, when 
they ignored the revelations of Giolitti (not even 
mentioned until the present day), when from the beginning 
they asserted that they had exercised " pressure on 
Vienna," but failed to produce evidence in support of 
their contention until the later, indeed very late, revelations 
of Bethmann (which I have elsewhere characterised), 



INTRODUCTION 5 

when they concealed, and even yet conceal, from the 
German people the significance of Sazonof's formulae 
for an understanding of July 30th and 31st, which, even 
at the last moment, would have prevented the outbreak 
of war. The system of burying things in silence is the 
most false and the most fatal that can be applied in an 
investigation into historical truth. It is fatal not only for 
the ascertainment of truth itself, but also for him who 
applies it, inasmuch as it lays upon him the suspicion of 
insincerity. 

This system I do not propose to follow. I have nothing 
to fear from the Belgian ambassadorial reports so far as 
my thesis of arraignment is concerned. On the contrary, 
I should be apprehensive of attack, if I ignored this appa- 
rently incriminating material against the Entente Powers, 
this alleged evidence in exoneration of the Central Powers. 
I should be accused of partiality, and an attempt would 
thus be made to enfeeble the annihilating force of my 
accusation. 

The fact that the Entente Powers on their part and 
the Belgian Government also have hitherto in part made 
no reply, and in part only an insufficient reply to the 
German publication, is one which I regret exceedingly and 
regard as a grave political mistake. And I hold this view 
more especially in the interests of the establishment of 
truth. The Belgian Government above all should have 
felt called upon to subject the German publication to a 
critical examination, to point out its shortcomings and its 
gaps, to make these good as far as possible, to explain 
and to base the judgments of their Ambassadors by reference 
to the time at which, the circumstances in which, and the 
persons by whom they were written, in short to confront 
the picture produced by the German publication, at 
first sight an unfavourable one, with an illuminating and 
supplementary picture of the other side, calculated to 
weaken or entirely obliterate the one-sided impression 
conveyed by this publication. 

Nothing of this kind, so far as I am aware, has hitherto 
been done either by the Belgian or by the Entente Govern- 
ments. I have therefore had to undertake the laborious 
task — so far as I know, the first in the whole literature 



6 THE CRIME 

of the war which is not influenced by Germany — of examin- 
ing the German publication, of sifting and investigating it 
with a view to determining its value as evidence for the 
more remote antecedents of the war. Since I do not 
enjoy the good fortune of being inspired, supported, or 
provided with material by any Government, I have been 
thrown back on the study of the documents themselves, 
and in drawing my conclusions I was forced to restrict 
myself to what the documents do and what they do not 
contain. 

It is true that to complete the material I was able to 
refer to the two Belgian Grey Books of 1914 and 1915, 
and further to the book written by Baron Beyens, the 
last Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, and later Prime 
Minister : Germany before the War. 1 If the Belgian 
ambassadorial reports dating from the period before the 
war are placed before us as historical documents to be 
admitted in evidence, it must be permissible by the same 
right to invoke Belgian documents dating from the period 
immediately before the war, and to assign to them the 
same force as evidence. If the German Government 
produce for the purposes of their demonstration eleven 
reports only from the two years' ambassadorial activity 
of Baron Beyens — concluding with a report of July 2nd, 
1914, that is to say a month before the outbreak of war — 
it must be permissible to rely on a book written by this 
same diplomatist, giving a connected and detailed account 
of his impressions regarding German policy and German 
conditions during the last years of peace down to the out- 
break of the war. 

The material, which I will hereafter discuss, thus com- 
prises : 

I. The " Belgian Documents 1905-14," published by the 
German Government. 

II. The Belgian Grey Book of 1914. 

III. The Belgian Grey Book of 1915. 

IV. The above-mentioned book of Baron Beyens. 

1 [English translation : Nelson.] 



CHAPTER I 

THE BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 

THE EXTERNAL DEFECTS OF THE REPORTS 

Time, Place, and Number. 

The collection published by the German Government 
begins with a report of Count Lalaing, the Belgian Am- 
bassador in London, dated February 7th, 1905, and ends 
with a report from Baron Beyens, the Belgian Ambassador 
in Berlin, dated July 2nd, 1914. The collection comprises 
in all 119 reports, which are distributed between the years 
1905-1914, that is to say nine years and five months, or 
113 months. As three embassies are involved, those in 
London, Paris, and Berlin, and as it must at least be assumed 
that each embassy sent to Brussels a report twice a month — 
this assumption certainly falls far short of the reality — 
there must in those 113 months have been received in 
Brussels from each of the three embassies at least 226 
reports, that is to say from all three at least 678 reports. 
Of these 678 reports (in reality there are obviously far 
more) the German Government publishes only 119, that 
is to say, slightly more than a sixth part. The remaining 
five-sixths, which, it must be assumed, were found in the 
archives in a consecutive series along with those that are 
published, are suppressed. 

But further, as is well known, there exist not 
merely three Great Powers, Germany, France, and Eng- 
land, but three others as well, Russia, Austria, and Italy. 



8 THE CRIME 

It appears to me that the reports of the Belgian Ambas- 
sadors, in so far as any value is to be attached to them, 
are at least as important and perhaps even more important 
when they come from Vienna, Petrograd, and Rome than 
when they are dated from Berlin, Paris, and London. It 
was precisely out of an Austro-Russian conflict that the 
world-war arose. The conflict of Austrian and Russian 
interests in the Balkans repeatedly brought Europe to 
the brink of a European war between 1905 and 1914, the 
years which come under review in the Belgian reports. 
If European questions of guilt are to be answered by refer- 
ence to sketches of public feeling drawn by neutral diplo- 
matists, there ought at least to be produced the complete 
picture of the European situation given by the Belgian 
representatives in the six capitals of the Great Powers, 
and not merely the section of the picture as it was seen in 
Berlin, Paris, and London. If it is assumed that the three 
Ambassadors at the Courts of Vienna, Petrograd, and 
Rome only sent to the Foreign Office in Brussels in the 
years in question the number of reports which we have 
assumed above as the minimum number in the case of the 
other three embassies, we have a total number of 1,356 
reports which, as a minimum, must have reached Brussels 
from the six capitals in the nine and a half years in question. 
The 119 reports published thus represent only about a 
twelfth part of the total received. 

This simple statistical fact suffices to deprive the German 
collection of documents of any weight as evidence. The 
question is rightly asked : What is contained in the 
eleven-twelfths of the reports which are left out ? In 
particular, what is contained in the reports from Vienna, 
Petrograd, and Rome which are entirely omitted ? Why 
have the reports from these capitals been so radically 
suppressed ? Why has such a small selection only been 
given from the other reports ? The answer is clear : 
what was favourable to the German Government and their 
thesis of defence has been sought out ; everything that 
confirmed the Entente Powers' love of peace, their will for 
peace and their continued action for peace, while represent- 
ing Germany and Austria as the European rowdies and 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 9 

disturbers of the peace, has been omitted. The Belgian 
Ambassadors in Vienna, Petrograd, and Rome were pre- 
sumably more penetrating in their judgment of the Euro- 
pean situation, of the pacific or bellicose intentions of the 
various Great Powers, than the Ambassadors in Berlin, 
Paris, and London. The Ambassadors who were un- 
favourable to the Triple Entente and favourable to the 
Triple Alliance were given a hearing ; those whose views 
were in the opposite direction were condemned to silence. 
Had this tendency to falsification not been present in the 
compilation of the ambassadorial reports which were 
selected for publication, characteristic reports from all six 
capitals would have been reproduced — so far as I am 
concerned a partial selection would have done — but they 
would not have brought forward sketches of public opinion 
exclusively from Berlin, Paris, and London. 

Here again the system is the same as that which is met 
everywhere in German apologetic literature. As Herr 
Helfferich seeks to deduce the guilt of the Entente Powers 
exclusively from their diplomatic documents — as Herr 
Schiemann in his demonstration of guilt appeals exclu- 
sively to the more remote antecedents of the crime, while 
leaving the essential history of the crime entirely aside — 
as another of my opponents seeks to prove point by point 
the untenability of my thesis of accusation, although 
with entirely insufficient means and without any success, 
and then suddenly stops as he does not consider that he is 
called upon to bring an accusation of guilt against the 
Entente Powers (so that according to this sagest of all 
sages no one is left behind as the guilty person who " began 
the business ") — as each of these defenders of Germany 
has devised his own strangely artificial system of separation 
and purification to enable him to do his whitewashing, 
so the German Government in the publication of the 
Belgian ambassadorial reports also make use of these 
approved methods. They do not give a whole, but merely 
excerpts and extracts, an insignificant part of the whole, 
compiled arbitrarily and with prejudice; they give a confused 
mixture of colour, a scrawl made up of a few individual 
strokes, and then triumphantly point to it, exclaiming: 
See, there is a picture, there is the picture of the encircle- 



io THE CRIME 

ment, of the isolation, of the strangulation, of the intended 
attack of arms, of the great sword of Damocles which 
has hung for years over the ' head of the peace-loving 
German people. 



The Writers of the Reports. 

The statistical survey of the German collection of docu- 
ments furnishes, however, other interesting results. From 
1905 to 1912 Belgium was represented in Berlin by Baron 
Greindl, a man highly regarded in Belgian diplomacy, 
who, however, by his origin, his family connections, his 
prolonged residence in Berlin, and his intimate intercourse 
with the Court and military circles of Germany, had gradu- 
ally entirely adopted the views of those circles and was 
indeed scarcely any longer distinguishable from a German 
nationalist. We have already seen elsewhere the influence 
exercised by the ideas of Schiemann on the attitude of 
mind of this Belgian diplomatist, and have heard the 
admiring recognition which the diplomatist, without 
any critical qualification, paid to the talent, the acumen, 
and the great influence of the publicist of the Kreuzzeitung. x 
In reading the reports of Greindl, it is possible to imagine 
that one is looking at the leading article of some Pan- 
German paper. All the catch-words of Pan-German 
literature constantly recur in Greindl : the French 
thirst for revenge ; English commercial envy ; the Pan- 
Slav impulse to conquest ; the peaceful Triple Alliance 
which has kept the peace of Europe for half a century ; 
the presumptuous, encircling, provocative Triple Entente, 
which has constantly led Europe to the brink of war ; 
the militaristic and nationalistic inclinations of the Poin- 
cares, the Millerands, the Delcasses and their comrades; 
the wiles and the deceit of English policy which would 
most prefer to incite the Continental Powers against each 
other, in order to fry its own fish at the fire — all this 
familiar and spicy concoction, of which the fatal cook was 
King Edward, the jealous and envious uncle of his more 
capable nephew — all this is conscientiously served up for 
1 See The Crime, Vol. II, p. 16. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS n 

us by Baron Greindl, just as if it had been prepared in 
the witches' kitchen of some Pan- German. It is no 
wonder that Messrs. von Bethmann and von Jagow hailed 
the discovery of Greindl's reports with a quite unusual 
shout of triumph, and made these reports the pivot of their 
whole publication. 

It may well occasion astonishment that from the period 
of Greindl's tenure of office, from 1905-1912, there are in 
all 91 reports from the three capitals which have been 
published, and of these more than half, namely 46, are due 
to Greindl ; in the year 1908, 11 out of 14 published reports 
come from Greindl ; in 1909, 7 out of 9. The year 1910 
produces only one report, and it of course comes from 
Greindl. If a collection of documents is compiled in this 
one-sided and tendencious manner, it is of course possible 
to prove anything. It is exactly as if the French Govern- 
ment were to undertake a compilation of reports from 
the period when Delcasse was at the embassy at Petrograd 
in order to concoct out of these a chronicle of the sins of 
Germany and Austria. That Greindl was no impartial 
observer, that his reports were not, as is stated in the 
introduction to the German collection, " an objective 
diplomatic account of international politics before the out- 
break of the war," but a one-sided and frequently erroneous 
view, seen through German spectacles, of the events, the 
intentions and the currents existing in the various European 
countries, is a fact which is at once obvious to anyone 
who reads Greindl's reports with a critical eye and who 
recognises the origins of his catch-words. Those who are 
familiar with the secrets of diplomatic life in Berlin in 
the last decade before the war could furnish all possible 
details regarding the personal relations of the Belgian 
diplomatist and the intellectual influences and suggestions 
to which he was exposed, and in this way explain his 
astonishing German national one-sidedness, which was 
combined with an even more astonishing blindness towards 
all the real events and tendencies which were taking 
place before his eyes. As I have adopted it as an 
unalterable rule in my books never to make use of anecdotic 
material, but always to rely on documents alone, I cannot 
go more fully into these personal explanations regarding 



12 THE CRIME 

the judgment of the Belgian diplomatist which in reality- 
was so remarkably unseeing. That Germany was the 
guardian of the peace of Europe, whereas France, England, 
and Russia, if they did not intentionally will war, yet at 
any rate did in fact endanger peace — a view which he 
frequently repeats — has been shown by the events of 1914 
to be so false and so mistaken that it is unnecessary to 
reduce it to absurdity by other than documentary methods. 
In the course of this investigation we shall see how hastily 
Greindl passes over the most important occurrences, as 
soon as they appear to be in contradiction with his pre- 
conceived thesis. He has almost nothing to say on the 
subject of the second Hague Conference, or on the Anglo- 
German negotiations for an understanding — so far at least 
as the testimony of the German publication goes. It 
might indeed be possible that he reported on these events 
in a manner unfavourable for Germany, and that for this 
very reason the Foreign Office suppressed these reports. 
This assumption is not improbable ; it is certain that he 
also makes many observations which — in contradistinction 
to his main thesis — do a certain measure of justice to the 
Governments of the Entente Powers and deliver in passing 
a well-deserved thrust at the dangerous efforts of Pan- 
Germany. It is very interesting to note that such occa- 
sional strokes against the German side only occur in such 
reports of Greindl as contain elsewhere bitter attacks 
against the Entente Governments or against certain 
tendencies in Entente countries. These attacks are so 
welcome to the German Government, and they fit in so well 
•with the gloomy picture of their enemies which they have 
undertaken to sketch with the help of the Belgian reports, 
that they were forced to decide that they must occasionally 
take into the bargain critical observations directed against 
Germany so that they might at the same time be able to 
use for their purposes the violent attacks made against 
the Entente Powers. Further, the German publication 
regularly follows the practice of displaying the attacks 
against their enemies in enormous heavy type, whereas 
the critical observations directed against Germany are 
put forward in the usual modest type. This device of 
resorting to heavy and usual type is also one of those 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 13 

approved methods of gaining to their side the unwary and 
the superficial reader. 1 Nowhere is there contained in 
the whole collection a report from any of the three em- 
bassies attacking the German Government or the mili- 
taristic and Pan- German tendencies in Germany without 
at the same time branding much more severely the corre- 
sponding tendencies in the other countries. This means 
and proves that any criticism directed against Germany 
is on principle omitted in the German publication : it 
is only included in exceptional cases where no other course 
is possible, if it is necessary to purchase the advantage of 
a bitter condemnation of the Entente Powers at the price 
of the disadvantage involved in a levis macula against 
Germany. From this it is possible to form some idea of 
what may be the contents of the unpublished reports 
from the six European capitals, which according to the 
above calculation I have estimated to amount to at least 
1,237. 

The Intervals. 

There is a further point to which it is necessary to draw 
attention, which, taken in conjunction with the points 
already mentioned, contributes to reduce to a nullity the 
force of the ambassadorial reports regarded as evidence. 
I refer to the long intervals which without any manifest 
reason interrupt the reports from the three capitals, Berlin, 
Paris, and London. Anyone who is interested in this 
critical investigation may himself note these intervals in 
the Belgian documents. 

I propose to refer here only to certain quite unusually 
long intervals of silence. Between the London report of 
Count Lalaing of July 28th, 1906, and the Paris report of 
M. Leghait of February 4th, 1907 (Nos. 20 and 21 of the 
Collection), there is an interval of no less than six months. 
No ambassadorial report dating from this interval has 

1 In order to combat the Berlin Foreign Office with its own 
weapons, I propose, in the following extracts from the Belgian 
documents, as a counter-stroke to the system of heavy type adopted 
in the German publication, to emphasise throughout with italics 
exclusively those passages which appear to me specially important 
and interesting. 



i 4 THE CRIME 

been printed. This was the time of preparation for the 
second Hague Conference, which, as is well known, met in 
July, 1907, and for whose successful constitution the then 
English Government, under Campbell-Bannerman, inter- 
vened with special vigour (see J 'accuse, pp. 83-90). It is 
known that Russia, after the failure of her efforts to secure 
a restriction of armaments at the first Hague Conference, 
had not put forward the question of armaments in the 
outline of the programme for the second Conference ; that 
then, in response to England's wish and desire, the question 
of armaments was included in the programme, but that 
owing to Germany's resistance a platonic resolution merely 
was passed on the subject and no discussion was allowed. 
The Liberal English Government, as a kind of overture 
to the second Hague Conference, had voluntarily reduced 
the plans for naval construction approved by the Balfour 
Cabinet, in order to give a good example to the Powers 
which were competing in naval construction, and especially 
to Germany, and in order to exert a favourable influence 
on the imminent Hague discussions regarding universal 
restriction of armaments. 

Count Lalaing reports on this as follows : — 

No. 20. 1 
Londres, le 23 juillet 1906. London, July 28, 1906. 

Monsieur le Baron, Monsieur le Baron : 

Apres les reductions dans After the reductions in the 

l'armee proposees a la Chambre Army proposed in the House it 

voici le tour de la marine, dans is now the turn of the Navy, 

laquelle aussi on cherche a in which also it is sought to effect 

effectuer des economies. Modi- economies. In modification of 

fiant les plans arretes par le the plans decided upon by Mr. 

Gouvernement de M. Balfour, le Balfour's Government, the pre- 

Cabinet actuel est d'avis de sent Cabinet proposes to con- 

construire trois cuirasses du struct three cruisers of the 

type Dreadnought au lieu de Dreadnought type in place of 

quatre, deux contre-torpilleurs four, two destroyers in place of 

1 [The English version of the extracts from the reports has been 
translated from the German, which does not in all cases follow 
the French very closely. In one passage, to which the author 
refers in The Crime, the variation amounts to a difference of 
meaning.] 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 15 



au lieu de cinq, et huit sous- 
marins au lieu de douze, soit 
d'encourir une depense de 
£6,800,000 au lieu de £9,300,000, 
et d'arriver a alleger le budget des 
annees prochaines de £2,500,000. 
On annoncerait cette decision 
a La Haye, pour prouver que 
V Angleterre est favorable au des- 
armement naval et a la limi- 
tation des depenses ; elle con- 
tinuerait dans la voie des econo- 
mies si son exemple trouvait de 
Vecho et des imitateurs a la 
Conference de la Paix en 1907. 
Dans le cas contraire, on con- 
struirait plus de vaisseaux. 

Mais, pour faire adopter ce 
plan, le Ministre de la Marine 
s'est trouve oblige de declarer 
que si son programme etait 
approuve par la Chambre, les 
forces navales de la Grande - 
Bretagne seraient encore superi- 
eures a celle des deux autres plus 
grandes marines du monde, et 
que l'Angleterre resterait sans 
rivale sur mer. Sa genereuse 
initiative dans la voie des re- 
formes est singulierement dimi- 
nuee par le fait qu'elle ne court 
aucun risque et qu'elle compte 
bien rester, apres comme avant, 
maitresse de 1' Ocean. 

Que les Etats-Unis ou l'Alle- 
magne surtout refusent a La 
Haye d'adopter les vues pre- 
conisees par les delegues 
anglais, on ne manquera pas 
de jeter sur ces nations la 
responsabilite de Vechec inflige 
aux idees humanitaires de V Angle- 
terre, et du nouvel apotre de la 
paix, Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman. 

Comte de Lalatjstg. 



five, and eight submarines in 
place of twelve, in other words 
to incur an expenditure of 
£6,800,000 in place of £9,300,000 
and thus reduce the budget for 
the following years by £2,500,000. 
This decision would then be 
announced at The Hague in 
order to prove that England is 
well-disposed to naval disarma- 
ment and to the limitation of 
expenditure ; it would continue to 
follow the path of economy, if its 
example found approval and imi- 
tators at the Peace Conference in 
1907. Otherwise more ships would 
be built. 

But in order to secure the 
adoption of this plan, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty was obliged 
to state that if his programme 
was approved by the House, 
the naval forces of Great Britain 
would still be superior to those of 
the two other greatest navies 
in the world, and that England 
would continue without a rival 
at sea. England's generous ini- 
tiative in the path of reform 
loses very much of its value by 
virtue of the fact that it runs no 
risk, and that it reckons on con- 
tinuing as before mistress of the 
seas. 

If the United States or, above 
all, if Germany refuse at The 
Hague to adopt the views main- 
tained by the English delegates, 
there will be no hesitation in 
throwing on these nations the 
responsibility for the check in- 
flicted on the humanitarian ideas 
of England and of its new apostle 
of peace, Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman. 

Count de Lalaing. 



In this report, which is undoubtedly laudatory and 
flattering for the English Government, the German Govern- 
ment naturally print in heavy type those sentences which 



1 6 THE CRIME 

speak of England's continued superiority at sea and of 
the absence of danger involved in such a generous initiative. 
On the other hand, all that I have emphasised in italics 
fades away into ordinary type : England's intention to 
give a good example to the other Powers by a voluntary 
reduction of naval armaments, the " humanitarian ideas 
of England and of its new apostle of peace, Campbell- 
Bannerman," etc. This is an example of the typographi- 
cal system of falsification pursued in the Wilhelmstrasse. 
I only wished at this place to emphasise that after this 
report of Count Lalaing there occurs an interval of more 
than six months in the collection of documents. It 
might not be rash to attribute this pause to the fact that 
in this interval favourable reports were received by the 
Brussels Government regarding the attitude of the Entente 
Powers to the second Hague Conference and unfavourable 
reports regarding the attitude assumed on the question 
by Germany and Austria. 

How negative was the attitude of the German Govern- 
ment at that time (as expressed by Prince Billow), and of 
all the authoritative circles in Germany, is a familiar fact 
of which I have given a full account in J' accuse and The 
Crime. The reflex of the different attitudes assumed by 
the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente towards the 
work of The Hague, which presumably was manifested in 
the Belgian ambassadorial reports in this period of prepara- 
tion, iias obviously been suppressed for the same reasons 
as those which have governed the whole German compila- 
tion. On nearly every occasion where an astonishingly 
long interval occurs in the collection of reports, it is possible 
to show that just at that time European events were being 
enacted the discussion of which, it may be presumed, 
drew from the Belgian Ambassadors a note unfavourable 
to the Central Powers. This also is a proof of the tenden- 
cious compilation of the collection, an argument for its 
worthlessness. 

The period from July 1st, 1907, until October 11th, 1907, 
that is to say the period in which the second Hague Con- 
ference met, is represented by three reports only (Nos. 36, 37, 
and 38), one of July 1st, 1907, from Baron Greindl, two 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 17 

dated August and October, 1907, from the London Ambas- 
sador and his representative. Greindl's report does not 
devote a single word to the Hague Conference which was 
immediately imminent, but on the other hand he speaks 
at great length of the reception accorded to M. Etienne 
at Kiel and Berlin, of the assumption of his duties by the 
new French Ambassador, Jules Cambon, who " plainly 
entertains the desire of improving the relations of his 
country to Germany," etc. 



No. 36. 



Berlin, le l er juillet 1907. 

. . . Quel qu'ait ete le sujet 
de la conversation, tin fait est 
certain, c'est que Sa Majeste a 
accueilli M. Etienne de la maniere 
la plus aimable et que celui-ci 
en a ete tres agreablement 
impressionne. Sa Majeste re- 
coit du reste tou jours avec une 
distinction tres marquee tons 
les Francais qui se presentent a 
Elle. 

De Kiel M. Etienne s'est 
rendu a Berlin ou ilaeuun tres 
long entretien avec le Chancelier. 
Une petite notice publiee par 
les journaux et evidemment 
inspiree dit que le Prince de 
Btilow aura sans doute ete 
charme par la personne de 
1'homme d'Etat eminent qui lui 
a rendu visite et que l'accueil 
amical et flatteur que M. Etienne 
a trouve a Berlin aura corre- 
spondu a celui que l'Empereur 
a reserve a Kiel a ses hotes 
frangais. 

II est visible que le nouvel 
ambassadeur de France a Berlin, 
M. Cambon, a le desir d'ameliorer 
les relations de son pays avec 
VAllemagne et il y a lieu de 
croire qiCil a presente des propo- 
sitions concretes ou qu'il se 

VOL. IV 



Berlin, July 1st, 1907. 

Whatever may have been the 
subject of the conversation, one 
fact is certain, namely, that 
His Majesty received M. Etienne 
in the most friendly manner, 
and that the latter was most 
agreeably impressed by the fact. 
Indeed, His Majesty always 
receives all Frenchmen who are 
presented to him with special 
marks of distinction. 

From Kiel M. Etienne went to 
Berlin, where he had a very 
long interview with the Chan- 
cellor. A short notice, pub- 
lished in the Press and obviously 
inspired, says that Prince von 
Biilow is without doubt very 
much charmed by the personality 
of the eminent statesman who 
visited him, and that the friendly 
and flattering reception which 
M. Etienne has met in Berlin 
is in agreement with that ac- 
corded by the Emperor to his 
French guests in Kiel. 

The new French Ambassador 
at Berlin, M. Cambon, plainly 
entertains the desire of improving 
the relations of his country to 
Germany, and there is reason to 
believe that he has put forward 
concrete propositions, or that he 



i8 



THE CRIME 



propose oV en j 'aire, lorsquHl jugera 
le moment favorable. 

En effet M. Cambon sans me 
faire aucune confidence, m'a 
dit recemment qu'il regrettait de 
trouver le gouvernement allemand 
toujours en defiance envers la 
France. Peu de temps aupara- 
vant M. de Miihlberg m'avait dit 
que M. Cambon s'etait exprime 
dans le meme sens avec lui et 
qu'il ne demandait pas mieux 
que d'etre confiant, si la France 
prouvait sa sincerite par des 
faits. Le regret exprime par 
M. Cambon n'aurait pas de 
raison d'etre, si l'ambassadeur 
de France n'avait pas fait ou 
essaye de faire des ouvertures 
sur quelqiie point determine. 

Le voyage de M. Etienne a 
Kiel et la maniere dont il y a 
ete recu, sont done a noter 
comme des symptomes, dont il 
ne faut toutefois pas exagerer 
1 'importance. Des relations cor- 
rectes entre Berlin et Paris 
sont le maximum de ce qui peut 
etre obtenu. Pour tin rap- 
prochement vrai et durable il 
faudrait ne plus penser a la 
revanche et il n'y a pas un 
Francais, meme parmi les plus 
sages et les plus pacifiques, qui 
n'en conserve l'espoir au fond 
du cceur. 

Gbeindl. 



intends doing so when he considers 
the moment favourable. 

In fact M. Cambon, without 
confiding in me, recently told 
me that he was sorry to find the 
German Government always dis- 
trustful towards France. Shortly 
before, Herr von Miihlberg had 
said to me that M. Cambon had 
expressed himself in the same 
sense to him ; there was nothing 
he desired more than to trust 
France if she proved her sin- 
cerity by her actions. There 
would have been no reason for 
the regret expressed by M. 
Cambon, if the French Ambas- 
sador had not made or attempted 
to make concrete proposals on 
some definite point. 

M. Etienne's voyage to Kiel 
and the reception there accorded 
to him therefore deserve to be 
noted as symptoms, the import- 
ance of which should at the same 
time not be over-estimated. The 
utmost that can be obtained is 
the existence of correct relations 
between Berlin and Paris. A 
true and lasting rapprochement 
would presuppose the abandon- 
ment of the thought of revenge, 
and there is not a Frenchman, 
even among the most reasonable 
and the most pacific, who does 
not keep the hope of this in the 
depths of his heart. 

Gbeindl. 



It will be seen that not a word is said about The Hague. 
Further, this short extract reveals Greindl's method, 
quite in the manner of Schiemann and his comrades, of 
attaching to every peace-utterance or peace-action on the 
part of the French the cloven hoof of secret evil intentions. 
An eminent French politician comes as a messenger of 
peace to the German Emperor and the German Govern- 
ment, a French Ambassador assures everyone who cares 
to listen that his only effort is to improve the relations 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 19 

between his country and Germany and to dispel all distrust. 
M. Greindl, however, utters an urgent warning against 
any over-estimation of these incidents, and even on this 
occasion permits the French thought of revenge to illumine 
the background. 

In the London reports of August and October, 1907, it is 
true that the Hague Conference is mentioned, but only 
in an entirely parenthetic manner and in a few empty 
words (I count sixteen words in all). Below I print the 
relevant sentences, in order to give some idea of how the 
most important European events are reflected in the German 
collection of documents : 



No. 37. 



Londres, le 10 aout 1907. 

. . . La Tribune, organe des 
pasteurs non-conformistes et des 
radicaux humanitariens, signale 
avec melancolie le fait que les 
escadres francaises et espagnoles 
bombardaient Casablanca au 
moment meme ou la Conference 
de La Haye adoptait une declara- 
tion tendant a defendre le bom- 
bardement des ports ouverts. . . 



London, August 10th, 1907. 

. . . The Tribune, the organ of 
non-conformist clergymen and 
humanitarian radicals, points 
sadly to the fact that French 
and Spanish squadrons were 
bombarding Casablanca at the 
very moment when the Hague 
Conference was adopting a declar- 
ation intended to prohibit the 
bombardment of open forts. . . . 



No. 38. 



Londres, le 11 octobre 1907. 

. . . Esperons plutot, ajoute 
perfidement le Times, que Ton 
regrette a Berlin l'attitude hostile 
adoptee lors de la guerre des 
Boers. Nous sommes prets a 
pardonner, mais pas a oublier 
cet incident, pourvu que le 
repentir soit serieux, ce que rien 
dans l'attitude allemande au 
Maroc ou a La Haye n'a prouv6 
jusqu'ici. S'il veut montrer sa 
sincerite, que le Chancelier fasse 
a nos amis les Francais des 



London, October 11th, 1907. 

. . . Let us rather hope, the 
Times adds perfidiously, that 
Berlin regrets the hostile attitude 
adopted during the Boer War. 
We are ready to forgive but not 
to forget that incident, provided 
the repentance is sincere, which 
nothing in the German attitude 
at Morocco or The Hague has 
so far proved. If he really 
wishes to show his sincerity, 
let the Chancellor make to our 
friends the French advances 

c 2 



20 



THE CRIME 



avances analogues a celles qu'il 
nous prodigue aujourd'hui. Sir 
Edward Grey a dit que des 
bonnes relations entre l'Alle- 
magne et la France depend 
l'amelioration des rapports entre 
l'Allemagne et l'Angleterre. . . . 



similar to those which he showers 
on us to-day. Sir Edward Grey 
has said that the improvement 
in the relations between Germany 
and England depends on the 
good relations between Germany 
and France. . . . x 



Apart from these two passages, I find the Hague Con- 
ference mentioned on two other occasions at a later date 
in Greindl's reports, in No. 44 of May 6th, 1908, and in 
No. 47 of May 30th, 1908. The passages may here be 
given : 

No. 44. 
Berlin, le 6 mai 1908. Berlin, May 6th, 1908. 



. . . Immediatement apres 
l'assassinat de ses ressortissants 
a Casablanca et sans avoir 
aucune raison de croire que le 
gouvernement marocain negli- 
gerait de rechercher et de punir 
les coupables, le gouvernement 
franfais a riposte par tin procede 
plus odieux encore que celui 
des assassins, bombardant une 
ville ouverte, massacrant des 
femmes et des enfants, ruinant 
des commercants inoffensifs, au 
moment meme ou ses delegues 
a La Haye pronon?aient vertu- 
eusement de beaux discours 
humanitaires. . . . 



. . . Immediately after the 
assassination of their subjects at 
Casablanca, and without having 
any grounds for the assumption 
that the Moroccan Government 
would neglect to seek out and 
punish the guilty, the French 
Government have proceeded in a 
manner even more odious than 
that of the assassins, inasmuch 
as they bombarded an open town, 
massacred women and children, 
and ruined inoffensive merchants 
at the very moment when 
their delegates were virtuously 
delivering fine humanitarian 
speeches at The Hague. . . . 



No. 47. 



Berlin, le 30 mai 1908. 

. . . Les declarations paci- 
fistes obligees et qui seront sans 
doute repetees a Reval signifient 
bien peu de chose emanant de 
trois puissances qui, comme la 
Russie et l'Angleterre, viennent 
avec des succes divers d' entre - 
prendre sans autre raison que le 
desir de s'agrandir et meme 



Berlin, May 30th, 1908. 

. . . The cixstomary pacifist de- 
clarations which without doubt 
will be repeated at Reval have 
very little significance when 
uttered by three Powers which, 
like Russia and England, have 
just undertaken, though with 
varying success, wars of conquest 
in Manchuria and in the Transvaal 



1 [Freely paraphrased and much abridged from an article in The 
Times of 10th Oct., 1907.] 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 21 

sans pretexte plausible, les without any other reason than 

guerres de conquete de la Mand- the desire of self -aggrandisement 

chourie et du Transvaal ou qui and even without a plausible 

comme la France procede en ce pretext, or which, like France, is 

moment meme a l'envahissement proceeding at tins very moment 

du Maroc au mepris de promesses to the conquest of Morocco, 

solennelles et sans autre titre que disregarding solemn promises and 

la cession des droits de l'Angle- without any other title than the 

terre qui n'en possedait aucun. cession of the rights of England, 

Ce sont les memes puissances qui, which possessed none. These 

en compagnie des Etats-Unis, are the same Powers which, in 

sortant a peine de la guerre de company with the United States, 

spoliation contre l'Espagne, se which had scarcely finished the 

sont montrees ultra -pacifistes a war of spoliation against Spain, 

La Haye. . . . appeared as Ultra -pacifists at The 

Hague. . . . 

It will be seen how well M. Greindl has learned in the 
school of the Pan-Germans. His ridicule of the " fine 
humanitarian speeches at The Hague," of the Entente 
Powers who there appeared " as Ultra-pacifists," is Pan- 
Germanism of the purest water. Messrs. Keim, Class, 
Bernhardi, Reventlow, Bassermann and Company could 
not have expressed their contempt for the efforts of The 
Hague better than the Belgian diplomatist does. 

This is all that I have found in the Belgian documents 
regarding the world-historical incident which is represented 
by the second Hague Conference. It will be seen how 
extremely rich, precious and faithful a " source for the 
antecedents of the war " is offered by the German collec- 
tion. Whether the Belgians may have written more 
regarding The Hague is, of course, beyond my knowledge. 
If such is the case, then they are exonerated, but all the 
heavier is the charge which falls upon the Foreign Office 
in Berlin — the charge of falsification, regarding which it is 
not merely the readers and the critics, but above all 
the Belgian Ambassadors who have been so misused, who 
have the right to complain. 



Another great interval in the collection of reports, 
an interval of over three months extending from October, 
1907, to January, 1908, is to be found just when the German 



22 THE CRIME 

Emperor with the Empress went on a somewhat lengthy- 
visit to England. On this occasion he stayed at Windsor 
Castle ; he was welcomed in a highly sympathetic manner 
by the public and the Press, and in the well-known 
Guildhall speech he gave eloquent expression to his friendly 
feelings for England and the English. The reception 
given to the German Emperor and his Consort by the 
Court and the people in England was a clear symptom 
that neither King Edward nor his Government enter- 
tained any evil design against Germany, that on the other 
side of the Channel there existed no manner of hatred or 
evil feeling towards their German cousins. These re- 
assuring symptoms may have been emphasised in the 
Belgian ambassadorial reports of the time. From the 
point of view of the authors of the German collection 
of documents this, however, did not at all fit into the 
complete picture which they had undertaken to draw. 
This is the reason of the long interval in the reports. 
Anyone perusing the collection carefully may with cer- 
tainty rely upon it that, on every occasion when a lengthy 
interval occurs in the reports, some important event 
took place which was calculated either to throw a favourable 
light on the tendencies of the Entente Powers, or an 
unfavourable light on those of Germany. The simplest 
means were taken to guard against this unwelcome im- 
pression : the reports in question were omitted. 



The report of Leghait, the Charge d' Affaires at Paris, 
dated July 20th, 1908 (No. 51), is followed by an interval 
of more than two and a half months. The report just 
mentioned is interesting in many directions. M. Fallieres 
had just begun his tour of visits to Russia and to the 
northern Courts, accompanied by Pichon, his Foreign 
Minister. A month previously King Edward had met 
the Tsar Nicholas in the roadstead of Reval. According 
to the Pan-German legend, we are to believe that it was at 
this meeting at Reval that the great aggressive conspiracy 
of the Entente Powers against Germany and Austria 
was forged. In so far as the Belgian ambassadorial reports 
are admitted as evidence, this legend is refuted by the 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 23 



following report 
July 20th. 



of the Paris Charge d'Affaires, dated 



No. 51. 



Paris, le 20 juillet 1908. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le President de la Republique 
a quitte la France le 18 de ce 
mois pour rendre officiellement 
visite a l'Empereur de Russie et 
aux Rois de Suede, de Danemark 
et de Norvege. M. Fallieres, 
s'inspirant de l'idee essentielle 
de la politique exterieure de la 
France et des voeux de 1' opinion 
publique, avait a coeur de saluer 
le chef de la nation amie et 
alliee. En meme temps le 
President rendra aux Souverains 
de Danemark et de Norvege la 
visite qu'ils lui ont faite et 
profitant de sa presence dans ces 
regions, il ira saluer le Souverain 
de la Suede. 

Le voyage de M. Fallieres, 
base sur des motifs de courtoisie, 
a en meme temps un caractere 
politique qui ne manque pas 
d'importance en ce moment oil le 
groupement des puissances est 
Fob jet de toutes les preoccupa- 
tions. 

La France infeodee a la poli- 
tique anglaise a voulu preter a 
celle-ci un solide concours aupres 
des puissances du Nord. S'il 
n'est peut-etre pas question pour 
le moment d'une nouvelle triple 
alliance, on voudrait du moins 
empecher un groupement trop 
intime de ces pays sous l'egide 
de l'Allemagne. Appuyee sur 
cette base, la France proclame 
hautement que le maintien de la 
paix est le but de sa politique et 
M. Pichon, aux cours qu'il va 
visiter, comma il l'a fait ici, ne 



Paris, July 20th, 1908. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

The President of the Republic 
left France on the 18th of this 
month in order to pay his 
official visit to the Emperor of 
Russia, and to the Kings of 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway. 
Having regard to the funda- 
mental idea of the foreign policy 
of France and to the wishes of 
public opinion, M. Fallieres was 
anxious to salute the supreme 
head of the friendly and allied 
nation. At the same time, the 
President will return the visit 
which the Sovereigns of Denmark 
and Norway have paid to him, 
and he will avail himself of his 
presence in these regions to 
visit the King of Sweden also. 

The voyage of M. Fallieres, 
which is taking place from 
motives of courtesy, has at 
the same time a political char- 
acter which is not without 
importance at this moment, 
when the grouping of the Powers 
occupies everyone's thoughts. 

France, subordinate to English 
policy, is anxious to give this 
policy solid support with the 
Northern Powers. If for the 
moment there is perhaps no 
question of a new Triple Alli- 
ance, it is at least desired to 
prevent a too intimate grouping 
of these countries under the 
aegis of Germany. On this basis 
France loudly proclaims that the 
maintenance of peace is the aim of 
her policy ; at the Courts which 
he will visit, as well as here, 
M. Pichon will not cease to 



24 THE CRIME 

cessera de le repeter en affirmant repeat this and will assert that 

que la diplomatic francaise French diplomacy, true to her 

pratiquera, fidele a ses alliances, allies, her friendships and her 

amities et engagements, une obligations, will follow a policy of 

politique d' entente entre tons et understanding towards all and of 

de conciliation generale des a general settlement of interests, 

interets. II cherchera a de- He will seek to show that this 

montrer que cette politique n'a policy does not have for its object 

pas pour but d'opposer les puis- that of setting the Powers against 

sances les unes aux autres ni each other, or of setting France 

d'opposer la France a aucune against any of them, 
d'elle. 

II est certain que la politique It is certain that French policy 

francaise est inspiree par des is inspired by pacific ideas, but 

idees pacifiques, mais, entrainee will France, drawn in England's 

dans l'orbite de l'Angleterre, la train, always remain master of 

France pourra-t-elle toujours the situation and be able to 

mait riser les evenements et eviter avoid dangerous feelings of un- 

que des f roissements dangereux easiness from arising on the other 

se manifestent au dela du Rhin 1 side of the Rhine ? 

Leghait. Leghait. 

It is impossible to imagine a plainer confirmation of 
the pacific tendencies of French policy than that here 
given. The Belgian diplomatist does not fear any bellicose 
tendencies on the part of France, but only " dangerous 
feelings of uneasiness " which might arise on the other 
side of the Rhine in consequence of the closer union of 
the Entente Powers (as is known, the Entente agreement 
between England and Russia was concluded in the summer 
of 1907). This fundamental idea of Belgian diplomacy, 
which runs through all the ambassadorial reports, must 
be kept carefully in view. The Entente in itself is in no 
way following offensive intentions ; it is merely a defensive 
union against any dangerous aspirations that may be 
manifested by Germany, and a means of maintaining 
European equilibrium, and thereby the peace of Europe, 
by confronting the Triple Alliance with the Triple Entente. 
This fundamental idea entirely agrees with the thesis of 
my book that the Triple Entente was a defensive alliance. 1 
The German Government have therefore no occasion to 
invoke the Belgian ambassadorial reports as evidence 
in support of their contrary thesis that the Triple Entente 

1 See J' accuse, p. 119. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 25 

was an offensive alliance. It is, however, only this latter 
thesis that would serve in justification of the German 
Government. Be it observed that this would not justify 
their assertion that they are waging a war of defence ; 
for this presupposes an actual attack ; but it would, none 
the less, justify their assertion, which they do not expressly 
advance, but which they allow everywhere to be suggested 
and to be advanced by their defenders, that they are 
waging a preventive war, that is to say that they were 
compelled to anticipate an intended attack by their 
opponents. Nowhere in the Belgian ambassadorial reports 
is there any mention of such an aggressive intention on the 
part of the Entente Powers. To this point we shall return 
later in greater detail. 



The Bosnian Crisis. 

Between July 20th and October 8th, 1908, we find, as 
already observed, an interval in the reports extending to 
more than two and a half months, and immediately after 
the latter date there is a similar interval of nearly three 
and a half months coming down to January 19th, 1909. 
We search for the reason of this astonishing silence on 
the part of the Belgian Ambassadors — or rather of the 
German collection of documents — and we find that in this 
interval the Bosnian crisis had broken out in consequence 
of the Austrian declaration of annexation. In this critical 
time, when Austria's ruthlessness and selfishness had 
even then brought Europe to the brink of war, the Belgian 
Ambassadors may have said things which were not pre- 
cisely flattering to the Viennese Government and to their 
faithful second, the Government in Berlin ; for a European 
conflict always meant for Belgium that her neutrality 
and her independence would be endangered. These 
flattering observations may not have been read with much 
pleasure by the gentlemen in Berlin whose task it was to 
see to the collection of documents. They were disposed 
of by not printing them. This explains the highly sus- 
picious interruption in the reports which occurs in this 
eventful period. 



26 



THE CRIME 



In No. 52, dated October 8th, 1908, which comes from 
the Parisian Charge d' Affaires, mention is already made 
of the fait accompli of the annexation, and at the same 
time of a Russian proposal for a conference for the main- 
tenance of the peace of Europe. The report says on the 
subject : 



No. 52. 



Paris, le 8 octcbre 1908. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Pour faire suite aux renseigne- 
ments que j'ai eu 1'honneur de 
vous adresser par ma lettre 
d'hier, je m'empresse de vous 
transmettre ci- joint divers arti- 
cles du journal le Temps de ce 
jour relatifs a l'incident des 
Balkans. La declaration de 
M. Isvolsky est totit particuliere- 
ment interessante, vu surtout 
qu'il en ' a lui-meme affirme 
l'exactitude. II ressort de cette 
declaration que les informations 
que je vous ai donnees hier au 
sujet du but poursuivi par la 
Russie en proposant la reunion 
oVune conference etaient bien 
fondees. La Russie veut dechirer 
le traite de Berlin qui a ete dirige 
contre elle et elle compte etre 
appuyee en cela par la France et 
l'Angleterre, mais on se demande 
si l'Allemagne laissera detruire 
impunement l'ceuvre du prince 
de Bismarck. 

II resulte des entretiens que 
j'ai eus avec divers ambassadeurs 
que Ton considere la question 
actuelle comme tres delicate, 
tres compliquee et tres difficile 
a resoudre. 

II ne sera pas aise oVarriver a 
reunir une conference et on ignore 
quel sera l'accueil qui sera 
reserve a l'invitation lancee par 
la Russie. Cet accueil dependra 



Paris, October 8th, 1908. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

In continuation of the informa- 
tion which I had the honour to 
convey to you in my report of 
yesterday's date, I hasten to 
send you herewith various 
articles from to-day's Temps 
which relate to the incidents in 
the Balkans. The statement of 
M. Isvolsky is all the more inter- 
esting, inasmuch as he himself 
has confirmed its correctness. 
From this declaration it appears 
that the information which I 
gave you yesterday regarding 
the purpose which Russia has 
in view in proposing that a 
conference be summoned was 
well-founded. Russia wishes to 
tear up the Treaty of Berlin, 
which is directed against her, 
and in this counts on the support 
of France and England. But 
the question is asked whether 
Germany will allow the work of 
Prince Bismarck to be destroyed 
unptmished. 

From the conversations which 
I have had with various Am- 
bassadors it appears that the 
present question is regarded as 
very delicate, very complicated, 
and very difficult to solve. 

It will not be easy to bring a 
conference together, and it is not 
yet known what reception will 
be accorded to Russia's invita- 
tion. This reception will depend 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 27 

du programme et l'accord sur on the programme, and agree- 

celui-ci sera fort laborieux a ment on this point will be very 

cause du fait accompli en presence difficult, in view of the fact 

duquel on se trouve et des involved in the existence of a 

" compensations " que Ton re- fait accompli and in view of the 

clame de toute part. Toutefois compensations which will be 

on semble esperer que toutes les demanded on all sides. Never - 

puissances accepteront la con- theless hope appears to be 

ference, car, me disait-on, le entertained that all the Powers 

desir du maintien de la paix est will accept the conference ; for, 

si unanime et si profond qiCil as was said to me, the desire to 

dominera tout. maintain peace is so unanimous 

and so strong that it will overcome 

all obstacles. 

Leghait. Leghait. 



From this report the fact is especially to be emphasised 
that Russia, like all the other Powers, entertained a firm 
desire to maintain the peace of Europe, and to allow no 
world-war to arise out of the Austrian act of violence 
involved in the annexation of Bosnia. The Russian pro- 
posal for a conference of the Powers, which, as is known, 
failed on that occasion also through the opposition 
of Germany and Austria, proves that Russia and the 
Powers that were friendly to her, England and France, 
sought in 1908 to maintain peace with exactly the same 
zeal and indeed by the same means as in 1914. The 
disturber of the peace was then, as to-day, exclu- 
sively Austria-Hungary supported and instigated by 
Germany, her powerful friend and ally, What the 
annexation of Bosnia and of Herzegovina was at 
that time, the Ultimatum and the declaration of war 
against Serbia were in 1914. As Austria then flatly 
refused any European mediation — whether by a con- 
ference or in any other form — and simply insisted on a 
recognition of the annexation by the other Great Powers 
and by Serbia, so also in 1914 the Viennese Government — 
down to July 31st, the day of the issue of the German 
Ultimata — bluntly declined any mediation of the Great 
Powers, no matter in what form. They declined any negotia- 
tion on the substance of what was contained in their 
ultimatum, any conference of Powers or decision by arbitra- 
tion, and insisted on regulating their dispute with Serbia 



28 THE CRIME 

according to their own standard, without regard to the 
European consequences. The parallel between 1908 and 
1914 is striking and obvious. The attitude of the Central 
Powers on the one hand, and of the Entente Powers on 
the other, is absolutely identical in the two cases. The 
difference is merely this, that in 1908 the act of violence 
succeeded and all the other Powers yielded, whereas in 
1914 the measure of Austrian arrogance was full to over-, 
flowing, and on this occasion Germany, Austria's instigator 
and inspirer, preferred the outbreak of war to the main- 
tenance of peace. 

Views similar to these on the policy then pursued by 
the Central Powers may have been expressed by the 
Belgian Ambassadors in their reports, and this would 
explain the astonishing interval in the German collection. 

BJC SfS , SfC »fS 3fC 3|C 

Later on, when it was hastening to its end, the Bosnian 
crisis is again mentioned in certain reports. Greindl's 
report of February 17th, 1909 (No. 55) — to which I have 
already referred elsewhere in discussing Schiemann and 
in establishing the community of ideas between the 
Prussian publicist and the Belgian diplomatist — is con- 
cerned with the visit of the King and Queen of England 
to Berlin and mentions the discussions between Hardinge, 
the English Under-Secretary of State, and the German 
statesmen regarding the Bosnian crisis : 

No. 55. 

Berlin, le 17 fevrier 1909. Berlin, February 17th, 1909. 

. . . Les conversations cle Sir . . . Sir C. Hardinge's conversa- 

C. Hardinge avec le chancelier et tions with the Chancellor and 

avec le secretaire d'Etat des the Foreign Secretary did not 

Affaires etrangeres ne sont pas go beyond generalities. It was 

sorties des generalites. On a recognised on both sides that 

reconnu de part et d' autre the greatest efforts must be made to 

qu'il fallait faire les plus grands prevent war arising out of the 

efforts pour empecher que la Balkan question. A declaration 

question des Balkans n'aboutisse in this sense was, however, so 

a la guerre. Une declaration to speak, obligatory. It has 

dans ce sens etait pour ainsi dire therefore no great importance, 

obligatoire. Elle n'a done pas More significant is the fact 

grande portee. Ce qui est plus that there was agreement as to 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 29 



significatif est qu'on s'est trouve 
d^ accord sur la necessite de reunir 
une conference, non pour reviser 
mais pour enregistrer le re- 
sultat des negociations pendantes 
entre les puissances les plus 
directement interessees. Sir C. 
Hardinge s'est done place au 
point de vue autrichien. 

II a ete convenu que de part 
et d'autre on se declarerait 
satisfait du resultat de l'entrevue 
de Berlin. C'est dans ce 
sens qu'ont 6te redigees les com- 
munications adressees aux 
journaux. 

Jusqu'a un certain point, du 
cote allemand, cette satisfaction 
est reelle. On a su gre a Sir C. 
Hardinge de n' avoir fait aucune 
allusion aux questions brulantes. 
II n'a parle ni de la limitation des 
armements maritimes ni du 
chemin de fer de Bagdad .... 



the necessity of calling a con- 
ference, not to review, but to 
register the result of the negotia- 
tions taking place between the 
Powers most directly interested. 
Sir C. Hardinge thus assumed 
the Austrian standpoint. 



It was agreed on both sides 
to declare their satisfaction with 
the result of the meeting at 
Berlin. It was hi this sense 
also that the communications 
addressed to the Press were 
drawn up. 

Up to a certain point this 
satisfaction on the German side 
is sincere. Gratitude was felt 
towards Sir C. Hardinge for 
making no allusion to the burn- 
ing questions. He spoke neither 
of the limitation of naval arma- 
ments nor of the Baghdad 
Railway .... 



These sentences written by Greindl prove that the 
English Government at that time were as much concerned 
for the maintenance of peace as the Russian Government, 
that they even assumed the Austrian standpoint, and that 
they regarded the same method of arriving at an under- 
standing as was proposed in 1914, namely, a Conference of 
Powers, as the most appropriate solution of the existing crisis. 
Greindl's report serves completely to destroy the legend 
which has recently been put forward by the German 
Government to the effect that England then assumed an 
attitude which was directed not to the maintenance 
but to the disturbance of the peace of Europe. I have 
elsewhere already referred to the untenability of this most 
recent attempt at incrimination, which is quite in the 
manner of Schiemann. If the Belgian ambassadorial 
reports, regarded as evidence, possess that cogency which 
the German Government would so gladly attribute to 
them, then they prove in favour of England and her 
friends in the Entente that these Powers did everything 



30 



THE CRIME 



to keep the peace in the winter of 1908-9, and that thus 
the Reval conspiracy of June, 1908, is a German lie and an 
invention. 

In a report from Greindl, dated April 1st, 1909, I find a 
retrospect of the annexation crisis, which had just been 
definitively overcome by the pliability of Russia and 
Serbia — a retrospect which contains the following sentences : 



No. 58. 



Berlin, le l er avril 1909. 

. . . Quoiqiie 1' imbroglio des 
Balkans, plus que mediocrement 
traite par la diplomatie euro- 
peenne, ait ete fecond en revire- 
ments et en surprises, on 
s'accorde neanmoins a le consi- 
derer comme virtuellement ter- 
mini par la demarche que la 
Serbie a faite hier a Vienne. 

Le gouvernement serbe recon- 
nait que 1' annexion de la Bosnie 
ne porte pas atteinte a ses droits; 
il promet de renoncer a son 
attitude de protestation ; de 
mettre son armee sur pied de 
paix, de licencier ses volontaires 
et ses bandes et de s'efforcer de 
vivre en bonne harmonie avec 
l'Autriche-Hongrie. A Vienne 
on s'etait engage a se declarer 
satisfait de cette communica- 
tion dont les termes avaient ete 
arretes d'accord avec le Baron 
d'Aehrenthal. S'il n'y avait pas 
eu d'arriere-pensee, on eut du 
l'etre aussi partout puisque c'est 
sur les conseils pressants et 
unanimes des puissances que le 
gouvernement serbe s'est resigne 
a la demarche qu'il vient d'ac- 
complir. 

Le Temps, de Paris, dont les 
relations avec le Quai d'Orsay 
sont notoires, s'exprime cepen- 
dant en termes dont on pourrait 



Berlin, April 1st, 1909. 

. . . Even if the treatment of 
the Balkan imbroglio by Euro- 
pean diplomacy was more than 
mediocre, and rich in new crises 
and surprises, it is nevertheless 
generally regarded as virtually 
ended by the demarche which 
Serbia made yesterday in Vienna. 

The Serbian Government 
recognise that the annexation 
of Bosnia does not prejudice 
her rights : they promise to give 
up their attitude of protestation, 
to place the army on a peace 
footing, to disband the volun- 
teers and troops, and to en- 
deavour to live on good rela- 
tions with Austria-Hungary. In 
Vienna they have pledged them- 
selves to declare their satisfac- 
tion with this statement, the 
text of which was determined 
in agreement with Baron Aehren- 
thal. If there were no arriere- 
pensee, there might also be 
general satisfaction with it, since 
it is on the urgent and unanimous 
counsels of the Powers that the 
Serbian Government has resigned 
itself to the demarche which it has 
just taken. 

The Paris Temps, whose re- 
lations to the Quai d'Orsay are 
generally known, expresses itself, 
however, in a way which enables 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 31 



induire qu'il ressent line certaine 
deception de ce qu'a Saint-Peters- 
bourg et a Belgrade on ait trop 
docilement suivi les conseils 
francais. Le Times marque de 
meme sa mauvaise humeur ; 
comrne toujours lorsque tout ne 
marche pas au gre des politiques 
francais, anglais ou russes, c'est 
l'Allemagne qui est le bouc 
emissaire. 

II n'est pas douteux, d mon avis, 
que la Russie et la France ne 
fussent animees d'un desir sincere 
de prevenir une conflagration 
europeenne. La Russie n'a rien 
de ce qu'il faut pour faire la 
guerre et aussi longtemps que 
leurs amis anglais ne seront pas 
en mesure de leur venir en aide 
sur le continent, les Francais 
sont loin d' avoir la certitude du 
succes. 

Mais tout en souhaitant la 
paix, on eut voulu qu'elle fut 
garantie autrement qu'elle ne 
l'a ete. Le pro jet de conference 
elabore par M. Isvolshi et Sir 
Edward Grey, les pourparlers au 
sujet d'une demarche collective 
a faire a Vienne et tous les 
echanges d'idees qui ont eu lieu 
entre Londres, Paris et Saint- 
Petersbourg tendaient invari- 
ablement a obliger l'Autriche- 
Hongrie a une transaction qui 
aurait fort ressemble a une 
humiliation atteignant l'Alle- 
magne tout aussi directement et 
aussi sensiblement que l'Au- 
triche-Hongrie et qui aurait 
porte une tres rude atteinte a la 
confiance qu' inspire a Vienne 
F alliance allemande. Les man- 
oeuvres ont ete dejouees par 
Vattitude tres nette et tres resolue 
qu'a prise VAllemagne et dont elle 
n'a jamais devie malgre les 
sollicitations dont elle a ete 
harcelee. Cest VAllemagne 



the reader to infer the existence 
of a certain disappointment that 
in Petrograd and Belgrade the 
French counsels have been too 
readily followed. As always 
happens when things do not go 
entirely according to the wish of 
the French, English, and Russian 
politicians, the Times also shows 
its ill -temper : Germany is the 
scapegoat. 

It is, in my opinion, beyond 
doubt that Russia and France 
were inspired by the sincere 
desire to avoid a general European 
conflagration. Russia has none 
of the things necessary for 
waging war, and so long as their 
English friends are not in a 
position to come to their assist- 
ance on the Continent, the 
French are far from feeling sure 
of success. 

But however much they may 
have wished peace, they would 
rather have seen it guaranteed 
otherwise. The Conference- 

proposal elaborated by M. Isvolsky 
and Sir Edward Grey, the negotia- 
tions for a collective demarche 
in Vienna, and the whole ex- 
change of opinion between Lon- 
don, Paris, and Petrograd were 
also directed to force Austria- 
Hungary to accept a settlement 
which would have been very 
similar to a humiliation. Ger- 
many would have felt this as 
immediately and as keenly as 
Austria-Hungary, and it would 
have given a rude shock to the 
confidence which Vienna feels 
in the alliance with Germany. 
These manoeuvres were frus- 
trated by the very unambiguous 
and decided attitude of Germany, 
an attitude which she never 
abandoned, despite all the pres- 
sure to which she was subjected. 
Germany alone imposed peace. 



32 THE CRIME 

seule qui a impose la paix Le The Powers in the new group 

nouveau groupement des puis- organised by the King of Eng- 

sances organise par le Roi land have measured their 

d'Angleterre, a fait l'epreuve de strength against the Union of 

ses forces contre 1' union de Central European Powers, and 

l'Europe centrale, et s'est trouv6 have shown themselves unable 

incapable de l'entamer. C'est to loosen it. Hence the feeling 

de Id que vient le depit. of dissatisfaction. 

Gbeindl. Gbeindl. 

We see that even this malicious reporter, whose custom 
it is to attach to every praiseworthy action of the Entente 
Government the spiteful suspicion that they only did the 
good because they were unable to achieve the evil — even 
Baron Greindl cannot avoid confirming the sincere love 
of peace displayed by Russia and France on the occasion 
of the solution of the Bosnian crisis, and making mention 
of the proposal for a conference elaborated in common 
by Isvolsky and Grey, etc. But, of course, he also cannot 
omit the inevitable further observation, with which we 
have already become acquainted in Schiemann as the 
regular accompaniment of all good news, that in England 
and France they were very much put out, disappointed, 
and ill-tempered as a result of the course the crisis had taken, 
and especially because of the pliability of Russia. The 
whole of this report, No. 58, is the purest and most unadul- 
terated Schiemann ; all the prescriptions of this professional 
and habitual poison-mixer are faithfully followed in this 
report, all his tricks of argumentation are faithfully 
imitated. We already find dished up in Greindl's report 
of 1909 all the phrases which are still constantly 
advanced in the present-day investigation of guilt, that 
the acceptance of a Conference would be a " humiliation " 
for Austria, a diminution of the prestige of the Central 
Powers, etc. This whole report is a masterpiece of bad 
logic and bad faith : Russia, England, and France desired 
the maintenance of peace, and for this purpose proposed 
a Conference. This Conference was regarded by the 
Central Powers as an intentional humiliation, and for this 
reason was refused. Instead of this, Germany struck on 
the table with her mailed fist, revealed her shining armour, 
and demanded from the other Powers the unconditional 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 33 

recognition of the Austrian act of violence. To avoid 
drenching Europe in blood these Powers gave way, and 
compelled Serbia also to recognise the situation. Germany 
has thus the immortal merit of having on this occasion 
preserved peace. This is the logic of Greindl and Schie- 
mann. Thus when the footpad, with his revolver loaded, 
calls to the traveller " Your purse or your life," and 
the terrified passenger delivers up his purse in order 
to save his life, the highwayman also has the indisputable 
merit that matters have stopped short of bloodshed. 

The Anglo-German Negotiations 
foe, an Understanding. 

The most astonishing and longest interval in the reports 
is to be found between No. 61 of August 3rd, 1909, and 
No. 62 of November 7th, 1910, that is to say, an interval 
of more than fifteen months. The Paris report of August 
3rd, 1909, relates to the meeting of President Fallieres 
and the Tsar in the roadstead at Cherbourg ; Greindl' s 
report from Berlin, dated November 7th, 1910, sum- 
marises the results of the interview which had just taken 
place at Potsdam between the Emperor William and 
the Tsar Nicholas. What may be the possible explanation 
of this extremely long break in the reports ? I can, of 
course, in this connection merely put forward hypotheses, 
but, on a survey of the events which took place in the 
interval, I believe that the probable, or at any rate a possible, 
reason for the suppression of the Belgian reports of that 
period is to be found in the Anglo-German negotiations 
for an understanding which were pending from 1909 to 
1912. These negotiations for an understanding are treated 
in the Belgian reports, so far as they are printed in the 
collection, in an even more niggardly manner than the 
Hague Conference. They are only mentioned in a few 
passages in an extremely superficial manner, although, 
as we now know, these negotiations constituted for a 
number of years — from the end of the second Hague Con- 
ference down to the failure of Haldane's mission — the 
crucial point in Anglo-German relations, and. as can like- 
wise be shown, the fate of Europe depended on their 

VOL. IV d 



34 THE CRIME 

issue. Had success crowned the English efforts to arrive 
at an agreement with Germany on the question of naval 
armaments — on the basis of the political agreement 
offered by England — we should to-day have had no 
European war. As I have proved elsewhere, the fact 
that these negotiations failed is due solely to Germany. 
This idea may have received expression in the reports of 
the Belgian Ambassadors in the years 1909 and 1910, 
and for this reason these reports, so far as it was possible, 
may have been suppressed. 

In a note which, it is true, precedes the long interval, 
that of March 31st, 1909 (No. 57), Greindl mentions the 
attitude of the English and the German Governments 
towards the question of a restriction of naval armaments. 
The Belgian diplomatist naturally assumes the negative 
standpoint of Prince Bulow, who is known to have declared 
that German naval armaments were a private affair of 
Germany, depending exclusively on the needs of coastal 
defence and the protection of trade. In a significant 
speech in the English House of Commons, on the other 
hand, Sir Edward Grey emphasised that a restriction of 
naval armaments by treaty was urgently to be desired 
for both parties and in the interests of both, and he indicated 
on this occasion that England would possibly be prepared 
for a neutralisation of private property at sea, if an agree- 
ment were brought about between Germany and England 
on the subject of naval armaments. (See, regarding all 
these incidents, J'accuse, pp. 90 to 106, and The Crime, 
Vol. II., pp. 235 to 274.) The incredible narrowness of 
vision of the Belgian diplomatist and his restriction within 
the narrow horizon of the crassest Pan-Germanism are 
revealed in the concluding observation contained in his 
next printed report of March 31st, 1909. 

No. 57. 

Berlin, le 31 mars 1909. Berlin, March 31st, 1909. 

Monsieur le Ministre, Monsieur le Ministre, 

Lorsque j'ai eu l'honneur de When I had the honour to 

vous adresser mon rapport d'hier, report to you yesterday that 
vous disant que le Prince de Prince Billow in his speech on 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 35 



Biilow n'avait pas parle, dans 
son discours sur la politique 
exterieure, de la limitation des 
armements maritimes, je n'etais 
pas encore en possession du 
compte rendu du deuxieme dis- 
cours prononce par le chancelier 
dans la seance de la veille. 

Dans ce deuxieme discours, le 
Prince de Biilow, oblige par les 
questions qui lui avaient ete 
adressees au cours du debat, 
de s'expliquer sur la proposition 
ou si Ton veut sur la suggestion 
anglaise, Fa fait aussi brievement 
que possible. II s'est borne a 
reproduire la declaration faite 
par M. le Baron de Schcen a la 
commission du budget, dont je 
vous ai envoye le texte par mon 
rapport du 25 mars, en y 
ajoutant que le programme du 
developpement de la flotte alle- 
mande a ete uniquement inspire 
par les besoins de defense des 
cotes et de protection du com- 
merce ; qu'il ne contient rien de 
secret et que le gouvernement 
imperial n'a nul dessein d'en 
accelerer l'execution. En 1912, 
l'Allemagne aura treize grands 
navires du nouveau type dont 
trois croiseurs, tous les bruits 
contraires sont inexacts. 



Le Reichstag n'a pas demande 
d'informations plus explicites. 
II a bien accueilli ce passage du 
discours de Biilow comme les 
autres. Quoique le chancelier 
compte beaucoup d'adversaires 
et meme beaucoup d'ennemis, la 
politique exterieure de l'Alle- 
magne a, sauf bien entendu les 
socialistes, ete approuvee par tous 
les partis, y compris le Centre. 
Le Baron de Hertling, qui a pris 
la parole au nom de ce dernier 



foreign politics did not touch 
on the question of the limitation 
of naval armaments, I was not 
yet in possession of the report 
of the second speech which the 
Chancellor delivered in the sitting 
of the preceding day. 

In this second speech, in 
consequence of questions ad- 
dressed to him in the course of 
the debate, Prince Biilow was 
obliged to explain his position 
with reference to the English 
proposal, or, if it is preferred, the 
English suggestion. He did 
this as briefly as possible. He 
restricted himself to repeating 
the statement which Freiherr 
von Schcen had given in the 
Budget Commission, the text 
of which I sent you with my 
report of March 25th. He 
merely added that the pro- 
gramme for the development of 
the German fleet was solely in- 
spired by the needs of the defence 
of the coast and of the protection 
of commerce, that it contained 
nothing secret, and that the 
Imperial Government in no way 
intended to accelerate its execu- 
tion. In 1912 Germany will 
possess 13 large vessels of the new 
type including three cruisers ; 
all rumours to the contrarj^ are 
false. 

The Reichstag did not ask 
for more explicit information. 
This passage in Biilow's speech, 
like the rest, was well received. 
Although the Chancellor has 
many opponents, and even 
numerous enemies, nevertheless 
all parties, with the obvious 
exception of the Social Demo- 
crats, but including the Centre, ap- 
proved Germany's foreign policy. 
Freiherr von Hertling, who spoke 
in the name of the latter group, 

D 2 



36 



THE CRIME 



groupe, y a applaudi tout en 
declarant que l'appui donne a la 
politique exterieure de 1' Empire 
n'implique pas un vote de 
confiance, qu'au surplus le chan- 
celier ne desire sans doute pas. 

Par une curieuse coincidence, 
au moment meme ou au Reichs- 
tag Ton s'efforcait de parler le 
moins possible de la question de 
la limitation des armements 
maritimes, le parlement anglais 
la soumettait a un debat ap- 
profondi. L'opposition l'avait 
provoque par une proposition de 
blame et le gouvernement britan- 
nique s'est prete a la discussion 
par une reponse des plus ex- 
plicites. Sir Edward Grey, tout 
en declarant qu'il n'y avait pas 
lieu de faire un grief a l'Alle- 
magne de n'etre pas entree dans 
les vues de 1' Angleterre, a exprime 
les plus vifs regrets de ce que la 
proposition anglaise ait ete re- 
poussee. II a dit qu'il ajoute une 
foi entiere aux communications 
que lui a faites le gouvernement 
allemand au sujet du programme 
de la flotte de guerre ; mais il a 
ajotite que ces communications ne 
constituent pas un engagement et 
que de plus il s'y trouve des 
lacunes qui autorisent ■ l'Angle- 
terre a se croire menacee dans 
ses inter ets vitaux. 

La presse anglaise, qui n'est 
pas tenue aux memes menage - 
ments que le gouvernement bri- 
tannique, temoigne plus vivement 
encore sa mauvaise humeur. 

L'etat d' esprit qui regne en 
Angleterre rappelle celui ou se 
trouvait la France de 1888 a 
1870. A cette epoque les Fran- 
cais se croyaient le droit d'em- 
peeher 1'Allemagne de recon- 
stituer son unite, parce qu'ils 
y voyaient une menace pour la 



assented, but in doing so he 
stated that the support given 
to the foreign policy of the 
Empire did not imply a vote of 
confidence, which no doubt the 
Chancellor did not in any case 
desire. 

By a curious coincidence, at 
the very moment when pains 
were being taken in the Reichs- 
tag to touch as little as possible 
on the question of the restric- 
tion of naval armaments, the 
English Parliament was subject- 
ing the question to a thorough 
debate. The Opposition had 
raised it by moving a vote of 
censure, and the English Govern- 
ment took up the discussion of 
the question and gave a detailed 
reply. Sir Edvjard Grey stated 
that there was no occasion to 
reproach Germany for not mak- 
ing the English views her own ; 
he expressed, however, his lively 
regret that the English proposal 
had been declined. He said that 
he entirely believed the com- 
munications made to him by 
the German Government re- 
garding the naval programme, 
but added that these communica- 
tions involved no obligation. More- 
over they contained lacunae 
which justified England in feeling 
menaced in her vital interests. 

The English Press, which need 
not exercise the same reticence 
as the British Government, ex- 
presses its bad temper even more 
plainly. 

The state of mind in England 
recalls that in France during 
the years from 1866 to 1870. 
Then the French regarded them- 
selves as justified in preventing 
Germany from re-establishing 
her unity, because she saw in 
this a menace to the domination 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 37 

preponderance continentale dont which France had hitherto exer- 

la France avait joui j usque-la. cised on the Continent. In the 

De meme aujourd'hui a Londres same way the refusal to undertake 

on considere comme iin mauvais an obligation by treaty, the refusal 

procede et une menace pour la to remain dependent on the grace 

paix, le refus de s'engager par of Englatvi, is regarded to-day 

traite a rester d la merci ds in London as an unfriendly act 

V Angleterre. and as a menace to peace. 

Greindl. Greindl. 

The proposal for a mutual restriction of armaments 
by treaty is described by this diplomatist as the demand 
" to remain dependent on the grace of England." Ke 
places this English proposal on the same footing as the 
attitude of Napoleon III towards German efforts to achieve 
unity in the years from 1866 to 1870. This " statesman " 
has not even yet awakened to the idea which every child 
understands, that the adherence by treaty to a definite 
present relationship of strength injures neither of the 
two sides, and that the continued competition in arma- 
ments brings advantage to neither party. A treaty based 
on reciprocal obligations, preserving both sides from 
economic ruin, he calls " dependence on the grace of 
England." This is a fine Crown Witness for Bethmann's 
demonstration ! A conference is a humiliation, an agree- 
ment as to armaments is slavery ! Such are the intellects 
to whom the Foreign Office in Berlin appeals as " objective" 
and " keen-sighted" critics of European politics. 

It may well be assumed that the opinions of the Belgian 
Ambassadors in London and Paris were somewhat different 
from those of the Prussian-coloured Greindl regarding these 
Anglo-German negotiations, in the course of which they 
were able to confirm at close quarters the extremely sincere 
will for an understanding which existed on the other side. 
This may be one of the reasons why the German collection 
deals so parsimoniously with the reports from this period. 

In addition, there were other events taking place in 
this interval calculated to promote the peace of Europe, 
which presumably were discussed in the Belgian reports. 
In March, 1910, the Russian Government had informed 
the Powers that the negotiations conducted between the 
Petrograd and the Viennese Cabinets regarding the existing 



38 THE CRIME 

Balkan questions had led to a complete agreement between 
the two Governments, and that entirely normal relations 
were now established between them. On May 6th, 1910, 
King Edward died. The accession of his successor, 
King George, was united everywhere with the most grati- 
fying hopes for a detente in the European situation, the 
temporary gravity of which was frequently ascribed to 
the antagonism between the Royal uncle and the Imperial 
nephew. These and many other incidents had transformed 
the European picture in a way which was full of the promise 
of peace ; they had dispersed the factitious mist which 
the Pan-German inciters to war had sought to produce 
from the most innocent of Royal and Presidential visits, 
from every meeting of the statesmen of the Entente 
Powers, from every naval or army manoeuvre. The 
atmosphere of Europe appeared to be cleansed from many 
murky vapours ; the alleged conspiracy of Reval appeared 
to be refuted by the actual events. However, this very 
improvement in the European situation accorded ill with 
the picture of the continuous " isolation and menace to 
Germany " which the publishers of the collection of 
documents had undertaken to draw ; for this very reason 
we find just at this place the astonishing break in the 
reports of more than fifteen months. 



No. 62 in the collection of documents, Greindl's report 
of November 7th, 1910, is the first document which we 
meet after the long interval. It discusses the Potsdam 
interview, its origin, its objects and its results, and is 
in many directions sufficiently interesting to be reproduced 
here textually : 

No. 62. 
Berlin, le 7 novembre 1910. Berlin, November 7th, 1910. 

Monsieur le Ministre, Monsieur le Ministre, 

Vous aurez remarque les arti- You will have observed the 

cles inspire? par lesquels la inspired article by which the 

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung N orddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 

a fait connaitre au public que has informed the public that the 

la recente visite rendue par most recent visit which the Emperor 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 39 



V Empereur de Bussie a l'Empe- 
reur d'Allemagne a Potsdam, 
est plus qu'une simple demarche 
de courtoisie. La Rossija, organe 
du ministere des Affaires etran- 
geres russe, ecrivait en meme 
temps que l'entrevue des deux 
souverains avait une haute portee 
politique. Le Fremdenblatt de 
Vienne s'exprimait dans le meme 
sens. Les deux premiers de 
ces journaux ofncieux disaient 
qu'il ne s'agissait nullement 
d'introduire dans le systeme 
politique de l'Europe des innova- 
tions qui ne sont desirees ni en 
Allemagne ni en Russie. Tous 
les trois etaient d'accord pour 
exprimer l'espoir que l'echange 
de vues entre les souverains et 
leurs ministres aiderait a dissiper 
les malentendus qui surgissent 
forcement entre les Etats limi- 
throphes qui ont des interets 
paralleles, mais conciliables et 
dont les rivalites sont sans 
influence sur la politiqiie gene- 
rale. Plus encore que par les 
commentaires ofncieux, le carac- 
tere de la visite du Czar a ete 
marque par le fait que Sa 
Majeste avait appele en Hesse 
son nouveau ministre des Affaires 
etrange.res M. Sasonow et s'etait 
fait accompaqner par lui pendant 
son court sejour a, Potsdam. M. 
Sasonow a ete recu par l'Empe- 
reur et par le chancelier, ainsi 
que par M. de Kiderlen-Wsechter. 
Les sujets de conversation n'ont 
pas du manquer. Ce qui se 
passe en Perse et en extreme 
Orient est de nature a eveiller 
en Allemagne la crainte que les 
evenements dont le cote politique 
pourrait laisser l'Empire in- 
different, n'aient pour conse- 
quence de fermer ces contrees 
au commerce allemand. En 
Russie le pro jet de chemin de 



of Russia paid to the German 
Emperor in Potsdam is something 
more than a demarche prompted 
by motives of courtesy. The 
Rossija, the organ of the Russian 
Foreign Office, wrote at the 
same time that the meeting of 
the two Sovereigns had great 
political siqnificance. The Wiener 
Fremdenblatt expressed itself in 
the same sense. The two former 
semi-official papers stated that 
it was in no way proposed 
to introduce into the political 
system of Europe innovations 
which were desired neither in 
Germany nor in Russia. All 
three were in agreement in 
giving expression to the hope 
that the exchange of views 
between the sovereigns and their 
Ministers would assist in dis- 
persing misunderstandinqs which 
necessarily arise between neigh- 
bouring States whose interests 
run parallel, thouqh capable of 
reconciliation, and whose rival- 
ries are without influence on 
general politics. Even more 
than by the semi-official com- 
mentaries, the character of the 
Tsar's visit is marked by the 
fact that His Majesty had sum- 
moned his new Foreign Minister, 
M. Sazonof, to Hesse and has 
been accompanied by him during 
his short visit to Potsdam. M. 
Sazonof has been received by 
the Emperor and by the Chan- 
cellor, as well as by Herr von 
Kiderlen-Waechter. There can 
have been no absence of topics 
of conversation. What is hap- 
pening in Persia and the Far 
East is calcvdated to awake 
anxiety in Germany that these 
events, the political aspect of 
which might be indifferent to 
the Empire, might have as a 
result that these countries would 



4 o 



THE CRIME 



fer allemand en Mesopotamia a 
tou jours ete vu de mauvais 
oeil. Quoique l'Allemagne ait 
pour principe de ne pas se meler 
des questions politiques de la 
p6ninsule des Balkans, il est 
impossible qu'on ne se preoceupe 
pas a Berlin comme a St-Peters- 
bourg de la turbulence de la 
Grece, de l'impossibilite ou sont 
les puissances protectrices de 
trouver la solution de la question 
cretoise, des troubles de la Mace- 
doine et des ambitions du czar 
des Bulgares ; mais tous ces 
problemes sont bien compliques 
et il n'est pas a penser qu'on soit 
parvenu a les resoudre dans le 
court espace de deux journees 
dont la plus grande partie a 
ete absorbee par des ceremonies 
officielles et des banquets. C'est 
a peine le necessaire pour 
echanger des assurances de bonne 
volonte forcement concues en 
termes vagues et d'une portee 
pratique douteuse. Ce qui est 
plus important que les conversa- 
tions entre les hommes d'Etat, 
c'est que la visite a eu lieu. 



Pendant les* trois premiers 
quarts du XIX e siecle l'union de 
la Russie et de la Prusse etait 
un facteur constant et assure 
de la politique europeenne. Elle 
6tait basee non seulement sur les 
interets communs de deux 
nations, mais aussi sur l'amitie 
etroite des deux families reg- 
nantes cimentee par les liens 
de parente. II en etait surtout 
ainsi du temps de l'empereur 
Nicolas I er . La premiere atteinte 
a ete portee a ces relations par le 
congres de Berlin ou le prince 
de Bismarck a essaye de rap- 
procher la Russie et FAngleterre 



be closed to German trade. In 
Russia the German railway pro- 
ject in Mesopotamia has always 
been viewed with envious eyes. 
Although Germany pursues the 
principle of not intervening in 
political questions in the Balkan 
peninsula, it is impossible that 
in Berlin, as in Petrograd, no 
anxiety should be felt regarding 
the turbulence of Greece, the 
fact that it has been impossible 
for the protecting Powers to find 
a solution for the Cretan ques- 
tion, the unrest in Macedonia, 
and the ambition of the Tsar of 
Bulgaria. But all these pro- 
blems are very complicated, and 
it cannot be assumed that it has 
been found possible to solve them 
in the short space of two days, 
the greater part of which was 
taken up with official ceremonies 
and banquets. That is scarcely 
sufficient for the exchange of 
mutual assurances of good will, 
which were naturally couched in 
vague expressions and of which 
the practical significance is 
doubtful. More important than 
the conversations between the 
statesmen is the fact that the 
visit has taken place. 

During the first three quarters 
of the nineteenth century the 
union of Russia and Prussia 
was a constant and certain 
factor in European politics. It 
rested not merely on the common 
interests of the two nations, but 
also on the close friendship 
between the two ruling houses 
which was cemented by the 
bonds of kinship. This was 
particularly the case at the 
time of the Tsar Nicholas I. 
These relations were for the 
first time impaired by the Con- 
gress of Berlin, where Prince 
Bismarck endeavoured to bring 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 41 



et oil il a eu le sort generalement 
reserve aux conciliateurs, c'est- 
a-dire qu'il a ete accuse par 
chacun des deux adversaires de 
partialite en faveur de Y autre. 
Le peuple russe, se croyant 
frustre par la faute de l'Alle- 
magne du fruit de ses victoires, 
a concu pour sa voisine de 
l'ouest une haine encore avivee 
par l'envie qu'a suscitee le 
rapide developpement de la puis- 
sance allemande. Dans 1'union 
entre la Russie et la Prusse 
celle-ci jouait un role quelque 
peu subordonne. On a 6te 
froisse a St-Petersbourg et sur- 
tout a Moscou, lorsque Berlin 
est devenu le centre principal de 
la politique europeenne. Les 
etapes du refroidissement pro- 
gressif des relations entre les 
deux pays out ete marquees par 
l'aliiance de la Russie avec la 
France, par l'etablissement de la 
triple entente et en dernier lieu 
par V intervention de VAllemagne 
dans V affaire de V annexion de la 
Bosnie. On se defend ici d'avoir 
exerce une pression sur la Russie. 
C'est jouer sur les mots. Sans la 
declaration du prince de Billow 
au sujet de la solidarite de 
VAllemagne et de V Atttriche- 
Hongrie et sans V avertissement 
donne par le comte de Pourtales 
a St-Petersbourg, la Russie 
rfaurait pas brusquement mis 
fin a I 'agitation qu'elle entretenait 
dans les petits Etats slaves et 
surtout a Belgrade contre VAu- 
iriche-Hongrie. La solution de 
la question de la Bosnie a ete 
a la fois pour la Russie une 
humiliation et une deception. 
Elle a dH laisser entam,er son 
prestige en retirant, sur une 
injonction de l'etranger, la pro- 
tection qu'elle accordait aux 
convoitises serbes. L'experience 



Russia and England together, 
and where he suffered the usual 
fate of all mediators, that is to 
say, he was accused by both 
the opposing parties of partiality 
for the other side. The Russian 
people, which believed itself 
robbed of the fruits of its victory 
by Germany, conceived a hatred 
against its Western neighbour 
which was further increased by 
the envy evoked by the rapid 
development of German power. 
In the union between Russia 
and Prussia, the latter played a 
somewhat subordinate part. An- 
noyance was felt at Petrograd, 
and above all at Moscow, when 
Berlin became the chief centre 
of European politics. The stages 
in the increasing coolness in the 
relations between the two coun- 
tries are represented by the 
alliance of Russia with France, 
the establishment of the Triple 
Entente, and finally the interven- 
tion of Germany in the question 
of the annexation of Bosnia. It 
is denied here that any pressure 
was exercised. This is merely 
playing with words. Without 
Prince Billow's statement regard- 
ing the solidarity of Germany and 
Austria -Hungary and without the 
warning given by Count Pourtales 
in Petrograd, Russia would not 
suddenly have abandoned her 
agitation against Austria-Hungary 
in the small Slav States, especially 
in Belgrade. The solution of the 
Bosnian question was a humilia- 
tion as well as a disappointment 
to Russia. Her prestige was 
bound to suffer, in abandoning 
on the summons of a foreign 
country the protection which 
she had extended to Serbian 
covetousness. The experience 
showed her the ineffectiveness of 
the coalition formed by the late 



4a 



THE CRIME 



lui a montre l'inefficacite de la 
coalition formee par le feu roi 
d'Angleterre, la premiere fois 
qu'elle a ete raise a l'epreuve. 

Si l'antipathie des peuples 
russe et allemand n'a pas eu 
de consequences plus graves, 
c'est parce que les rapports 
entre les souverains, quoique 
alter es, ont toujours ete meilleurs 
qu'entre les nations et meme 
entre les deux gouvernements. 
II semble qu'il en coutait aux 
deux maisons regnantes de 
rompre avec une tradition secu- 
laire et la demarche de Temper eur 
Nicolas parait indiquer qu'il veut 
la reprervdre. Cest lui qui a 
exprime le desir d'une entrevue 
avec Vempereur d' Allemagne ac- 
cueilli au debut avec assez peu 
d'empressement a Berlin. Le 
moment choisi a ete aussi celui 
oil le terrain etait deblaye par 
la retraite de M. Iswolski. Uini- 
mitie personnelle de Vancien 
ministre des affaires etrangeres 
russes et du comte de Aehrenthal a 
ete l'un des principaux obstacles 
qu'il a fallu surmonter pour 
arriver a une solution pacifique 
de la question bosniaque. J'ai 
lieu de croire aussi, M. Iswolski 
n'inspirait a Berlin qu'une confi- 
ance tres mediocre. M. Sasonow 
a produit au contraire sur Vempe- 
reur, le chancelier et le secretaire 
d'Etat des Affaires etrangeres, 
une tres bonne impression. 



La visite a Potsdam est done 
un evenement dont il faui se 
feliciter comme de nature a 
ameliorer les relations entre les 
deux empires et peut-etre aussi 



King of England, on the first 
occasion on which it was put to 
the test. 

That the antipathy between 
the Russian and the German 
peoples has had no graver conse- 
quences is to be attributed to 
the fact that the relations between 
the Rulers, even though they 
also have altered, have neverthe- 
less always been better than 
those between the nations and 
even between the two Govern- 
ments. It appears to have 
been hard for the two Royal 
Houses to break with a tradi- 
tion which has endured for cen- 
turies, and the demarche of the 
Emperor Nicholas appears to 
indicate that he is anxious to 
revive it. It was he who expressed 
a desire for a meeting with the 
German Emperor, a desire which 
at the beginning was received 
with but little enthusiasm in 
Berlin. The moment chosen 
was also that in which the 
ground was cleared by the retire - 
ment of M. Isvolsky. The 
personal hostility between the 
former Russian Foreign Minister 
and Count Aehrenthal was one 
of the chief obstacles which 
had to be overcome in order to 
arrive at a peaceful solution of 
the Bosnian question. I have 
also reason to believe that M. 
Isvolsky inspired very little 
confidence in Berlin, whereas 
on the other hand M. Sazonof 
has produced a very favourable 
impression on the Emperor, the 
Chancellor, and the Foreign Secre- 
tary. 

The visit to Potsdam is thus 
an event which must give cause 
for satisfaction as calculated to 
improve the relations between 
the two Empires, and perhaps 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 43 

par contre-coup entre Vienne et in the sequel between Vienna 

St-Petersbourg, mais c'est une and Petrograd ; but it is an 

exageration que de lui attribuer, exaggeration to ascribe to it, 

commie l'a fait la Rossija, une as the Rossija does, great 

haute portee politique. Les political significance. Thegroup- 

groupements des grandes puis- ings of the great European 

sances europeennes resteront ce Powers will remain as they were 

qu'ils etaient auparavant, et les in the past, and the feelings of 

sentiments du peuple russe pour the Russian people towards Ger- 

1' Allemagne n'en deviendront pas many will not for this reason 

plus cordiaux. Le langage des become more cordial. The lan- 

journaux russes le demontre guage of the Russian newspapers 

deja. proves this already. 

Greindl. Greindl. 

In this report from Greindl the following points are 
noteworthy and, so far as the remoter antecedents are 
concerned, important in connection with the question 
of the responsibility for the war. 

1. The initiative to the interview at Potsdam was taken 
by the Tsar Nicholas, as was also in the previous year the 
initiative to the meeting of the two Emperors in Baltisch- 
port (see Greindl's report of June 21st, 1909, No. 60). 

2. The Court at Berlin received the Russian suggestion 
with but little enthusiasm. 

3. The Tsar intentionally chose for the meeting the 
moment of the retirement of Isvolsky, his former Foreign 
Minister, and of the accession to office of Sazonof, the 
new Minister. In consequence of his personal hostility 
to Aehrenthal, Isvolsky formed one of the " chief obstacles" 
to a peaceful rapprochement of Russia to Germany and 
Austria. On the other hand, Sazonof, the new Minister 
whom the Tsar brought with him to Potsdam, inspired 
confidence in Berlin, and was very well received there. 

4. The semi-official journals of the Berlin, Viennese, 
and Petrograd Governments agreed in attributing great 
political significance to the interview at Potsdam. 

5. The traditional friendship of the ruling houses of 
Prussia and of Russia and of their peoples had been some- 
what impaired by the Congress of Berlin and by Prince 
Bismarck's activities as an " honest broker." The cool- 
ness, however, had grown into something approaching 
hostility as a result of the intervention of Germany in 



44 



THE CRIME 



the question of the annexation of Bosnia. Germany had 
here exercised pressure — to dispute this is merely ' 4 playing 
with words" — and this pressure had led to a humiliation 
and a disappointment for Russia. The prestige of Russia 
was seriously damaged by the compliance forced upon 
her by Germany. This statement of Greindl's is specially 
interesting when it is compared with his above mentioned 
report, dated April 1st, 1909 (No. 58), in which he cannot 
find sufficiently laudatory words for the " quite unam- 
biguous and resolute attitude of Germany " in the Bosnian 
question, which " alone had imposed peace." Reports 
Nos. 58 and 62 are in irreconcilable opposition to each 
other. The latter corresponds with the generally prevailing 
European view, the former with the narrow and arrogant 
view held in Berlin. In this, as in many other passages, 
it is possible to see in the soul of the Belgian diplomatist 
the conflict of two tendencies of thought : on the one 
hand, regard for the peace of Europe, which in the case 
of differences between Great Powers demands a certain 
measure of concessions on both sides in order that a 
European war may be avoided ; on the other, a certain 
blindly superstitious enthusiasm for Prussian-German 
strength, which in all conflicts affecting Germany or 
Austria seeks to give absolute effect to the will of the 
two Imperial Powers by threatening, bluffing and sabre- 
rattling, no matter what European consequences may 
arise from such provocative action. There is, in fact, a 
European Greindl and a Berlino-Prussian Greindl. In 
No. 58 the latter speaks, in No. 62 the former. 

6. The experience in the Bosnian crisis had — so Greindl 
observes — convinced the Tsar and his Government of 
the " ineffectiveness of the coalition formed by the late 
King of England " on the first occasion on which it was 
tested. This sentence is correct only if aims are ascribed 
to the Entente coalition which it never entertained, and 
for the existence of which no evidence has yet been pro- 
duced : the aim, that is to say, of isolating, browbeating, 
and checkmating Germany and Austria in all conflicts 
between Great Powers both inside and outside Europe. 
Had this been the aim of the Entente, then certainly the 
course of the Bosnian crisis would have proved that the 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 45 

efforts of the Entente had miserably failed. That such 
an aim had, however, never been entertained by the 
Triple Entente is obvious from the fact that it did not make 
use of the favourable opportunity offered by the Bosnian 
annexation to give effect to this aim on an occasion when 
all the wrong was on the side of Austria. The course of 
the crisis is thus not a proof of the ineffectiveness of the 
coalition, but, on the contrary, it is evidence of its entirely 
pacific tendencies, which, indeed, went so far (on Greindl's 
own testimony) as to demand of Russia a direct humiliation 
and diminution of prestige, and that with the sole object 
of maintaining the peace of Europe at all cost. Thus 
Greindl's report (No. 62), properly read, is the most 
glowing testimony to the policy of the Entente Powers, and 
a flat contradiction of all the Pan-German legends which 
in its helplessness the German Government have to-day 
admitted into their arsenal of defence — those legends which 
ascribe to the Triple Entente the effort to provoke 
the catastrophe of a European war, and which date the 
firm conclusion of the conspiracy to June, 1908, that is to 
say, two and a half years before the Potsdam interview. 
7. The concluding observation in Greindl's report 
is entirely mean and furnishes an indication of the most 
one-sided partiality. This, again, is of the purest Schie- 
mann school. The Potsdam visit is, as even Greindl 
cannot deny, an event which will improve the relations 
between Germany and Russia and perhaps also between 
Vienna and Petrograd. But " the feelings of the Russian 
people towards Germany will not for this reason become 
more cordial. The language of the Russian newspapers 
proves this already." Here again we see the infamous 
cloven hoof which this " neutral " diplomatist, following 
the Pan-German example, attaches to all political events 
calculated to further peace. The monarchs meet in old 
friendship, the leading statesmen in new sympathy. All 
current political questions are discussed to the satisfaction 
of both sides in a peaceful and sensible manner ; all 
shadows from the past are swept away. This, however, 
does not suit the German war-intriguers and their docile 
follower, the Belgian Ambassador. At once the alleged 
hostile feelings of the Russian people (as if peoples ever felt 



46 THE CRIME 

hostility against each other !), the alleged hostile language 
of Russian newspapers, are moved into position, so that 
the picture of peace may not be without some dark touches, 
and the desired state of tension may continue to exist. 
The Foreign Office in Berlin, of course, hastens to reproduce 
in heavy type just this base and utterly unproved con- 
cluding sentence in Greindl's report in order to obliterate 
immediately the impression produced by Greindl's account 
in favour of Russia. What is necessary, in fact, is to 
wipe out the peaceful Potsdam interlude— like many 
other " entr'actes " of a similar nature during the last 
decade before the outbreak of war — in order to reveal in 
a continuous straight line the Entente's intentions to 
encircle and strangle their opponents and thus to justify 
the war which was " forced upon " innocent Germany. 
Herr Professor Helmolt calls the Potsdam interview 
" the great lie of Potsdam." The concluding sentence of 
Greindl's report is also designed to further this lying 
invention of a lie. 

* * * * * * 

In various other places in the collection I found astonish- 
ingly long intervals between the reports, which are 
obviously always attributable to the fact that in the 
interval nothing favourable to Germany or something 
favourable to the Entente Powers was reported. Why 
should the authorities in Berlin incriminate themselves ? 
I find, for example, between Reports Nos. 62 and 63, 
both from Greindl, an interval of four months comprising 
the whole winter of 1910-11. M. Greindl is not again heard 
until March 3rd, 1911 (No. 63), when he reports regarding 
the nomination of Delcasse to be Marine Minister in the 
Monis Cabinet and is in a position to deliver a few thrusts 
at French policy in the person of Delcasse. The Belgian 
diplomatist writes as follows regarding Delcasse' s return 
to power : 

No. 63. 
Berlin, le 3 mars 1911. Berlin, March 3rd, 1911. 

Monsieur le Ministre, Monsieur le Ministre, 

Comme il fallait s'y attendre As was to be expected, the 

on a d'autant plus mal accueilli nomination of M. Delcasse to 
la nomination de M. Delcasse au be Marine Minister has been 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 47 



ministere de la marine que le 
portefeuille de la guerre a ete 
confie a M. Berteaux dans le 
nouveau cabinet peniblement 
forme par M. Monis. Le Gou- 
vernement Imperial ne fera vrai- 
semblablement pas connaitre, 
au moins publiquement, son 
impression afin d'eviter toute 
apparence d' intervention dans 
les affaires interieures de la 
France ; mais elle ne differe 
^videmment pas de celle des 
journaux. Ainsi que je l'ai 
ecrit a M. le baron de Favereau, 
M. le baron de Richthofen 
m'avait dit au moment de la 
retraite de M. Delcasse en 1905 
que l'ancien ministre des Affaires 
etrangeres francais avait depuis 
des annees affecte de traiter 
l'Allemagne en quantite neglige - 
able. On considerait ici la 
longue administration de M. 
Delcasse comme ayant cree une 
situation tres grave. Ce n'etait 
pas sans raison, puisque la 
premiere fois que M. Delcasse a 
pris la parole apres sa chute, il 
Va fait pour se vanter oVavoir 
organise une ligue agressive contre 
V Allemagne. 



On ne prend pas toutefois 
tres au tragique le retour au 
pouvoir de M. Delcasse. Ce 
n'est plus le ministere des 
Affaires etrangeres qui lui est 
confie. II n'a plus a cote de lui 
le roi Edouard VII dont il se 
croyait le collaborateur et dont 
il etait l'instrument. L'entrevue 
de Potsdam a diminue la confi- 
ance des Francais dans 1' alliance 
russe, parce qu'a Paris et a 
Londres on persiste a lui at- 
tribuer une portee qu'elle n'a 
pas. Enfin le ministere Monis a 



all the more unfavourably re- 
ceived here, inasmuch as the 
conduct of the Ministry of War 
in the new Cabinet which has 
been formed under great diffi- 
culties by M. Monis has been 
entrusted to M. Berteaux. The 
Imperial Government will pre- 
sumably not let then impressions 
become known, at any rate 
publicly, in order to avoid any 
appearance of intervention in 
the internal affairs of France ; 
obviously, however, their impres- 
sions are in no way different 
from those of the Press. As I 
wrote at the time to the Baron 
de Favereau, Freiherr von Richt- 
hofen said to me on the occasion 
of the resignation of Delcasse in 
1905 that the former French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had 
for a number of years intention- 
ally treated Germany as a 
' ' quantite negl igeable . ' ' Accord - 
ing to the view held here, M. 
Delcasse's long tenure of office 
had created a very serious 
position. This view was not 
unfounded, seeing that Delcasse, 
on the first occasion on ,which he 
spoke after his fall, did so in 
order to boast that he had organised 
an aggressive league against Ger- 
many. 

Delcasse's return to power is 
not, however, taken too seri- 
ously. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is no longer entrusted to 
him. Moreover, he no longer has 
at his side King Edward VII, 
whose collaborator he believed 
himself to be, whose tool he 
really was. The meeting at 
Potsdam has diminished the 
confidence felt by the French in 
the Russian alliance because in 
Paris and London they insist 
on giving it an importance which 
it does not possess. Lastly, the 



48 THE CRIME 

ete si mal accueilli en France Monis Ministry has been so 
meme qu'il n'aura probablement badly received in France itself, 
qu'une duree ephemere. . . . that in all probability it will be 

allowed only a brief tenure of 

life. . . • 

I have elsewhere fully discussed x Delcasse's resignation 
in June 1905, and its importance in framing a judgment on 
French politics. I have considered the events immediately 
bearing on his withdrawal from office, the proceedings 
in the Council of Ministers under the Presidency of Rouvier, 
and the revelations of the Matin of October 7th and 8th, 
1905, bearing on the subject. I have there endeavoured 
to prove : 

1. That these very Matin revelations prove the entirely 
defensive character of the Anglo-French Entente, and 

2. That the dismissal of Delcasse as Foreign Minister 
shows the entirely pacific tendencies of French policy in 
the state of tension existing at that time. 

In the above sentences of his report Baron Greindl 
refers to the speech which Delcasse delivered in January 
1908 in the French Chamber of Deputies in justification 
of the policy which he had pursued until 1905. At the 
time when it was delivered Greindl had already fully 
reported on this speech (on January 27th, 1908, Report 
No. 39). When in March 1911, that is to say, three years 
later, the Belgian diplomatist had again occasion to speak 
of Delcasse's speech in his own justification, he had already 
forgotten his earlier report, and gaily asserted that Delcasse 
had boasted at the time (1908) that he had "organised an 
aggressive league against Germany." In the report of 
1 January 27th, 1908 (No. 39), on the other hand, it is stated : 

. . . En d'autres termes, M. ... In other words, M. Del- 

Delcasse se vante d' avoir preserve casse boasts that he has kept the 

la paix du monde grace a la peace of the world, thanks to his 

campagne menee par lui de policy of encirclement which he 

concert avec le roi d'Angleterre has pursued against Germany in 

pour isoler l'Allemagne. union with the King of England. 

M. Delcasse dit qu'il ne faut M. Delcasse says that a foreign 

pas laisser daflgurer une politique policy (viz. his own), ivhich has 

etrangere (la sienne) qui a par already twice preserved the peace 

deux fois conserve la paix a of Europe, must not be mis- 

VEurope. . . . represented. . . . 

1 See The Crime, Vol. II, p. 129 et seq. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 49 

This statement made by Delcasse in 1908 is, it is true, 
subjected in the report written at the time by Greindl to a 
criticism the nature of which it is possible to imagine with- 
out further description. It is, however, in any case a false 
assertion on the part of Greindl when in his report of 1911 
he reproaches the French statesman with the fact that 
he himself had boasted that he had organised an aggressive 
league against Germany. This is directly contrary to 
the truth. Delcasse always maintained, and especially 
in his speech of January 1908, that the Entente con- 
cluded by him and Lansdowne in 1904, as well as all his 
further ministerial actions, aimed merely at securing a 
guarantee for the peace of Europe, a protection against 
aggression and possible bellicose intentions on the part 
of Germany. M. Greindl attributes to the French states- 
man a confession of guilt which he had never made. As 
a matter of course, the Berlin Foreign Office hastens to 
emphasise in heavy type just this lying statement in 
Greindl' s report of 1911, which is directly contradicted by 
the report of 1908. It is thus that diplomatic evidence is 
manufactured. In other respects, also, the report of 
March 3rd, 1911, is full of distorted explanations of familiar 
diplomatic occurrences, of malicious intentions ascribed 
to the Entente Powers, of attempts to explain away the 
importance of the Potsdam interview, etc. It would 
take us too far to go more closely into all these 
matters. 



Another lacuna which, if not very large, is at any rate 
very characteristic, is to be found after No. 65, Greindl' s 
report of March 20th, 1911. This report deals in a full 
and fairly sympathetic manner with Grey's striking 
speech in the House of Commons on March 13th, 1911, 
on the relations between Germany and England, and on 
the fatal competition in naval armaments between all 
States, which must finally, if the system is not checked, 
lead to a complete collapse of civilisation. (See also 
J 'accuse, p. 96). I give below the text of Greindl's report 
on Grey's speech : 

VOL. IV E 



50 



THE CRIME 



No. 65. 



Berlin, le 20 mars 1911. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le discolors sur la politique 
exterieure prononce, il y a huit 
jours par Sir Edward Grey, a 
1' occasion de la discussion du 
budget de la marine, a provoque 
de nombreux commentaires dans 
la presse anglaise et dans celle 
de tous les pays, a 1' exception 
de 1' Allemagne. La Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung a temoigne 
la satisfaction du gouvernement 
imperial. De la part de Vorgane 
hautement officieux, c'etait oblige. 
Le silence eut ete a bon droit 
considere d Londres comme une 
injure ; mais les autres journaux 
se sont bornes a reproduire le 
resume du disc ours transmis 
par les agences telegraphiques 
ou n'y ont ajouto que de courtes 
reflexions insignifiantes . C'est 
ici cependant que les paroles du 
secretaire d'Etat britannique 
auraient du causer le plus de 
sensation et produire la plus 
agreable impression, si Ton avait 
la confiance qu'elles expriment 
bien toute la pensee du gouverne- 
ment anglais. Elles marqueraient 
un revirement notable de la 
politique inauguree naguere par 
le cabinet unioniste et dont ses 
successeurs lib6raux ont con- 
tinue la tradition. L' evolution 
n'impliquerait pas un derange- 
ment du groupement actuel des 
grandes piussances ; mais elle 
signifierait que V Angleterre ne 
veut plus conserver a la triple 
entente le caractere agressif que 
lui avait imprime son createur 
le roi Edouard VII. A voir 
V indifference du public allemand, 
on dirait qu'il est blase par les 
innombrables entrevues et 



Berlin, March 20th, 1911. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

The speech on foreign politics 
which Sir Edward Grey delivered 
a week ago in the debate on the 
Naval Estimates has evoked 
numerous commentaries in the 
English Press, as well as in the 
Press of all other countries except 
in Germany. The Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung gave expres- 
sion to the satisfaction felt by 
the Imperial Government. As 
an organ which is in a high 
degree semi-official it was bound 
to do so. Its silence voould rightly 
have been viewed in London as an 
insult ; but the other news- 
papers restricted themselves to 
reproducing a resume of the 
speech, as it was transmitted 
by the telegraphic agencies, or 
merely added short and trivial 
observations. It was, however, 
more particularly here that the 
words of the British Secretary of 
State should have evoked the 
greatest sensation, and produced 
the best impression, if there had 
been confidence that they really 
quite represented the ideas of 
the English Government. They 
would imply a remarkable revul- 
sion in the policy initiated in its 
time by the Unionist Cabinet, 
whose traditions the Liberal 
Government which followed has 
continued. Sixch a develop- 
ment would not be equivalent to 
a change in the present grouping 
of the Great Powers ; but it 
would indicate that England no 
longer desires to give to the Triple 
Entente the aggressive character 
which its creator, King Edward 
VII, imprinted upon it. In 
seeing the indifference of the 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 51 



echanges de demonstrations 
courtoises qui n'ont jamais pro- 
duit aucun resultat posit if et 
qvi'il veuille se mettre en garde 
contre de nouvelles deceptions. 
Cette mefiance se comprend, 
puisque tout recemment encore 
le gouvernement anglais prenait 
part a 1' intrigue de Flessingue. 
Nous en avons eu la preuve, par 
la demarche qu'a faite aupres 
de vous Sir A. Hardinge pour 
essayer de nous y entrainer. 



Toutef ois, on peut se demander 
si le scepticisme n'est pas dans le 
cas present quelque peu exagcre. 

Le rapprochement avec la 
Russie et l'Angleterre faisait 
partie du programme politique 
trace par M. de Kidsrlen- 
Wsechter, lorsqu'il a accepte la 
direction du departement im- 
perial des Affaires etrangeres. 
La premiere partie de ce plan 
a ete executee par l'entrevue de 
Potsdam. Les pourparlers entre 
Berlin et Saint-Petersbourg sont 
interrompus depuis que M. 
Sazonow est malade ; niais au- 
paravant, il y a eu un echange 
d'idees tres actif entre les deux 
cabinets. Aucun resultat posit if 
n'a encore ete obtenu, et peut- 
etre n'arrivera-t-on pas a grand' - 
chose de concret ; mais les 
relations des deux pays sont 
redevenues normales. Elles n'ont 
plus le caractere de reserve 
hargneuse qu' elles avaient pris 
depuis 1' affaire de 1' annexion de 
la Bosnie. 

Les circonstances se pretent 
a la realisation du programme 
du secretaire d'Etat des Affaires 
etrangeres. II y a six semaines 



German public, it might be be- 
lieved that it has become blase, 
as the result of countless meet- 
ings and mutual demonstra- 
tions of courtesy which, not- 
withstanding, have never led 
to any positive result, and that 
it is anxious to protect itself 
against new disillusions. This 
distrust is comprehensible, since 
the English Government quite 
recently took part in the Flushing 
intrigue. We have evidence of 
this in the demarche which Sir A. 
Hardinge made to you in order 
to endeavour to involve us in 
the matter. 

At the same time, it may be 
asked whether the scepticism in 
the present case is not somewhat 
exaggerated. 

The rapprochement with Russia 
and England was part of the 
political programme of Herr 
von Kiderlen-Waechter, when he 
took over the conduct of the 
Foreign Office. The first part 
of this programme was realised 
by the meeting at Potsdam. 
Since Sazonof was taken ill, the 
discussions between Berlin and 
Petrograd have been interrupted; 
before that, however, an active 
exchange of ideas took place 
between the two Cabinets. A 
positive result has not yet been 
attained, and perhaps nothing 
very tangible will emerge ; in 
any case, however, the relations 
between the two countries have 
again become normal. They have 
no longer the reserved and 
hostile character which they had 
assumed after the annexation of 
Bosnia. 

Circumstances are favouring 
the execution of the Foreign 
Secretary's programme. About 
six weeks ago the King of England 

E 2 



52 



THE CRIME 



environ, le roi d'Angleterre a 
ecrit a Vempereur d'Allemagne 
pour Vinviter a assister a Vin- 
auguration de la statue de la 
reine Victoria. C'est la premiere 
lettre que le roi George V 
adressait a Sa Majeste depuis 
qu'il est monte sur le trone. 
Elle etait concue en termes 
particulierement cordiaux, qui ont 
produit ici la plus agreable 
impression. Vous vous souvi- 
endrez sans doute, Monsieur le 
Ministre, de ce qu'a dit, quelques 
jours apres, le chancelier de 
F Empire dans son discours au 
Reichstag sur les affaires etran- 
geres au sujet de sa confiance 
dans la loyaute de la politique 
anglaise envers 1'Allemagne. On 
peut considerer 1' attitude de 
M. de Bethmann Hollweg comme 
la consequence du message du 
roi d'Angleterre. 

Le discours de Sir Edward Grey 
ne s'est pas borne a de vaines 
paroles comme dans des occasions 
anterieures. II a ete accompagne, 
ou plutot precede, d'un acte. 
Pendant des annees, la presse 
anglaise a emis Farrogante pre- 
tention de controler et meme 
d'interdire Fachevement du 
chemin de fer de Bagdad ; c'est- 
a-dire d' avoir la haute main sur 
une entreprise qui ne concerne 
que la Turquie, la compagnie 
concessionnaire et indirectement 
le gouvernement allemand, qui 
a appuye celle-ci. Sir Edward 
Grey a replace la question sur 
le terrain du droit, en recon- 
naissant que FAngleterre n'a 
aucun titre Fautorisant a inter- 
venir dans une affaire interieure 
ottomane et en annongant qu'elle 
se bornerait a garantir ses 
interets par les moyens legaux 
dont elle dispose. C'est une base 
sur laquelle on peut s 'entendre. 



wrote to the German Emperor 
inviting him to the unveiling of 
the memorial to Queen Victoria. 
This is King George's first letter 
to His Majesty since his accession 
to the throne. It was couched in 
particularly cordial terms and 
produced the most agreeable 
impression here. You will with- 
out doubt remember, Monsieur 
le Ministre, what the Chancellor 
said a few days later in his 
speech in the Reichstag on 
foreign politics regarding his 
confidence in the sincerity of 
English policy towards Ger- 
many. The attitude of Herr 
von Bethmann may be regarded 
as the consequence of the letter 
from the King of England. 



Sir Edward Grey's speech was 
not restricted to empty words as 
on former occasions. It was 
accompa?iied or rather preceded 
by action. For years the English 
Press has advanced the arrogant 
claim to control and even to 
forbid the completion of the 
Baghdad Railway, that is to 
say, they wanted to lay their 
hand on an undertaking which 
concerns only Turkey, the con- 
cessionary company, and, in- 
directly, the German Govern- 
ment which supported it. Sir 
Edward Grey has brought this 
question back into the domain 
of law. He recognised that 
England possesses no title in 
law to intervene in an internal 
Ottoman affair, and announced 
that England would restrict 
herself to guarding her interests 
by the legal means at her dis- 
posal. On this basis it is possible 
to arrive at an understanding. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 53 



Personne ne niera 1' existence de 
ces interests anglais et ne songera 
a faire au gouvernement bri- 
tannique un grief de les defendre. 



Enfin, le moment est propice 
pour une tentative oV amelioration 
des relations entre VAllemagne et 
V Angleterre. II n'y a maintenant 
a l'ordre du jour aucune question 
irritante de nature a l'entraver. 

Je dois vous prier de noter, 
Monsieur le Ministre, que le 
present rapport ne signifie pas 
que je considere comme deja ac- 
quis ou imminent un rapproche- 
ment entre F Angleterre et l'Alle- 
magne que j'appelle de totis mes 
voeux, parce qu'il constituerait 
une sensible augmentation de 
securite pour la Belgique. Tout 
ce que je veux dire est quCa mon 
avis les journaux allemands n'ont 
pas prete une attention assez 
serieuse au discours de Sir Edward 
Grey et qu'il faut attendre les 
ev6nements pour asseoir un juge- 
ment sur sa veritable portee. 
Le depit manifesto par le journal 
Le Temps demontre qu'a Paris 
1' opinion publique lui en attache 
beaucoup plus qu'on ne l'a fait a 
Berlin. A la maniere dont 
s'exprime le journal francais, on 
dirait qa'il ne considere plus 
la triple entente que comme une 
formule vide de sens. 



Greindl. 



No one will deny the existence 
of English interests, and . no 
one will think of making it a 
reproach against the British 
Government that they defend 
these. 

The moment is in any case 
favourable for an attempt to 
improve Anglo-German relations. 
There is at present on the order 
of the day no question giving 
rise to friction which would 
counteract it. 

I would ask to draw your 
attention to the fact, Monsieur 
le Ministre, that the present 
report is not intended to give 
expression to the view that an 
Anglo-German rapprochement is 
already complete or is imminent. 
It is true that I would wish for 
this with my whole heart, since 
thereby the security of Belgium 
would be considerably increased. 
All that I say is merely that in 
my opinion the German news- 
papers have not given sufficiently 
serious attention to Sir Edward 
Grey's speech, and that it is 
necessary to await events before 
it is possible to form a judgment 
regarding its real importance. 
The disappointment of the Temps 
proves that public opinion in 
Paris sees much more in the 
speech than in Berlin. To judge 
from the way in which the 
French newspaper expressed it- 
self, it might be thought that 
it sees in the Triple Entente 
nothing more than an empty 
formula void of meaning. 

Greindl. 



This report of Greindl's is differentiated from almost 
all the other reports of this diplomatist in being worded 
in relatively objective terms and it does a certain measure 
of justice, unusual in Greindl, to the English King George, 
who had invited the Emperor to the unveiling of the 



54 THE CRIME 

Victoria Memorial in extremely cordial terms, as well as 
to the English Government and their intentions with 
regard to an understanding. The Belgian diplomatist 
regards the moment as favourable for an attempt to 
improve Anglo-German relations. He even goes so far 
as to make it a charge against the German Press that 
they had not devoted sufficient attention to Grey's speech. 
He praises the attitude of the English Government in 
the question of the Baghdad Railway, and points to a 
remarkable revulsion in the policy initiated in its time 
by the Unionist Cabinet. 

Grey's speech was answered in the Reichstag on March 
30th by Herr von Bethmann, who poured cold water on 
the suggestions put forward. In his speech he bluntly 
rejected every possibility of arriving at an agreement as 
to armaments ; he advanced the hackneyed argument of 
the inrpossibility of exercising control, and stated that 
agreements as to armaments were once for all excluded 
" so long as men are men, and States States." (See 
T accuse, p. 97.) 

This cold douche from Bethmann, a weighty link in 
the long chain of German shortcomings, is not so much 
as mentioned in the Belgian collection of documents. 
The Belgian Ambassador, who expresses himself at great 
length on the subject of the speech delivered by Grey in 
London, has nothing whatever to say about the speech 
delivered by Bethmann in Berlin. That is to say, he 
obviously reported on the subject, but, as may with cer- 
tainty be assumed, having regard to his opinion of Grey's 
speech, his report was so unfavourable to Bethmann that it 
was omitted in printing. This is an extremely suspicious state 
of affairs so far as the German Government are concerned, 
and it furnishes a weighty consideration in proof of the 
dishonest and tendencious compilation of the Belgian 
collection of documents. This one fact in itself — apart 
from all other considerations — deprives the collection of 
any value as evidence. 

No. 66, following on No. 65, also contains a report 
from Greindl dated April 21st, 1911, but makes no men- 
tion of the meeting of the Reichstag and of Bethmann's 
significant speech which had received the most pained 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 55 

attention throughout the whole political world. This is 
the " objective diplomatic account of international politics " 
which is so great a merit in the German collection of 
documents. 

Haldane's Visit to Berlin. 

Haldane's visit to Berlin is fully mentioned in the 
report of Count Lalaing, the London Ambassador, dated 
February 9th, 1912. It is there stated : 



No. 88. 



Londres, le 9 fevrier 1912. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le depart de Lord Haldane, 
ministre de la Guerre, pour Berlin 
a eveille la curiosite ; la presse 
trouve diver ses explications pour 
ce voyage, entrepris au lende- 
main d'un conseil de Cabinet et 
presque a la veille de l'ouverture 
des Chambres. On a sugger6 
que le Ministre etait charge, ou : 



1° de traiter la question d'un 
echange de renseignements sur 
les armements anglo-allemands ; 

2° de demander la grace d'un 
espion anglais Stewart, recem- 
ment condamne en Allemagne ; 

3° de travailler a une entente 
anglo-allemande ; 

4° de s'occuper d'une recti- 
fication de frontieres en Afrique ; 

5 3 d'un partage des colonies 
portugaises ; 

6° d'une cession de Walfisch 
Bay a l'Allemagne ; 

7° d'une mission personnelle 
du roi George au kaiser. 



London, February 9th, 1912. 

Monsieur le Ministre. 

The departure for Berlin of 
Lord Haldane, the Minister of 
War, has aroused curiosity ; the 
Press has the most various 
explanations to give of this 
journey which is taking place 
on the day after a meeting of 
the Cabinet and almost on the 
eve of the opening of Parliament. 
It has been suggested that the 
Minister has been entrusted 
either : 

1. to negotiate on the question 
of an exchange of information 
regarding Anglo -German arma- 
ments, 

2. to intercede for the pardon 
of an English spy,named Stewart, 
who was recently condemned in 
Germany, 

3. to work with a view to the 
establishment of an Anglo - 
German Entente, 

4. to negotiate on a recti- 
fication of frontier in Africa, 

5. to bring about a partition 
of the Portuguese colonies, 

6. to cede Walfisch Bay to 
Germany, or finally, 

7. to discharge a personal 
mission from King George to the 
Emperor. 



56 



THE CRIME 



Ce qui est certain est que le but 
que Von a en vue est pacifique. On 
voudrait a tout prix diminuer la 
tension existante entre les deux 
pays. C'est la politique actuelle 
du Cabinet et,de tous les ministres 
de la Couronne, celui de la Guerre 
est le plus philo-allemand. Lord 
Haldane a ete en son temps 
etudiant a Heidelberg, parle 
bien la langue si peu familiere 
aux Anglais, et a des amis 
personnels a Berlin. Le choix 
de 1' envoy e ©st sous c© rapport un 
nouvel indice de la tendance de 
la mission officieuse. De toutes 
les hypotheses, celle d'une con- 
versation amicale, cherchant un 
terrain d" entente et deplorant les 
depenses imposees aux deux 
nations par les programmes de 
constructions navales semble le 
plus probable. L'Angleterre est 
disposee a ne plus contrecarrer 
VAllemagne dans les questions 
secondaires, mais on ne doit pas 
lui disputer la suprematie sur 
mer. 



Comte de Lalaing. 



It is certain that the aim in 
view is a pacific one. It is de- 
sired to diminish at any price the 
tension existing between the 
two countri©s. This is the present 
policy of the Cabinet, and of all 
the Ministers of the Crown the 
Minister for War is the most 
friendly to Germany. Lord Hal- 
dan© was in his time a student at 
Heidelberg, he has a good 
command of the language which 
is so little known to the English, 
and he has personal friends in 
Berlin. In this respect the 
choice of the envoy is a new 
indication of the tendency of 
the semi-official mission. Of all 
the hypotheses, the most pro- 
bable appears to me to be that 
of a friendly exchange of thought, 
seeking a basis for an under- 
standing and regretting the ex- 
penditure imposed on both 
peoples by the naval programmes. 
England is no longer inclined to 
work against Germany in less 
important questions, but her 
supremacy at sea must not be 
questioned. 

Count de Lalaing. 



In a further report from the London Ambassador 
dated February 16th, 1912 (No. 90), Haldane's journey 
and in particular the English Government's endeavour to 
arrive at an understanding with that of Germany are 
mentioned with appreciation. 



No. 
Londres, le 16 fevrier 1912. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le Premier Ministre, lors de la 
discussion de la response au dis- 
cours du Trone, a eu V occasion 
de fournir quelques eclaircisse- 
ments sur le but de la recente 



90. 

London, February 16th, 1912. 

Monsieur le Ministre. 

During the debate on the 
Reply to the King's Speech the 
Prime Minister had an oppor- 
tunity of giving certain explana- 
tions regarding the purpose of 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 57 



visite du ministre de la Guerre 
a Berlin. 

Dans mon rapport du 9 de ce 
mois je vous disais que de toutes 
les hypotheses mises en avant 
celle d'une conversation ainicale, 
en vue de rechercher un terrain 
d? entente et de diminuer la tension 
existante etait la plus vraisem- 
blable. 

Le discours de M. Asquith con- 
firnie cette impression. 

II a admis que dans les derniers 
mois Yamitie, traditionnelle entre 
les deux nations avait subi des 
atteintes serieuses, a cause de la 
mefiance qui existait de part et 
d'autre. 

Le public allemand a ete jusqu'a 
croire que la flotte britannique 
avait prepare une attaque contre 
les escadres gertnaniques pendant 
l'6te et l'automne 1911. — C'est 
une pure invention. Les deux 
gouvernements ont le sincere 
desir d'arriver a une entente 
meilleure, et le cabinet de Berlin 
a fait comprendre a Londres que 
ce but commun serait peut-etre 
plus facilement atteint si un 
ministre anglais se rendait en 
Allemagne. 

C'est peut-etre contraire aux 
usages diplomatiques,mais il en a 
resulte d'heureuses et franches 
explications de nature a detruire 
V impression que les gouverne- 
ments en cause ont des intentions 
agressives. M. Asquith croit que 
les conversations de son collegue 
a Berlin pourraient avoir d'autres 
heureux resultats dans l'avenir, 
sur lesquels il ne s'est pas 
explique. 

Si les deux nations desirent voir 
s' etablir entre elles des relations plus 
cordiales, le Premier Ministre a eu 
soin d'ajouter qu'il ne s'agissait 
cependant en aucune facon de 



the recent visit of the Minister for 
War to Berlin. 

In my report of the 9th instant 
I wrote to you that of all the 
hypotheses which had been ad- 
vanced the most probable was 
that of a friendly exchange of 
opinion in order to seek a basis 
for an understanding and to 
diminish the existing tension. . 

Mr. Asquith's speech confirms 
this impression. 

He admitted that the tradi- 
tional friendship between the two 
peoples had been gravely im- 
perilled in recent months by the 
distrust existing on both sides. 

The German public has gone 
so far as to believe that during 
the summer and the autumn of 
1911 the English fleet had pre- 
pared an attack against the 
German squadrons. This is pure 
invention. Both Governments 
are sincerely desirous of arriving 
at a better understanding, and 
theBerlin Government have given 
it to be understood in London 
that this common aim would 
perhaps be realised more easily 
if an English Minister came to 
Germany. 

. This is, perhaps, contrary to 
diplomatic usage, but it has led 
to happy and open discussions 
which have destroyed the assump- 
tion that the Governments in 
question had aggressive inten- 
tions. Mr. Asquith believes that 
the discussions which his col- 
league had in Berlin might have 
other fortunate results in 
future on which he did not 
express himself further. 

The Prime Minister was careful 
to add that even if the two 
nations were desirous of seeing 
more cordial relations arise be- 
tween them, there was no question 



58 THE CRIME 

modifier la situation speciale of modifying in any way the 

dans laquelle l'Allemagne, d'une special relations of Germany and 

part, la Grande-Bretagne, de Great Britain vis-a-vis other 

l'autre, se trouvaient vis-a-vis Powers. Both sides were, how- 

d'autres puissances, mais les ever, at the moment examining 

deux Etats examinent en ce what could be done. . . . 
moment ce qu'il serait possible 
de faire. . . . 

It might have been assumed that Belgium's Ambassador 
in Berlin, the doyen of Belgian diplomacy who enjoyed 
a position of exceptional authority in Brussels, would 
also have expressed himself regarding Haldane's visit 
to Berlin and its results. That is also, of course, what 
happened, but obviously he expressed himself unfavour- 
ably regarding the attitude of the German Government, 
and for this reason the reports written by him during this 
period have been suppressed. Greindl's report of De- 
cember 9th, 1911 (No. 86), is not followed by a report 
from the same Ambassador until that of April 26th, 
1912 (No. 91): This witness for the Crown is thus con- 
demned to almost five months of silence because in these 
five months he obviously said much that was in the highest 
degree inconvenient to the German Government. 



A Missing Report from Greindl 

In this interval Greindl sent a report to Brussels (on 
December 23rd, 1911), which has been published in part 
by the German Government in another place and in another 
connection, but strangely it has been omitted in the 
collection of reports. 

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, as is well known, 
published on October 13th, 1914, its first revelation 
regarding the documents found in Brussels — a revelation 
which at a later date, on November 25th, 1914, was 
amplified by a reprint of the conversation between Bar- 
nardiston and Ducarne (1906) and that between Bridges 
and Jungbluth (1912). In the first article in the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung extracts are given from a 
report from Greindl dated December 23rd, 1911, with 
the addition that " the publication of this in its entirety 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 59 

is reserved." At that time — that is to say, immediately 
after the conclusion of the Kiderlen treaty regarding 
Morocco — there had been communicated to Baron Greindl 
a plan of the Belgian General Staff for the defence of their 
neutral country in the contingency of a Franco-German 
war. The presupposition of this plan was that which 
was realised in 1914, that is to say, it was the violation" 
of Belgian neutrality by Germany. Greindl, as has already 
been remarked, was by his extraction, his education, his 
train of thought and his personal relations, almost more 
a German than a Belgian, and the contingency in question, 
that of a German invasion, this blindly credulous friend 
of Germany considered, in his incomprehensible or rather 
very comprehensible infatuation, to be not more probable 
than the other contingency, that of a French invasion, 
and this view he held despite all the candid accounts 
contained in German military literature. He therefore 
urgently exhorted the Belgian Government to take military 
precautions to meet this case also. The Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung prints only this latter part of Greindl's 
dissertations. Until the present day the complete report 
has been kept back, and is also missing from the collection 
of ambassadorial reports. In the month of December, 
1911, we find here two reports from Greindl, those of 
December 6th and December 9th (Nos. 85 and 86), but 
we seek in vain for the important report of December 23rd, 
the later publication of which was contemplated by the 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 

What can be the reason of this omission ? I presume 
it is that the first part of the report which the Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung suppresses and which deals with the 
contingency of a German invasion of Belgium contains, 
despite all the Belgian Ambassador's friendliness for 
Germany, certain observations on the strategic plans of 
the German General Staff which were compromising for 
the German Government. Germany cannot admit and 
never has admitted — though it is an historical fact 
apart from any such admission — that the passage through 
Belgium had been the basis of the strategic plan of the 
General Staff in the event of a Franco-German war ever 
since the construction of the line of fortifications on the 



60 THE CRIME 

eastern frontier of France had been completed. The 
attempt has been made — and the praiseworthy endeavour 
is still being continued — to induce the world, and above 
all the German people, to believe that it was merely 
the fear of an intended attack in the flank by France in 
August 1914 that led to the decision to pass through 
Belgium. Presumably Greindl's report of December 23rd, 
1911, upset in its first part this lying calculation. For 
this reason it was considered preferable to print only the 
second part, which reflects on France, and to postpone 
indefinitely the publication of the first part. Should I 
be mistaken in my hypothesis, it is still open to the Foreign 
Office to print even at this date the whole of the report. 
So long as this is not done, I venture to describe this 
incident also as a characteristic symptom of the German 
method of falsifying documents. 



Greindl's Successor, Baron Beyens. 

In June, 1912, Baron Greindl was replaced by Baron 
Beyens as Belgian Ambassador in Berlin. Beyens, at a 
later date Belgian Prime Minister, is the author of the 
book mentioned above, Germany Before the War. The 
reports of the new Belgian representative at once breathe 
an entirely different spirit from those of his predecessor. 
There is no longer any question of a prepossession in 
favour of German nationalism. On the contrary, the 
reader notes everywhere the endeavour and also the 
capacity to judge European matters objectively without 
coloured spectacles. From Beyens' two years' tenure of 
office eleven reports are given. The last report dates from 
July 2nd, 1914, that is to say, a few days after the outrage 
of Serajevo. Between the individual reports fairly long 
intervals occur, e.g. between No. 92 and No. 93 there are 
almost four months, between No. 96 and No. 102 three and 
a half months, between No. 103 and No. 106 seven weeks, 
between No. 106 and No. Ill there are as much as nine 
months, between No. Ill and No. 113 two months, etc. 
From this it would appear that the German Government 
has not found in Baron Greindl's successor a particularly 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 61 

favourable witness for their alleged innocent policy. 
This also is, broadly speaking, confirmed by the printed 
reports of Baron Beyens, from which it is possible to 
imagine what may have been contained in those not 
printed. 

Let us hear some of his reports (in extracts) : I may 
expressly observe that here, as elsewhere, in my extracts 
I have frequently reproduced such passages as are em- 
phasised in heavy type in the German edition, and are 
thus regarded by the German Government as specially 
favourable for their defence — an evidence of impartiality 
on my part which can certainly not be noted in the case 
of the German " abridgers." 

No. 92. 



Berlin, le 28 juin 1912. 

. . L'Ambassadeur d'Angle- 
terre m'a paru assez sceptique 
quant ait succes de cette mission. 
Ce qui rend, m'a dit Sir Edward 
Goschen, le retablissement de la 
bonne entente d' autrefois si 
difficile, c'est qu'il n'existe entre 
les deux nations aucun motif 
concret d'irritation ou d'eloigne- 
ment. Nous n'avons pas eu 
a regler avec l'Allemagne un 
incident penible comme celui de 
Fachoda. La mesintelligence 
date de renvoi du telegramme de 
V Empereur au President Kriiger. 
C'a ete pour nous comme un 
trait de lumiere qui nous a 
montre qu'un abime s'etait 
creuse silencieusement, et sans 
que nous nous en f ussions apercus, 
entre nous et le peuple allemand, 
La question de la limitation de la 
flotte de guerre allemande est 
insoluble. Nous n'avons aucun 
droit de Vimposer au Gouverne- 



Berlin, June 28th, 1912. 

. . . The English Ambassador 
appeared to me fairly sceptical 
regarding the success of this 
mission. 1 What makes the re- 
establishment of the former good 
understanding so difficult is, 
in the opinion of Sir Edward 
Goschen, the fact that no real 
ground of irritation or alienation 
exists between the two peoples. 
We had no painful incident, like 
that of Fashoda, to regulate with 
Germany. The misunderstand- 
ings date from the time of the 
Emperor's telegram to Kriiger. 
That was for us a flash of light 
which revealed to us the abyss 
which had silently opened be- 
tween \is and the German people 
without our having noticed it. 
The question of the limitation of 
the German navy is insoluble. 
We have no right to impose it on 
the Imperial Government. We 
can only follow it on the path 



1 The reference is to the mission of Freiherr von Marschall to 
London. 



62 



THE CRIME 



merit Imperial. Nous ne pouvons 
que le suivre dans la voie ruineuse 
oil il s'est engage, car le salut de 
l'Angleterre depend de sa supe- 
riorite navale. L'Ambassadeur 
croit, comme M. Winston 
Churchill, que la fiotte alle- 
mande, creation personnelle de 
l'Empereur, est Vobjet de ses 
predilections, qvCil prend plaisir 
d V augmenter et qu'il ne renon- 
cera pas a la rendre plus redout - 
able que ne l'exige la protection 
du commerce allemand. ... 



to ruin on which it has entered, 
for the safety of England depends 
on her superiority at sea. Like 
Mr. Winston Churchill, the Am- 
bassador believes that the Ger- 
man navy is a personal creation 
of the Emperor, that it is the 
object of his predilections, that 
he finds pleasure in increasing 
it, and that he will not renounce 
making it stronger than the 
protection of German trade 
demands. . . . 



Baron Bey ens' report of October 18th, 1912 (No. 93), 
which is here relevant, is quoted elsewhere. 

No. 94. 



Berlin, le 24 Octobre 1912. 

. . . La politique de M. Sazonow 
estd'autant plus sage que les evene- 
ments actuels ont surpris la Rassie 
en pleine reorganisation de ses 
forces militaires et qu'un desastre 
ou un simple echec en Europe 
lui serait autrement funeste que 
ses defaites en Extreme-Orient. 
II serait le signal d : une revolution 
sociale qui s'arme dans Vombre et 
menace sourdement le Trone des 
Czars. A comparer le peu d'avan- 
tage personnel que la Russie 
retirerait d'une intervention avec 
les risques qu'elle encourrait, on 
devrait avoir confiance dans le 
bon sens de ses gouvernants et 
envisager l'avenir prochain avec 
assez de tranquillite, n'etaient 
les sentiments panslavistes et 
ceux qui les attisent. 



Baron Beyens. 



Berlin, October 24th, 1912. 

. . . The policy of M. Sazonof is 
all the more prudent inasmuch as 
the present events have surprised 
Russia in the middle of the reor- 
ganisation of her military forces, 
and a disaster or even a simple 
check in Europe would be much 
more fatal for Russia than her 
defeats in East Asia. It would 
be th.e signal for a social revolu- 
tion which is being prepared 
in the dark and which is secretly 
menacing the throne of the Tsars. 
When the small personal advan- 
tage which B.ussia would derive 
from intervention is compared 
with the risk which it would run, 
one should be compelled to feel 
confidence in the sound sense of 
its statesmen and look forward 
to the near future with a fair 
measure of composure, were it 
not for Pan -Slav feelings and 
those who incite them. 

Baron Beyens. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 63 



No. 106. 



Berlin, le 26 mai 1913. 

. . . On peut dire, tout aumoins, 
sans risquer de se tromper que la 
visite du couple royal d'Angleterre 
a Berlin apparait comme la con- 
firmation et comme la consecra- 
tion aux yeux de VEurope du 
rapprochement qui s'est incon- 
testablement opere entre l'Alle- 
magne et la Grande-Bretagne 
pendant la guerre balkanique, oil 
les deux Etats ont agi de concert 
pour la preservation de la paix 
europeenne. C'est un avertisse- 
ment que la France ferait bien 
de mediter, au moment ou elle 
se consume en efforts peut-etre 
inutiles et destines en tout cas a 
reveler a l'etranger l'etat de 
decomposition interne de son 
armee, en vue de retablir l'equi- 
libre des forces entre elle et 
l'Allemagne. 

Quant au voyage du Czar, il 
est une nouvelle preuve des 
bonnes relations, inaugurees lors 
de Ventrevue de Potsdam et 
cimentees par celle de Port Bal- 
tique, qui existent entre les 
Maisons regnantes des deux 
Empires voisins et aussi entre 
leurs Gouvernements. La guerre 
balkanique n'y a pas porte 
atteinte. . . . 

Faut-il conclure de la visite des 
Souverains anglais a Berlin qu'xm 
rapprochement anglo-allemand 
est en preparation, qui pour- 
suivrait un but concret, tel que 
celui de 1' absorption du Congo 
beige par l'Allemagne, un rap- 
prochement de ce genre ne pou- 
vant etre realise, comme le 
pretend la Post de Berlin, que 
sous la forme d'une entente 
coloniale ? Nous sommes avertis 



Berlin, May 26th, 1913. 

. . . Withoxit running any danger 
of being mistaken, it is in any case 
possible to say that the visit of 
the English King and Queen to 
Berlin appears in the eyes of 
Europe as the confirmation and 
consecration of the rapproche- 
ment between Germany and Great 
Britain which unmistakably 
took place during the Balkan war, 
when the two States co-operated 
for the maintenance of peace. 
France would do well to take this 
warning to heart, especially at 
this moment when she is devour- 
ing herself in efforts to re-estab- 
lish the equilibrium of forces 
between herself and Germany, 
efforts which are perhaps useless, 
and are in any case calculated 
to reveal to foreign countries 
the state of internal decomposi- 
tion of the French Army. 

So far as the voyage of the 
Tsar is concerned, this furnishes 
a new proof of the good relations 
existing between the Imperial 
families and the two neighbour- 
ing Empires, which were inaugu- 
rated at the meeting at Potsdam 
and cemented at Baltischport. 
The Balkan war has in no way 
altered this. . . . 

Is it possible to infer from the 
visit of the English King and 
Queen to Berlin that an Anglo- 
German rapprochement is in pre- 
paration which would pursue 
a concrete aim such as the 
absorption of Belgian Congo by 
Germany ? The Berlin Post 
maintains that this is the case, 
and that such a rapprochement 
could only take place in the form 
of a colonial agreement. The 



64 



THE CRIME 



par l'experience de 1909 qu'un 
arrangement secret, conclu aux 
depens du Congo par les Cabinets 
de Londres et de Berlin, n'aurait 
rien d'impossible. Mais en 1909 
il ne s'agissait que d'une faible 
portion du territoire de la colonie 
beige, dont la possession nous 
etait, d'ailleurs, contestee par 
l'Angleterre. Aujourdliui la 
"Post " parle, comma d'une chose 
toute naturelle, de la cession 
volontaire ou forcee de notre 
empire africain. II n'est pas 
admissible, quelles que soient les 
convoitises des coloniaux et des 
pangermanistes allemands, que 
l'Angleterre consente a introduire 
au cceur de l'Afrique une rivale 
dont la puissance expansive et 
economique menacerait les 
colonies britanniques elles-memes, 
et a lui ceder le magnifique 
bassin du Congo, sans que 
l'Allemagne soit en mesure de lui 
offrir une compensation equiva- 
lente. . . . 



experiences of 1909 have taught 
us that a secret agreement be- 
tween the Cabinets of London 
and Berlin at the cost of the 
Congo is by no means an im- 
possibility. But in 1909 the 
question at issue was merely 
that of a small part of the terri- 
tory of the Belgian colony, the 
possession of which was, more- 
over, disputed against us by 
England. To-day the "Post " 
speaks of the voluntary or com- 
pulsory cession of our African 
Empire as if it were an entirely 
natural matter. Great as may 
be the covetousness of German 
colonial circles and of the Pan- 
Germans, it is not, however, 
to be assumed that England 
would be prepared to create in 
the heart of Africa a competitor 
whose expansive and economic 
power would threaten the Eng- 
lish Colonies, and that she would 
cede to her the magnificent 
basin of the Congo, unless Ger- 
many were in a position to 
offer her equivalent compen- 
sation. . . . 



No. 111. 



Berlin, le 20 fevrier 1914. 

U accord franco -allemand relatif 
a VAsie Mineure conclu tout 
dernierement a Berlin apres de 
difficiles negociations et grace a 
V intervention personnelle du Chan- 
celier, assure a la France une 
sphere d'action et d'influence 
considerable en Syrie. . . . 

. . . La diffieulte des negocia- 
tions a reside principalement dans 
la delimitation precise des zones 
d" influences francaises et alle- 
mandes (60 kilometres de chaque 
cote de la voie ferree), de fagon a 



Berlin, February 20th, 1914. 

The Franco -German agreement 
regarding Asia Minor, which was 
quite recently concluded in 
Berlin after difficidt negotiations 
and thanks to the personal 
intervention of the Chancellor, 
guarantees France a consider- 
able sphere of activity and of 
influence in Syria. . . . 

. . . The difficulty of the nego- 
tiations existed chiefly in the 
accurate delimitation of the 
French and German zones of 
influence (60 kilometres on each 
side of the railway) so as to 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 65 



eviter qu'elles ne se penetrent 
reciproquement. La France con- 
serve en outre les concessions cle 
chemin de fer qu'eile a obtenues 
de la Turquie dans la riche region 
miniere de l'ancienne Cappadoce, 
le long de la Mer Noire, et le 
railway tres productif de Smyrne 
a Kassaba. 

Sans doute elle est eliminee a 
tout jamais de la grande entreprise 
du Bagdadbahn, de cette ligne 
principale qui traversera depart en 
part VAsie Mineure et drainera 
ses produits. . . . 



prevent their interpenetration. 
France, moreover, keeps the 
railway concession which she 
obtained from Turkey in the 
rich mineral area of old Cappa- 
docia along the coast of the 
Black Sea, and the very pro- 
ductive railway from Smyrna to 
Kassaba. 

Without doubt she is excluded 
for all time from the great under- 
taking of the Baghdad Railway, 
this great line which will traverse 
Asia Minor from one side to the 
other and drain her products. . . . 



No. 113. 



Berlin, le 24 avril 1914. 

. . . Les Allemands sont per- 
suades que V Angleterre ne prendra 
jamais les armes, afin d'aider la 
France dreconquerir les provinces 
perdues. 

M. Cambon voit encore la main 
de M. Isvolsky dans cette cam- 
pagne inutile des journaux russes 
et francais. M. Isvolsky est de 
nouveau en grande faveur a 
St - Petersbourg, comme en 
temoigne la haute distinction, 
le cordon de Saint Alexandre 
Newski, qu'il vient de recevoir, 
mats a Paris il n'a pas Voreille du 
Cabinet radical. Aussi l'Ambas- 
sadeur de France a Berlin espere- 
t-il que l'intrigant diplomate 
ira bientot representer le Czar 
a Londres. II pourra s'y con- 
vaincre que V opinion publique 
n'est pas disposee a voir F Angle- 
terre perdre sa liberie d'action 
par un traite formel qui lierait 
son sort a celui de la Russie et 
de la France. 

II est curieux de constater que 
c'est le parti radical anglais qui 
eprouve le plus de repugnance a 

VOL. IV 



Berlin, April 24th, 1914. 

. . . The Germans are con- 
vinced that England will never 
take up arms to help France to 
reconquer the lost provinces. 

M. Cambon again sees the 
hand of M. Isvolsky in this 
purposeless campaign on the 
part of the Russian and French 
newspapers. M. Isvolsky is 
again in high favour at Petro- 
grad, as is witnessed by the high 
distinction of the Order of St. 
Alexandre Newski which he has 
just received, but in Paris he 
does not possess the ear of the 
Radical Cabinet. The French 
Ambassador in Berlin hopes for 
this reason that the intriguing 
diplomatist will soon represent 
the Tsar in London. He will 
there be able to convince himself 
that public opinion is not disposed 
to see England lose her freedom 
of action by a formal treaty which 
would link her fate to that of 
Russia and France. 

It is curious to note the fact 
that it is the English Radical 
party which feels most repug- 



66 



THE CRIME 



s'allier a la Republique. Ses ten- 
dances intransigeantes et son 
programme de reformes sociales 
devraient au contraire le rap- 
procher des radicaux francais 
qui poursuivent de 1' autre 
cote de la Manche, le meme 
but politique. Ses sympathies 
vont pourtant de preference a 
V Allemagne, malgre son gouveme- 
ment conservateur et plutot re- 
actionnaire. . . . 

II semble a un observateur 
vivant a Berlin que les liens de 
VEntente cordiale se sont quelque 
peu detendus, que la pointe de cette 
arme defensive n'est plus tournee 
exclusivement contre V Allemagne, 
comme elle le fut du temps du 
Hoi Edouard, et que la Triple 
Entente est devenue plutot un 
concert qu'une Union de Puis- 
sances, agissant ensemble dans 
certaines questions determinees 
pour la poursuite oVinterets com- 
muns. Mais cette facon de voir 
peut etre fausse ou influencee 
par la lecture d'ecrits politiques 
dus a des plumes allemandes. 
II serait fort interessant pour 
moi de savoir ce que pensent, 
du caractere qu'a pris l'Entente 
cordiale, mes Collegues de Lon- 
dres et de Paris. 

Baron Beyens. 



nance against an alliance with 
France. Their irreconcilable 
tendencies and their programme 
of social reform ought, on the 
contrary, to bring them closer 
to the French Radicals, who are 
pursuing the same political ends 
on the other side of the Channel. 
Yet their sympathies belong by 
preference to Germany in spite 
of its conservative and rather 
reactionary Government. . . . 

To an observer who lives in 
Berlin, it appears as if the bonds 
of the Entente Cordiale had to 
some extent become looser, as if 
the point of this weapon of defence 
were no longer directed exclusively 
against Germany, as in the time of 
King Edward, as if the Triple 
Entente had become a concert 
rather than a Union of Powers 
which in certain specific and 
closely defined questions act 
together in the pursuit of com- 
mon interests. But this method 
of looking at things may be false 
or may be influenced by the 
perusal of political pamphlets 
emanating from German pens. 
It would be very interesting to 
me to know what my colleagues 
in London and Paris think of the 
character which the Entente 
Cordiale has assumed. 

Baron Beyens. 



No. 118. 



Berlin, le 12 juin 1914. 

. . . Les elections legislatives en 
France, comme j'ai eu 1'honneur 
de vousl'ecrire le 14 mai dernier, 
avaient cause ici une grande 
satisfaction qui s'etait fait jour 
dans le langage de la presse, 
avec cette restriction cependant 
qu'il ne fallait pas esperer de la 
majorite de la nouvelle Chambre 



Berlin, June 12th, 1914. 

... As I had the honour to 
report to you on May 14th, the 
elections for the Legislature in 
France have here evoked great 
satisfaction, which found ex- 
pression in the language of the 
Press, with the restriction, how- 
ever, that no immediate abro- 
gation of the law regarding three 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 67 



1' abrogation immediate de la 
loi sur le service militaire de 
trois ans. . . . 

. . . Le peuple francais n'a pas 
montre a cette occasion V abne- 
gation patriotique dont il avait 
donne des preuves dans d'autres 
circonstances. Cela tient sans 
doute a la propagation des idees 
socialistes dans les classes in- 
ferieures de la nation. . . . 

II est resulte de cette agitation 
montree par les Francais une 
plus grande tension dans leurs 
rapports avec 1' Empire voisin 
et Videe, faussement repandue ou 
acceptee sans controle par les 
meilleurs esprits de ce pays-ci, 
que la guerre est inevitable dans 
un avenir rapproche, parce que 
la France la desire violemment 
et s'arme febrilement pour s'y 
preparer. A Paris les memes 
intentions sont pretees au 
Gouvernement Imperial dont plu- 
sieurs membres out eu parfois, 
il faut en convenir, des paroles 
malheureuses ; tel le Ministre 
de la Guerre parlant d'une " offen- 
sive foudroy 'ante ' ' et d'une ' ' attaque 
brusqaee" pour donner la victoire 
a l'armee allemande. II n'y a 
peut-etre encore aujourd'hui qu' 
une effroyable meprise chez Fun 
comme chez V autre des deux 
peuples. La majorite de la nation 
francaise ne veut certainement pas 
d'une guerre et cette guerre ne 
serait pas necessaire a, VAlle- 
magne. . . . 



years' military service was to 
be hoped for from the majority 
of the new Chamber. . . . 

... On this occasion the 
French people did not show the 
patriotic self-sacrifice of which it 
has given proof on other occa- 
sions . This is without doubt t o be 
attributed to the dissemination 
of socialistic ideas in the lower 
ranks of the nation. . . . 

The result of this agitation 
thus manifested by the French 
was a greater tension in the 
relations to the neighbouring 
empire, and the growth of the 
idea which is falsely disseminated 
or uncritically accepted by the 
best minds in this country that 
war is inevitable in the near 
future, because France ardently 
desires it and is feverishly arming 
to prepare herself for it. In 
Paris the same intentions are 
ascribed to the Imperial Govern- 
ment : several of its members 
have certainly at times made 
use of unfortunate expressions ; 
thus the Minister of War with his 
phrase about the " lightning 
offensive'''' and the "'unexpected 
attack'" to assure victory to the 
German Army. Perhaps even 
to-day there is nothing more 
than a terrible mutual mis- 
understanding in both the 
nations. The majority of the 
French people certainly does not 
want war, and Germany does not 
need this war. . . . 



No. 119. 

Berlin, le 2 juillet 1914. 



Berlin, July 2nd, 1914. 



Monsieur le Ministre, Monsieur le Ministre, 

La nouvelle que le Ministre The news that the Austro- 

d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade Hungarian Ambassador in Bel- 

avait ete charge de demander au grade has been instructed to 

Gouvernement serbe d'ouvrir une ask the Serbian Government 

F 2 



68 



THE CRIME 



instruction contre les menees 
anarchistes dont 1' Archiduc Fran- 
cois-Ferdinand et la Duchesse de 
Hohenberg ont ete les victimes et 
de laisser des agents de la police 
austro-hongroise prendre part aux 
recherches a excite un certain 
emoi dans les cercles diplo- 
matiques de Berlin. Le fait que 
la resolution d'adresser cette 
demande au Cabinet de Belgrade 
a ete prise a la suite d'une con- 
ference entre le Ministre des 
Affaires Etranglres, Comte Berch- 
told, le Chef de VEtat-mafor 
general Conrad von Hotzendorff, 
et le Ministre de la Guerre, Kro- 
batin, grossit les commentaires 
que la nouvelle provoque. . . . 

Mais tout de meme la demande 
soi't des regies ordinaires du droit. 
Quand un Etat accepte, a la 
suggestion d'un gouvernement 
etr anger, de poursuivre sur son 
territoire des criminels, il confie 
les recherches a ses propres 
agents. La Serbie consentira-t- 
elle a subir le concours de policiers 
austro-hongrois ? Si elle le refuse, 
comrae une atieinte portee a ses 
droits de souverainete, un con- 
flit s'en suivra-t-il qui etant 
donnee la colere legitime des 
gouvernements de Vienne et de 
Budapest et les manifestations 
anti-serbes dont des villes de la 
monarchie sont le theatre, pour- 
rait desenerer en hostilites ? 



La Serbie n'en viendrait la, se 
dit-on a Berlin, que si elle se 
sentait appuyee par la Russie et 
le gouvernement du czar ne la 
soutiendrait pas, car il doit lui- 
meme partager l'horreur et les 
craintes causees par le crime des 
regicides de Sarajewo. 

Baron Beyens. 



to open an inquiry into the 
anarchical intrigues to which 
the Archduke Francis Ferdinand 
and the Duchess of Hohenberg 
fell victims, and to allow the 
Austro -Hungarian police agents 
to take part in the investigations, 
has evoked a certain measure of 
uneasiness in the diplomatic 
circles of Berlin. The fact that 
the decision to address this 
demand to the Belgrade Cabinet 
was taken after a conference 
between Count Berchtold, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Conrad von Hotzendorff, the Chief 
of the General Staff, and Krobatin, 
the Minister for War, increases the 
commentaries provoked by the 
news. . . . 

But, nevertheless, the demand 
goes beyond the ordinary principles 
of law. When a State agrees, 
at the suggestion of a foreign 
Government, to proceed against 
criminals on its own territory, 
it entrusts its own officials with 
the investigations. Will Serbia 
agree to the collaboration of 
the Austro -Hungarian police 
officials ? If it refuses this as 
an intrusion in her sovereign 
rights, will there then arise a 
conflict which might lead to 
hostilities, bearing in mind the 
justified indignation of the 
Governments in Vienna and 
Budapest and the anti-Serbian 
manifestations which have taken 
place in certain towns in the 
monarchy ? 

It is said in Berlin that Serbia 
will only let matters go so far, 
if she feels herself supported by 
Russia, but the Government of 
the Tsar will not support her, 
for it must itself share the horror 
and the fear which the crime of 
the regicides of Serajevo has 
evoked. 

Baron Beyens. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 69 

Nowhere in Beyens' reports — a point to which I shall 
frequently recur in later passages — do we find elaborated 
the theme, so beloved of Greindl, of the one-sided, danger 
of war involved in the Entente's policy. Without con- 
cealing certain tendencies, especially in France and Russia, 
GreindPs successor repeatedly and with the utmost emphasis 
points to the dangerousness of the intransigeant Balkan 
policy pursued by Austria with the uncritical support of 
Germany, to the fatal effect of Pan- German propaganda 
and to similar phenomena. The ascendancy of the pacific 
elements in France, the victory at the election of 1914 of 
the Radicals and Socialists who were unconditionally 
friendly to peace, the peaceful intentions of Russian 
policy conducted by Sazonof, the purely defensive tendency 
of the Entente Coalition, this " weapon of defence," the 
symptomatic significance of the German agreements with 
England and France regarding spheres of interest in Asia 
Minor, etc. — in short, all the factors which furthered peace 
are emphasised by the new Belgian Ambassador in an 
entirely impartial manner, and the disturbers of the 
peace on both sides are fittingly branded. 

From Beyens' reports the German Government can 
certainly not deduce a shadow of justification for their 
action in ascribing to the Entente Powers any intention 
to attack or to strangle their opponents. The course 
they would have preferred would have been to silence 
this inconvenient diplomatist altogether, but even this 
would not have done. After the ambassadorial reports 
which had been found in the Brussels archives had been 
so far sifted that only those from three capitals (and of 
those only a very small fraction) were published, it would 
have been impossible to break off the Berlin reports sud- 
denly with GreindPs departure in June 1912. This 
would have been too surprising and too suspicious a 
manipulation. In consequence, from among Beyens' 
reports those which were comparatively favourable were 
selected, but the compilers prudently stopped at the 
report of July 2nd, 1914, because in this report there is 
already to be found the sharpest attacks on the probable 
Austrian demands against Serbia which were at that time 
already being canvassed, and the later reports of the 



70 THE CRIME 

Belgian Ambassador were certainly crushing for Austria, 
the battering-ram which had been pushed into the fore- 
ground, and for Germany, the real instigator of the war. 

Resume of the External Defects of the Collection. 

Thus we see that the collection of documents published 
by the Foreign Office cannot resist the simplest critical 
examination. Even the defects which are externally 
recognisable deprive it of any value as evidence. 

I summarise these defects again as follows : 

(a) The collection contains only reports from three 
capitals of the Great Powers, while the reports from the 
three other capitals are completely absent. 

(b) Only a small portion even of the reports from Berlin, 
Paris, and London, dating from the years between 1905 
and 1914, are printed, and these represent a prejudiced 
selection, while by far the greater portion of the reports 
is missing. 

(c) Among the reports which are printed those of Baron 
Greindl, the Belgian Ambassador in Berlin, occupy a 
disproportionately large space. The explanation of this 
is to be found in the reports themselves, which taking 
them as a whole follow blindly and credulously in the 
track of Berlin politics and their journalistic abettors. 

(d) The collection of reports breaks suddenly off on 
July 2nd, 1914, that is to say, just at the beginning of 
the European crisis which led to this war. 

(e) The collection of reports contains a series of astonish- 
ing and suspicious lacunae which " accidentally " almost 
always coincide with political events in which the German 
Government played a baneful role, giving occasion to 
sharp criticism. 

(/) The second Hague Conference of 1907, as well as 
the Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding in 
the following years, down to 1912, are treated in an 
entirely inadequate manner in the printed reports. 

(g) The typographical arrangement of the collection of 
reports produces in the reader a false picture of its contents. 
All the observations favourable to Germany and unfavour- 
able to the Entente are emphasised in heavy type ; on 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 71 

the other hand, everything that is unfavourable to Ger- 
many and favourable to the Entente Powers is reproduced 
in ordinary type. 

(h) In various places where the reporting Ambassadors 
refer to their earlier reports, these earlier reports are not 
to be found in the collection. 

In the eyes of the impartial investigator these externally 
recognisable defects in the collection of documents deprive 
it of all value. The material existing in the Brussels 
archives has been so sifted and resifted and again resifted 
by the German Government, that it need occasion no sur- 
prise if in the end a complete picture emerges flattering 
to the authorities in the Wilhelmstrasse. The officials 
of the Foreign Office who were entrusted with this agreeable 
task of sifting have thrown almost 1,400 reports into the 
great retort ; they have allowed more than 1,200 to fall 
through the holes in the sieve ; among the remaining 200 
they have made a further careful selection, they have 
separated the chaff from the grain, and then in the remnant 
designed for publication they have typographically em- 
phasised all that is advantageous, without sparing the 
printer's ink. And now they seek to persuade the world : 
What we are placing before you is the view of Belgian 
diplomacy regarding the attitude of the various Great 
Powers, and this view is at the same time the authentic 
expression of reality. Futile endeavour ! The collection 
of the Foreign Office proves no more than all the similar 
attempts of the German Government, namely, the con- 
vulsive effort of the guilty to whitewash themselves, and 
their cunning unscrupulousness in procuring the necessary 
soft-soap. 

THE INTERNAL DEFECTS OF THE REPORTS. 
The Personal Position of the Belgian Reporters. 

Even if the collection were not compiled in this ten- 
dencious manner, even if it were not so incomplete and 
defective as it really is, the views of the Belgian Ambas- 
sadors in London, Paris, and Berlin must nevertheless be 
accepted only cum grano salis. 



72 THE CRIME 

The Belgian Ambassadors were representatives of a 
small neutral State, who in the nature of things were 
not invited to participate in the negotiations between 
the Great Powers. Everything that was the subject of 
conversation and negotiation with the Ambassadors in 
the cabinets of the Foreign Ministers, everything that 
was discussed and decided at the meetings of monarchs 
and the leading Ministers of the Great Powers, only reached 
the ears of the Belgian Ambassadors at second hand 
as a matter of hearsay ; in the interests of their country 
these men may well have devoted special attention to 
the discussions and decisions of the great, but they were 
certainly not taken into the confidence of any of the 
leading Ministers or diplomatists. One thing is clear : 
on the peace of Europe depended also the weal or the 
woe of the small country, so unhappily hemmed in 
between the great States, whose territory had already 
so often been called upon to furnish the battlefield for 
the struggles of the great. For this reason the Ambassa- 
dors of Belgium may constantly have been pricking their 
ears so that they might observe in due time every distant 
storm ; but this very anxiety on the subject of European 
hurricanes, comprehensible as it is, may often have 
clouded their vision, may often have conjured up before 
them terrifying phantoms which in reality had no exist- 
ence. That feelings of anxiety easily lead to diseased 
imaginations and to hallucinations is a familiar fact in 
psychiatry. 

Had the Kingdom of Belgium been entirely unconcerned 
in European conflicts, had its security and existence 
been entirely independent of such conflicts, it might be 
possible to recognise in the reports of the Belgian Am- 
bassadors the quality which the introductory words of 
the Berlin Foreign Office attribute to them, namely, that 
they are an objective diplomatic account by the " repre- 
sentatives of a State which is only indirectly involved in 
great world-politics, merely as spectators, so to speak." 
In reality, however, as experience shows, and as every 
diplomatic or military expert must long ago have foreseen, 
Belgium was directly concerned in the highest degree in 
European events. According to the plans of the German 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 73 

General Staff, which were everywhere known, Belgium 
was singled out as the whipping-boy on whose back the 
Great Powers would fight out their sanguinary conflicts. 
In these circumstances the position of the Belgian Am- 
bassadors was a peculiarly difficult and responsible one. 
It was their duty to keep their Government in touch 
with all that was taking place between the Great Powers, 
to collect and report all the symptoms which pointed to 
tension between the Great Powers or to the danger of 
war ; on the other hand, they were never in a position, 
of their own observation, to report what was occurring 
in the Chancelleries of the Great Powers. In the 
ante-chambers and corridors of all the diplomatists and 
statesmen directly concerned they had to fish about 
for news, to dance attendance, to spy and infer, and had 
then to submit to their Government the uncertain result 
of their laborious investigations as reports on the actual 
situation, whereas in truth they were merely personal 
reports of their own opinions, a hotch-potch from all 
possible sources, more or less turbid, seen through the 
spectacles of the diplomatist in question. 

The German Diplomatists' " Love of Truth." 

In many cases also the Belgian Ambassadors, the " dis- 
interested spectators " of the world-drama, were inten- 
tionally kept in the dark by the chief actors. In this 
task of designedly misleading the Belgians, the German 
statesmen in particular showed an astonishing degree of 
skill ; the difficult task, indeed, devolved on them, in 
presence of the rumours which had for years been current 
in Europe that Germany in the " inevitable " war with 
France would march upon Paris through Belgium, of 
calming the small neighbouring country and lulling it 
into a deceptive security. Particularly instructive as an 
example of this method is No. 12 of the first Belgian Grey 
Book to which I have already referred in my book (J' accuse, 
p. 278). In 1911, on the occasion of the diplomatic dis- 
cussions regarding the fortifications of Flushing, these 
fears as to a violation of neutrality by Germany had 
reappeared in a particularly active form. Herr von 



74 THE CRIME 

Bethmann was asked by the Belgian Government to 
dispel these fears, in the interests of the good relations 
between the two countries, by a public declaration in the 
Reichstag. What, however, was the reply of the German 
Chancellor ? Germany had no intention of violating Belgian 
neutrality, but he could not make a public declaration 
in this sense, as thereby the military situation of Germany 
in regard to the French Republic might be weakened in 
the event of war : France, secured on the north, might 
concentrate all her force on the east. 

A similar assurance was given by Herr von Jagow, the 
Foreign Secretary, in the Budget Commission of the 
Reichstag on April 29th, 1913, on the occasion of the 
discussion of the great Army Bill : he answered an inquiry 
on the subject made by a Social Democrat with the 
definite declaration that Germany was determined to 
respect under all circumstances the neutrality of Belgium, 
which was guaranteed by international treaties. Herr 
von Heeringen, who was then Minister for War, confirmed 
the statement of the Foreign Secretary (see the enclosure 
to No. 12 of the first Belgian Grey Book). 

As no one will be so hardy as to assert that the plans of 
the German General Staff, presupposing the passage through 
Belgium, were not lying in the drawers of the General 
Staff in Berlin in a state of complete readiness long before 
the outbreak of the present war, it is possible to imagine 
the " love of truth " of the German diplomatists and the 
sangfroid with which the Belgian statesmen in Berlin, 
and possibly also those elsewhere, were deceived according 
to the needs of high politics. It is indeed amusing to observe 
these same men, Bethmann and Jagow, who had given 
evidence of so great a love of truth in their dealings with 
the Belgian diplomatists, now seeking to represent their 
reports, in so far as after a careful sifting they are favour- 
able to their cause, as models of the art of writing authentic 
history. If the leading Ministers of the other Great Powers 
deceived the Belgian Ambassadors half as .much as was 
done in the Wilhelmstrasse, it is easy to imagine how faith- 
ful must have been the picture of the European situation 
which was drawn by the Belgians in their reports. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 75 

In this connection the fact is also worthy of note that 
the above-mentioned incidents of 1911 and 1913 are not 
so much as mentioned in the collection of reports, although 
the question of the possible march of the German armies 
through Belgium was one of life and death for this small 
country. In his reports written in 1911, so far as the 
Foreign Office has printed them, Baron Greindl is entirely 
silent regarding the inquiry addressed to Bethmann and 
the answer which he gave. He cannot possibly have 
failed to report on this pre-eminently important incident. 
The report was either unfavourable to the German states- 
men, or else it was rightly felt in Berlin that after what 
actually happened in August, 1914, Bethmann's former 
reassuring statement was bound to appear as an obvious 
lie. This explains why this incident is not mentioned in 
the German collection of reports. 

The same plan was followed with the incident of 1913. 
In this case, however, it is possible to prove documentarily 
the tactics of suppression : Grey Book I (enclosure to 
No. 12) gives us Baron Beyens' original report, telling us 
minutely of the incidents which took place in the Budget 
Commission. This report, however, dating from the 
spring of 1913, must have been found among the docu- 
ments unearthed in Brussels, but it is missing in the 
German collection. 

These two suppressions of highly important documents 
furnish a valuable contribution to the material on which 
to form a judgment on the German collection of docu- 
ments. 

% sj: :js < $ . :j: $ 

Another good example of the way in which German 
diplomatists deceived those of Belgium is furnished by 
Nos. 19 and 20 of the first Grey Book. In the course of 
August 2nd, Davignon, the Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, communicated to Herr von Below-Saleske, the 
German Ambassador, the statement which Klobukowski, 
the French Ambassador in Brussels, had given the Belgian 
Government on the previous day with reference to the 
observation of Belgian neutrality. Herr von Below ex- 
pressed his thanks for the great attention, but regretted 



76 THE CRIME 

that he had not yet received any instruction from his 
Government to make an official communication on the 
subject ; his personal view as to the feeling of security 
with which Belgium could regard her Eastern neighbour 
was well known. The German Ambassador gave no 
further answer in reply to Davignon's observation that 
while he had no ground, after the innumerable previous 
utterances of the German Ambassador, to doubt their 
absolute correctness, nevertheless in the interests of his 
country he would attach great importance to a formal 
declaration by the German Government. On the other 
hand, at seven o'clock on the same evening, he handed 
to the Belgian Minister the Ultimatum (Grey Book I, 
No. 20) in which, with a view to avoiding military violence, 
the passage through Belgium was demanded as " essential 
for the self-defence of Germany," and it was explained by 
reference to the intentions to force a passage, lyingly 
attributed to France. 

This example also shows with what love of truth Belgian 
diplomacy was treated by that of Germany. Let us 
suppose that occurrences similar to those which took place 
on the afternoon and the evening of August 2nd between 
the Belgian Minister and the German Ambassador had 
taken place in any other European capital between the 
Belgian Ambassador there and the Foreign Minister in 
question, that the Ambassador had sent home a separate 
report on each of the two incidents, but that a compiler 
of documents had printed the first report only, while 
suppressing the second ; — such a hypothesis gives one 
some idea how a tendencious selection of documents, 
even without direct falsification, may distort the truth, 
and indeed entirely reverse it. 

Belgium, a Common Object of Plundee. 

I said above that the Belgian reports — quite apart from 
their tendencious compilation by the German Government 
— further possessed little or no value as evidence, inasmuch 
as the Belgian Ambassadors were informed of high politics 
only by hearsay, and because they were frequently directly 
deceived by the leading statesmen of the Great Powers, 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 77 

The dishonesty of the great towards the small was also 
attributable in many cases to the fact that Belgium, like 
other small States (for example, Portugal), was considered 
as a common object of plunder, and its oversea possessions 
were viewed as objects of compensation for the settlement 
of the rivalries of the Great European Powers. 

An interesting example of this is provided by No. 2 
in the second Grey Book, the text of which, on account 
of its importance, I reproduce below. It relates to a 
report of Baron Beyens of April 2nd, 1914, regarding a 
confidential communication which Jules Cambon, the 
French Ambassador, had made to the Belgian Ambassador 
regarding a conversation between Cambon and Jagow : 

Grey Book II, No. 2. 

Berlin, le 2 avril 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

M. l'Ambassadeur de France m'a fait part ce matin confidentielle- 
ment d'une conversation qu'il avait eue tout dernierement avec M. 
de Jagow, apres un diner intime auquel il avait ete invite chez ce 
dernier. 

Pendant une recente absence de M. Cambon, le Secretaire d'Etat 
aux Colonies, rencontrant le Charge d'affaires de France dans une 
soiree et, quelques jours apres, 1' attache naval, leur avait dit que 
1' Allemagne et la France devraient bien s'entendrepour la construction 
et le raccordement des lignes de chemin de fer qu'elles projetaient de 
construire en Afrique, afin que ces lignes ne se fissent pas concurrence. 

M. Cambon demanda ce que signiflaient ces ouvertures. M. de 
Jagow repondit que la question etait encore a 1'etude, mais qu'il 
etait d'avis, comme M. Solf, qu'une entente entre ies deux pays et 
aussi avec l'Angleterre serait des plus utiles. Dans ce cas, reprit 
l'Ambassadeur, il faudrait inviter la Belgique a conferer avec nous, 
car elle construit de nouveaux chemins de fer au Congo et, a mon 
sentiment, il serait preferable que la Conference se tint a Bruxelles. 

" Oh ! non," repondit le Secretaire d'Etat, " car c'est aux depens de 
la Belgique que notre accord devrait se conclure. — Comment cela ? — A T e 
trouvez-vous pas que le Roi Leopold a place sur les ipaules de la Belgique 
un poids trop lourd ? La Belgique n'est pas assez riche pour mettre 
en valeur ce vaste domaine. C'est une entreprise au-dessus de ses 
moyens financiers et de ses forces d'expansion. Elle sera obligee a 
y renoncer." 

L'Ambassadeur trouva ce jugement tout a fait exagere. 

M. de Jagow ne se tint pas pour battu. II developpa 1' opinion que 
seules les grandes Puissances sont en situation de coloniser. II devoila 
meme le fond de sa pensee en soutenant que les petits Etats nepourraient 



78 THE CRIME 

plus mener, dans la transformation qui s'operait en Europe au profit 
des nationalites les plus fortes, par suite du developpement des forces 
economiques et des moyens de communication, I'existence indepen- 
dante dont ils avaient joui jusqu'a present. lis etaient destines a 
disparaitre on a graviter dans Vorbite des grandes Puissances. 

L'Ambassadeur repondit qtie ces vues n' etaient pas du tout celles 
de la France ni, autant qu'il pouvait le savoir, celles de l'Angleterre ; 
qu'il persistait a penser que certains accords etaient necessaires pour 
la mise en valeur de l'Afrique, mais que, dans les conditions pre- 
sentees par M. de Jagow, toute entente etait impossible. 

Sur cette reponse, M. de Jagow se hata de dire qu'il n'avait ex- 
prime que des idees toutes personnelles, qu'il n'avait parle qxCa titre 
prive et non en Secretaire d'Etat s'adressant a l'Ambassadeur de 
France. 

M. Cambon n'en attache pas moins une signification tres serieuse 
aux vues que M. de Jagow n'a pas craint de devoiler dans cet entretien. 
II a pense qu'il etait de notre interet de connaitre les dispositions dont 
le dirigeant officiel de la politique allemande est aninie a Vegard des 
petits Etats et de lews colonies. 

J'ai remercie l'Ambassadeur de sa communication absolument 
confidentielle. Vous en apprecierez certainement toute la gravite. 

Baron Beyens. 

The conversation here reproduced has, it is true, been 
denied by Jagow ; I have, however, no reason to attach 
greater importance to this dementi than to the statement 
of the Belgian Ambassador whom the Berlin Foreign 
Office itself cites as a Crown witness in these cases 
in which it believes it can deduce favourable conclusions 
from his reports. I have equally little reason to distrust 
Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, who has always 
been regarded by all his colleagues as absolutely trust- 
worthy and truth-loving — a man who was honourably 
mentioned even by the German semi-official Press on his 
departure from Berlin, whose numerous reports in the 
Yellow Book cannot fail to produce on every unprejudiced 
reader the impression of sincerity and of an earnest desire 
for peace. 

Jagow, moreover, in no way disputed the genuineness of 
Beyens' report, but merely the substance of his alleged 
conversation with Cambon. Beyens' report is thus 
recognised as authentic, and it is merely the account given 
by Cambon, the French Ambassador, to Beyens, which is 
described as not being in accordance with the facts. It 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 79 

would also be a difficult matter for the German Govern- 
ment to dispute the authenticity of Beyens' report, inas- 
much as they must have found this report in the original 
in the Brussels archives. In fact, they print from 1914 
four reports of Beyens, those of February 20th, April 
24th, June 12th, and July 2nd. Between the first and 
second of these reports comes that of April 2nd, of which 
an extract or a duplicate must have remained in the hands 
of the Belgian Government. Why did Herr Bethmann 
and Herr Jagow suppress Beyens' report of April 2nd ? 
Because it was inconvenient and compromising for them, 
because it was a proof of the brutal ruthlessness of the 
great Germany against the small Belgium, a proof of 
Germany's imperialistic tendencies in the direction of 
conquest. 

The suppression of the report in question is a further 
symptom of the tactics of falsification pursued by the 
authorities in the Wilhelmstrasse. It is extremely to be 
regretted that the Belgian Government are apparently not 
in a position to fill up other gaps in the German collection 
in the same way as has been done by means of the report 
of April 2nd, 1914. From this fortuitous example it is 
possible to imagine how changed a picture would emerge 
if all the lacunae in the German collection of reports were 
completed in the same way — above all if the reports from 
the three missing capitals were added and the collection 
were continued down to the outbreak of war. Since such 
a completion and amplification is apparently impossible 
— presumably because of the absence of the relevant 
documents — the conscientious inquirer is obliged to fasten 
on a few definite examples, and from these to draw his 
conclusions regarding the whole. 

So far as Jagow's utterances are concerned, the report 
of April 2nd, 1914, breathes the same spirit as that which 
has governed and still governs the whole of Pan-German 
literature both before and during the war, the spirit of 
ruthless lust of plunder existing in the powerful great 
against the impotent and weak, the spirit to which Bern- 
hardi gives expression in the principles : The time of small 
neutral States is past, they must either disappear or seek 



80 THE CRIME 

support from one of the great States ; above all, they are 
neither justified nor fitted to possess extensive colonial 
territories which they are unable to exploit to the same 
degree as a great Power. 1 The spirit of Bernhardi and of 
Pan-Germany moves over the conversation between 
Jagow and Cambon and gives it internal probability, 
apart from its authentication by the French diplomatist. 



I have already spoken of Baron Greindl's Prussian way 
of thinking. But Count Lalaing and Baron Guillaume, 
the Ambassadors in London and Paris, as members of the 
Clerical Conservative Government which had for years be- 
fore the war been in power in Belgium, were also bound in the 
nature of things to feel more sympathy with the absolutist 
and reactionary Imperial Powers than with the democratic 
and progressive Western Powers. Moreover, it is not to 
be forgotten that the Government and the people in Belgium 
were anything but benevolently disposed towards the 
English on account of their African policy, involving, as it 
did, a menace to the independence of the Congo State — 
a policy which at times threatened to degenerate into an 
open conflict between Great Britain and the small neutral 
State. It is a well-known fact, confirmed by many 
political incidents, that the English had for a time a strong 
desire for the Belgian Congo or for a part of it in order to 
round off their African possessions. There was a danger 
that this English desire might agree with the voracious 
German hunger for an increase of colonial power, and that 
the promising African Empire of the small defenceless 
State might become the innocent victim of the ravenousness 
of the two Great Powers. How far the authorities in Berlin 
had gone in contemplating this common robbery of a third 
party is proved by the conversation between Jagow and 
Cambon mentioned above (Grey Book II, No. 2). The 
fact that England had at first cast covetous eyes on the 
Belgian Congo Empire, the animated campaign which 
developed in consequence between the Governments and 
the Press of the two countries, may also have been a 
contributory cause in disposing the Belgian Ambassadors 

1 See also, on this, J'accuse, p. 234. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 81 

in advance to an attitude unfavourable to English 
policy. 

Apart from the external and statistically demonstrable 
defects of the German collection of documents, there are 
thus also many internal grounds which show the reports 
of the three Belgian Ambassadors to be not an objective 
historical account, but much rather to be partial and 
subjectively influenced. 

The Legend of the Anglo-Belgian Offensive 
Alliance. 

I should like here to observe this in parenthesis : In 
publishing the Belgian ambassadorial reports with their 
undeniable reflections — in places — on the policy of the 
Entente, and in presenting them to us as an historically 
faithful picture of European reality, the German Govern- 
ment — naturally without meaning to do so and without 
even thinking of it — cut away the ground from their 
assertion of a conspiracy between Belgium and the Entente 
Powers, directed against Germany. It is obvious that 
Belgium had, and could have, only one governing interest, 
the maintenance of the peace of Europe, which at the same 
time implied the maintenance of her neutrality. This 
appears in every sentence of the ambassadorial reports, 
and further it is not denied by the German Government. 
How, then, is it supposed that Belgium should have come 
to unite herself with just these Powers whose policy is 
repeatedly represented in the ambassadorial reports as 
involving a challenge to German chauvinism, and as 
constituting in this sense a danger of war ? Why should 
she have united herself against just that Power which, 
according to the tendencious collection of reports, appears 
as the lover and maintainer of peace, as the innocent 
victim of the militaristic and nationalistic tendencies on 
the other side ? Since Belgium was interested only in 
peace, it was after all but natural, assuming that she were 
in any way to emerge from her strict neutrality, that she 
should have united herself to that Power which ostensibly 
— according to Germany's assertions and certain passages 
in Greindl's reports — was the surest guardian of the peace 
of Europe. 

VOL. IV g 



82 THE CRIME 

In so far as concerns the alleged Anglo-Belgian con- 
spiracy of Barnardiston and Ducarne in 1906 — that 
alleged " agreement " (convention) which in truth was 
merely a non-committal " conversation " between military 
experts — we know from Greindl's report of April 5th, 1906 
(Belgian Documents, No. 17), that this conversation between 
the English Military Attache and the Chief of the Belgian 
General Staff was well known to the Ambassador in Berlin. 
We likewise know Greindl's sympathies for Germany and 
his blind confidence in Germany's love of peace. Are we 
to believe that Greindl would for a moment have continued 
to hold his office as Ambassador in Berlin if these dis- 
cussions between the English colonel and the Chief of the 
Belgian General Staff had had, even in the remotest degree, 
the character of a " convention," a rapprochement, or a 
complicity of Belgium with England, if they had been 
pointed against Germany ? This one consideration in 
itself cuts away all ground from the charge brought against 
Belgium of having been faithless and of having acted in 
violation of her neutrality. 

There is nothing that so completely destroys the legend 
of the Anglo-Belgian offensive alliance against Germany 
as the German collection of reports. Either the reports 
speak the truth, that is to say they are not tendenciously 
compiled so as to produce an untrue picture, and in that 
case the Anglo-Belgian conspiracy is at once unmasked as 
an invention, or else the reports say what is not true, that 
is, the tendencious compilation falsifies the whole picture 
of Europe (which would appear entirely different if refer- 
ence were made to all the Belgian ambassadorial reports 
from all the capitals), and in that case all the conclusions 
which the German Government seek to deduce from their 
collection collapse. Then the alleged proof, on the one hand, 
of " the German Emperor's love of peace, the pacific 
tendencies of German policy and Germany's great patience " 
is left in the air owing to the absence of the appropriate 
evidence, and so on the other hand is the proof of the 
" provocative action of England and France, Isvolsky's 
rage for revenge," etc. It is the old experience : He who 
wants to prove too much, proves nothing. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 83 

WHAT SHOULD THE REPORTS PROVE? 
WHAT DO THE? REALLY PROVE? 

So much for the general value of the collection of docu- 
ments. Let us, however, assume that all the external 
and internal defects, inherent in this collection, did not 
exist ; that it really gave a faithful picture of European 
politics in the years from 1905 to 1914, objectively pre- 
sented by impartial observers, the question remains : 
What then do these reports really contain ? What, on 
Germany's statement, ought they to prove ? What 
defensive thesis of the German Government should they 
support ? What do they prove in reality ? 

So far as I am aware, this investigation, which of course 
forms the crucial point in judging these documents, has 
hitherto been undertaken only by such writers as have 
expressly taken as their task the defence of Germany and 
Austria, the proof of their innocence of the war. I have 
already mentioned above that extracts from the Belgian 
ambassadorial reports form one of the favourite and most 
approved methods of proving Germany's innocence. 
If even the official extracts from the total extant material 
give such a one-sided picture as is presented by the col- 
lection, it is possible to imagine what emerges when biassed 
writers arrange extracts from the extracts, and seek to 
place their doubly-sifted material before us as historical 
truth. The dark-grey picture sketched by the German 
Government becomes a pitch-dark night of raven blackness, 
enveloping with its dark wings the guilty Entente Govern- 
ments. 

What railing once rose to my lip 

If any poor girl made a slip ! 

My tongue hard words could scarcely frame 

Enough to brand another's shame ; 

It looked so black that blacken it 

Howe'er I might they seemed unfit 

To stamp its blackness infinite. 1 

These words of Gretchen at the well appear to be 
the guiding star of the German alarmists, who have 
taken upon themselves the easy and grateful task of collect- 

1 [Sir Theodore Martin's translation.] 

G 2 



84 THE CRIME 

ing from the German publication all the statements 
containing any reflection upon the Entente Powers, which 
are already emphasised in heavy black type, and with the 
help of these of concocting an apparently deadly poisonous 
drink for the disturbers of the peace, England, Russia 
and France. 

Confronted with this method of accusation, which has 
hitherto been unimpeached and undisputed, it appears to 
me to be at last high time to inquire thoroughly into these 
matters, to subject the Belgian documents to a careful 
analysis, to determine what is the conclusion which 
ostensibly they are supposed to support, and to investigate 
whether and how far this alleged proof can be regarded 
as having been furnished. 

What is it that the German Government propose to prove 
by means of their publication ? When all is said their object 
can only be to free themselves from the guilt of the war. 
Such an exoneration could, however, be supported on two 
grounds only : 

either on the ground that an attack was in fact made 
by the Entente Powers in the summer of 1914 ; 

or — if the standpoint of the preventionists is 
assumed — on the ground of an attack which it can be 
demonstrated was intended to be carried out at a 
later dale and which it was necessary to anticipate 
at the most favourable moment. 

If the publication of the ambassadorial reports is supposed 
to have any meaning or purpose, it can only have for its 
end to justify either the German war of defence or the 
German war of prevention. 

Does the publication achieve this object ? Is it, in fact, 
calculated to serve this purpose ? 

(a) It cannot serve to justify the war of defence, if only 
because the collection ends on July 2nd, 1914, that is to 
say, three weeks before the Austrian Ultimatum. As 
has already been mentioned, Beyens' report of July 2nd 
already contains in anticipation a sharp criticism of the 
demands which it was foreseen Austria would address to 
Serbia. As a matter of course, at this early stage of the 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 85 

matter there is no question of any desire, intention, or 
menace of war on the part of the Entente Powers — as 
indeed Beyens, in contradistinction to Greindl, nowhere 
ascribes intentions of war to the Entente Governments. 
This one fact in itself — the conclusion of the collection of 
reports five days after the murder of Serajevo and twenty- 
one days before the Austrian Ultimatum- — proves that the 
collection of documents is absolutely without significance 
as evidence of the war of defence, and indeed that it has 
nothing to do with the actual conflict which led to the 
war. This disposes once for all of the view that the official 
publication is intended to prove the thesis of the war of 
defence. 

(b) There thus only remains the thesis of the war of 
prevention. To prove this thesis can alone be the object 
of the German publication. In so far, however, as this 
thesis is the object of their publication, the German 
Government disown their own words, and give the lie to 
all the Imperial, Royal, and Ministerial proclamations, 
speeches, and appeals, which have continued without 
interruption down to the present day to hold up, to the 
hapless victims of this butchery of the nations, the " shame- 
fully attacked Fatherland " as a symbol of consolation. 
Even if it were true that the Belgian documents proved 
the existence in fact of all the presuppositions which, 
according to our earlier explanations, could justify a pre- 
ventive war on the theory of the preventionists, neverthe- 
less the German Government by the mere fact of venturing 
upon such a demonstration would acknowledge and 
confess : " We are waging no war of defence, but we were 
forced to a preventive war of aggression, since otherwise 
we would have been attacked by the other side." 

The situation is thus extremely unfavourable for the 
German Government. If they succeed in proving that the 
others wanted to attack us, with their " war of defence " 
they stand convicted as liars before the world and before 
their own people. If they do not succeed in proving 
this, the Belgian publication has completely failed in 
its purpose : the German war will not even have been 
justified as a war of prevention, much less then as a war 
of defence. 



86 THE CRIME 

Do the Reports prove the Existence of a Warlike 
Aggressive Conspiracy on the Part of the Entente 

Powers ? 

Now I maintain : 

That the collected ambassadorial reports — ten- 
denciously as they may have been selected, assailable 
as they may be individually, defective as they may be 
taken as whole — furnish not a trace, not a semblance 
of support for the view that the Entente Powers had 
intended to undertake an armed attack upon Germany 
either in 1914 or at a later date. 

Even the extracts from the extracts which confront us 
everywhere in the war literature of Germany prove no 
intention to attack, no offensive conspiracy, no military 
aggressive plans, but merely nationalistic tendencies in 
France, agitations inspired by jealousies in England, Pan- 
Slav antipathies in Russia. It would be a foolish endeavour 
to seek to deny the existence of these tendencies of thought 
in the Entente countries, which are repeatedly mentioned 
in the reports, as at least an expression of the opinion of 
the Belgian Ambassadors. I expressly admit that the 
Ambassadors in London, Paris, and Berlin frequently 
speak of a dangerous policy pursued by King Edward, of 
a resuscitation of chauvinistic tendencies in France, of 
Isvolsky's thirst for intrigue and revenge. All these 
passages are emphasised in heavy type in the German 
publication and anyone can easily find them. It is 
therefore unnecessary that I should print them here ; I 
confirm their existence and hope by doing so to be proof 
against the charge that my quotations are prejudiced 
and one-sided, that what is unfavourable to my thesis of 
accusation is maliciously omitted. In making this ad- 
mission I must, however, again emphasise that it may be 
presumed that even this reflection on the Entente Powers 
would appear in an entirely different light, or at least 
would be compensated by an equal or stronger reflection 
on the Central Powers, if all the ambassadorial reports 
from all capitals had been published. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 87 

Nevertheless, I can and will readily admit that the 
Belgian Ambassadors, so far as their reports are before us, 
say much that involves a charge on the rulers and the 
Governments of the Entente Powers. I can all the more 
readily admit this, inasmuch as what they do say is of no 
importance whatever for the question with which we are 
here engaged. So far as the Belgian reports are regarded 
as evidence, the war of defence is, as we have already seen, 
excluded for reasons outside the reports. For the war of 
prevention it is not, however, sufficient to prove the 
existence on the other side of suspicious, envious, revengeful 
and intriguing feelings, nor even the existence of a provo- 
cative policy. The preventive war demands for its justi- 
fication — if indeed it is ever to be justified, a view which 
in my opinion is to be rejected on principle — but even in 
the opinion of the preventionists it demands the definite, 
demonstrable intention of an attack by arms on the other 
side. 1 

The question which we have to investigate is thus, 
stated simply, as follows : 

Do the Belgian ambassadorial reports prove the 
existence of an intention on the part of the Entente 
Powers to carry out an attack by war on Germany or 
her allies ? Yes or No ? 

If the answer is in the affirmative, the preventive war, 
at any rate according to the theories of the preventionists, 
is justified. If the answer is in the negative, the preventive 
war is without justification ; in that case the documents are, 
just as in the case of the war of defence, of no value for the 
preventive war either. 

****** 

If the documents had contained anything that hinted 
at real military aggressive intentions on the part of the 
Entente Powers, the German Government would not have 
been slow to point this out with special distinctness in the 
introductory chapter. Any indication of this kind is 
wanting. Even the German Government can deduce from 

1 See on this The Crime Vol. II., Chap. I. The Preventive War. 
Chap. II. The Theory and the Practice of the Preventive War. 



88 THE CRIME 

the Belgian reports nothing more than " accusatory material 
against the policy of the Entente Powers." 

The English Government as the mainspring, King Edward as the 
standard-bearer of the efforts made by the Entente in the direction 
of the isolation of Germany, form a constantly recurring theme of the 
reports. . . . 

English presumption and the claims of England to a monopoly 
of world-trade and to the control of the seas, the activities of the 
English Press of incitement, are characterised in fitting language. 
The insincerity of France's Moroccan policy, the continued breaches 
of treaty towards Germany of which France, supported by England, 
was guilty in Morocco, are established. The writers point out 
the growth of French chauvinism and the recrudescence of Franco - 
German points of conflict as the result of the Entente with 
England. . . . 

These and the remaining phrases of the introductory 
chapter show in the vague and nebulous accusations 
brought against the other side that even the German 
Government are unable to infer from the Belgian reports the 
existence of an aggressive conspiracy. The cardinal 
point of the German accusation is the charge that the 
policy initiated by King Edward was directed to the 
" Isolation " of Germany, and that in this way it en- 
gendered the state of European tension which finally led 
to the war. 



What is meant by the " Isolation of Germany " ? 

As a matter of fact the Belgian Ambassadors — and 
primarily, of course, Greindl — refer in many places to this 
English " policy of isolation," and they depict the dangers 
to Europe which this involved. What, however, is the 
meaning of isolation ? Can there, indeed, be any question 
of isolation, when Germany had for decades been united in a 
Triple Alliance with her allies, Austria and Italy, and had 
in fact been so united at a time when an Entente had 
never been mentioned ? Can anyone seriously maintain 
that the Triple Alliance had been a weaker, less influential, 
less imposing structure than the Triple Entente ? Had 
not the Triple Alliance — a fact to which I have already 
referred in my first book — merely by virtue of the military 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 89 

power of Germany so authoritative a voice in the Council 
of Europe that almost all the conflicts of the last decade, 
in which any of the members of the Triple Alliance was 
involved, were decided in favour of the member of the 
Alliance ? Was not Austria able to carry through with suc- 
cess the Bosnian annexation, and Italy her war in Tripoli ? 
Were not all the questions regarding the Adriatic which 
arose in connection with the Balkan War decided in the 
sense and according to the wishes of Austria and Italy ? 
Did not the Moroccan conflict, even if it did not lead to a 
diplomatic victory for Germany, at any rate lead to a 
valuable territorial settlement ? Were not the questions 
affecting national interests in Asia Minor disposed of 
immediately before the war by just treaties between 
Germany on the one side and England and France on the 
other ? Is it not the case that an Anglo-German agree- 
ment with reference to certain territories in Central Africa 
was already drawn up on the outbreak of war, and only 
remained to be signed and ratified ? x Were not the industry 
and trade of Germany enjoying unhampered in every 
country and on every sea a period of increasingly brilliant 
development ? What is the meaning of " isolation " as 
applied to a Power like Germany, which, quite apart from 
her own strength, had by her side two allies who were 
bound by treaties, whereas the other side relied merely on 
an alliance of two Powers and an entirely loose relationship 
of the nature of an Entente with England ? Where, how, 
and when did the alleged isolation of Germany manifest 
itself ? What damage did the German people suffer, as 
a result of this alleged isolation, in their culture, their 
trade, their industry, their power, their influence in the 
world ? I have elsewhere proved, by reference to the 
writings of the German Secretary of State, Dr. Helfferich, 
the phenomenal development of Germany during the 
period of the Emperor William's reign. 2 

If that was the result of the English policy of isolation, 
then every country and every people might well wish to 
be " isolated " in this manner. 

1 See with regard to all the details of these agreements Prince 
Lichnowsky's Memoir, My London Mission, 1912-1914. 

2 See J'accuse, p. 40 et seq. ; The Crime, Vol. II., p. 424 et seq. 



90 THE CRIME 

In the more recent diplomatic history of Europe we have 
experienced the case of the isolation of one State. That 
State was England, before the conclusion of the Entente 
with France. But how did the English themselves describe 
this isolation ? They referred to it as a " splendid isolation." 
They were proud to be able to play an influential part, 
even while standing alone in Europe, without alliances 
and without ententes. It was particularly the Unionist 
Government — far more inclined than the later Liberal 
Government to ideas of expansion — which had experience 
of this isolation and felt it to be a proud mark of their 
own power and greatness. As Tell says to Stauffacher, 
" The strong man is most powerful when alone." From an 
economic, political, or cultural point of view was England 
in a worse position then, when she was so splendidly 
isolated ? Did Germany feel unhappy, did she in any way 
fall short in power, influence and industrial activity in the 
years before the war, when she was supposed to be isolated ? 
Supposed to be ! In reality Triple Alliance stood opposite 
Triple Entente, two mighty groups stood opposed to each 
other ; there was even a considerable excess of power 
on the side of the group led by Germany. The course of 
this war, indeed, proves that Germany and Austria almost 
alone — supported only by the inferior strength of Bulgaria 
and Turkey, without the third member of the alliance, 
Italy, indeed, against that country and the three other 
Great Powers — have now for four years been able to main- 
tain with success the Titanic struggle. Germany, all-powerful 
Germany, which to-day boasts that she has in alliance 
with one great Power and two small Powers been able to 
hold out against the other four Great Powers with America 
and all the rest of the world in addition, which boasts that 
she is unconquerable despite the overwhelming superiority 
of her enemies — it is Germany which pathetically laments 
that then, before the war, she was deserted and isolated — 
at a time when the raising of her mailed fist, the revelation 
of her shining armour, was sufficient to force the other 
Powers on their knees and make them on all occasions 
submissive to her will. 

I ask again : What is the meaning of being " isolated " ? 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 91 

Is the act of " isolation " equivalent to a desire to attack, 
a desire to destroy ? A criminal is isolated, so that he may- 
no longer be able to injure human society. A wild beast is 
isolated, so that it may not kill and devour us. A madman 
is isolated, so as to prevent him from being dangerous to 
his fellow men. Does it follow from this that it is intended 
to destroy the criminal, the wild beast, the madman ? 
The purpose is merely to protect those around from de- 
struction. Germany, as none know better than the Germans, 
was anything but isolated : she had her own allies, her own 
strength, her unlimited freedom of movement in the world. 
What is described in Pan-German literature and by a few 
Belgian Ambassadors following in the train of Pan- 
Germanism, what above all is described by the German 
Government in their introductory chapter to the collection 
of documents as the " isolation of Germany " was nothing 
else than a prophylactic measure against the criminality, 
the predatory instincts, and the attacks of warlike insanity 
which were feared from the side of Pan-Germanic Germany 
and its exalted and serene leaders. In my book I have 
already described the Entente as a defensive alliance. The 
ground for the union of the Entente Powers was the fear 
of Germany, and this constantly increasing fear had arisen 
from the continuous growth in the power of the Pan- 
German movement, the continuous growth in the influence 
at the German Imperial Court of the war-party led by the 
Crown Prince — it had arisen from the policy of Biilow and 
Bethmann which, with its armaments by land and sea, 
with its openly proclaimed repudiation of the ideals of The 
Hague, with its ever-increasing surrender to the war- 
incitements of Pan-Germanism, brought the danger of a 
German war of aggression nearer and nearer. As against 
Germany, isolation meant nothing more than protection 
against attack ; it in no way implied encirclement or 
strangulation in the sense of a restriction of the freedom of 
movement. The isolation-cell in which Germany was 
enclosed was the whole world ; everywhere on foreign 
territory free competition with all nations in the pursuit 
of commerce stood open to her, and although Germany 
had come somewhat late to the partition of the world, 



9 2 



THE CRIME 



even her own territory beyond the seas could be constantly 
extended with the concurrence of her European com- 
petitors. 

****** 

A few examples from the reports may show that the 
Belgian Ambassadors also — including even Greindl with 
his German nationalistic tendencies — viewed the alleged 
isolation of Germany exactly in the above sense, in the 
sense, that is to say, of an attempt to render Germany 
innocuous, not as a preparation for an armed attack. 



No. 31. 



Berlin, le 30 mai 1907 

. . . Oette defiance est encore 
nourrie par le soin que met 
personnellement le roi d'Angle- 
terre a conclure des ententes avec 
le monde entier sauf avec 
l'Allemagne contre laquelle il 
n'a aucun grief a formiuer. La 
presse y aide en representant 
chacun des succes de la politique 
exterieure de V Angleterre com/me 
tendant au but final de Visolement 
de l'Allemagne. Qui oserait 
affirmer qu'elle se trompe sur 
ce point ? . . . 



Berlin, May 30th, 1907. 

. . . This distrust is further nour- 
ished by the personal efforts of 
the King of England to conclude 
Ententes with the whole world 
except with Germany, against 
which he has no manner of 
ground of complaint. The Press 
contributes to this by representing 
every success of England's foreign 
policy as directed to the final aim 
of isolating Germany. Who 
would dare to assert that it is 
mistaken on this point ? . . . 



No. 32. 



Berlin, le 8 juin 1907. 

. . . Que restera-t-il de toutes ces 
demonstrations ? Probablement 
rien. Le rapport que vous avez 
bien voulu me communiquer par 
votre depeche d'avant-hier me 
montre que mon collegue de 
Londres, mieux place que je 
ne le suis pour juger la situation, 
est encore plus sceptique que 
moi. Comme le dit tres juste- 
ment M. le comte de Lalaing, 
le Roi d' Angleterre dirige per- 
sonnellement une politique dont 
le but final est Visolement de 
VAllemagne. . . . 



Berlin, June 8th, 1907. 

. . . What will be the result of 
all these demonstrations ? Pro- 
bably nothing. The report which 
you sent to me with your des- 
patch of two days ago proves 
to me that my colleague in 
London, who is in a better posi- 
tion than I am to judge the 
situation, is even more sceptical 
than I. As Count Lalaing quite 
correctly says, the King of 
England is personally pursuing 
a policy the final awn of which 
is the isolation of Germany. . . . 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 93 



No. 54. 



Berlin, le 13 fevrier 1909. 

. . . Deja avantl'arrivee duRoi 
d'Angleterre, les journaux avaient 
premuni leurs lecteurs contre la 
tentation d'exagerer les resultats 
possibles de l'entrevue. On at- 
tend, pour voir si les actes 
repondront aux paroles et Ton 
a eprouve trop de deceptions, 
pour s'abandonner a la confiance. 

Le Roi d'Angleterre affirme que 
la conservation de la paix a tou- 
jour s ete le but de ses efforts ; c'est 
ce qu'il n'a pas cesse de dire 
depuis le debut de la campagne 
diplomatique qu'il a menee a 
bonne fin, dans le but d'isoler 
V Allemagne ; mais on ne peut 
pas s'empecher de remarquer, 
que la paix du monde n'a jamais 
ete plus compromise que depuis 
que le Roi d'Angleterre se mele 
de la consolider. . . . 



Berlin, February 13th, 1909. 

. . . Even before the arrival of 
the King of England, the news- 
papers had warned their readers 
against exaggerating the possible 
results of the meeting. People 
are waiting to see whether deeds 
will correspond with words, 
since there have been too many 
disillusions to allow any abandon- 
ment to a spirit of confidence. 

The King of England asserts 
that the maintenance of peace has 
always been the aim of his 
endeavours ; this is what he has 
always said since the beginning 
of the diplomatic campaign 
which he has successfully carried 
through with the object of isolat- 
ing Germany ; but it is impossi- 
ble not to observe that the peace 
of the world has never been more 
gravely threatened than since 
the King of England intervened 
to consolidate it. . . . 



No. 84. 
Londres, le 30 novembre 1911. London, November 30th, 1911. 



. . . Lord Courtney of Pen with, 
liberal et ami de 1' Allemagne, a 
attaque la politique du gouverne- 
ment parce qu'elle avait vise 
Visolement de V Allemagne (il est 
rare d' entendre cette verite au 
parlement britannique) et parce 
qu'elle n'avait pas soutenu l'acte 
d'Algesiras. . . 

Un passage du discours de 
Lord Lansdowne est a noter. 
C'est celui oil il a parle des 
articles secrets de 1904, recem- 
ment publies. II a admis que, 
dans un cas de ce genre, la 
promesse de donner simplement 



. . . Lord Courtney of Penwith, 
a Liberal and a friend of Ger- 
many, attacked the policy of 
the Government because it has 
been directed to the isolation of 
Germany (this truth is seldom 
heard in the English Parliament) 
and because it had not main- 
tained the Act of Algeciras. . . . 

One passage in the speech of 
Lord Lansdowne is worthy of 
note, namely that in which he 
spoke of the secret articles of 
the Agreement of 1904, recently 
published. He admitted that 
in a case of this land the 



94 



THE CRIME 



un appui diplomatique a une 
autre puissance peut amener 
1' obligation de lui fournir une 
assistance d'un autre genre (lisez 
militaire et navale). Une entente 
cordiale amene d'etroites re- 
lations entre deux pays et ils ne 
peuvent rester indifferents. Si 
Vun des deux se trouve dans une 
situation difficile sans que ce so it 
de sa faute, il s'attendra a etre 
soutenu par son ami. 



II suffit de lire entre les lignes 
pour voir que d'apres Lord Lans- 
downe, un des auteurs de V entente 
cordiale, celle-ci, sans etre une 
alliance, pourrait produire, dans 
certaines eventualites, tous les 
effets d'un traite defensif entre 
les deux nations. 



promise to give to another 
Power merely diplomatic sup- 
port might easily lead to 
the obligation to furnish assist- 
ance of another kind (understand 
military and naval assistance). 
An Entente Cordiale brings close 
relations between two countries 
and they cannot remain mutually 
indifferent. If one of the two coun- 
tries were to find itself in a difficult 
situation without any blame 
attaching to it, it will expect to be 
supported by its friend. 

It is only necessary to read 
between the lines in order to 
see that in the opinion of Lord 
Lansdowne, one of its authors, 
the Entente Cordiale without 
being an alliance may in certain 
contingencies produce all the 
effects of a defensive treaty be- 
tween the txoo countries. 



The Fear of Germany. 

The following examples from the Reports may show that 
the fear of Germany was the leading motive of the union 
of the Entente. 

No. 35. 



Berlin, le 22 juin 1907. 

. . . li 'accord entre VAnglelerre, 
la France et VEspagne n'est pas 
encore pviblie et l'intention des 
puissances contractantes etait 
de ne le faire connaitre qu'au 
mois d'aout. Une indiscretion 
commise a Rome Fa livre pre- 
maturement aux journaux. J'ai 
eu 1' occasion de m'assurer que 
leurs renseignements sont exacts. 
Les trois puissances reconnais- 
sent le status quo dans la Mediter- 
ranee et dans l'Atlantique et 
s'entendront sur les mesures 



Berlin, June 22nd, 1907. 

. . . The agreement between Eng- 
land, France, and Spain is not 
yet published and the intention 
of the contracting parties was 
that publication should not take 
place until August. An indis- 
cretion which took place at Rome 
made it prematurely accessible 
to the newspapers. I have had 
the opportunity of assuring 
myself that their communica- 
tions are correct. The three 
Powers recognise the status quo 
in the Mediterranean and the 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 95 



a prendre si leurs possessions 
venaient a etre menacees. 



II n'y a rien Id-dedans qui 
touche aux interets de VAllemagne, 
Le gouvernement Imperial a 
ete tenu au courant des nego- 
ciations entre la France et le 
Japon par les soins des gouverne- 
ments japonais et francais. Les 
ambassadeurs d'Espagne, de 
France et d'Angleterre ont sepa- 
rement communique au departe- 
ment Imperial des affaires etran- 
geres, depuis plusieurs jours 
deja, les notes echangees pour 
constater l'accord intervenu entre 
leurs pays. Tout a done ete 
d'une correction parfaite et il n'y 
a rien qui pourrait servir de base 
a une plainte officielle. . . . 

S'ils ne contiennent aucune 
clause secrete, ils semblent n' avoir 
ete conclus que pour le plaisir 
de laisser une fois de plus l'Alle- 
magne en dehors du reglement 
des interets mondiaux. Ces pre- 
cautions prises contre des perils 
imaginaires sont de nature a 
eveiller et a nourrir chez les 
peuples l'idee que VAllemagne 
est la puissance agressive contre 
les entreprises de laquelle les 
autres pays sont obliges de se 
liguer. . . . 



Atlantic Ocean and will come 
to an understanding regarding 
the measures to be taken in the 
event of their possessions being 
threatened. 

There is nothing in this which 
could affect German interests. 
The Imperial Government were 
kept informed of the course of 
the negotiations between France 
and Japan by the Governments 
of the two countries mentioned. 
Some days ago the Ambassadors 
of Spain, France, and England, 
each acting separately, com- 
municated to the Foreign Office 
the notes which were exchanged 
on the conclusion of the agree- 
ment. Things have thus been 
carried through with complete 
correctness, and there was nothing 
which could give occasion to an 
official complaint. 

If they contain no secret 
clause, it appears that they have 
been concluded only for the 
pleasure of once more leaving 
Germany aside in the regulation 
of world-affairs. These measures 
of precaution taken against imagi- 
nary dangers are calculated to 
awake and to foster among the 
nations the idea that Germany 
is the aggressive Power, against 
whose undertakings the other 
Powers are obliged to unite. . . . 



No. 56. 
Berlin, le 22 mars 1909. Berlin, March 22nd, 1909. 



Je n'ai pas a vous donner d'in- 
formations sur les debats relatifs 
a la marine de guerre qui ont eu 
lieu a la commission du budget 
du Reichstag en memo temps 
qu'a la Chambre des communes 
anglaise. Les journaux en sont 
pleins et je ne pourrais rien 



I may be excused from report- 
ing to your Excellency regarding 
the debates on the Navy which 
took place in the Budget Com- 
mission of the Reichstag at 
the same time as the discussions 
in the English House of Commons. 
The papers are full of it, and I 



9 6 



THE CRIME 



ajouter a ce qu'ils rapportent. 
Je me borne a noter qu'a enten- 
dre les orateurs qui out discute 
a Londres la question de savoir 
ce que doivent etre les forces 
navales de l'Angleterre pour 
parer & tout danger, il semblerait 
qu'en dehors de la Grande - 
Bretagne, FAllemagne soit la 
seule puissance entretenant une 
marine de guerre. On n'a parle 
que d'elle comme si les autres 
n'existaient pas ; eel a se passe 
un mois apres l'echange des 
toasts chaleureux prononces a 
1' occasion de la visite du Roi 
d' Angleterre a Berlin. Cette pre- 
occupation exclusive tenant de 
Vhypnose en dit plus long que 
les courtoisies ofncielles obligees 
dont 1' omission est a coup sur un 
symptome alarmant, mais dont 
raccomplissement ne signifie 
rien du tout. Avant comme 
apres le pr6tendu rapprochement 
ce qui domine les relations des 
deux pays est une profonde 
defiance mutuelle. 

Gbeindl. 



have nothing to add to their 
reports. I would only observe 
that anyone hearing the speakers 
who have discussed in London 
how the English naval forces 
must be constituted so as to be 
equal to any danger might 
believe that Germany is the only 
Power which, apart from Great 
Britain, possesses a navy. She 
was spoken about as if the others 
did not exist, and all this took 
place one month after the visit 
of the King of England to Berlin, 
when such cordial speeches were 
exchanged. This one-sided and 
indeed hypnotic fear says more 
than the indispensable official 
courtesies, the omission of which 
certainly furnishes ground for 
uneasiness, the fulfilment of 
which is, however, empty of 
meaning. After the alleged 
rapprochement, just as before 
it, the relations of the two 
countries are governed by a 
deep and mutual distrust. 

Gkeindl. 



No. 71. 



Londres, le 22 mai 1911. 

... La mort du Roi Edouard 
semble avoir amene une legere 
detente dans les relations anglo- 
allemandes. On dirait qu'a 
l'epoque des "ententes" dont 
le defunt Souverain etait si 
friand, la nation meme avait 
conscience de la tentative d'en- 
cerclement a l'egard de l'AUe- 
magne que favorisait si ouverte- 
ment le Cabinet de Londres et 
qui ne pouvait manquer de 
froisser celui de Berlin. On 
en craignait un peu les conse- 
quences possibles, et, de la 
crainte a la haine, il n'y a qu'un 



London, May 22nd, 1911. 

. . . King Edward's death 
appears to have brought about 
a slight detente in the Anglo - 
German relations. It appears 
that at the time of the 
" Ententes " of which the late 
ruler was so fond, the people 
itself was conscious of the effort 
to encircle Germany, an effort 
which the London Cabinet 
favoured so openly and which 
was necessarily bound to annoy 
the Berlin Cabinet. Some fear 
was entertained regarding the 
possible consequences, and from 
fear to hatred is only a step ; the 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 97 



Press,' hostile to Germany, did 
not fail to see that this step was 
taken. The panic which was 
the occasion of so much ridicule 
in Germany was humiliating, and 
they suffered for it here. In 
spite of the Cassandras in naval 
and military circles, it appears 
that there is again more com- 
posure, and just at the very 
favourable moment when the 
public were at last beginning to 
think soberly, William II ap- 
peared without his shining armour 
and in civilian clothes, and led 
the Empress and the Princess, 
with the children of the English 
Royal House, through the streets 
of London. The effect, even if 
it may only have been for the 
moment, was good. The grand- 
son of Queen Victoria has no 
occasion to regret the step 
which he has taken under 
favourable circumstances. . . . 

Even in favour of King Edward personally, the " black 
man " of the policy of encirclement, the Belgian Am- 
bassadors testify that he was moved not by military love 
of aggression, but only by the thought of the maintenance 
of the peace of Europe against possible aggressive desires 
on the part of Germany : 



pas, que la presse antigermanique 
n'a pas manque de faire franchir. 
La panique dont on s'est tant 
moque en Allemagne, etait humili- 
ante et on en souffrait id. Malgre 
les Cassandres des milieux navals 
et militaires, il semble que 
Ton se soit un peu ressaisi et, au 
moment tres opportun oil le 
public commencait enfin a faire 
la part de V exageration, Quillaume 
II a paru, delaissant Varmure 
etincelante pour la redingote 
bourgeoise et promenant a 
travers Londres l'lmperatrice 
et la Princesse avec les enfants 
Royaux d'Angleterre. L'effet, 
pour momentane qu'il puisse 
etre, a ete bon. Le petit-fils 
de la Reine Victoria n'a pas a 
regretter la demarche qu'il a 
faite dans des circonstances 
propices . . . 



No. 

Berlin, le 18 fevrier 1905. 

. . . On dit le Roi Edouard 
VII profondement pacifique ; 
mais un Roi d'Angleterre n'a 
qu'une influence tres limitee sur 
la direction politique de son 
pays. Le gouvernement anglais 

f>artage jusqu'a un certain point 
e sentiment public ou du moins 
il est incapable de resistor au 
courant, puisqu'il depend ex- 
clusivement de la chambre des 
communes a laquelle le pouvoir 
executif est de plus en plus 
subordonne. . . . 



2. 

Berlin, February 18th, 1905. 

. . . It is said that King 
Edward VII is essentially pacific ; 
but a Bang of England has only 
very little influence on the policy 
of his country. To a certain 
degree the English Government 
share the opinion of the public, 
or are at any rate incapable of 
swimming against the stream, 
since they depend exclusively on 
the House of Commons, to which 
the executive power is more and 
more subordinated. . . . 



9 8 



THE CRIME 



The Pacific Character of the English Government. 

The pacific character of the Liberal English Govern- 
ment, which had been in power since 1905, that is to say, 
during the whole period of the Reports, is proved in the 
following passages amongst others : 



No. 69. 



Londres, le 9 mai 1911. 

. . . Bien entendu, on est 
loin de croire que le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial veuille la guerre ; 
on est persuade que l'Empereur 
ne la desire pas, mais on se 
demande si le Cabinet de Berlin 
ne serait pas tente, dans cer- 
taines eventualites, de s'affirmer 
par quelque reclamation, et de 
donner ainsi une preuve eclatante 
de sa puissance qui serait humili- 
ante pour le Gouvemement de la 
Bepublique, et desagreable pour 
V Angleterre et la Russie. Le 
Gouvemement Allemand, en affich- 
ant sa preponderance dans les 
conseih de V Europe, justifierait 
ainsi vis-a-vis des partis de 
1' opposition pariementaire alle- 
mande, Futilite du maintien de 
ses enormes forces militaires et 
navales, dont le cout lui est con- 
stamment reproche au Reichstag. 
Une occupation de Fez, qui 
revetirait par exemple un aspect 
trop definitif , ou un manquement 
a 1' esprit, si pas a la lettre des 
engagements pris a Algesiras, 
pourrait fournir a Berlin une 
occasion d' inter venir. 

L'Ambassadeur de France a 
Londres a constamment de longs 
entretiens au Foreign Office ou 
il s'efforcerait plus particuliere- 
ment d'insister sur les droits 
preponderants de la France au 
Maroc, a cote desquels ceux de 
l'Espagne seraient insignifiants. 



London, May 9th, 1911. 

... It is, of course, far from 
being the case that the German 
Government want war. There is a 
conviction that the Emperor does 
not want it, but the question is 
asked whether the Berlin Cabinet 
might not in certain circum- 
stances be tempted to assert 
themselves by some protestation, 
and thus give a striking proof 
of their power which would be 
humiliating for the French Govern- 
ment and disagreeable to England 
and Russia. In emphasising their 
preponderance in the Council of 
Europe the German Government 
would be able to justify, as 
against Parliamentary opposi- 
tion, the maintenance of their 
enormous land and sea forces, 
the cost of which is constantly 
made a subject of attack in the 
Reichstag. 

An occupation of Fez, which 
for example had too strongly 
the appearance of being defini- 
tive, or looked like a violation 
of the spirit, if not of the letter, 
of the obligations undertaken at 
Algeciras, might offer Berlin an 
opportunity for intervention. 

The French Ambassador in 
London has constantly long 
conversations at the Foreign 
Office, in which he is said to 
take special pains to prove the 
preponderating rights of France in 
Morocco, compared with which 
those of Spain are insignificant. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 99 



Certains organ.es chauvins de 
la presse londonniene declarent 
que la Grande-Bretagne devrait 
soutenir energiquement le Cabi- 
net francais, si le Gouvernement 
Imperial faisait mine d'exercer 
une pression. Cette attitude ne 
semblepas devoir etre cette qu'adop- 
terait un Gouvernement aussi 
pacifique que celui de M. Asquith. 



Certain chauvinistic organs of 
the London Press state that 
Great Britain must energetically 
support the French Government, 
should the Imperial Government 
show any indication of exercising 
pressure. It certainly does not 
appear that this would correspond 
with the attitude of so pacific 
a Government as that of Mr. 
Asquith. . . . 



No. 85. 



Berlin, le 6 decembre 1911. 

... II n'eut pas ete possible 
sans casser les vitres de repousser 
les avances de M. de Bethmann 
Hollweg. M. Asquith et le chef 
de l'opposition M. Bonar Law 
les ont accueillies en fort bons 
termes. Sir E. Grey s'est efforce 
aussi d'etre correct, mais avec 
une froideur marquee. Sir E. 
Grey a dit a la verite qu'il est 
dispose a faire tout ce qui sera 
en son pouvoir dans le but 
d'ameliorer les relations de VAlle- 
magne avec V Angleterre. Les 
amities actuelles de la Grancle- 
Bretagne auxquelles il entend 
rester fidele ne l'empechent pas 
d'en contracter d'autres. Loin de 
chercher a troubler les recentes 
negotiations entre l'Allemagne 
et la France, il s'est sincerement 
felicite de Vaccord intervenu. II 
comprend le besoin d' expansion 
de l'Allemagne et n'a nul dessein 
de Ventraver. II indiqtie meme 
le terrain sur lequel pourra 
s'exercer Taction coloniale alle- 
mande. C'est l'Afrique ou 
1' Angleterre n'a pas le pro jet 
d'etendre ses possessions. (Est-ce 
des notres qu'il entend trafiquer 
suivant les principes du droit 
international nouveau tel qu'on 



Berlin, December 6th, 1911. 

... It would not have been 
possible to repel the advances 
of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg 
without, so to speak, "breaking 
the windows." Mr. Asquith and 
the Leader of the Opposition, 
Mr. Bonar Law, cordially wel- 
comed them. Sir Edward Grey 
also endeavoured to be correctj 
but displayed a marked coolness. 
Sir Edward Grey, it is true, said 
that he was ready to do every- 
thing that stood in his power to 
improve Anglo-German relations. 
The existing friendships of Great 
Britain, to which he intended to 
remain true, did not prevent 
him from entering into new 
friendships. So far from desiring 
to disturb the recent negotiations 
between Germany and France, 
he was, on the contrary, sin- 
cerely gratified at the under- 
standing arrived at. He under- 
stood Germany's need for ex- 
pansion, and he had no intention 
of placing obstacles in its way. 
He even indicated the territory 
on which Germany's colonial 
expansion could take place. It 
lies in Africa, where England has 
no thought of extending her 
possessions. (Is it by any 

H 2 



100 



THE CRIME 



le pratique a Londres et mal- 
heureusement ailleurs aussi ? Le 
Marocj Tripoli, la Perse.) Sir 
E. Grey ne croit pas, dit-il, a 
des plans allemands hostiles a 
l'Angleterre. Celle-ci non plus 
n'entretient aucun dessein hostile 
a VAllemagne et ri 'accorderait pas 
son appui a une puissance tierce 
dont Vattitude serait hostile ou 
provocatrice. 



C'eut ete parfait si Sir E. Grey 
se fut arrete la ; mais tout son 
discours est penetre d'un senti- 
ment de defiance non deguisee 
envers VAllemagne et ses asser- 
tions amicales sont attenu6es par 
des restrictions qui en detruisent 
completement la portee. C'est 
ainsi qu'il met pour condition a 
un rapprochement avec l'Alle- 
magne que ses amis francais et 
russes y soient aussi compris 
comme s'il n'etait pas notoire 
qu'aucun Gouvernement Fran- 
cais n'oserait se livrer a une 
tentative de ce genre qui serait 
reprouv6e par 1' opinion publique 
en France. 

Les commentaires des jour- 
naux allemands ont presque 
exclusivement porte sur les re- 
strictions. Les declarations d'ou il 
faudrait deduire des aspirations 
conciliantes sont restees inapercues 
ou si elles ont ete mentionnees, 
ce n'est qu'en passant et de 
facon a laisser entendre que les 
Allemands sont biases sur les 
assurances de ce genre pro- 
diguees a 1' occasion de chacune 
des nombreuses tentatives de 
rapprochement entre l'Alle- 
magne et l'Angleterre et dont 
TeUet a tou jours ete des plus 
ephemeres. . . . 



chance our possessions with 
which he proposes to traffic, 
following the principles of recent 
international law as it is applied 
in London and unfortunately in 
otherplaces as well? — In Morocco, 
Tripoli, Persia.) As Sir Edward 
Grey said, he does not believe 
in German plans of hostility to 
England. England likewise enter- 
tains no hostile intentions against 
Germany, and would not give its 
support to any third Power whose 
attitude was hostile or provocative. 

It would have been admirable, 
if Sir Edward Grey had stopped 
there. But his whole speech was 
permeated with an undisguised 
feeling of distrust towards Ger- 
many, and his friendly utterances 
were weakened by reservations 
which entirely destroyed their 
significance. As a condition for 
a rapprochement with Germany 
he demanded that his French 
and Russian friends should be 
included, as if it were not uni- 
versally known that no French 
Government would dare to lend 
themselves to such an attempt, 
which would be repudiated by 
the public opinion of France. 

The commentaries of the Ger- 
man newspapers were occupied 
almost exclusively with the reser- 
vations. The statements from 
which it would have been possible 
to infer conciliatory intentions 
remained unobserved, or if they 
were mentioned at all, it was 
only in passing and in such a 
way as to let it be understood 
that the Germans were become 
insensitive to assurances of this 
kind, such as have been squan- 
dered on each of the numerous 
-attempts at rapprochement be- 
tween Germany and England, 
without ever attaining more than 
an ephemeral success. . . . 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 10: 



No. 106. 1 



Berlin, le 26 mai 1913. 

. . . On peut dire, tout au 
moins, sans risquer de se tromper, 
que la visite du couple royal 
d'Angleterre a Berlin apparait 
corarae la confirmation et comme 
la consecration aux yeux de 
l'Europe du rapprochement qui 
s'est incontestablement opere 
entre VAllemagne et la Grande- 
Bretagne pendant la guerre bal- 
hanique oil les deux Etats ont agi 
de concert pour la preservation de 
la paix europeenne. C'est un 
avertissement que la France 
feroit bien de mediter, au mo- 
ment oil elle se consume en 
efforts peut-etre inutiles et des- 
tines en tout cas a reveler a 
l'etranger l'etat de decomposi- 
tion interne de son armee, en vue 
de retablir l'equilibre des forces 
entre elle et l'AUemagne. . . . 



Berlin, May 26th, 1913. 

. . . Without running any dan- 
ger of being mistaken, it is in any 
case possible to say that the 
visit of the English King and 
Queen to Berlin appears in the 
eyes of Europe as the confirma- 
tion and consecration of the 
rapprochement which unmistak- 
ably took place during the Balkan 
War when the two States co- 
operated for the maintenance of 
peace. France would do well to 
take this warning to heart, 
especially at this moment when 
she is devouring herself in efforts 
to re-establish the equilibrium 
of forces between herself and 
Germany — efforts which are per- 
haps useless, and are in any 
case calculated to reveal to 
foreign countries the state of 
internal decomposition of the 
French Army. . . . 



No. 108. 



Londres, le 7 novembre 1913. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Sir Edward Grey a prononce 
a Newcastle un speech sur les 
devoirs d'un Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres. II s'est renferme 
dans les generalites en faisant 
prevoir que le Premier Ministre, 
au banquet du Guildhall le 10 
de ce mois, ferait une allusion 
plus precise au programme goii- 
vernemental en ce qui concerne 
les relations exterieures. 



London, November 7th, 1913. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

Sir Edward Grey has delivered 
a speech in Newcastle on the 
duties of a Foreign Minister. 
He has confined himself ex- 
clusively to generalities, and has 
merely indicated that the Prime 
Minister will go more fully into 
the programme of the Govern- 
ment in matters relating to 
foreign affairs at the Guildhall 
banquet on the 10th of this 
month. 



1 This, like several other of the reports, is quoted in various 
places of my investigation. The reference to the same documents 
on various occasions, and as a consequence the repeated quotation 
of certain passages in the reports, was inevitable, inasmuch as the 
same report often furnishes evidence for various arguments. 



102 



THE CRIME 



Sir Edward Grey a commence 
par constater que FAngleterre, 
de concert avec les autresGrandes 
Puissances, avait essaye, pen- 
dant les hostilites balkaniques, 
d'empecher que ce conflit ne 
degenerdt en guerre generate. Le 
succes avait couronn6 ces efforts. 
L'opposition au Parlement bri- 
tannique avait loyalement sou- 
tenu le Gouvernement dans les 
moments difficiles et s'etait mon- 
tree patriotiqne. 

Ensuite le Ministre a defini la 
taehe de son Departement, qui 
devait avoir quatre grands buts 
en vue : 

1° empecher les changements 
ou combinaisons politiques qui, 
du dehors, menaceraient la se- 
curite de l'Empire ; 

2° ne pas augmenter les respon- 
sabilites territoriales de V Empire, 
assez grandes deja et se bomer a 
garder et a developper ce que 
l'Angleterre possede ; 



3° encourager le commerce 
britannique, surtout en evitant la 
guerre ; 

4° employer l'influence de la 
nation enfaveur des buts humani- 
taires dans le monde. 

On peut resumer pratiquement 
ces desiderata comme suit : 

1° le Ministre est en faveur du 
maintien de la triple entente ; 

2° il est hostile a toute politique 
de conquete, qui exciterait l'ani- 
mosite des grands rivaux ; 

3° il veut favoriser 1' expansion 
economique du pays, au dehors, 
en eliminant l'anxiete que pro- 
duit la crainte de complications 
Internationales, c'est-a-dire en 
maintenant avec VAllemagne les 
meilleures relations possibles ; 



Sir Edward Grey has first of 
all affirmed that during the 
Balkan War England, in union 
with the Great Powers, endea- 
voured to prevent that conflict 
degenerating into a world war. 
These efforts were successful. 
The Opposition in the British 
Parliament had loyally sup- 
ported the Government in these 
difficult moments and had shown 
itself to be patriotic. 

Thereafter the Minister defined 
the task of his department, 
which ought to have four great 
aims in view : 

1. All political changes or 
combinations were to be pre- 
vented which might menace the 
external security of the Empire. 

2. The territorial extent of the 
Empire, which is already large 
enough, ought not to be increased, 
and their efforts should be 
restricted to the defence and 
development of England's pos- 
sessions. 

3. British trade ought to be 
promoted, above all by the 
avoidance of war. 

4. The influence of the nation 
should be used to promote 
humanitarian efforts in the world. 

In practice those demands 
may be summarised as follows : 

1. The Minister is in favour of 
the maintenance of the Triple 
Entente. 

2. He is averse from any 
policy of conquest which might 
evoke the distrust of England's 
great competitors. 

3. He wishes to promote the 
economic expansion of the coun- 
try abroad, by eliminating the 
anxiety which arises from inter- 
national complications — that is to 
say he wishes to maintain the best 
possible relations with Germany. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 103 



4° il ne renonce pas a user 
vis-a-vis d'autres nations (sur- 
tout vraisemblablement vis-a- 
vis des Etats faibles) du prestige 
et de l'influence de l'Angleterre, 
pour appuyer les campagnes hu- 
manitaires. 

Cette formule, dangereusement 
elastique, est destinee au parti 
philanthropique, si puissant dans 
ce pays, et permet des interven- 
tions souvent injustifiees et irri- 
tantes. 

Cte. de Lalaing. 



4. He does not renounce, as 
against other nations (above all 
probably as against weak States), 
the use of. the prestige and the 
influence of England for the 
promotion of humanitarian efforts. 

This dangerously elastic for- 
mula is intended for the philan- 
thropic party which is so power- 
ful in this country, and leaves the 
door open to interventions which 
are often unjustified and irri- 
tating. 

Count de Lalaing. 



No. 113. 



Berlin, le 24 avril 1914. 

. . . Les Allemands sont per- 
suades que l'Angleterre ne prendra 
jamais les armes, afin d' aider la 
France a, reconquerir les provinces 
perdues. . . . 

... II pourra s'y convain- 
cre, que l'opinion publique rtest 
pas disposee a voir V Angleterre 
perdre sa liberte d'action par un 
traite formel qui lierait son sort 
a celui de la Russie et de la 
France. . . . 



Berlin, April 24th, 1914. 

. . . The Germans are con- 
vinced that England will never 
take up arms to help France to 
reconquer the lost provinces. . . . 

. . . He will there be able 
to convince himself that public 
opinion is not disposed to see 
England lose her freedom of 
action by a formal treaty which 
would link her fate to that of 
Russia and France. . . . 



No. 115. 



Paris, le 8 mai 1914. 

. . . Quelle est la nature 
des engagements qui lient entre 
eux les deux Etats ? Ont-ils 
conclu une Convention mili- 
taire ? Je 1' ignore, mais je 
n'oublie pas que des esprits 
reflechis et serieux doutent quelque 
peu de V assistance que la France 
trouverait chez les Anglais au 
jour d'une conflagration euro- 
peenne. 11 Be trouve meme des 
gens qui ne croient pas a un 
concours britannique bien se- 
rieux sur mer. . . . 



Paris, May 8th, 1914. 

. . . What is the nature of 
the obligations which bind the 
two States ? Have they con- 
cluded a military convention ? 
I do not know, but I do not 
forget that thoughtful and 
serious minds doubt whether on 
the day of a European conflagra- 
tion France will find support in 
the English. There are indeed 
people who do not even believe 
in serious support from England 
at sea. . . . 



104 



THE CRIME 



Je ne crois pas au desir ni de 
Vun ni de Vautre des deux pays 
de jouer Vejfroyable coup de des 
que serait une guerre ; mais il est 
tou jours a craindre, avec le 
caractere francais, qu'un incident 
mal presente n'amene sa popula- 
tion ou pour mieux dire, les 
elements les plus nerveux voire 
meme les moins respectables de 
la population, a creer une situa- 
tion qui rendrait la guerre 
inevitable. . . . 

La presse est mauvaise dans 
les deux pays. La campagne qui 
se pour suit en Allemagne au sujet 
de la Legion etr anger e est exces- 
sivement maladroite, et le ton des 
journaux francais ne cesse d'etre 
acerbe et agressif. . . . 

... II n'y a rien a attendre 
du Parlement ; le premier tour 
de scrutin des elections nous a 
deja montre comme nous nous 
y attendions, que la prochaine 
Chambre des Deputes sera a peu 
de chose pres la meme que la 
devanciere. Les Socialistes pour- 
ront gagner quelques voix, mais 
dans F ensemble, la suprematie 
restera au parti radical -socialiste, 
malgre ses fautes et ses erreurs. 
Quoi que Ton puisse penser des 
evenements recents, M . Caillaux, 
le seul financier que compte 
aujourd'hui la Chambre, semble 
devoir r ester V instigateur de la 
politique fran^aise avec un peu 
de fiel et de mauvaise humeur en 
plus. 

GlTIIXAUME. 



I do not believe that either of 
the two countries desires to risk 
the horrible gamble of war ; but 
with the French national char- 
acter there is always reason to 
fear that an incident unfor- 
tunately presented may lead the 
people, or rather the most 
nervous and indeed the basest 
elements of the population, to 
create a situation which would 
make war inevitable. . . . 

The feeling of the Press is bad 
in both countries. The campaign 
which is being conducted in 
Germany against the foreign legion 
is extremely maladroit and the 
tone of the French newspapers 
is continually bitter and aggres- 
sive. . . . 

. . . There is nothing to be 
expected from Parliament : the 
first electoral scrutiny has already 
shown, as we expected, that the 
next Chamber with slight modi- 
fications will be almost the same 
as its predecessor. The Socialists 
may perhaps gain a few votes, 
but taking everything together 
the Radical -Socialists, despite 
their mistakes and errors, will 
keep the upper hand. Whatever 
may be thought regarding recent 
events, it appears that M. Cail- 
laux, the only financier whom the 
Chamber can show to-day, is to 
remain the director of French 
policy with a small addition of 
choler and bad temper. 

Gtjillatjme. 



France's Love of Peace. 

Despite the existence of chauvinistic tendencies in the 
country, despite certain nationalistic inclinations in some 
of the leading personalities, those in power in France, 
the Presidents as well as the various successive Govern- 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 105 

ments, have, according to the testimony of Belgian 
Ambassadors, never thought of beginning a European 
war for the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine by force of 
arms. Certainly in France also there have been inciters 
to war, but since the foundation of the Republic — with 
the solitary exception of the short Boulangist episode 
— these men have never exercised authoritative influence 
on the resolutions of the Government or on the destiny 
of their country. The reader will recall the tactful 
restraint of the French Government in the spring of 
1913 — that is to say, during the Presidency of M. Poin- 
care, who is alleged to have been so eager for war — in 
connection with the incidents of Luneville and Nancy, 
when the German chauvinist Press was conducting orgies 
of incitement to war, and could have wished even then 
to provoke the European war on account of these insig- 
nificant occurrences. 

Let us hear how the Belgian Ambassador in Paris, 
Baron Guillaume, speaks regarding the incident of Nancy : 

No. 104. 

Paris, le 16 avril 1913. Paris, April 16th, 1913 

Je viens de voir M. le Ministre I have just seen the Minister 

des Affaires Etrangeres avec for Foreign Affairs, with whom 

lequel j'ai cause assez longue- I had a fairly long conversation 

ment de l'incident de Nancy, que regarding the incident of Nancy 

les journaux vous ont rapporte. about which you have been 

informed by the newspapers. 

M . Pichon se montre tres M. Pichon is very much grieved 

desole de V esprit de susceptibilite by the display of chauvinistic 

chauvine dont la presse allemande sensibility provided by the German 

donne le spectacle. Press. 

Les organes officieux du Gou- The semi-official organs of the 
vernement Imperial sont pru- Imperial Government are care- 
dents mais les pangermanistes ful, but the Pan-Germans spit 
jettent feu et flamme, et il est fire and flame, and it is regrettable 
regrettable que Vagence Wolff that Wolff's Bureau should hasten 
s'empresse de repandre dans toute to disseminate such deplorable 
VAllemagne de si deplorables articles throughout the whole of 
articles. . . . Germany. . . . 

In the Casablanca conflict as well France — notwithstand- 
ing the unspeakable incitement of the German chauvinist 
Press — remained calm and made it possible to arrive at 



106 THE CRIME 

a settlement of the dispute by arbitration. I need not 
here return to the question of 4 ! Morocco. We shall see in 
a later passage the judgment passed by the Belgian 
Ambassadors on Delcasse, alleged to be the chief scapegoat 
of France. I must decline to enumerate once again all 
the symptoms, which indicate that nothing was further 
from the minds of the rulers of France than the provocation 
of a European war on .account of the question of Alsace- 
Lorraine. Such ideas of war were never more remote 
from the French than in the summer of 1914, after the 
elections in the spring of that year had brought a material 
increase in strength to the Socialist, the Radical, and 
Radical-Socialist parties, and had thus assured to those 
political tendencies which unconditionally stood for the 
maintenance of the peace of Europe, and if possible for 
an understanding with Germany, authoritative influence 
in the coming years. It is well known that the electoral 
victory of these peace-parties once again raised the 
question of the Three Years Law adopted in the previous 
year, and led to a lively agitation in the country with 
a view to the modification or the relaxation of this law. 
Without fear of contradiction, it may be asserted that 
France was never so pacific, never so much in need of 
peace, as just in the summer of 1914, when she is supposed 
to have fallen upon us with aviators' bombs or at least 
to have planned an attack, against which we were con- 
strained to protect ourselves by preventive measures. 

A Crushing Document of Guilt. 

I have sufficiently shown in my books how false, and 
indeed how contemptible, is the charge of having willed 
and begun the war which since the beginning of hostilities 
has been brought by Germany against France both 
officially and semi-officially. While this work was in 
the press- — at the beginning of March 1918 — Pichon, the 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, disclosed a document 
until then unknown, which must completely open the 
eyes even of the blindest as to the side on which there 
was a preconceived intention to make war and the actual 
authorship of the war. The ultimatum of the German 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 107 

Government (printed in the 25th Exhibit to the German 
White Book) which was handed to Viviani, the French 
Prime Minister, at 7 p.m. on July 31st, 1914, demanded 
from the French Government a statement, to be given 
within eighteen hours, " whether France will remain neut- 
ral in a Russo-German war." According to the telegram 
of Herr von Schon, the Imperial Ambassador in Paris, 
dated 1.5 p.m. on August 1st, the French Premier stated 
to the German Ambassador, in answer to the ultimatum 
of the previous evening, " that France will do what her 
interests require" (White Book, Exhibit 27; Yellow Book, 
No. 117). 

Now, however, it has become known by Pichon's 
revelation that Bethmann's instruction to his Parisian 
Ambassador (White Book, Exhibit 25) contained an addition 
which the German Government has prudently suppressed 
in their White Book, and which it has only been possible 
to decipher after three and a half years of war as a result 
of the discovery of the key by the French Government. 

This addition runs (according to the text printed in 
the Berliner Tageblatt of March 8th, 1918) : 

" If the French Government declare that they will 
remain neutral, your Excellency will inform them that 
we must demand as a guarantee for their neutrality 
the surrender of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, 
which we would occupy and return after the conclusion 
of the war with Russia. The answer to the latter 
question must be here before 4 o'clock on Saturday 
afternoon." 

It is quite unnecessary to waste a single word on the 
meaning and the intention of this instruction to the 
German Ambassador which has been kept so strictly 
secret by the German Government. Nothing can more 
clearly demonstrate the absolute and immovable will 
of the German despots to provoke a European war than 
this preposterous demand addressed to a great State, 
a demand to which there is no parallel in diplomatic 
history. The Napoleonic demand that the King of Prussia, 
after the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidate to 
the Spanish throne, should declare that for all time he 



108 THE CRIME 

would not consent to such a candidature (a demand on 
the part of Napoleon III which claimed no real guaran- 
tees) was described by Bismarck in his Gedanhen und 
Erinnerungen as an act of " international insolence," 
as an " insult and an outrage," as an " attack on 
the national honour and independence " of Prussia 
and Germany, as a" threat with the hand on the sword- 
hilt which made any compliance impossible for our 
national sense of honour." When compared with that 
relatively harmless formal demand for a guarantee on 
the part of Napoleon III, how are we to describe William 
II's real demand for security, the demand for the surrender 
of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun until the end of the 
Russo-German war ? Elsewhere Prince Bismarck once 
applied the phrase " Bonapartist ruthlessness " to certain 
diplomatic manoeuvres intended to provoke the other side 
to war and then lay upon him the guilt of the war. The 
Hohenzollern ruthlessness of July 31st, 1914, surpasses 
any similar action ever committed by a Bonapartist. 

As a matter of course it was impossible to think for 
a moment of complying with the German demand for a 
guarantee, of concurring in the occupation of the most 
important French fortresses, the possession of which 
would have placed in the hands of the German Generals 
a revolver directed against the heart of France. In order 
to grasp the monstrousness of the demand, imagine the 
reverse case : suppose that France had become involved 
in war with Italy — for example, during the Libyan war, 
when there was no absence of points of difference between 
the two countries ; suppose that the French Government 
had inquired of the Government in Berlin — say with a 
view to determining the possible obligations falling on 
its Russian ally — whether Germany would remain neutral 
in a Franco-Italian war, and that then it had subsequently 
demanded as a guarantee for the promised neutrality 
of Germany the surrender as a pledge of Metz and Strass- 
bourg. Without doubt such outrageous impudence would 
have been answered not with words but with the sword, 
and the whole world would have pointed to France as 
the conscious and intentional author of the war. 

It is not with a " maladroitness " on the part of Beth- 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 109 

mann or Jagow that we are here concerned — as the 
defenders of German innocence, with the social patriot 
Dr. David at their head, at once endeavoured to re- 
present the matter. No, we are here confronted with 
the plainly expressed will for war, not merely against 
Russia, but against France as well. We are confronted 
with the will to a European war which it was believed 
could at that moment be waged under the most 
favourable conditions, and from the toils of which 
there was no intention to allow the escape, in any 
circumstances, of their French neighbour, the possessor 
of the North African colonies, so long hungrily desired, 
as well as of other sources of wealth on her north- 
eastern frontier. Further, the eastern portions of Belgium, 
as well as Antwerp and the Flemish coast, which had 
long inspired Pan-German dreams as an object ardently 
to be desired, could only be incorporated in the German 
stomach, if matters proceeded so far as a war with France, 
which would bring with it the attack of spoliation upon 
Belgium. 

This time it was a case of everything or nothing. The 
Russian war alone would have satisfied only a part of 
German ambitions. The appetite for the East would 
have been sated, but the hunger for the West would have 
remained. No, this time there had to be a " clearing 
up." According to the long-prepared plans of the General 
Staff, the war had in the first place to be waged with 
lightning speed and finished on the West, in order that 
they might then be able to encounter with full force the 
Russian " steam-roller " in the East. The German hege- 
mony on the Continent had to be achieved at one stroke 
and not in two stages, of which the second might be 
prevented by all kinds of incidents and accidents which 
could not be foreseen. If France remained true to her 
alliance with Russia — as in fact she did — the ground for 
war against the Republic was automatically provided. 
If she were untrue to her alliance with Russia, the ground 
for war must then be artificially created, and this end 
would be served by the demand for the surrender of the 
eastern fortresses — a demand with which it was certain 
in advance that there could be no compliance. This 



no THE CRIME 

was the celebrated " shuffling of the cards " which Bern- 
hardi had already recommended with so much insistence 
in his book — the shuffling of the cards in such a way that 
the opponent should be challenged by the most provocative 
action, that he should be compelled to the refusal of 
unjustified demands, and indeed, if at all possible, to a 
declaration of war. 

That is the German " war of defence " in which the 
hapless German people has now believed for almost four 
years, blind to all revelations, deaf against all evidence. 
That is the war which France provoked, according to 
Bethmann's great lying speech of August 4th, 1914. 
There is not a single one in Germany among those who 
know, from the Emperor down to the last voluntary or 
involuntary governmental penny-a-liner, who has ever 
believed in the legend of the war of defence. The Augurs 
smile together when conversation turns on the attack 
upon Germany. That is food for the people — fodder for 
the " cannon-fodder." " We need this war, and for this 
reason we made it " — that is the thesis which the initiated, 
when they are together, acknowledge cynically and in 
cold blood. A gigantic fraud has been perpetrated on 
the German people. When will Michel, who still slumbers, 
awake, pull his white linen night-cap from his ears-, and 
put on his head the Phrygian cap ? 



After this digression, let us hear what the Belgian 
Ambassadors tell us regarding France's love of peace : 

No. 75. 

Paris, le 8 juillet 1911. Paris, July 8th, 1911. 

. . . Nous ne tarderons sans . . . Without doubt we shall 

doute pas a savoir dans quels very soon know in what form the 

termes le Gouvernement de la Government of the Republic will 

Republique repondra a la com- reply to the communication of 

munication de la Chancellerie de the Berlin Cabinet with regard 

Berlin relative a V intervention to German intervention in Mo- 

allemande au Maroc. rocco. 

II ne manque pas de gens There are some people who 

pour trouver que l'attitude du are of opinion that the attitude 

Cabinet de Paris a manque of the Paris Cabinet was some- 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS in 



d'ampleur, et que l'insistance 
que Ton a mise a fa ire remarquer 
que la France ne peut prendre 
de decision sans consulter la 
Russie et l'Angleterre, est peu 
digne du role dhme grande Puis- 
sance. 

La verite est que le Cabinet 
Caillaux, a peine entre en fonc- 
tions, a ete pris au depourvu. 
L'inexperience du Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres et de plu- 
sieurs de ses collegues, le desarroi 
dans lequel se trouvent tant de 
rouages administratifs en France, 
une sainte crainte des complica- 
tions et de la guerre, ont fait naitre 
dans les regions gouvernementales 
une veritable timidite. . . . 



what lacking in greatness, and 
that the emphasis with which it 
was pointed out that France 
could take no decision without 
consulting Russia and England 
was little worthy of the r6le of a 
Great Power. 

The fact is that the Caillaux 
Cabinet, which has just taken 
up office, was completely taken 
by surprise. The inexperience 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and several of his colleagues, the 
disorder which is to be found in 
so many parts of the adminis- 
trative machinery in France, a 
holy horror of complications and 
of war, have produced a veritable 
timidity in governmental circles. 



No. 79. 



Paris, le 28 juillet 1911 

. . . La situation presente, 
certes, un certain caractere de 
gravite ; des incidents peuvent 
surgir qui se grefferaient sur 
un etat de choses trouble ; mais 
personne ne veut la guerre ; on 
cherchera a Veviter. . . . 

. . . La France ne veut pas 
et ne peut pas vouloir que les 
affaires se gatent completement. 
Son Gouvernement sait que la 
guerre marquerait la derniere 
fieure de la Republique. . . . 

. . . Or, la situation poli- 
tique interieure de l'Angleterre 
est aujourd'hui fort troublee et 
c'est le parti liberal qui est au 
pouvoir. 

Comme je l'ai pense, des le 
premier jour, c'est a Londres 
qu'est le nceud de la situation. 
C'est la seulement qu'elle peut 
devenir grave. Les Francais 
cederont sur tous les points pour 
avoir la paix II n'en est pas de 



Paris, July 28th, 1911. 

. . . The present situation 
has certainly a grave character. 
Incidents may arise which, in 
the state of tension already 
existing, would find a fruitful 
soil. But no one wants war ; the 
attempt will be made to avoid 
it. . . . 

. . . France does not desire 
and cannot desire that the 
negotiations should completely 
fail. Its Government know that 
war would mean the last hour of 
the Republic. . . . 

. . . Now the internal politi- 
cal situation in England is at 
present very confused and it is 
the Liberal Party who are in 
power. 

As I assumed from the first 
day, the crucial point in the 
situation lies in London. It is 
there only that it may become 
grave. The French will give way 
on every point in order to maintain 
peace. It is not so in the case of 



112 



THE CRIME 



meme des Anglais qui ne transi- 
geront pas sur quelques regies 
et quelques pretentions. Mais 
on n'eprouve nul desir de les 
pousser a bout. 

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, 
un article interessant du Temps 
et un article assez modere du 
Matin. 

GuiLLAUME. 



the English, who will not com- 
promise on certain principles and 
demands. But there is no desire 
to drive them to extremes. 

Enclosed is an interesting 
article from the Temps and a 
fairly moderate article from the 
Matin. 

Guillaume. 



No. 93. 



Berlin, le 18 octobre 1912. 

. . . V initiative prise per- 
sonnellement par M. Poincare en 
vue du ritablissement de la paix 
a recu V approbation et meme les 
eloges de la presse allemande, 
quoiqu'elle ait trouve qu'il etait 
trop tot pour parler de la reunion 
d'une Conference. Enfin le 
Matin a chante les louanges de 
M. de Kiderlen, si Ton peut 
qualifier ainsi 1' article qu'il lui 
a consacre. . . . 

II etait, d'ailleurs, assez natu- 
rel que 1' attention et les pre- 
occupations du public des deux 
cotes des Vosges se detournassent 
des sujets habituels de discussion 
et de polemique pour se concen- 
trer sur les evenements balkan- 
iques. Sans vouloir exagerer 
la portee de la detente que je 
signale, il est permis d'esperer 
que la communauti de vues de 
VAllemagne et de la France dans 
les circonstances prisentes servira 
puissamment au ritablissement 
de la paix. 

Baron Be yens. 



Berlin, October 18th, 1912. 

. . . The initiative personally 
taken by M. Poincare for the 
assurance of peace is approved 
and indeed praised by the German 
Press. True, it was found that 
it was still too early to speak of 
a Conference. In the end the 
Matin sang the praises of Herr 
von Kiderlen, if it is possible 
so to describe the article which it 
devoted to him. . . . 

It was moreover only natural 
that the attention of the public 
on both sides of the Vosges 
should be diverted from the 
usual subjects of dispute and 
discussion and should be con- 
centrated on the events in the 
Balkans. Without desiring to 
exaggerate the extent of the 
detente to which I refer, it may 
be hoped that the community of 
the views of Germany and France 
under present circumstances will 
materially contribute to the re- 
establishment of peace. 

Baron Beyens. 



No. 101. 



Paris, le 3 mars 1913. 

. . . On demande le vote 
immediat et presque d' acclama- 
tion de toute mesure capable 
d'accroitre la puissance defensive 



Paris, March 3rd, 1913. 

. . . The immediate accept- 
ance of any measure wliich is 
calculated to increase the defen- 
sive strength of France is de- 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 113 



de la France. Les plus raison- 
nobles soutiennent qiCil faut s , ar- 
mer jusqu'aux dents pour effrayer 
Vadversaire et empecher la guerre. 



C'est ce que prechait encore 
recemment, au sein d'une associ- 
ation, M. Pichon, homme d'ex- 
perience, qui fut longtemps 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 
II disait : 

" Travaillons a l'accroissement 
continu de nos forces, c'est la 
encore une des garanties les plus 
efficaces de la paix. Les efforts 
de notre diplomatie seraient 
vains si notre puissance militaire 
n'etait pas crainte et respectee. 

" Pas de desequilibre diplo- 
matique en Europe. Pas de 
desequilibre militaire non plus 
au detriment de Vune des nations 
qui representent au plus haut 
degre V ideal pacifique des demo- 
craiies modernes. Qu'aucune 
charge reconnue necessaire ne 
soit au dessus de notre patriot- 
isme. Ce n'est pas pour la guerre 
que nous nous armons ; c'est 
pour Veviter, la conjurer. Et 
nous ne fortifions l'armee dont 
nous sommes fiers, et qui est 
notre sauvegarde, que dans la 
mesure ou il le faut pour prevenir 
toutes les surprises et decourager 
toute velleite de provocation." 

J'ai rencontre hier soir M. 
Pichon qui m'a repete ces memes 
paroles ; il faut armer de plus 
en plus pour empecher la guerre. 



manded almost with acclama- 
tion. The most reasonable people 
assert that it is necessary to be 
armed to the teeth in order to 
deter the adversary and prevent 
war. 

This doctrine was preached 
quite recently at a meeting by 
M. Pichon, a man of experience, 
who was for a long time Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. He said : 

" Let us work uninterruptedly 
at the increase of our forces ; 
therein lies one of the most 
effective guarantees for peace. 
The efforts of our diplomacy 
would be vain, if our military 
power were not feared and 
respected. 

" Let there be no disturbance 
of the diplomatic equilibrium in 
Europe, and equally no disturb- 
ance of the military equilibrium 
to the disadvantage of one of the 
nations which represent in the 
highest measure the peace ideal of 
modern democracy. Let no burden 
that may be found necessary be 
too heavy for our patriotism. 
It is not for war that we are 
arming ourselves, but to avoid and 
avert it. And we are increasing 
the strength of our army, of 
which we are so proud and 
which is our safeguard, only in 
so far as it is necessary to 
anticipate all surprises and stifle 
every desire to challenge us." 

Yesterday evening I met M. 
Pichon, who repeated to me the 
same words : It is necessary to 
arm more and more in order to 
prevent war. . . . 



No. 110. 

Paris, le 16 Janvier 1914. 



. . . M. Caillaux a vote con- 
tre la loi de trois ans : nombreux 



Paris, January 16th, 1914. 

. . . M. Caillaux has voted 
against the three years' law. A 



ii 4 



THE CRIME 



sont les hommes politiques qui le 
soutiennent et partagent son avis 
d cet egard. Le President du 
Conseil pousse par les hauts 
personnages de la Republiqiie 
a promis le respect loyal de la 
loi de trois ans ; mais il n'est pas 
oxagere de supposer que dans sa 
pensee et dans celle de ses amis, 
on conserve le dessein d'adoucir 
considerablement les rigueurs du 
regime actuel. 



M. Caillaux, qui est le veritable 
President du Conseil, est connu 
pour ses sentiments en faveur 
d'un rapprochement avec VAlle- 
magne ; il connait admirablement 
son pays et sait qu'en dehors 
des etats-majors politiques, des 
poignees de chauvins et de gens qui 
n'osent pas avouer leurs idees et 
leurs preferences, le plus grand 
nombre des Francais, des pay- 
sans, des commercants et des 
industriels subissent avec im- 
patience le surcroit de depenses et 
de charges personnelles qui leur 
est impose. . . . 

Mais je tenais a vous faire 
remarquer que nous n'avons 
certes pas a desirer, comme 
Beiges, la chute de M. Caillaux. 
Cet homme d'Etat pent etre 
dangereux pour les finances du 
pays ; il peut amener des divi- 
sions malsaines et regrettables 
pour la politique interieure de la 
France mais j'estime que sa 
presence au pouvoir diminuera 
Vacuite des rivalites internation- 
ales et constituera une rneilleure 
base pour les relations entre la 
France et VAllemagne, 

GUILLATJME. 



large number of politicians sup- 
port him and share his views 
in this respect. Under the 
influence of highly- placed persons 
in the Republic, the Prime 
Minister has promised that he 
will loyally give effect to the law 
regarding the period of three 
years' service ; but it is not too 
much to assume that he and his 
friends in their own minds are 
thinking of considerably soften- 
ing the harshness of the existing 
system. 

M. Caillaux, who is the real 
Prime Minister, is inclined, as is 
well known, to a rapprochement 
with Germany. He knows his 
country extremely well, and he 
knows that apart from the political 
readers, a handful of chauvinists 
and of people who dare not 
confess their thoughts and inclina- 
tions, the majority of the French 
people — peasants, merchants, 
manufacturers — are only bearing 
with impatience the excessive 
expenditure and personal burdens 
which are laid upon them. . . . 

But I consider it important to 
draw your attention to the fact 
that we, as Belgians, certainly 
cannot desire the fall of Caillaux. 
This statesman may well be 
dangerous so far as the finances 
of his country are concerned : 
he may bring about unhealthy 
divisions, which are to be re- 
gretted in the interest of the 
internal politics of France, but 
bis participation in the Govern- 
ment will, in my opinion, di- 
minish international friction and 
constitute a better basis for Franco- 
German relations. 

Guillaume. 



Here also reference should be made to Beyens' report 
of February 20th, 1914 (No. Ill), quoted above, which 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 115 



tells of the conclusion of the Franco-German agreement 
regarding Asia Minor and adds : " Beyond doubt the 
majority of the French and the German people wish to 
live in peace." 

No. 118. 



Berlin, le 12 juin 1914. 

Les journaux allemands con- 
sacrent depuis dix jours en 
premiere page des articles quoti- 
diens a la crise ministerielle 
francaise. Elle accapare leur 
attention et cellede leurs lecteurs. 
La question albanaise, l'imbro- 
glio mexieain, sont relegues au 
second plan. Les elections legis- 
latives en France, comme j'ai 
eu l'honneur de vous l'ecrire le 
14 mai dernier, avaient cause id 
une grande satisfaction qui s'dtait 
fait jour dans le langage de la 
presse, avec cette restriction 
cependant qu'il ne fallait pas 
esperer de la majorit6 de la 
nouvelle Chambre V abrogation 
immediate de la loi sur le service 
militaire de trois ans. Cette loi 
a acquis en effet une importance 
extraordinaire, et suivant moi 
quelque peu exageree, aux yeux 
des Allemands . C ' est le leitmotiv, 
le refrain oblige de leurs appreci- 
ations sur la politique francaise 
a l'egard de l'AUemagne. C'est 
pour eux la preuve manifesto 
des desseins agressifs qu'ils pre- 
tent a ses dirigeants. 



La demission du Cabinet Dou- 
mergue, l'echec de la combin- 
aison Viviani, le refus de MM. 
Deschanel, Delcasse et Jean 
Dupuy d'assumer la responsa- 
bilite de constituer un Ministere, 
avaient rendu confiance a la 
presse allemande dans la reali- 



Berlin, June 12th, 1914. 

For the last ten days the 
German newspapers have every 
day been devoting articles, ap- 
pearing in the leading place, to 
the French Ministerial crisis. 
This crisis absorbs their atten- 
tion as well as that of their 
readers. The Albanian question 
and the Mexican imbroglio have 
been consigned into the back- 
ground. As I had the honour to 
report to you on May 14th, the 
elections for the Legislature in 
France have here evoked great 
satisfaction, which found ex- 
pression in the language of the 
Press, with the restriction, how- 
ever, that no immediate abroga- 
tion of the law regarding three 
years' military service was to be 
hoped for from the majority of 
the new Chamber. In fact this 
law has in the eyes of the 
Germans gained an extraordi- 
nary and, in my opinion, a 
somewhat exaggerated importance. 
It is the leitmotiv and the 
inevitable refrain of their dis- 
cussions regarding the policy of 
France towards Germany. They 
see in it the manifest proof of 
the aggressive plans which they 
assume in its leaders. 

The resignation of the Dou- 
mergue Cabinet, the fiasco of 
the Viviani combination, and the 
refusal of Messrs. Deschanel, 
Delcasse, and Jean Dupuy to 
accept the responsibility for the 
formation of a Ministry had 
given the German Press confi- 
I 2 



n6 



THE CRIME 



sation de son desir : V abolition du 
service militaire de trois ans par 
une majorite de radicaux social- 
istes. Mais si la pensee etait la 
meme chez tous les organes de 
l'opinion publique allemande, 
1' expression en etait bien diffe- 
rente, sxiivant la couleur politique 
du journal. La oic la presse 
liberate applaudissait sans mesure 
au triomphe du radicalisme fran- 
cais, les pangermanistes ne trou- 
vaient que matiere a raillerie et a 
denigrement ; on peut meme dire 
que la plupart des journaux 
conservateurs n'ont observe aucune 
mesure dans leurs jugements. 
Tous cependant sont d' accord 
pour voir dans l'obstination des 
radicaux-socialistes a ne pas 
faire partie d'un Ministere qui 
ne promettrait pas de resoudre 
immediatement la question mili- 
taire, un plan de campagne ourdi 
contre l'Elysee, la crise minis - 
terielle en se prolongeant devant 
se transformer en crise presi- 
dentielle. 

. . . Le peuple francais n'a 
pas montre a cette occasion Vab- 
negation patriotique dont il avait 
donne des preuves dans d'autres 
circonstances. Cela tient sans 
doute a la propagation des idees 
socialistes dans les classes in- 
ferieures de la nation. Quoi 
qu'il en soit, on doit se demander 
si le Cabinet Barthou et le 
President de la Republique n'ont 
pas agi avec trop de precipita- 
tion ; si, mal eclaires sur les 
veritables intentions du Gou- 
vernement Imperial lorsqu'il a 
depose l'an dernier son pro jet de 
loi pour le renforcement de 
1'armee, Us ont eu raison de 
riposter du tac au tac par la loi 
sur le service de trois ans, au lieu 
de s'assurer que 1' augmentation 
des effectifs allemands etait 



dence in the fulfilment of their 
wish, namely, the repeal of the 
three years' period of service by a 
Radical- Socialist majority. But 
if all the organs of German public 
opinion were filled with the same 
thought, it was nevertheless 
expressed in very different forms 
according to the political colour 
of the paper. While the Liberal 
Press bestowed unmeasured ap- 
plause on the triumph of French 
Radicalism, the Pan-Germans only 
found occasion for sneering and 
contemptuous judgments : it may 
indeed be said that the majority 
of the Conservative newspapers 
completely lacked restraint in 
their judgments. All, however, 
see in the obstinate refusal of 
the Radical-Socialists to enter a 
Ministry which does not promise 
an immediate solution of the 
military question a plan of 
campaign against the Elysee, 
inasmuch as a lengthy Minis- 
terial crisis is bound to change 
into a Presidential crisis. 

. . . On this occasion the 
French people did not shotu the 
patriotic self-sacrifice of which it 
has given proof on other occa- 
sions. This is without doubt 
to be attributed to the dissemina- 
tion of socialistic ideas in the 
lower ranks of the nation. How- 
ever this may be, it must be 
asked whether the Cabinet Bar- 
thou and the President of the 
Republic have not acted with 
undue haste, whether they were 
not badly informed regarding 
the true intentions of the Im- 
perial Government when they 
introduced their Bill last year 
for increasing the strength of 
the army, and whether they 
acted rightly in replying tit for 
tat with the law on the subject 
of three years' period of ser- 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 117 



reellement une arme tournee 
contre la France. Je crois en 
definitive, comme l'a dit M. de 
Bethmann-Hollweg a la tribune 
du Reichstag, que le danger 
d'une confederation balkanique, 
qui paralyserait plus tard une 
grande par tie des forces autrichi- 
ennes, a ete la raison dominante 
de la loi allemande de 1913. 
Quelques semaines apres le deptt 
de cette loi, la confederation 
balkanique avait cesse d'exister. 
Mais le Gouvernement Imperial 
se trouvait en presence d'un 
autre danger qu'il n'avait pas 
prevu : le depot d'une loi aug- 
mentant les effectifs de combat 
de l'armee francaise, suivi d'une 
campagne violente de discours 
et d'articles de journaux dirigee 
contre 1'AUemagne. II est requite 
de cette agitation montree par 
les Francais une plus grande 
tension dans leurs rapports avec 
l'Empire voisin et l'idee, fausse- 
ment repandue ou acceptee sans 
controle par les meilleurs esprits 
de ce pays-ci, que la guerre est 
inevitable dans un avenir rap- 
proche, parce que la France la 
desireviolemment et s'armef ebrile- 
ment pour s'y preparer. A 
Paris les memes intentions sont 
pretees au Gouvernement Im- 
perial dont plusieurs membres 
ont eu parfois, il faut en conve- 
nir, des paroles malheureuses ; 
tel le Ministre de la Guerre 
parlant d'une "offensive fou~ 
droyante" et d'une " attaque 
brusquee " pour donner la victoire 
d Varmee allemande. II n'y a 
peut-etre encore aujourd'hui 
qu'une effroyable meprise chez 
l'un comme chez l'autre des 
deux peuples. La majorite de 
la nation francaise ne veut cer- 
tainement pas d'une guerre et 
cette guerre ne serait pas neces- 



vice, instead of assuring them- 
selves whether the increase of 
the German effectives was in 
fact a weapon directed against 
France. I have come to the 
conclusion that, as Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg said in the 
tribune of the Reichstag, the 
danger of a Balkan League which 
might at a later date paralyse 
a large portion of the Austrian 
forces was the chief reason for 
the German law of 1913. Some 
weeks after the introduction of 
this law the Balkan League had 
ceased to exist. But the Im- 
perial Government found them- 
selves confronted by a new 
danger which they had not 
foreseen, namely, the introduc- 
tion of a law regarding the 
increase of the strength of the 
French Army, which was fol- 
lowed by a violent campaign of 
speeches and newspaper articles 
against Germany. The result of 
the agitation thus manifested by 
the French was a greater tension 
in the relations with the neigh- 
bouring Empire, and the growth 
of the idea which is falsely 
disseminated or uncritically ac- 
cepted by the best minds in this 
country that war is inevitable in 
the near future, because France 
ardently desires it and is fever- 
ishly arming to prepare herself 
for it. In Paris the same inten- 
tions are ascribed to the Imperial 
Government ; several of their 
members have certainly at times 
made use of unfortunate expres- 
sions ; thus the Minister of War 
with his phrase about the " light- 
ning offensive " and the " unex- 
pected attack " to assure victory 
to the German Army. Perhaps 
even to-day there is nothing 
more than a terrible mutual 
misunderstanding in both the 



n8 THE CRIME 

saire a VAllemagne. Dans peii nations. The majority of the 
d'annees l'equilibre des forces French people certainly does not 
ne sera plus possible entre elle want war, and Germany does not 
et sa voisine. L'Allemagne n'a need this war. In a few years an 
qu'd prendre patience, qyCa pour- equilibrium of forces between 
suivre en paix le developpement her and her neighbour will no 
incessant de sa puissance econo- longer be possible. Germany 
mique et fmanciere, qu'a need only have patience, she need 
attendre les effets de sa natalit6 only further increase in peace 
prep onder ante, pour dominer her economic and financial 
sans conteste et sans lulte toute strength, she need only await 
V Europe centrale. . . . the effects of her greater number 

of births in order to dominate 
without contradiction and with- 
out struggle the whole of Central 
Europe. . . . 

This document No. 118, dated June 12th, 1914, is the 
penultimate report of Baron Beyens from Berlin. It 
has already been mentioned elsewhere and is of quite 
exceptional interest. The following inferences may be 
drawn from it : 

1. The elections to the French Chamber of 1914 evoked 
in general great satisfaction in Germany, since a repeal, 
or at any rate an alteration of the provisions, of the Three 
Years Law was hoped from the new majority. 

2. It was only the Conservative and the Pan-German 
Press in Germany which vied with each other in their 
unmeasured tone and in the contemptuous views which 
they expressed regarding French conditions. Nor need 
this occasion any surprise : the peace tendencies on the 
other side made it more difficult for these intriguers to 
carry out their warlike intentions. 

3. The temporal and causal sequence of the German 
Military Law and the French Three Years Law was 
exactly as it is shown to have been by the dates of the 
introduction and the acceptance of these two measures. 
The Military Law preceded, the Three Years Law fol- 
lowed. Mention is nowhere made in the Belgian reports 
of Schiemann's legend, involving a lying inversion of the 
facts, to the effect that the Three Years Law had already 
been promised in Petrograd in the summer of 1912 by 
the then Prime Minister Poincare, that this promise was 
known in Berlin, and that in consequence the Military 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 119 

Law was framed. Baron Beyens confirms the sequence 
of the two laws to be exactly as emerges from their 
dates. 

4. The German Military Law, which forced France 
to the prolongation of the period of service which was so 
extremely burdensome and unpopular, had, as was only 
to be expected, let loose a violent Press campaign on the 
other side of the Vosges against the German provocators 
to armaments. The excitement was still further increased 
by unfortunate expressions which were used by the 
German War Minister. " The majority of the French 
people certainly does not want war. For Germany such 
a war would not be necessary," since in any case it will 
soon enjoy domination in Central Europe by virtue of 
its increasing population and its increasing economic 
power. The distinction in Beyens' diagnosis of French 
and German conditions deserves to be noted : France 
does not want war ; Germany does not need war. In 
other words Germany would be foolish if it sought for 
war ; the Belgian Ambassador, however, does not say 
that it is not being guilty or that it might not in future 
be guilty of this folly. The will -for peace he emphasises 
only in the case of France, not in the case of Germany. 

It would be a sufficiently interesting and attractive 
task to dissect many other of the Belgian reports in this 
way. This would, however, take us too far, and I must 
therefore in general leave it to the reader to draw his 
own conclusions from the text. 

Russia's Love of Peace. 

Russia's love of peace is expressly recognised in many 
places in the Belgian reports. Nowhere is any doubt 
thrown on the Tsar's will for peace, and on the occasion 
of the Potsdam meeting flattery and praise are bestowed 
by Baron Greindl, the then representative of Belgium 
at the Berlin Court, even on Sazonof, the Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who followed Isvolsky towards the 
end of 1910. On this the reader should refer to the 
report of November 7th, 1910 (No. 62), already quoted, 
and further, as examples, to the following passages which 



120 



THE CRIME 



prove that the Belgian diplomatists did not attribute 
any warlike intentions to those in authority in Russia : 



No. 60. 



Berlin, le 21 juin 1909. 

..." II a de plus ete 
reconnu que les arrangements 
interna tionaux en vigueur 
auxquels participent la Russie 
et l'Allemagne rC empechenl nulle- 
ment ces bonnes relations.'''' . . . 

Ici, comme j'ai eu l'honneur de 
vous l'ecrire par mon rapport du 
7 juin, on ne s'est pas fait 
d'illusion sur l'etendue du resul- 
tat possible de l'entrevue. Uini- 
tiative prise par la cour et le 
gouvernement russes montre seule- 
ment qu'a Saint-Petersbourg de 
recents ev6nements ont laisse 
l'impression que la triple entente 
ne fournit pas a la Russie tin 
appui suffisant pour se passer de 
relations au moins normales avec 
VAllemagne. 

Greindl. 



Berlin, June 21st, 1909. 

. . . "It was further recog- 
nised that the existing inter- 
national arrangements, in which 
Russia and Germany participate, 
in no way prevent these good 
relations" . . . 

As I had the honour to 
announce to you in my report 
of June 7th, no illusions are here 
entertained regarding the pos- 
sible results of this meeting. 
The initiative of the Russian 
Court and of the Russian Gov- 
ernment shows merely that cer- 
tain recent events in Petrograd 
have left behind the impression 
that the Triple Entente offers 
Russia no sufficient support to 
enable her to renounce relations 
with Germany which are at 
least normal. 

Gbeindl. 



No. 94 (Greindl's report of October 24th, 1912, already 
quoted) speaks of the " policy of understanding with 
other Powers which M. Sazonof is pursuing," and states 
that this policy is " all the more reasonable inasmuch 
as present events have surprised Russia in the middle of 
the reorganisation of her military forces." No. 103 
(Greindl's report of April 4th, 1913, which has also been 
quoted already) testifies in favour of M. Sazonof that 
he is " at heart in agreement with his colleagues who 
conduct the policy of the Great Powers " and sees the 
dangers for the peace of Europe in the Viennese Govern- 
ment and in the " direction which the Viennese Cabinet 
has given the Triple Alliance in the Balkan question." 
(The attitude of Austria towards Serbia and Montenegro : 
the harbour question, the question of Skutari, etc.) 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 121 

The Purpose of the Triple Entente : the 
Maintenance of Peace. 

Alongside the many testimonies to the love of peace 
inspiring the individual Powers belonging to the Entente, 
the Belgian reports also contain a considerable number 
of observations which attribute to the Triple Entente, 
as a whole, nothing else than the intention to preserve 
the peace of Europe. Such utterances are already repro- 
duced in part in the reports previously quoted. I would 
here again refer to Greindl's report of July 18th, 1908 
(No. 50), which no doubt speaks of a policy hostile 
to Germany pursued by the King of England, but also 
speaks at the same time of France's sincere love of peace 
and of the disinclination of Russia against the Entente 
Coalition being directed towards enmity against Germany. 
Greindl declares quite positively " that this plan (the 
English plan for giving the Entente such a direction, 
for which, however, there is no evidence whatever) had 
failed on the opposition of France and Russia. A month 
ago this was exclusively an inference on my part : to-day 
it is positively ascertained." 

The Aggressive Conspiracy of Reval ? 

This report of Greindl, be it observed, dates from 
July, 1908, that is to say, a month after the meeting at 
Reval. Where then is the famous aggressive conspiracy 
of Reval, the invention of Schiemann, which now belongs 
to the stock in trade of German apologetic literature ? 
The German Crown witness Greindl here confirms exactly 
the opposite, namely, that Russia and France had as- 
sumed an attitude of hostility towards any closer or more 
aggressive shape being given to the Entente. 

A further confirmation of the fact that the alleged 
offensive conspiracy of Reval is merely a lying invention 
of German chauvinism is shown by the above quoted 
report of Greindl of June 21st, 1909 (No. 60), which 
relates directly to the meeting of the German Emperor 
and the Tsar in Baltischport. 



122 THE CRIME 

The meeting of the two Emperors took place a year 
after the interview at Reval, some months after the 
conclusion of the crisis in connection with the annexation 
of Bosnia. Both Emperors were accompanied by repre- 
sentatives of their Foreign Offices. The Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in Russia was at that time still Isvolsky 
— that Minister who, alongside Delcasse, is always repre- 
sented in the Pan-German cliche as the worst inciter to 
war. King Edward the Encircler was still alive, and 
still sitting comfortably in England — in the Pan-German 
view like a poisonous spider doing nothing else from 
morning to evening but spinning its web over the whole 
of Europe, in order to entangle and suffocate the hapless 
Germany therein. All these factors which were favour- 
able to the exercise of the power of the Entente- Coalition 
were still in existence, though they did not exist much 
longer, and yet Greindl, the sworn enemy of the Entente, 
is forced to confess that the Coalition was beginning 
gravely to totter, that the " machine " no longer responded 
to the English King's pressure on the button, indeed 
that it had refused to act on the first occasion on which 
it had been put to the test during the conflict regarding 
annexation which had just been surmounted. Russia, such 
is the opinion of Greindl, had no longer any real confi- 
dence in the power of the Triple Entente to furnish her 
with support, and therefore the Tsar and his Government 
had taken the initiative to the meeting in Baltischport. 

What then, I again ask, becomes of the Reval conspiracy 
of June, 1908, in view of the account here given ? If 
even Greindl, the apt and aping follower of Schiemann, 
disowns his legend about the conspiracy, what are we to 
regard as being true in the invention of the Kreuzzeitung 
Professor ? What becomes of the whole policy of encircle- 
ment, which we are told was pursued with such clear 
consciousness of the end to be attained, if, according 
to the testimony of the Belgian Ambassador, it had 
already broken down a year after it had been entered 
upon ? 

Moreover Greindl, even before the meeting at Reval, 
had expressed himself very sceptically regarding the 
probable results of the discussions which took place there, 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 123 

in the sense of a policy hostile to Germany. In his 
previous report of May 30th, 1908 (No. 47), he had already 
referred to Grey's speech in the House of Commons, on 
the occasion of the debate which took place on the 
imminent Russian tour of the English King. Rumours 
had at the time gained currency in England that this 
Royal tour was intended to lead to a closer union of the 
Entente Powers, to a kind of Triple Alliance as an equi- 
poise to the existing Triple Alliance of the Continental 
Powers. By his speech Grey disposed of these rumours, 
denying that the Royal tour was invested with any 
unusual importance and representing its object as merely 
that of sealing the Anglo-Russian Entente on Asiatic 
questions which had been concluded in the previous 
year. Greindl also expressly mentions the aversion of the 
leading Press of England and France from a consolidation 
of the Entente to a new Triple Alliance. It is, of course, 
inevitable that this Belgian of German nationalistic sym- 
pathies should attach all manner of insinuations to the 
Reval meeting, despite the facts to the contrary reported 
by himself. To what a degree of blindest partiality this 
so " objective " reporter rises may be shown in the follow- 
ing paragraphs of the report which has already been 
mentioned elsewhere : 

No. 47. 

Berlin, le 30 mai 1908. Berlin, May 30th, 1908. 

. . . La presse independante . . . The independent Press, 

qui n'est pas tenue aux which need not observe the 

memes menagements, ne se fait same restraint, does not indeed 

pas faute de manifester ses fail to give expression to its 

inquietudes. Qu'on l'appelle uneasiness. Whether it be called 

alliance, entente ou comme Ton an Alliance, an Entente, or by 

voudra, le groupement des puis- any other name, the grouping 

sances prepare personnelle- of Powers personally initiated 

ment par le Roi d'Angleterre, by the King of England does 

existe et s'il n'est pas une exist, and even if it does not 

menace directe et prochaine de indicate a direct or an early 

guerre pour l'Allemagne (ce qui danger of war for Germany 

serait trop dire), il n'en constitue (which would be saying too 

pas moins une diminution de much) it nevertheless involves a 

securite. diminution of security. 

Les declarations pacifistes obli- The customary pacifist declar- 

gees et qiii seront sans doute ations which without doubt will 



124 



THE CRIME 



rep6tees a Reval signifient bien 
peu de chose emanant de trois 
puissances qui comme la Russie 
et l'Angleterre viennent avec 
des succes divers d'entreprendre 
sans autre raison que le desir de 
s'agrandir et meme sans pretexte 
plausible, les guerres de con- 
quete de la Mandchourie et du 
Transvaal ou qui cornme la 
France procede en ce moment 
meme a l'envahissement du 
Maroc au mepris de promesses 
solennelles et sans autre titre 
que la cession des droits de 
l'Angleterre qui n'en possedait 
aucun. Ce sont les memes puis- 
sances qui en compagnie des 
Etats-Unis sortant a peine de 
la guerre de spoliation contre 
l'Espagne se sont montrees ultra- 
pacifistes a La Haye. 

La triple alliance a garanti 
pendant trente ans la paix du 
monde, parce qu'elle etait dirigee 
par l'Allemagne satisfaite du 
partage politique de l'Europe. 
Le nouveau groupement la 
menace parce qu'il se compose 
des puissances qui aspirent a 
une revision du status quo, au 
point d' avoir fait taire des haines 
seculaires pour preparer la 
realisation de ce desir. 



Greindl. 



be repeated at Reval have very- 
little significance when uttered 
by three Powers which, like 
Russia and England, have just 
undertaken, though with varying 
success, wars of conquest in 
Manchuria and in the Transvaal 
without any other reason than 
the desire of self -aggrandisement 
and even without a plausible 
pretext, or which, like France, 
is proceeding at this very mo- 
ment to the conquest of Morocco, 
disregarding solemn promises 
and without any other title 
than the cession of the rights of 
England, which possessed none. 
These are the same Powers which, 
in company with the United 
States, which had scarcely finished 
the war of spoliation against Spain 
appeared as ultra -pacifists at The 
Hague. 

For thirty years the Triple 
Alliance has guaranteed the 
peace of the world because it 
stood under the leadership of 
Germany, which was satisfied 
with the political division of 
Europe. The new grouping 
threatens this peace, because it 
is composed of Powers who are 
striving for a revision of the 
status quo to such an extent 
that they have silenced feelings 
of hatred which have endured 
for centuries, in order to be able 
to realise this desire. 

Gkeindl. 



Nearly every one of the sentences here reproduced is 
printed in heavy type in the German collection — a fact 
which does not prevent me from giving them here and 
thus again furnishing proof of the impartiality of my 
method of selection. In fact, this effusion of the Belgian 
diplomatist is one of the corner-stones on which the Berlin 
Foreign Office builds its proof of defence, and yet the 
evidence completely breaks down in the direction in which 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 125 

it is intended to be effective. The Belgian reporter is 
observed to be making painful efforts to attach subjectively 
a warlike note to the Reval meeting, which, from all 
the objective signs, had in no way a character that imperilled 
peace. He sees in the Triple Entente a diminution of 
the security of peace ; he scoffs at the " ultra-pacifists 
of The Hague," whom he upbraids for all manner of 
wars of conquest in the past (as if the Powers of the Triple 
Alliance had not also acquired their colonial territory 
by conquest !) He regards the Triple Alliance as a shield of 
the world's peace but on the other hand, the new grouping 
of Powers, which " strives for a revision of the status 
quo," as a danger to peace. What is meant by striving 
for a revision of the status quo ? Does this refer to Europe ? 
Where, when and how has such a revision ever been ad- 
vanced in time of peace by one of the Entente Powers, 
or by all of them together as the object in view ? 1 Did 
the thought of Alsace-Lorraine, which slumbered in many 
French minds, ever demonstrably form the object of 
positive Entente agreements ? Did this idea ever develop, 
even in France alone, to a positive " will for action," to 
a positive will in the minds of the leading men of France ? 

1 I have already explained fully in the third volume of The 
Crime (section, "War Aims") that the demands of a territorial 
nature put forward by the Entente Powers during the war must 
be judged from a special point of view. The criterion for the judg- 
ment of war aims is the same as for the judgment of the origin 
of the war: "Who is the aggressor? Who is the defender?" 
The aggressor who begins a war for the sake of imperialistic aims 
of conquest and who realises these aims during the war cannot 
make it a reproach against the defender if he also, in the course 
of his war of defence, in addition to other guarantees for protection 
against future' attacks, strives to weaken his opponent from 
a territorial point of view. Such territorial acquisitions, con- 
templated after the outbreak of war (whether one approves of 
them or not, whether one regards them as an appropriate guarantee 
or not), are at any rate something entirely different from intentions 
to make conquest, entertained before the war and with a view to 
war ; more especially they have nothing to do with the question 
of responsibility. 

This consideration at once disposes of all the conclusions drawn 
from the Russian secret documents vinfavourable to the Entente 
Powers, since all these documents, published by the Maximalist 
Government, so far as they are of any importance, date from the 
period after the outbreak of war. 



126 THE CRIME 

Once for all I ask the question : Where is the evidence 
that any man in authority in France during the last 
fifteen years willed or prepared for the European war with 
a view to the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine ? 

Where is the further evidence that any Russian or 
English ruler or statesman was ever willing to support 
the French with a view to such a reconquest ? What, 
then, is meant when the Belgian observer ascribes to the 
Entente Powers the intention to revise the status quo ? 
If this observation relates to colonial territory, to spheres 
of interest outside Europe, then it is, as a one-sided charge 
against the Entente Powers, more than ever destitute 
of meaning. In these domains all the Powers have con- 
stantly striven for revisions of the existing conditions, 
the Powers of the Triple Alliance just as much as those 
of the Triple Entente. In these domains such revisions 
have been arrived at on countless occasions by amicable 
agreement, some, indeed, immediately before the outbreak 
of the war. Such an adjustment of interests constitutes 
no danger of war, but on the contrary a guarantee of 
peace. What, then, does M. Greindl mean by the revision 
of the status quo involving a danger to peace, which he 
ascribes to the Entente Powers as the aim of their policy ? 
I have intentionally dwelt somewhat longer on this report 
of Greindl's than it deserves : first, to meet the charge 
that I suppress matters which appear unfavourable to 
my thesis, but secondly and above all to illustrate the 
blind partiality of the Belgian observer, who uncritically 
and without any proof takes his arguments and, indeed, 
in part his phraseology from the arsenal of the Pan- 
German literature of incitement which lies ready to his 
hand. 

It is interesting to observe how this acute observer 
in the next report of June 12th, 1908 (No. 48) — the 
meeting at Reval had meanwhile taken place — was obliged 
almost entirely to withdraw his unfavourable prognostica- 
tions of May. Let us hear how he now expresses himself, 
after the meeting with regard to its results. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 127 



No. 48. 



Berlin, le 12 juin 1908. 

. . . Malgre les denegations 
posterieures il a du exister quelque 
pro jet de resserrer les liens entre 
les puissances groupees par le 
Roi d'Angleterre dans une pensee 
hostile a l'Allemagne. Le jour- 
nal Le Temps bien place pour etre 
exactement informe, puisque 
c'est l'organe officieux du gou- 
vernement francais, paraissait si 
sur qu'a Londres on aspirait a 
transformer 1' entente cordiale 
en alliance qu'il y mettait deja 
ses conditions. II lui fallait 
une reforme de l'armee anglaise, 
permettant a l'Angleterre de 
fournir un contingent pour une 
guerre continentale. Cela signi- 
fiait qu'a Paris on ne se souciait 
pas d'etre engage dans un conflit 
dont l'Angleterre pourrait se 
retirer, apres avoir detruit la 
marine de guerre et de commerce 
de l'Allemagne et annexe les 
colonies allemandes, hors d'etat 
de proteger la France et d'em- 
pecher l'Allemagne de s'indem- 
niser aux depens de celle-ci des 
desastres maritimes certains. 



Mise en demeure de creer une 
armee de terre dont elle estime 
n'avoir pas besoin pour elle- 
meme simplement pour aider la 
France a la conquete de V Alsace- 
Lorraine dont l'Angleterre n'a 
cure, celle-ci a repondu par ses 
journaux a l'unisson, en decli- 
nant l'idee suggeree par l'organe 
officieux francais. C'estseulement 
alors que Le Temps a declare 
qu'il n'avait voulu faire que 
de la theorie pure. Si c'est vrai, 
il faut avouer que le moment 



Berlin, June 12th, 1908. 

. . . Despite later denials, 
some plan must have existed to 
draw more closely the bonds 
between the Powers grouped by 
the King of England in a sense 
hostile to Germany. The news- 
paper Le Temps, which as a 
semi-official organ of the French 
Government is in a position to be 
accurately informed, appeared 
to be so certain that the attempt 
was being made in London to 
transform the Entente Cordiale 
into an Alliance that it already 
prescribed its conditions for such 
a contingency. It demanded a 
reform of the English Army 
which would place England in a 
position to furnish a contingent 
for a continental war. This 
meant that in Paris they did not 
wish to be involved in a conflict 
from which England might with- 
draw after the annihilation of 
the German navy and mercantile 
shipping and the annexation of 
the German colonies, without 
being in a position to protect 
France and to prevent Germany 
from compensating herself at 
the cost of France for the defeat 
at sea which would certainly 
await her. 

In reply to the demand to 
create a land army which she 
considers that she does not need 
for herself, but solely to aid 
France in the reconquest of 
Alsace-Lorraine, to which England 
is indifferent, the latter has by 
its Press unanimously repudiated 
the suggestion of the French 
semi-official organ : only then 
did Le Temps state that it had 
spoken exclusively from the 
theoretical point of view. If 
this is the case, it must be con- 



128 



THE CRIME 



etait singulierement choisi pour 
discuter une pareille question de 
doctrine. 

A St-Petersbourg aussi il faut 
qu'on ait, malgre les declarations 
de Sir Ed. Grey au parlement, 
craint une proposition oValliance 
exposant la Russie a un conflit 
qu'elle est hors d'etat de sup- 
porter. Si ce West pas pour 
prevenir toute demarche semblable, 
on ne comprend pas l'article 
par lequel l'officieuse Bossija a, 
a la veille de l'entrevue de Reval, 
insiste sur Vamitie seculaire de 
VAllemagne et de la Russie, en 
termes beaucoup plus chaleureux 
que ne le comporte la situation 
veritable. La Russie ne veut 
pas se laisser exploiter par VAngle- 
terre, comme elle-meme elle a 
exploite la France, en lui em- 
pruntant des milliards, non pour 
la revanche comme on l'esperait 
a Paris, mais pour ses entre- 
prises en Extreme Orient. . . . 



fessed that the moment for the 
theoretical discussion of such a 
question was strangely chosen. 

In Petrograd also, despite the 
assurances of Sir Edward Grey 
in Parliament, there must have 
been some apprehension of a 
proposal for an alliance which 
would expose Russia to a conflict 
which it would not be in a 
position to sustain. If it did 
not have the object of preventing 
any such step, it would be 
impossible to understand the 
article in the semi-official Rossija 
the evening before the Reval 
meeting, emphasising in much 
more cordial words than corre- 
spond with the actual situation 
the friendship between Germany 
and Russia which has existed for 
centuries. Russia will not allow 
herself to be exploited by England, 
as she herself has exploited 
France, in borrowing from her 
milliards of francs, not for the 
revanche, as was hoped in Paris, 
but for her own undertakings in 
Eastern Asia. 

It will be seen that it was anything but a Triple Alliance, 
much less an aggressive conspiracy, that emerged from 
the meeting at Reval. The French were averse from 
such a closer union, because England's land army promised 
them no sufficient support. The English had no intention 
of forming a new land army in order to reconquer Alsace- 
Lorraine for France. The Russians were apprehensive — 
what do you say to this word of Greindl's, Herr Schiemann ? 
— of a proposal of an alliance from the side of England, 
which in fact was not made, but which they declined 
in advance as they were not willing to allow themselves 
to be exploited by England for her special purposes. 
This is, according to Greindl, the meagre result of the 
meeting at Reval which the same Greindl fourteen days 
before had presented to his Government as a fat piece 
of war news. From this meeting nothing remains, apart 
from the intention to "isolate" Germany. I have else- 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 129 

where explained what this means and how little it is 
connected with the question of guilt which we have to 
investigate. 



From the beginning of his tenure of office at Berlin 
Baron Beyens expresses himself quite differently from 
his predecessor Greindl regarding the aims of the Entente. 
He nowhere reproaches the Entente with entertaining 
warlike intentions or even with producing warlike effects. 
For him the Entente is what it always has been for every 
unprejudiced reader : a coalition for the protection of 
the peace of Europe by setting up an equivalent group of 
Powers over against the Triple Alliance, by the creation 
of a European equilibrium. In Baron Beyens' report of 
April 24th, 1914 (No. 113, already quoted elsewhere), we 
read as follows : 

No. 113. 



Berlin, le 24 avril 1914. 

... II semble a un obser- 
vateur vivant a Berlin que les 
liens de I'Entente cordiale se 
sont quelque peu detendus, que 
la pointe de cette arme defensive 
n'est plus tournee exclusivement 
contre 1'Allemagne, comme elle 
le f ut du temps du Roi Edouard, 
et que la Triple Entente est 
devenue plutot un concert qu'une 
Union de Puissances, agissant 
ensemble dans certaines questions 
determinees pour la poursuite 
d'interets communs. Mais cette 
facon de voir peut etre fausse ou 
influencee par la lecture d'ecrits 
politiques dus a des plumes alle- 
mandes. II serait fort inter es- 
sant pour moi de savoir ce que 
pensent du caractere qu'a pris 
I'Entente cordiale mes Collegues 
de Londres et de Paris. 

Baron Beyens. 



Berlin, April 24th, 1914. 

... To an observer who 
lives in Berlin, it appears as if 
the bonds of the Entente Cor- 
diale had to some extent become 
looser, as if the point of this 
weapon of defence were no longer 
directed exclusively against Ger- 
many as in the time of King 
Edward, as if the Triple Entente 
had become a Concert rather than 
a Union of Powers which in 
certain specific and closely defined 
questions act together in the 
pursuit of common interests. But 
this method of looking at things 
may be false or may be influenced 
by the perusal of political pam- 
phlets emanating from German 
pens. It would be very interest- 
ing to me to know what my 
colleagues in London and Paris 
t hink of the character which the 
Entente Cordiale has assumed. 
Baron Beyens. 



In Guillaume's next report, dated April 25th, 1914 
(No. 114), it is emphasised that the relations of France 



i 3 o THE CRIME 

and England " are favourable to the maintenance of 
general peace without thereby being prejudicial to other 
attempts at a rapprochement which are equally advan- 
tageous to the maintenance of European equilibrium." 



Further commentaries on these reports are superfluous. 
As a result of this section it has been shown that the Entente 
Powers, individually or collectively, never entertained 
the thought of beginning a European war, nor did they 
prepare for its execution. The intention of " isolating " 
Germany is the only charge that can be extracted from 
these Belgian reports, if, indeed, such an " intention to 
isolate " is to be, or can be, described as a charge. Even 
this mild reproach, however, rests on a very uncertain 
basis, when we bear in mind the onesidedness, the defects, 
and the lacunae of the German collection — qualities which 
rob it of any evidential force. 

Assuming that this charge is sustained, the German 
thesis of defence runs as follows : 

You wanted to isolate me, and therefore I have 
attacked you. 

Even if all the premises are admitted, the cogency of 
the Belgian documents regarded as evidence, the actual 
isolation of Germany (ignoring, that is to say, the fact 
that Germany in reality was not isolated, that she had 
her allies by her side, that she could constantly extend 
her political, military and economic power, and give 
evidence of her strength in every international conflict) — 
even if all these non-existent premises are admitted, 
the above monstrous conclusion would still stand in 
accusation against Germany : that isolation means war. 
This conclusion in itself would justify the damning judg- 
ment passed by the whole civilised world on Germany's 
rulers and Government. 

The German Chauvinists. 

We have hitherto been concerned with the Belgian 
reports only in so far as they refer to the tendencies in the 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 131 



Entente countries. Two-thirds of the necessary material 
is wanting to enable us to determine the judgment of 
the Belgian Ambassadors on the corresponding tendencies 
in the countries of the Triple Alliance. As already 
observed, we have the reports from Berlin only, not those 
from Vienna or Rome. 

What do the Belgians say regarding German chauvinism, 
and the dangers of war which threatened from the side 
of Germany ? Let us hear a report from the Paris Am- 
bassador, Guillaume, dated March 4th, 1911 (No. 64), 
that is to say, written in the period before the outbreak 
of the Agadir conflict. 



No. 64. 



Paris, le 4 mars 1911. 

. . . L'incident de la Legion 
Etrangere, dont vous aurez certes 
suivi les developpements, dans 
la presse des deux pays, doit 
etre surveille. Le Ministre de la 
guerre de l'Empire s'est exprime 
de facon assez nette sur ce corps 
de mercenaires ; des journaux 
allemands ont notablement accen- 
tue les reproches faits au re- 
crutement et au traitement des 
legionnaires, et la presse fran- 
caise s'en est emue ; depuis 
quelques jours son langage est 
devenu plus acerbe ; le chauv'n- 
isme s'en mele, on interviewe 
des autorites militaires et d'an- 
ciens Chefs de la Legion, et la 
note que vient de publier la 
" Gazette de Cologne " n'est guere 
faite pour calmer 1' emotion pro- 
duite. 

Je ne pense pas que cette 
emotion s'etende bien profonde- 
ment en France et que 1' opinion 
publique dans la veritable accep- 
tion du mot, soit touchee ; mais 
la presse fait du chauvinisme et 
peut prononcer des paroles mal- 
heureuses qui aggraveraient la 
situation. 



Paris, March 4th, 1911. 

. . . The incident of the Foreign 
Legion, of which you have cer- 
tainly followed the development 
in the Press of both countries, 
must be watched. The German 
Minister of War has expressed 
himself fairly clearly regarding 
this body of mercenaries ; Ger- 
man newspapers lay special em- 
phasis on the charges brought 
against the recruitment and the 
treatment of the mercenaries, 
and the French Press became 
excited on the question ; for 
some days back its language has 
become more bitter ; chauvinism 
steps in, military authorities and 
former commanders of the 
Legion are interviewed, and the 
notice which the " Kolnische Zei- 
tung " has just published is hardly 
calculated to calm the excite- 
ment which has arisen. 

I do not believe that the 
excitement in France goes very 
deep, and that public opinion in 
the true sense of the word is 
affected by it ; but the Press 
creates chauvinism, and might 
make use of certain unfortunate 
words which would render the 
situation more difficult. 

K 2 



132 



THE CRIME 



II est a esperer qu'il n'en sera 
rien, mais il n'est pas douteux 
que la question est susceptible 
de s'envenimer, et que, si elle 
Ventend ainsi, VAllemagne peut 
entretenir cette affaire dans un 
etat de mi-acuite pour le jour oil 
elle voudrait trouver une cause de 
brouille. 

II me revient d'ailleurs, que 
Ton ne cesse de faire en Alle- 
magne, le long de la frontiere 
francaise, une veritable propa- 
gande pour amener dans l'armee 
Imperiale des desertions au profit 
de la Legion Etrangere francaise. 
Gxjillaume. 

Let us hear, further, a report from Greindl, dated May 1st, 
1911 (No. 68). 



It is to be hoped that nothing 
of the kind will happen, but 
without doubt the question may 
become more acute, and if 
Germany so wishes, she may 
leave the question open until the 
day on which she desires to find 
a pretext for a conflict. 

Moreover, as I hear, there is 
a regular propaganda being con- 
ducted in Germany, along the 
French frontier, in order to bring 
about desertions from the Ger- 
man army into the French 
Foreign Legion. 

Guillaume. 



No. 68. 



Berlin, le l er mai 1911. 

Depuis que la crise marocaine 
a repasse a l'etat aigu, la presse 
officieuse allemande s'etait bor- 
nee a reproduire les informations 
apportees par les agences tel6- 
graphiques en s'abstenant de 
tout commentaire. Elle a rompu 
le silence hier matin par l'article 
insere en tete de la Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung dont la tra- 
duction suit : . . . 



Malgr6 les dispositions mani- 
festoes par l'article officieux, la 
situation reste delicate. Une 
maladresse quelconque peut 
obliger rAllemagne a sortir de 
l'inaction. Beaucoup depend 
aussi de la presse. Des journaux 
francais montrent beaucoup trop 
ouvertement qu'il s'agit de faire 
du Maroc une seconde Tunisie. 
L'attitude des journaux alle- 
mands est en general tres reser- 
vee, mais ceux qui sont inspires 



Berlin, May 1st, 1911. 

Since the Morocco affair has 
again become more acute, the 
German semi-official Press has 
restricted itself to reproducing 
the information provided by the 
telegraphic agencies and refrains 
from any commentary. Yester- 
day morning this silence was 
broken by the leading article 
which appeared at the head of 
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zei- 
tung, the translation of which 
follows : . . . 

Notwithstanding the inten- 
tions manifested in the semi- 
official article, the situation re- 
mains delicate. Any maladroit 
action might force Germany to 
emerge from her inactivity. Much 
also depends on the Press. 
French newspapers show much 
too clearly that the question 
is one of making a second Tunis 
out of Morocco. The German 
newspapers are in general very 
reserved ; but the journals which 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 133 



par les pangermanistes, emettent 
des pretentions des plus genantes 
pour la politique Imperiale. 



Gbeindl. 



are under Pan-German influence 
put forward demands which are 
extremely inconvenient for the 
policy of the Imperial Govern- 
ment. 

Greindl. 



From Guillaume's report of April 17th, 1913 (No. 105) : 
No. 105. 



Paris, le 17 avril 1913. 

On ne connait pas encore les 
resultats definitifs de l'enquete 
que le Gouvernement a charge 
un haut fonctionnaire, M. Ogier, 
de faire a Nancy sur les incidents 
franco -allemands. 

Les nombreuses correspon- 
dances que publient les journaux 
donnent cependant l'impression 
que j'avais d6ja l'honneur de 
vous communiquer hier, que les 
faits n'ont pas eu une importance 
suffisante pour legitimer la levee 
de boucliers d'une partie de la 
presse allemande et les paroles 
prononcees au Parlement de Ber- 
lin par le Sous -Secretaire d'Etat 
des Affaires Etrangeres. . . . 



Paris, April 17th, 1913. 

There is as yet no information 
as to the final results of the 
inquiry which the Government 
entrusted to a high official, M. 
Ogier, to be conducted in Nancy 
with regard to the Franco -German 
incidents. 

The numerous communica- 
tions published in the newspapers 
nevertheless produce the im- 
pression which I have already 
had the honour to report to 
you yesterday, namely, that the 
facts were not sufficiently im- 
portant to justify the call to 
arms of a section of the German 
Press and the words of the Under 
Foreign Secretary in the Berlin 
Parliament. . , . 



From Guillaume's report of May 8th, 1914 (No. 115) : 
No. 115. 



Paris, le 8 mai 1914. 

. . . La presse est mauvaise 
dans les deux pays. La campagne 
qui se pour suit en Allemagne au 
sujet de la Legion etranq&re est 
excessivement maladroite, et le 
ton des journaux francais ne 
cesse d'etre acerbe et agressif. 
Personne n'a assez d'autorite et 
d'independance pour essayer de 
modifier cette situation qui est 
cependant blamee par beaucoup 
de bons esprits. . . . 



Paris, May 8th, 1914. 

. . . The feeling of the Press is 
bad in both countries. The cam- 
paign which is being conducted 
in Germany against the Foreign 
Legion is extremely maladroit, and 
the tone of the French news- 
papers is continually bitter and 
aggressive. No one has sufficient 
authority and independence to 
make an attempt to alter this 
situation, which is nevertheless 
condemned by many people of 
understanding. . . . 



J 34 



THE CRIME 



From Beyens' report of June 12th, 1914 (No. 118) 
No. 118. 



Berlin, le 12 juin 1914. 

... La demission du Cabi- 
net Doumergue, l'echec de la 
combinaison Viviani, le refus de 
MM. Deschanel, Delcasse et Jean 
Dupuy d'assumer la responsa- 
bilite de constituer un Minis- 
tere, avaient rendu confiance a 
la presse allemande dans la 
realisation de son desir : Vaboli- 
tion du service militaire de trois 
ans par une majorite de radicaux 
socialistes. Mais si la pensee 
etait la meme chez tous les 
organes de 1' opinion publique 
allemande, 1' expression en etait 
bien differente, suivant la couleur 
politique du journal. La ou la 
presse liberale applaudissait sans 
mesure au triomphe du radi- 
calisme francais, les pangerman- 
istes ne trouvaient que matiere a 
raillerie et a, denigrement ; on 
pent meme dire que la plupart 
des journaux conservateurs rCont 
observe aucune mesure dans 
leurs jugements. Tous cepen- 
dant sont d'accord pour voir 
dans l'obstination des radicaux- 
socialistes a ne pas faire 
partie d'un Ministere qui ne 
promettrait pas de resoudre im- 
m^diatement la question mili- 
taire, un plan de campagne 
ourdi contre l'Elysee, la crise 
ministerielle en se prolongeant 
devant se transformer en crise 
presidentielle. . . . 



Berlin, June 12th, 1914. 

. . . The resignation of the 
Doumergue Cabinet, the fiasco of 
the Viviani combination, and 
the refusal of Messrs. Deschanel, 
Delcasse and Jean Dupuy to 
accept the responsibility for the 
formation of a Ministry had 
given the German Press con- 
fidence in the fulfilment of their 
wish, namely, the repeal of the 
three years period of service by a 
Radical-Socialist majority. But 
if all the organs of German public 
opinion were filled with the 
same thought, it was neverthe- 
less expressed in very different 
forms according to the political 
colour of the paper. While the 
Liberal Press bestowed unmea- 
sured applause on the triumph of 
French Radicalism, the Pan- 
Germans only found occasion for 
sneering and contemptuous judg- 
ments : it may indeed be said 
that the majority of the Conserva- 
tive newspapers completely lacked 
restraint in their judgments. All, 
however, see in the obstinate 
refusal of the Radical-Socialists 
to enter a Ministry which does 
not promise an immediate solu- 
tion of the military question a 
plan of campaign against the 
Elysee, inasmuch as a lengthy 
Ministerial crisis is bound to 
change into a Presidential crisis. 



I have already referred to other similar passages in 
this report. 

The Morocco Conflict, 1911. 

The following reports deal with the Moroccan conflict, 
more particularly with the attitude of the French Govern- 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 135 



merit in this matter and with the absolute desire of France 
to maintain peace : 

Guillaume's report of July 28th, 1911 (No. 79) : 



No. 79. 



Paris, le28 juillet 1911. 

. . . La situation presente, 
certes, un certain caractere de 
gravite ; des incidents peuvent 
surgir qui se grefferaient sur un 
etat de choses trouble : mais 
personne ne veut la guerre ; on 
cherchera & Veviter. 

On se livre a un " bluff " in- 
ternational tres caracterise, un 
veritable marchandage que des 
communications officieuses de la 
presse presentent au public pour 
tater 1' opinion. 

La France ne veut pas et ne 
pent pas vouloir que les affaires se 
gdtent completement. Son Oou- 
vernement sait que la guerre mar- 
querait la derniere heure de la 
Republique. J'ai une tres grande 
confiance dans les sentiments 
pacifiques de l'Empereur Guil- 
laume, malgre V exageration assez 
frequente de certains de ses gestes. 
II ne se laissera pas entrainer 
plus loin qu'il ne le voudra par 
le temperament exuberant et la 
maniere lourde de son tres intelli- 
gent Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres. . . . 

Les Francais cederont sur tous 
les points pour avoir la paix. II 
n'en est pas de meme des 
Anglais qui ne transigeront pas 
sur quelques regies et quelques 
pretentions. Mais on n'eprouve 
nul desir de les pousser a bout. 

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, un 
article interessant du Temps et 
un article assez modere du 
Matin. 

GUILLAUME. 



Paris, July 28th, 1911. 

. . . The present situation has 
certainly a grave character. In- 
cidents may arise which in the 
state of tension already existing 
would find a fruitful soil. But 
no one wants war, the attempt 
will be made to avoid it. 

People surrender themselves 
to a very significant international 
" bluff," a veritable traffic, which 
semi-official communications of 
the Press offer to the public 
with a view to sounding public 
opinion. 

France does not desire, and 
cannot desire, that the negotia- 
tions should completely fail. Its 
Government knows that war would 
mean the last hour of the Republic. 
I have great confidence in the 
pacific sentiments of the Emperor 
William in spite of the not infre- 
quent exaggeration of certain of 
his actions. He will not allow 
himself to be carried away 
further than he desires by the 
exuberant temperament and the 
heavy hand of his very skilful 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. . . . 

The French will give way on 
every point in order to maintain 
peace. It is not so in the case 
of the English, who will not 
compromise on certain principles 
and demands. But there is no 
desire to drive them to extremes. 

Enclosed is an interesting 
article from the Temps and a 
fairly moderate article from the 
Matin. 

Gtjillattme. 



136 THE CRIME 

Greindl's report of October 12th, 1911 (No. 81) : 



No. 81. 



Berlin, le 12 octobre 1911. 

. . . J'ai lieu de penser que 
Von croit id le Gouvernement 
Francais sincerement desireux de 
tenir la parole donnee ; mais il est 
faible, dependant des caprices 
d'une majority mal assuree. 
Aura-t-il le courage et la force 
de resister a une poussee de 
1' opinion publique si celle-ci 
s'accentue dans le sens du refus 
de toute compensation terri- 
toriale ? 

Nous devons nous feliciter de 
ce que l'accord soit conclu sur 
la premiere moitie de l'arrange- 
ment marocain, mais le peril ne 
sera entierement ecarte pour la 
Belgique que quand le traite 
tout entier sera signe et approuve 
par les parlements des deux 
pays. 

Geeindl. 



Berlin, October 12th, 1911. 

... I have reason to assume 
that the French Government are 
here believed to be sincerely de- 
sirous of keeping their word. But 
they are weak and depend on the 
caprices of an uncertain majo- 
rity. Will they have the courage 
and the strength to resist the 
pressure of public opinion if this 
increasingly assumes an attitude 
of refusal towards any territorial 
compensations ? 

We may congratulate our- 
selves that an understanding 
has been reached regarding the 
first part of the Moroccan agree- 
ment, but the danger will not be 
entirely removed, so far as 
Belgium is concerned, until the 
whole treaty has been signed 
and approved by the Parlia- 
ments of both countries. 

Gbeindl. 



A report from Lalaing of November 28th, 1911 (No. 83), 
discusses England's action in the promotion of peace 
during the recent Moroccan crisis : 



No. 83. 



Londres, le 28 novembre 1911. 

. . . Pour le reste, Sir E. 
Grey a dit qu'il n'y avait plus 
lieu de s'alarmer, aujourd'hui il 
n'etait pas question de guerre. 
II n'existe plus aucun traite 
secret avec la France. UAngle- 
terre ne demande qu'a vivre en 
bons termes avec V Allemagne, 
sans sacrifier ses autres amities. 
File ne desire aucun accroisse- 
ment territorial en Afrique. 



London, November 28th, 1911. 

. . . For the rest, Sir E. 
Grey said there was no longer 
any ground for uneasiness : to- 
day there was no question of 
war. There exists no secret 
treaty with France. England 
desires merely to live on good 
terms ivith Germany, without 
thereby sacrificing her other friend- 
ships. She does not wish any 
territorial aggrandisement in 
Africa. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 137 

Le discours du Ministre a The speech of the Minister was 

ete bien recu, et a calme bien des well received and dispelled many 

apprehensions. On en a deduit misgivings. It was inferred 

que la crise est passee, que from it that the crisis is past, 

V entente cordiale n'est pas une that the Entente Cordiale is not 

alliance deguisee et que 1' Angle- a veiled alliance, and that England 

terre a loyalement soutenu la has loyally supported France 

France (d'autant plus que c'etait (all the more so because it was 

son interet), et est disposee a se in her own interest), further 

montrer conciliante pour VA.lle- that she is disposed to show, 

■magne. herself conciliatory to Germany. 

Le nouveau chef de l'opposi- The new leader of the Opposi- 
tion, M. Bonar Law, a soutenu tion, Mr. Bonar Law, supported 
le Gouvernement et a approuve, the Government, and in the 
au nom des conservatoires, la name of the Conservatives ap- 
politique de Sir E. Grey, qui n'a proved Sir E. Grey's policy, 
ete attaquee que par le parti which was attacked only by the 
ouvrier. Le Premier Ministre a Labour Party. The Prime 
pris aussi la parole pour declarer Minister also spoke in order to 
que la Grande-Bretagne etait pad- declare that Great Britain was 
fique, et ne refusait a aucune pacific and did not refuse any 
autre Puissance sa place au other Power her place in the 
soleil. . . . sun. . . . 

From this report regarding Grey's great speech of 
November 27th, 1911, it is especially to be noted that 
the English Foreign Secretary emphasised England's 
desire to live on good terms with Germany, to show 
herself conciliatory towards Germany, and not to grudge 
that Power her place in the sun. Is not the plan of the 
English Government as so described in correspondence 
with the whole of the earlier and the later action of the 
Liberal Cabinet ? " Live and let live " was the sign 
manual of the foreign policy of the Liberal English 
Government ever since its accession to office. A happy 
life on both sides, however, required not only a peaceful 
understanding regarding all possible questions affecting 
their interests, but above all an understanding regarding 
the ruinous naval armaments which imposed the gravest 
sacrifices on the well-being of both countries, without 
altering even in the slightest degree the relative strength 
of the two naval Powers. We have elsewhere seen that 
England blocked this path to the well-being of both 
sides by her machiavellian conditions on the question of 
neutrality. 1 

1 The Crime, Vol. II, p. 235 et seq. 



138 



THE CRIME 



In the report of Baron Beyens of June 28th, 1912 
(No. 92), reference is again made to the place in the sun 
which Germany in fact occupied, and also to the dangers 
involved in the competition in armaments with England. 
Beyens, it is true, does not conceal a certain " antipathy " 
on the part of the English, " an intelligible envy " when 
they see " how a European people gains ground every year 
in the struggle on the world-market." At the same time 
he is carefully speaking only of the opinions of certain 
interested circles in the people, never by any chance does 
he speak of any actual intentions or preconceived plans 
formed by those in authority, which might imperil the 
peace of Europe. 



Even Baron Greindl cannot refrain from criticising 
the German Moroccan policy as false and dangerous. 
In his report of April 21st, 1911 (No. 66), it is stated : 



No. 66. 



Berlin, le 21 avril 1911. 

. . . En s'engageant par l'ar- 
rangement du 9 fevrier 1909 a 
ne pas entraver les interets 
politiques de la France au Maroc, 
le Gouvernement Imperial savait 
a n'en pouvoir douter que le 
Gouvernement Francais inter - 
preterait cette clause comme un 
encouragement a perseverer dans 
la meme voie et regarderait la 
promesse de respecter l'ind6pen- 
dance du Maroc comme lettre 
morte. Reculer serait maintenant 
pour la France une cruelle hu- 
miliation. 

L'Allemagne rCa nulle raison 
de la lui infliger et ne pourrait 
d'ailleurs pas, apres huit ans de 
tolerance, changer d' attitude 
sans etre determinee a aller 
jusqu'a la guerre. C'est de- 
mesurement plus que le Maroc 
ne vaut. 



Berlin, April 21st, 1911. 

. . . When the Imperial 
Government pledged itself by 
the agreement of February 9th, 
1909, to lay no obstacles in the 
way of France's political interests 
in Morocco, they doubtless knew 
that the French Government 
would interpret this clause as an 
encouragement to continue on 
the same path, and that they 
would regard the promise to 
respect the independence of 
Morocco as a dead letter. To 
withdraw now would be for France 
a cruel humiliation. 

Germany has no reason to 
inflict this upon France, and, 
moreover, after eight years' suf- 
ferance it could not change its 
attitude without being deter- 
mined to allow matters to pro- 
ceed as far as a war. This would 
be immeasurably more than 
Morocco is worth. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 139 



Enfin il ne peut pas d6plaire 
a Berlin que la France soit 
engagee dans une entreprise 
coloniale qui pour bien long- 
temps l'obligera a immobiliser 
des forces de plus en plus con- 
siderables en Afrique et qui 
detourne ses regards des provinces 
perdues. Cetait la politique du 
Prince de Bismarck. On s'en 
est ecarte il y a huit ans, parce 
qu'il s'agissait de prouver au 
Roi d'Angleterre et a M. Del- 
casse que l'Allemagne ne se 
laisserait pas traiter en quantite 
negligeable, mais il n'y a plus 
maintenant de raison de n'y pas 
revenir. Mais il ne depend pas 
uniquement du Gouvernement 
Imperial de pratiquer 1' absten- 
tion. II faut qu'on l'y aide de 
1 exterieur. II est parfaitement 
exact que l'opinion publique est 
emue. Comme j'ai eu l'honneur 
de vous l'ecrire par mon rapport 
du 11 fevrier 1909, l'arrangement 
du 9 fevrier a ete critique par 
tous les journaux allemands qui 
n'ont pas d'attaches officieuses. 
Depuis on a plus d'une fois 
reproche au Gouvernement Im- 
perial trop de condescendance 
envers la France dans V affaire 
marocaine. . . . 



Finally, it cannot be displeas- 
ing to Berlin that France has 
entered upon a colonial enter- 
prise which will for a long time 
compel her to detain considerable 
forces in Africa and which will 
divert her looks from the lost 
provinces. This was the policy of 
Prince Bismarck. It was departed 
from eight years ago, because it 
was necessary to prove to the 
King of England and to M. 
Delcass6 that Germany would 
not allow herself to be treated 
as a " quantite negligeable," 
but now there is no longer any 
ground for not returning to it. 
However, the practice of re- 
straint does not depend simply 
and solely on the Imperial 
Government. It must be helped 
from outside. It is perfectly 
true that public opinion is 
excited. As I had the honour to 
write to you in my report of 
February 11th, 1909, the agree- 
ment of February 9th is criti- 
cised by all German newspapers 
which have no semi-official rela- 
tions. Since then the Imperial 
Government have on more than one 
occasion been accused of too much 
compliance towards France in 
the Moroccan affair. . . . 



In this passage even so mild a critic as Greindl rightly 
adduces the Pan-German Press as the inciting element, 
which constantly accused the German Government, and 
above all the Emperor himself, of cowardice towards 
France, and which was even then seeking to find in the 
Moroccan question the European apple of discord. 

In the same provocative way the familiar incidents 
of the Foreign Legion were at the time exploited in the 
German chauvinist Press. On this point the reader 
should refer to Guillaume's report of March 4th, 1911 
(No. 64), quoted above, especially to the penultimate 



140 



THE CRIME 



paragraph of this report which the Foreign Office, on 
well-considered grounds, allows to fade away into ordinary- 
type : 

It is to be hoped that nothing of the kind will happen, but 
without doubt the question may become more acute, and if 
Germany so wishes, she may leave the question open until the 
day on which she desires to find a pretext for a conflict. 

The Paris Ambassador here is apprehensive of counter- 
outbreaks of French chauvinism against the excesses of 
the chauvinism of Germany ; but his apprehensions are 
not based on the fact that a danger of war might thereby 
come from the side of France, but that such French 
counter-utterances might, as a reaction, encourage the 
war-intriguers in Germany, and might finally on the day 
convenient to her provide the German Government with 
the pretext for a conflict. 

Baron Guillaume expresses the same idea even more 
plainly in a report of January 16th, 1914 (No. 110), which 
has already been quoted in part : 

No. 110. 



Paris, le 16 Janvier 1914. 

... II me semble certain 
que nous aurions plus d'interet 
a voir le succes de la politique 
de M. Caillaux — des radieaux et 
radicaux-soeialistes. J'ai deja eu 
l'honneur de vous dire que ce 
sont MM. Poincare, Delcasse, 
Millerand et leurs amis qui ont 
invente et poursuivi la politique 
nationaliste, cocardiere et chau- 
vine dont nous avons constate 
la renaissance. C'est un danger 
pour l'Europe — et pour la Bel- 
gique. J'y vois le plus grand 
peril qui menace aujourd'hui la 
paix de l'Europe, non pas que 
faie le droit de supposer le 
Gouvernement de la Republique 
dispose d la troubler de propos 
delibere — je crois plutot le con- 
traire — mais parce que Vattitude 
qiCa prise le Cabinet Barthou est, 



Paris, January 16th, 1914. 

It appears to me certain that 
it would be more to our interest 
to see the success of the policy 
of M. Caillaux, of the Radicals 
and Radical-Socialists. I have 
already had the honour to 
report to you that it is Messrs. 
Poincare, Delcasse, Millerand 
and their friends who have 
invented and pursued the nation- 
alistic, militaristic and chauvin- 
istic policy, the renaissance of 
which we have noted. It con- 
stitutes a danger for Europe and 
for Belgium. In this I see the 
greatest danger for the peace of 
Europe, not that I have any right 
to assume that the French Govern- 
ment will intentionally disturb the 
peace — i" believe, rather, that the 
contrary is the case — but because 
the attitude of the Barthou Cabinet 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 141 



selon moi, la cause determinante 
d'un surcroit de tendances mill- 
taristes en Allemagne. 

Lea folies belliqueuses de la 
Turquie et la loi de trois ans 
me paraissent constituer les seuls 
dangers a redouter pour la paix 
de l'Europe. Je crois pouvoir 
relever le peril que fait naitre 
la legislation, militaire actuelle de 
la Republique. . . . 

M. Caillaux a vote contre la 
loi de trois ans ; nombreux sont 
les hommes politiques qui le 
soutiennent et partagent son avis 
a cet egard. Le President du 
Conseil pousse par les hauts 
personnages de la Republique a 
promis le respect loyal de la loi 
de trois ans ; mais il n'est pas 
exagere de supposer que dans 
sa pensee et dans celle de ses 
amis, on conserve le dessin 
d'adoucir considerablement les 
rigueurs du regime actuel. 

M. Caillaux, qui est le veritable 
President du Conseil, est connu 
pour ses sentiments en faveur 
d'un rapprochement avec V Alle- 
magne ; il connait admirable- 
ment son pays et sait, qu'en 
dehors des etats-majors poli- 
tiques, de poignees de chauvins 
et de gens qui n'osent pas 
avouer leurs idees et leurs prefer- 
ences, le plus grand nombre des 
Francais, des pay sans, des com- 
mercants et des industriels subis- 
sent avec impatience le surcroit de 
depenses et de charges per son - 
nelles qui leur est impose. . . . 



has, in my opinion, led to an 
increase of militaristic tendencies 
in Germany. 

The bellicose desires of Turkey 
and the law regarding the three 
years military service appear 
to me to constitute the only 
dangers which threaten the peace 
of Europe. I believe I can show 
the dangers involved in the 
present military legislation of 
the Republic. . . . 

M. Caillaux has voted against 
the three years law. A large 
number of politicians support 
him and share his views in 
this respect. Under the influence 
of highly placed persons in the 
Republic, the Prime Minister 
has promised that he will loyally 
give effect to the law regarding 
the period of three years' service, 
but it is not too much to assume 
that he and his friends in their 
own minds are thinking of 
considerably softening the harsh- 
ness of the existing system. 

M. Caillaux, who is the real 
Prime Minister, is inclined, as is 
well known, to a rapprochement 
with Germany. He knows his 
country extremely well, and he 
knows that, apart from the 
political leaders, a handful of 
chauvinists, and of people who 
dare not confess their thmights 
and inclinations, the majority of 
the French people — peasants, mer- 
chants, manufacturers — are only 
bearing with impatience the ex- 
cessive expenditure and personal 
burdens which are laid upon 
them. . . . 



In the foregoing extract I have, as a proof of my ob- 
jectivity, reproduced no fewer than twenty-one lines 
which are printed in heavy type in the German publication 
and are obviously regarded as highly incriminating for 
French policy. In fact, these lines do contain almost 



14a THE CRIME 

the strongest statement to be found in the German 
collection of reports against certain leading French 
politicians. And yet — accurately viewed — the apparent 
charge which is here involved against French Nationalism 
is rather seen to be a charge against Prussian-German 
militarism. 

Guillaume's report, which is important and interesting 
from many points of view, shows : 

1. That the policy of M. Caillaux, that is to say, 
of the Radicals and Radical-Socialists (who, later 
on, were in fact victorious at the elections), was 
constantly gaining more adherents ; 

2. that, as the Caillaux group had voted against 
the three years law, so they now intended to carry 
into effect a considerable alleviation of the terms of 
the law ; 

3. that Caillaux, although not formally, was in 
fact the real Prime Minister, and as such was inclined 
to a rapprochement with Germany ; 

4. that the majority of the French were disposed 
to peace, and were only reluctantly bearing the new 
burdens ; 

5. that, while the policy of Poincar6, Delcasse, 
Millerand and their friends no doubt constituted a 
danger for Europe, it was not in the sense that there 
was any possible intention to make war on the part 
of France, but, on the contrary, only in the sense 
that certain phenomena in France had led to an 
increase of militaristic tendencies in Germany. 

That is the fundamental idea which runs through all 
the Belgian reports, in so far as they criticise certain 
tendencies in France. Their idea was that militaristic 
tendencies in France, even if their purpose was merely 
to achieve effective defence against a possible German 
attack, might on the other hand provide nourishment 
to the inciters to war in Germany and so lead to the 
German war of aggression. This reaction — par ricochet — 
would thus evoke against the will of France precisely 
what the French were anxious to prevent by means of 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 143 

the further development of their military power, that 
is to say, the German war of aggression. This train of 
thought in no way supports the exoneration of Germany, 
but on the contrary tends to her incrimination. The 
desire for war and the danger of war are not on the side of 
France, but on the side of Germany. The position, as 
represented in the Belgian ambassadorial reports, is 
more or less analogous to that of a thoughtless boy in 
the zoological garden who makes the wild tiger angry 
by provoking and irritating him ; the attendant who 
stands near by warns the boy : " Do not make the animal 
angry ; he might become dangerous to you and those 
around." The attendant is represented by the Belgian 
Ambassadors. The thoughtless boys are the French 
Nationalists. It is, however, Germany that is the dan- 
gerous marauding beast. Only from her is a fatal attack 
to be feared. This explains the warning of the Belgians : 

'Tis perilous to rouse the lion ; 
There's venom in the tiger's tooth. 

It is a complete perversion of the picture on the part 
of the German war- writers to seek to represent the thought- 
less boy as the dangerous beast of prey. The evil instincts 
of the beast of prey are ascribed by the Belgian observers 
to the Pan-German war-inciters only, and not to the 
French Nationalists or even the English " encirclers." 
Even Greindl, the strongest enemy of the Entente to be 
found among the Belgian diplomatists, reveals the same 
train of thought in most passages in his reports, and 
there is only one single occasion in the whole German 
collection where I have found a passage in which Greindl 
attributes offensive intentions to the Triple Entente. 
If now among the six Belgian representatives in the six 
European capitals there is only one, and he a man im- 
printed with German nationalist sentiment, who speaks 
of the offensive intentions of the Entente, and if he only 
does so in a single passage, this fact is sufficient to charac- 
terise the German assertion that such offensive intentions 
existed. It continues to be no more than a picture of 
the imagination left suspended in the air without any basis 
of proof, and in any case the Belgian reports cannot be 



i 4 4 THE CRIME 

cited as providing evidence in support of such an assertion. 
When, however, this fact is determined, the justification 
of the present war as a war of prevention collapses as does 
the invention of the officially proclaimed war of defence, 
for which it is even truer that there is no basis in the 
Belgian reports. 

Attitude of the Entente Powers during the Bosnian 
Annexation Crisis and during the Balkan War. 

Below are a few more extracts from the reports, affording 
valuable amplification of the picture of the peaceful inten- 
tions of the Entente Powers and of the action which they 
actually took in promoting peace in the European disputes 
of recent years. These reports have already in part 
been quoted in earlier passages, and therefore I only 
reproduce here a few sentences intended to confirm the 
view we are considering. 

What was the attitude of the Entente Powers during 
the Bosnian annexation crisis and during the Balkan 
war ? 

Light is thrown on this point, first of all by the Paris 
report of Leghait, dated October 8th, 1908 (No. 52), 
which has already been quoted above. I will here give 
only those sentences which speak of the Russian proposal 
for a conference : 

No. 52. 

Paris, le 8 octobre 1908. Paris, October 8th, 1908. 

... II ne sera pas aise . . . It will not be easy to 
d'arriver a reunir une conference bring a conference together, and 
et on ignore quel sera l'accueil it is not yet known what recep- 
qui sera reserve a V invitation tion will be accorded to Russia's 
lancee par la Russie. Cet accueil invitation. This reception will 
dependra du programme et l'ac- depend on the programme, and 
cord sur celui-ci sera fort labo- agreement on this point will be 
rieux a cause du fait accompli very difficult, in view of the 
en pr6sence duquel on se trouve fact involved in the existence of 
et des "compensations" que a fait accompli and in view of the 
Ton reclame de toute part. compensations which will be 
Toutef ois on semble esperer que demanded on all sides. Neverthe- 
toutes les Puissances accepteront less, hope appears to be enter- 
la conference, car, me disait-on, tained that all the Powers will 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 145 



le desir du maintien de la paix 
est si unanime et si profond qu'il 
dominera tout. 



Leghait. 



accept the conference ; for, as 
was said to me, the desire to 
maintain peace is so unanimous 
and so strong that it will overcome 
all obstacles. 

Leghait. 



At this point GreindPs report of February 17th, 1909, 
already quoted (No. 55), is also in point ; also the report 
of the same Ambassador of April 1st, 1909, mentioned in an 
earlier passage, from which I quote here only the sentence : 

... II n'est pas douteux a 
mon avis que la Russie et la 
France ne fussent animees d'un 
desir sincere de prevenir une con- 
flagration europeenne. . . . 



... It is in my opinion 
beyond doubt that Russia and 
France were inspired by a sincere 
desire to prevent a universal 
European conflagration. . . . 



Baron Beyens' report of October 18th, 1912 (No. 93, 
already quoted in part) — the second report of the then 
recently appointed Berlin representative of the Kingdom 
of Belgium — discusses the attitude of the European 
Powers in the Balkan war, and confirms the will for peace 
as well as the action for peace which was manifested on 
this occasion by all the Great Powers without exception : 



No. 93. 



Berlin, le 18 octobre 1912. 

. . . Le premier effet de la 
crise balkanique a et6 d'operer 
un rapprochement entre le Gou- 
vernement Imperial et celui de 
la Republique. Egalement de- 
sireux de voir le conflit localise 
dans la peninsule et d'eviter une 
guerre europeenne, Us se sont 
entendus pour agir dans le meme 
sens sur leurs allies respectifs, la 
Russie et V Autriche, et ils ont 
pris part en meme temps aux 
demarches tentees, un peu tar- 
divement, a Constantinople et 
dans les capitales des Balkans. 
U initiative prise personnellement 
par M. Poincare en vue du 
retablissement de la paix a recu 
l'approbation et meme les eloges 



Berlin, October 18th, 1912. 

. . . The first result of the 
Balkan crisis was a rapproche- 
ment between the Imperial 
Government and the French 
Republic. Equally inspired by the 
desire to localise the conflict on 
the Balkan peninsula and to 
avoid a European war, they 
agreed to act in the same sense on 
their respective allies, Russia, and 
Austria, and simultaneously took 
part in the demarches which, 
somewhat tardily, were under- 
taken in Constantinople and the 
capitals of the Balkan countries. 
The initiative personally taken by 
M. Poincare for the assurance of 
peace is approved and indeed 
praised by the German Press. 



146 THE CRIME 

de la presse allemande, quoi- True, it was found that it was 

qu'elle ait trouve qu'il etait still too early to speak of a 

trop tot pour parler de la Conference. In the end the 

reunion d'une Conference. Enfin Matin sang the praises of Herr 

le Matin a chante les louanges von Kiderlen, if it is possible so 

de M. de Kiderlen, si Ton peut to describe the article which it 

qualifier ainsi l'article qu'il lui devoted to him. . . . 
a consacre. . . . 

... II etait, d'ailleurs, assez It was, moreover, only natural 

naturel que 1' attention et les that the attention of the public 

preoccupations du public des on both sides of the Vosges 

deux c6tes des Vosges se detour- should be diverted from the 

nassent des sujets habituels de usual subjects of dispute and 

discussion et de polemique pour discussion and should be con- 

se concentrer sur les evenements centrated on the events in the 

balkaniques. Sans vouloir ex- Balkans. Without desiring to 

agerer la portee de la detente exaggerate the extent of the 

que je signale, il est permis detente to which I refer, it may 

d'esperer que la communaute de be hoped that the community of 

vues de VAllemagne et de la the views of Germany and France 

France dans les circonstances under present circumstances will 

presentes servira puissamment au materially contribute to the re- 

retablissement de la paix. establishment of peace. 

Baron Beyens. Baron Beyens. 

Specially noteworthy in this report is the " initiative 
for the re- establishment of peace personally undertaken 
by M. Poincare." Poincare, then Prime Minister, was 
constantly accused by the German chauvinist Press, 
then as to-day, of having agreed all the preparations 
for the later attack on Germany with the Russian rulers, 
down to every detail, as far back as the summer of 1912 
on the occasion of his Petrograd visit. And, nevertheless, 
in the autumn of 1912, acting on his own initiative and 
with the eulogistic approval of the German Press, he 
did everything possible for the maintenance of peace. 
Clearly only for the sake of appearance, Herr Schiemann ? 
In order to lull Germany to sleep, and attack her later 
with the greater security ! If a Poincare does anything 
good, he is, as a matter of course, a dissembler. It is 
only when he does what is evil, that he is sincere. . . . 
On the " militaristic and chauvinistic policy " which 
Baron Guillaume, in his already mentioned report of 
January 16th, 1914, lays at the door of M. Poincare, the 
eulogistic recognition of the Berlin Ambassador also 
throws a peculiar light, 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 147 



From Beyens' report of October 24th, 1912 (No. 94, 
already quoted in part) : 



No. 94. 



Berlin, le 24 octobre 1912. 

. . . La politique de M. 
Sazonow est d'autant plus sage 
que les evenements actuels ont 
surpris la Russie en pleine 
reorganisation de ses forces mili- 
taires et qu'un desastre ou un 
simple echec en Europe lui serait 
autrement funeste que ses defaites 
en Extreme-Orient. II serait le 
signal d'une revolution sociale 
qui s'arme dans 1' ombre et 
menace sourdement le Trone 
des Czars. . . . 



Berlin, October 24th, 1912. 

. . . The policy of M. Sazonof 
is all the more prudent inasmuch 
as the present events have 
surprised Russia in the middle 
of the reorganisation of her 
military forces, and a disaster or 
even a simple check in Europe 
would be much more fatal for 
Russia than her defeats in East 
Asia. It would be the signal for 
a social revolution, which is being 
prepared in the dark and which 
is secretly menacing the throne 
of the Tsars. . . . 



How accurately does the Belgian Ambassador here 
prophesy the future ! But it is precisely the accuracy 
of this prediction, the grounds for which must have been 
better known to the Russian despots than to anyone else, 
which confirms the thesis, advanced and proved in all 
my writings, that no one could have been further removed 
from the idea of provoking a European war than the 
Tsar and his Government, who in a war might lose every- 
thing but could gain nothing. 

From Beyens' report of November 30th, 1912 (No. 96) : 



No. 96. 



Berlin, le 30 novembre 1912. 

Le voyage de l'Archiduc Heri- 
tier d'Autriche en Allemagne, 
bien qu'il ait eu pour pretexte un 
deplacement de chasse motive 
par une invitation de l'Empereur, 
a eu cette annee-ci une import- 
ance particuliere, etant donnes 
la guerre balkanique et le conflit 
entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la 
Serbie. L'Archiduc a dit a 
Berlin que la Monarchie austro- 



Berlin, November 30th, 1912. 

Even if the journey to Ger- 
many of the Archduke, the 
successor to the throne of Aus- 
tria, has taken place under the 
pretext of a hunting-invitation 
from the Emperor, nevertheless 
it has special significance this 
year on account of the Balkan 
war and the conflict between 
Austria -Hungary and Serbia. 
The Archduke stated in Berlin 
L 2 



148 



THE CRIME 



hongroise etait arrivee a la limite 
des concessions qu'elle pouvait 
faire a sa voisine. L'Empereur 
et ses Conseillers ne lui en ont 
pas moins prodigue des conseils 
de moderation, que Guillaume 
II, en reconduisant son h6te a 
la gare, a resumes avec la fa- 
miliarity de langage dont il est 
coutumier par ces mots expres- 
sifs : " Surtout pas de betises ! " 
Je puis, sur la foi d'Ambassa- 
deurs qui me Font repete, vous 
garantir 1' authenticate de ce 
conseil qui a echappe aux indis- 
cr6tions des journaux. . . . 



Quels que soient les projets 
que M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, 
qui a de grandes idees, porte dans 
sa tete pour concilier a son pays 
les sympathies des jeunes Puis- 
sances balkaniques, un fait ab- 
solument certain, c'est qu'il veut 
fermement eviter une conflagra- 
tion europ6enne. La politique 
allemande se rapproche sur ce 
point de celle de V Angleterre et de 
la France, toutes deux resolument 
pacifiques, et, si les sujets de 
polemique continuent d'etre jour - 
naliers entre la presse de Paris 
et celle de Berlin, celle-ci a 
adopte un ton beaucoup plus 
conciliant a l'egard de la Grande- 
Bretagne et de Sir Edward Grey 
en particulier. Les relations 
entre les Gouvernements alle- 
mand et britannique sont meil- 
leures qu'elles n'avaient ete de- 
puis longtemps et meme, a ce 
qu'assure l'Ambassadeur de 
France, une detente tres favorable 
au maintien de la paix se produit 
aussi entre les Cabinets de Berlin 
et de Paris. . . . 

M. Sazonow s'est, parait-il, 
ressaisi et il joue activement 



that the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy had reached the limit of the 
concessions which it could make 
to its neighbour. The Emperor 
and his counsellors have, how- 
ever, not failed in giving counsels 
of moderation, which William 
II, in conducting his guest to 
the railway, summed up in the 
familiar method of expression 
which is peculiar to him in the 
following expressive words : 
" Above all, no silly mistakes." 
I can guarantee you, on the 
authority of Ambassadors who 
have repeated it to me, the 
authenticity of this advice, which 
has escaped the indiscretions of 
the newpapers. . . . 

Whatever may be the schemes 
which Herr von Kiderlen-Waech- 
ter, who has large ideas, has in 
mind with a view to gaining for 
his country the sympathies of 
the young Balkan Powers, one 
thing is certain, namely, that he 
is firmly resolved to avoid a 
European conflagration. On this 
point German policy coincides 
with that of England and France, 
who are both decidedly pacific ; 
even if subjects of dispute 
between the Paris and Berlin 
Press are no day absent, the 
latter has assumed a much more 
conciliatory tone towards Eng- 
land and towards Sir Edward 
Grey in particular. The relations 
between the German and the 
English Government are better 
than they have been for a long 
time, and according to what the 
French Ambassador has assured 
me a detente very favourable to the 
maintenance of peace is also 
taking place between the Cabi- 
nets of Berlin and Paris. . . . 

M. Sazonof has, it appeal's, 
recovered himself, and zealously 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 149 



aupres de la Cour de Belgrade le 
mime role que la diplomatic 
allemande aupres de la Cour 
de Vienne. Sous Vinfluence des 
Conseils russes V intransigeance 
serbe va-t-elle se plier a un com- 
promis dans la question du port 
de l'Adriatique ? Mes Collegues 
a qui j'ai fait cette demande 
m'ont repondu affirmativement. 
Or c'est la le noeud de la ques- 
tion. . . . 

Le pro jet oVune Conference 
cT Ambassadeurs qui aurait pour 
but de deblayer le terrain en 
amenant une entente prealable 
entre les six grandes Puissances 
pour la solution de questions 
importantes, telles que celle des 
iles de la Mer Egee et celle de 
l'Albanie, a laquelle est fatale- 
ment liee la question d'un port 
serbe sur l'Adriatique, a trouve 
un accueil favorable a Berlin. 
Uidee de Sir Edward Grey repond 
d une preoccupation de M. de 
Kiderlen-Waechter qui s'est plaint 
d diverses reprises de perdre un 
temps precieux et de n'aboutir a 
aucun resultat par des echanges 
de vues de Cabinet & Cabinet. En 
les concentrant dans une seule 
capitale et en confiant a des 
diplomates experimentes, on ar- 
riverait sans doute a un accord 
qui rendrait plus facile la tache 
du Congres appele plus tard a 
regler les questions soulevees par 
la guerre actuelle. II semble 
tout naturel, la proposition ema- 
nant duGouvernement britannique, 
que la Conference des Ambassa- 
deurs ait lieu a Londres. . . . 



plays at the Court of Belgrade 
the same role as German diplo- 
macy at the Court of Vienna. 
Under the influence of Russian 
counsels, will the irreconcilability 
of Serbia submit to a compromise 
in the question of the Adriatic 
harbour ? My colleagues, to 
whom I put this question, 
answered me in the affirmative. 
There, however, lies the crux of 
the question. . . . 

A friendly reception has been 
accorded in Berlin to the proposal 
for a Conference of Ambassadors 
which should have for its object 
to prepare the ground, by a 
previous agreement among the 
six Great Powers, for the solu- 
tion of important questions like 
that of the Aegean Islands and 
the Albanian question, with 
which the question of the Serbian 
Adriatic harbour is necessarily 
linked. Sir Edward Grey's idea 
corresponds with the wishes of 
Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, who 
has on various occasions com- 
plained that valuable time is lost 
and no result achieved in the 
exchange of ideas from Cabinet to 
Cabinet. If negotiations were 
concentrated in a single capital 
and entrusted to experienced 
diplomatists, it would without 
doubt be possible to arrive at an 
understanding which would fa- 
cilitate the task of the Congress 
which will later have to settle 
the questions created by the 
present war. Since the proposal 
emanates from the British Govern- 
ment, it appears entirely natural 
that the Conference of Ambas- 
sadors should take place in 
London. . . . 



This praise of the method of holding a conference for 
the settlement of difficult European questions — especially 
in the mouth of Herr von Kiderlen, the German Secretary 



150 THE CRIME 

of State — is extremely piquant and throws a significant 
light on the attitude of Herr von Bethmann and Herr 
von Jagow towards the same conference-proposal in 
1914. The situation of 1912 was exactly similar to that 
of 1914 : in both cases the question at issue was that 
of the settlement of difficult Balkan questions ; in both 
cases Austrian and Russian interests stood opposed to 
each other ready for battle ; in both cases the English 
Secretary of State, Sir Edward Grey, proposed a London 
Conference of Ambassadors as the best method of securing 
a rapid and successful exchange of thought between the 
Great Powers. The difference between the two cases is 
merely this, that Germany in 1912 still wanted peace 
and consequently accepted forthwith what was the best 
method of securing the maintenance of peace, whereas 
in 1914 it was resolved on war and consequently had of 
necessity to refuse to follow the path which, in the light 
of the experiences of 1912, would have led with absolute 
certainty to the solution of the question in dispute, on 
this occasion a much simpler one. The Emperor William's 
warning to his friend the Archduke, who even in the 
autumn of 1912 could scarcely control his impatience 
to strike against Serbia — " Above all, no silly mistakes " — 
was not in the summer of 1914, after the death of the 
Archduke, addressed to the leading personalities in Vienna. 
Now the gentlemen in Berlin did not object to " silly 
mistakes " on the part of Austria, no matter how enormous, 
to headlong action against their Serbian neighbours, 
no matter how blind, since in the interval the change in 
the views of the Emperor William which had begun in 
1912 had been completed, the Emperor had been definitively 
won over by the war party led by his son, and at the 
same time Germany's military preparation by land and 
sea had been pushed to the desired degree of perfection. 
This explains the refusal of the Conference which on this 
occasion was again proposed by Grey, and readily accepted 
by France, Russia and Italy. This is the reason why 
the Berlin Government continually pointed to the direct 
negotiations from Cabinet to Cabinet. 

In the confusion resulting from despatches crossing 
each other, from discussions and measures of military 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 151 

preparation taking place in six different capitals, between 
twenty to thirty different statesmen, six supreme heads 
of States, many chiefs of general staffs, army leaders and 
military attaches — in this telegraphic intercourse flashing 
by day and night from one end of Europe to the other, 
from one head of a State to another, from one Govern- 
ment' to another, from all Governments to their diplomatic 
representatives, a dangerous confusion was inevitable 
— misunderstandings, delays, incomplete information were 
not to be avoided. In this troubled water it was com- 
paratively easy for a malicious Government to fish out 
specious grounds in exoneration of their suspicious attitude, 
to ascribe to the other party the intentions entertained 
by themselves, and to carry out other similar manoeuvres 
intended to deceive. On the one hand, the loss of 
time connected with intercourse from capital to capital, 
on the other, the fear entertained by the military party 
of an advantage enjoyed by their opponents, were bound 
to produce in all concerned such a nervous haste and 
excitement that a calm consideration of the decisions 
to be taken was scarcely any longer possible, and in any 
case a careful examination of the events really taking 
place was impossible to the outside public. This whole 
imbroglio provided the desired fog, under the protection 
of which Vienna and Berlin were able to prepare and 
execute their criminal action — just as the pickpocket 
can best develop his profitable activities in the densest 
throng. It was necessary that this welcome fog should 
not be dispersed and replaced by that clarity which would 
at once have been produced by an open and sincere 
discussion of the Ambassadors of the four disinterested 
Powers around the council table at London. Here all 
the subterfuges of Bethmann, Berchtold and Jagow would 
have been impossible. Here, eye to eye with the repre- 
sentatives of the three other Powers, the German Am- 
bassador would have had to show his true colours ; he 
would not have been able to escape the alternative of 
either accepting the proposals for an understanding put 
forward by the Entente Powers (of which there were any 
number to select from), or else on his own side making 
proposals for the furtherance of peace, which the other 



1 52 THE CRIME 

Powers had already stated in anticipation that they 
were prepared to accept. 

This alternative was repeatedly placed before the 
German and Austrian statesmen during the critical days 
by Grey, Viviani and Sazonof,-by the Ambassadors of 
the Entente Powers in Berlin and Vienna, especially 
by Goschen, Bunsen, and Jules Cambon. By incomplete 
and ambiguous statements, by procrastination and un- 
tenable objections, the German and Austrian Ambassadors 
always avoided giving a precise answer to the questions 
put to them — a point with which I have elsewhere fully 
dealt. All these vague and ambiguous statements would 
have been impossible at the London Conference of 
Ambassadors. In these circumstances, there would have 
been no concealment behind the Viennese screen, behind 
accidental absences of Count Berchtold, who in the first 
critical days was wandering about in the hills at Ischl : 
there would have been no excuses about replies from 
Vienna which had not yet been received, about English 
or Russian proposals for an understanding which had 
not yet become known, etc. There it would have been 
necessary to play with open cards, to show openly what 
one wanted and what one did not want. The Conference 
of 1914 would have been, like that of 1912, the great 
Clearing House where European business would have 
been regulated from a central office in place of a system 
of complicated individual settlements. The aim of the 
Conference, the maintenance of the peace of Europe, 
must have been achieved and would have been achieved. 
For this reason it durst not under any conditions be 
allowed to come into being. This was the reason of the 
stubborn refusal on the part of Berlin and Vienna. This 
is the crucial point in the proof of guilt. 

From Beyens' report of March 18th, 1913 (No. 102) : 

No. 102. 

. . . On croit que la question ... It is believed that the 

de Scutari se resoudra conforme- Skutari question will be regu- 

ment a la volonte du Cabinet de lated, in agreement with the wish 

Vienne, appuye par V Allemagne of the Viennese Cabinet which is 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 153 



et Vltalie, d'annexer cette place 
a l'Albanie, et en depit des ter- 
giversations de la Russie qui ne 
peut se decider a abandonner le 
Mont6negro. . . . 



supported by Germany and Italy, 
in the sense of an annexation of 
this town to Albania, in spite of 
the prevarications of Russia, which 
cannot make up its mind to 
leave Montenegro in the lurch. 



This assumption of the Belgian Ambassador was, as 
is known, confirmed. The Skutari question was solved 
entirely in accordance with the views of Austria and 
Italy, and here again the Entente Powers, with Russia 
at their head, yielded in the interests of the peace of 
Europe. 

From Beyens' report of April 4th, 1913 (No. 103) : 

No. 103. 



Berlin, le 4 avril 1913. 

. . . A Berlin on n'est pas, 
au fond, plus satisfait de la 
direction imprimee d la Triple- 
Alliance dans la question balkan- 
ique par le Cabinet de Vienne, 
mais on fait meilleure figure et 
on envisage avec sang-froid les 
complications qui peuvent en 
resulter. Dans les declarations 
pleines de reserve faites hier par 
le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires 
Etrangeres a la Commission du 
budget du Reichstag, le seul 
point sur lequel M. de Jagow se 
soit exprime avec une nettete 
qui ne laisse aucun doute quant 
aux intentions de V Allemagne, 
c'est Vappui quelle est resolu de 
preter jusqyCau bout d son alliee, 
V Autriche-Hongrie. 

On ne pense pas dans le monde 
diplomatique de Berlin, ou plutot 
on n'espere plus que la demon- 
stration navale devant Antivari 
empSchera la continuation du 
siege de Scutari et l'assaut final 



Berlin, April 4th, 1913. 

. . . In Berlin there is not at 
bottom much satisfaction regarding 
the direction which the Viennese 
Cabinet has given to the Triple 
Alliance in the Balkan question, 
but they put a good face on it 
and view with composure the 
complications which may arise. 
In the very restrained state- 
ments which the Foreign Secre- 
tary made yesterday in the 
Budget Commission of the 
Reichstag there was only one 
point on which Herr von Jagow 
expressed himself with a clear- 
ness which leaves no dovibt as to 
Germany's intentions, and that 
is the support which the German 
Empire is resolved to extend to 
the last to her ally Austria- 
Hungary. 

In the diplomatic world of 
Berlin it is not believed, or 
rather it is no longer hoped, 
that the naval demonstration 
before Antivari will prevent the 
continuation of the siege of 



iS4 



THE CRIME 



Skutari and the final assault on 
the fortress for which the Monte- 
negrins and the Serbians are 
eagerly preparing. If the place 
falls into their hands, something 
more will be needed to drive 
them out than a simple blockade 
and summonses repeated without 
effect. The entrance of Austrian 
troops in the territory of a Balkan 
State — and that State Serbia, 
rather than Montenegro, inas- 
much as military operations 
would be easier in Serbia than in 
Montenegro — would provoke an 
intervention on the part of Russia 
and perhaps be the starting point 
of a general war. That would be 
so grave an event that — so at 
least it is hoped here — the two 
Powers on whose decision the 
peace of Europe depends to-day 
would recoil before the possi- 
bility. In other words, it is 
believed that the magnitude of 
the danger, to which the whole of 
Europe is exposed by any un- 
considered decision, offers the 
best guarantee that this danger 
will be avoided. . . . 

This report of the Belgian Ambassador foretells with 
prophetic certainty in the spring of 1913 what in fact 
came to pass in the summer of 1914 : the entrance of 
Austrian troops into Serbian territory provoked the 
intervention of Russia and in further sequence the Euro- 
pean war. That Russia could not look on with indifference 
while the small Slav State was being crushed by Austria 
was a fact which had already been foreseen with certainty 
in the diplomatic circles of Berlin in the spring of 1913, 
as is confirmed by the Belgian Ambassador, and indeed 
the memorandum in the German White Book testifies 
that on this point no illusions had been entertained in 
Berlin. Baron Beyens' report is a new document in 
support of the view that the proposal for a localisation 
of the conflict between Austria and Serbia, which was 
constantly advanced by the Berlin Government — ostensibly 



auquel les Montenegrins et les 
Serbes se preparent activement. 
Si la place tombe entre leurs 
mains, il faudra autre chose 
qu'un simple blocus et des som- 
mations inutilement repetees 
pour les en deloger. Li 'entree des 
troupes autrichiennes sur un terri- 
toire balkanique, plutot serbe que 
montenegrin, parce qu'en Serbie 
des operations militaires seraient 
plus faciles qu'au Montenegro, 
motiverait une intervention de la 
Russie et dechainerait peut-etre 
une guerre generale. C'est une 
eventualite tellement grave 
qu'elle ferait recul er — on l'espere 
du moins ici — les deux Puis- 
sances, de la decision desquelles 
depend aujourd'hui la paix euro- 
peenne. En d'autres termes, on 
croit que la gravite du peril auquel 
toute decision inconsideree ex- 
poserait V Europe entiere est la 
meilleure garantie que Ton ait 
qu'il sera evite. . . . 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 155 

as a path to an understanding — was from the outset 
void of any prospect of success, that it was a trick, which 
the Berlin Government, long before the outbreak of the 
conflict, were already convinced would come to nothing. 



The German Military Law and the French Three 

Years Law. 

The following reports deal with the relations of the 
French Three Years Law to the German Military Law. 

From Guillaume's report of February 19th, 1913 
(No. 98) : 

No. 98. 



Paris, le 19 fevrier 1913. 

Je viens de voir M. le Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres qui m'a 
dit que la situation internationale 
ne s'est guere modifiee. L'armee 
bulgare ne fait pas de progres 
appreciables, et la Conference 
des Ambassadeurs de Londres 
semble dans un certain marasme. 

Le Cabinet de Vienne est tou- 
jours intransigeant pour toutes les 
questions qui Vinteressent, et la 
Russie defend energiquement la 
Serbie et le Montenegro. ... 

. . . La presse allemande 
se montre etonnee des mesures 
militaires que le Gouvernement 
francais va prendre en reponse a 
V accroissement des forces de V Em- 
pire ; il ne pouvait en etre 
autrement ; nous savons par- 
faitement bien, m'a dit le Minis- 
tre, quel avantage donne a 
notre voisin l'augmentation con- 
tinuelle de la population ; mais 
nous devons faire tout ce qui 
nous est possible pour compenser 
cet avantage par une meilleure 
organisation de nos forces. . . . 



Paris, February 19th, 1913. 

I have just seen the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who informed 
me that the international situa- 
tion has scarcely altered. The 
Bulgarian army is making no 
appreciable progress, and the 
Conference of Ambassadors in 
London appears to be in a kind 
of decline. 

The Viennese Cabinet continue 
to be irreconcilable in all questions 
which concern them, and Russia is 
energetically defending Serbia 
and Montenegro. . . . 

. . . The German Press is 
surprised at the military mea- 
sures which the French Govern- 
ment propose to take in answer 
to the increase in the strength of 
Germany 's armies ; it could not 
be otherwise. We know quite 
well, the Minister said to me, 
what advantage our neighbour 
derives from the continual in- 
crease in their population ; but 
we must do our utmost to 
compensate for this advantage by 
a better organisation of our forces. 



156 



THE CRIME 



From Guillaume's report of February 21st, 1913 (No.99) : 



No. 99. 



. . . L'acc?'oissement notable 
des armements de VAllemagne, 
qui survient au moment de V entree 
a VElysee de M. Poineare, va 
augmenter le danger d'une orient- 
ation trop nationaliste de la 
politique de la France. 

GuiLLAUME. 



. . . The considerable in- 
crease in Germany's armaments 
at the moment when M. Poineare 
is entering the Elysee will increase 
the danger of a too nationalistic 
orientation of French politics. . . . 

Gttillaume. 



Here again we see the thread which runs through all 
the Belgian reports : France wants peace, despite certain 
militaristic-nationalistic tendencies in the country. The 
German Military Law, which must compel France to 
new military efforts, will encourage rather than subdue 
nationalistic tendencies in France. 

In his report of February 24th, 1913 (No. 100), the 
Belgian Ambassador in London discusses in the same 
sense the relationship of the German Military Law to 
the French Three Years Law : 



No. 100. 



Londres, le 24 fevrier 1913. 

Les milieux politiques out ete 
emus et l'imagination du public 
fortement frappee, par les vastes 
projeis militaires de VAllemagne 
et plus encore peut-etre par la 
reponse si prompte et si ferme de 
la France. Les deux gouverne- 
ments sont prets a faire des 
sacrifices financiers consid6rables 
et paraissent soutenus par l'opi- 
nion dans les deux pays, ou 
seuls les socialistes font entendre 
une voix discordante. 

La presse anglaise veut natu- 
rellement endosser a VAllemagne 
la responsabilite de la nouvelle 
tension qui resulte de ses projets 
et qui peut apporter a VEurope 
des sujets d'inquietude nouveaux. 



London, February 24th, 1913. 

The great military plans of 
Germany, and even more perhaps 
the answer which has been given so 
promptly and so firmly by France, 
have moved political circles, and 
deeply stirred the imagination of 
the public. Both Governments 
are ready to make considerable 
financial sacrifices, and are ap- 
parently supported by the public 
opinion of both countries, where 
the Socialists alone sound a 
discordant note. 

The English Press, of course, 
wishes to lay on Germany the 
responsibility for the new tension 
which arises out of its projects 
and may give Europe occasion for 
new unrest. Many newspapers 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 157 



Beaucoup de journaux estiment 
que le Gouvernement frangais, 
en se declarant pret a imposer 
le service de trois ans, et en 
nommant M. Delcasse a St.- 
Petersbourg, a adopte la seule 
attitude digne de la grande 
Republique en presence d'une 
provocation allemande. . . . 



are of the opinion that the French 
Government, in declaring their 
readiness to introduce the three 
years' period of service and in 
sending M. Delcass6 to Petro- 
grad, have assumed the only 
attitude which, in face of a Oer- 
man provocation, is worthy of the 
great Republic. . . . 



In his report of December 13th, 1913 (No. 109), Count 
Lalaing, the London Ambassador, speaks of the fall of 
the Barthou Cabinet, which, as is known, had passed the 
Three Years Law, and he portrays the impression 
produced by this event on the political world in England : 

No. 109. 



Londres, le 13 d6cembre 1913. 

. . . On a constate, avec 
une certaine amertume, Vim- 
popularite plus reelle qu'on ne se 
Vimaginait, du service de trois 
ans et on a ete frappe des 
difficult6s dans lesquelles se 
trouve le Gouvernement de la 
Republique au sujet de l'em- 
prunt. . . . 



London, December 13th, 1913. 

... It was noted with a 
certain degree of bitterness that 
the three years' period of service 
was in fact more unpopular than 
had been believed, and people 
were struck with the difficulties 
in which the French Government 
were situated on the subject of 
the loan. . . . 



The report of Baron Guillaume, the Parisian Ambassador, 
dated April 25th, 1914 (No. 114), is connected with the 
visit which the King and Queen of England had paid to 
Paris — the first since the accession of King George to 
the Throne. It is there stated : 



No. 114. 



Paris, le 25 avril 1914. 

. . . Un deuil cruel m'a empe- 
che d'assister aux festivites et re- 
unions qui marquerent la visite 
royale ; mais les echos en sont 
venus jusqu'a moi, et j'ai acquis 
ainsi la certitude que les trois j our- 
nees qui ont marque le sejour de 
lours Majestes a Paris, gratifiees 
d'un temps superbe, ont pleine- 



Paris, April 25th, 1914- 

... A sad bereavement pre- 
vented me from taking part in 
the festivities and receptions on 
the occasion of the royal visit ; 
but their echo reached me, and 
I was thus assured that the 
three days which their Majesties 
spent in Paris, favoured by 
magnificent weather, were com- 



'58 



THE CRIME 



ment reussi et souleve des mani- 
festations de sympathie tres 
accentuees. Elles s'adressaient 
surtout au principe de " l'En- 
tente cordiale," et trouvaient un 
aliment particulierement actif 
dans la poussee de nationalisme 
— pour ne pas dire de chauvin- 
isme — que les dirigeants de la 
nation ont fait naitre pour faire 
accepter le principe si lourd de la 
loi de 3 ans, et de toutes ses conse- 
quences personnelles, economiques 
et financier es. . . . 

... II n'y fut naturellement 
pas question de la possibilit6 de 
donner a ces rapports une portee 
plus formelle, sous la forme d'un 
traite ou d'une convention. Cer- 
tains journaux avaient reve de 
cette combinaison ; mais il n'en 
fut jamais question, et des com- 
munications quasi-officielles faites 
a Londres et a Paris, comme 
echo des conversations echan- 
gees entre M. Doumergue et Sir 
Edward Grey, V etablissent sans 
detours. La Qrande-Bretagne 
n'aime pas les conventions for- 
melles et les arrangements conclus 
entre les deux Gouvernements, 
tels qu'ils sont aujourd'hui etab- 
lis, suffisent a la realisation du 
but a atteindre, tout en respec- 
tant certaines libertes pour les 
contractants. . . . 

La visite en France du Roi 
d'Angleterre etait prevue, neees- 
saire et opportune. II rt etait pas 
venu a Paris depuis son accession 
au trone, et il devait repondre a 
une demarche de courtoisie faite 
l'annee derniere par M. Poincare. 

Mais il est permis de se 
demander si elle est de nature a 
modifier sensiblement les rela- 
tions relativement confiantes qui 
existent deja entre les deux pays. 
Elles ont d'ailleurs donne, durant 



pletely successful and evoked 
warm manifestations of sym- 
pathy. These related chiefly to 
the Entente Cordiale, and found 
special support in the national- 
ism — not to say chauvinism — 
which the leaders of the nation 
have kindled in order to secure 
the acceptance of the principle of 
the oppressive law regarding the 
three years' period of service, with 
all its personal, economic and 
financial consequences. . . . 

. . . There was, of course, 
no question of the possibility of 
giving these relations a more 
formal character in the form of a 
treaty or a convention. Certain 
newspapers had dreamed of this 
possibility ; but there was never 
any question of it, and semi- 
official communications in London 
and in Paris, representing the 
echo of conversations between 
M. Doumergue and Sir Edward 
Grey, place this beyond all doubt. 
Great Britain does not like formal 
conventions, and the arrange- 
ments which exist between the 
two Governments suffice, as they 
are to-day, for the purpose for 
which they were intended, while 
leaving certain liberties to the 
contracting parties. . . . 

The visit of the King of Eng- 
land to France was foreseen, 
necessary and opportune. He 
had not come to Paris since his 
accession to the Throne, and he 
was bound to return the visit of 
courtesy which M. Poincare made 
to him last year. 

But it may nevertheless be 
asked whether it is of such a 
character as to exercise a sensible 
influence on the comparatively 
confidential relations which al- 
ready exist between the two 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 159 

ces demiers mois, des preuves countries. In recent months they 
d'efficacite indiscutables et furent have, moreover, given proof of 
favorables au maintien de la paix indisputable efficacy and were 
generale, tout en permettant favourable to the maintenance of 
d'ailleurs d'autres tentatives de universal peace, without at the 
rapprochement egalement profit- same time being prejudicial to 
ables au respect de l'equilibre other attempts at rapprochement 
europeen. which are equally useful to the 

continuance of European equili- 
brium. 

GUTLLAUME. GUTLLATTME. 

The contents of this report — from which again, to prove 
my objectivity, I reproduce a series of passages quoted 
in heavy type in the German collection — may be sum- 
marised as follows : 

1. Certain nationalistic-chauvinistic tendencies in 
France were exclusively intended to serve the internal 
political aim of securing the acceptance of the ex- 
tremely oppressive and unpopular Three Years 
Law, the necessary answer to the German Military 
Law. These tendencies thus signified no aggressive 
intentions on the part of France, but merely the 
effort to make acceptable to Parliament and the people 
the defensive preparations considered necessary. 
All Governments from time immemorial have been 
guilty of such internal political manoeuvres for the 
purpose of giving effect to military measures, and the 
German Government have shown themselves special 
masters of the art. 

2. Even at the time in question, the spring of 1914, 
there existed nothing between France and England 
which could in any way have been regarded as 
resembling a formal treaty of alliance ; still less was 
there any question of an offensive alliance. 

3. The visit of the English King and his Consort 
was a measure of courtesy which, taking place four 
years after his accession to the Throne, had in it 
nothing extraordinary, or at any rate nothing pro- 
vocative. 

4. The Royal visit was solely designed to serve 
the cause of universal peace and, so far as the Entente 
Powers are concerned, it produced this effect. 



i6o 



THE CRIME 



The following report of Guillaume of May 8th, 1914 
(No. 115, already partially quoted), expresses with even 
greater emphasis the foregoing train of thought : 

No. 115. 



Paris, le 8 mai 1914. 

. . . Quelle est la nature des 
engagements qui lient entre eux 
les deux Etats ? Ont-ils conclu une 
Convention militaire ? Je V ignore, 
mais je n'oublie pas que des 
esprits renechis et serieux doutent 
quelque pen de I 'assistance que la 
France trouverait chez les Anglais 
au jour d'une conflagration euro- 
peenne. II se trouve meme des 
gens qui ne croient pas a un 
concours britannique bien serieux 
sur mer. . . . 

Enfin, l'Angleterre ne cesse de 
faire des coquetteries a l'Alle- 
magne. Je n'ai pu savoir, ces 
dernier s temps, ce qu'etaient 
devenues lesnegociations germano- 
anglaises relativement a V Angola 
et au Mozambique ; c'est un 
point sur lequel il serait inte- 
ressant cependant d'avoir des 
pr6cisions. . . . 

Je ne crois pas au desir ni de 
Vun ni de V autre des deux pays de 
jouer V effroyable coup de des que 
serait une guerre ; mais il est 
toujours a craindre, avec le 
caractere francais, qu'un incident 
mal presente n'amene sa popula- 
tion ou pour mieux dire, les 
elements les plus nerveux voire 
meme les moins respectables de 
la population, a creer une situa- 
tion qui rendrait la guerre 
inevitable. . . . 

Un des elements les plus 
dangereux de la situation actu- 
elle est le retour de la France a 
la loi de trois ans. . . . 

La presse est mauvaise dans 



Paris, May 8th, 1914. 

. . . What is the nature of 
the obligations which bind the 
two States ? Have they concluded 
a military convention ? I do not 
know, but I do not forget that 
thoughtful and serious minds 
doubt whether on the day of a 
European conflagration France 
will find support in the English. 
There are indeed people who do 
not even believe in serious sup- 
port from England at sea. 

Finally, England does not 
cease to coquet with Germany. 
I have not recently been able to 
learn what has become of the 
Anglo-German negotiations on 
Angola and Mozambique ; but it 
would be interesting to be more 
accurately informed on this 
point. . . . 

I do not believe that either of 
the two countries desires to risk 
the horrible gamble of war ; but 
with the French national char- 
acter, there is always reason to 
fear that an incident unfor- 
tunately presented may lead the 
people, or rather the most 
nervous and indeed the basest 
elements of the population, to 
create a situation which would 
make war inevitable. . . . 

One of the most dangerous 
elements in the present situation 
is the return of France to the law 
regarding the three years' period 
of service. 

The feeling of the Press is bad 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 161 



les deux pays. La campagne qui 
se pour suit en Allemagne au sujet 
de la Legion etrangere est exces- 
sivement maladroite, et le ton des 
journaux francais ne cesse d'etre 
acerbe et agressif. Persorme n'a 
assez d'autorite et d'indepen- 
dance pour essayer de modifier 
cette situation qui est cependant 
blamee par beaucoup de bons 
esprits. 

II n'y a rien a attendre du 
Parlement ; le premier tour de 
scrutin des elections nous a 
deja montr6 comme nous nous y 
attendions, que la prochaine 
Chambre des Deputes sera a peu 
de chose pres, la meme que sa 
devanciere. Les Socialistes pour- 
ront gagner quelques voix, mais 
dans l'ensemble, la suprematie 
restera au parti radical-socialiste, 
malgre ses fautes et ses erreurs. 
Quoi que Ton puisse penser de3 
evenements recents, M. Gaillaux, 
le seul financier que compte 
aujouroVhui la Chambre, semble 
devoir r ester V instigateur de la 
politique francaise avec un peu de 
fiel et de mauvaise humeur en plus. 

GlTILLAUME. 



in both, countries. The campaign 
which is being conducted in Ger- 
many against the Foreign Legion 
is extremely maladroit, and the 
tone of the French newspapers 
is continually bitter and aggres- 
sive. ISTo one has sufficient 
authority and is sufficiently in- 
dependent to make an attempt 
to alter this situation, which is, 
however, condemned by many 
people of understanding. 

There is nothing to be expected 
from Parliament : the first elec- 
toral scrutiny has already shown, 
as we expected, that the next 
Chamber with slight modifica- 
tion will be almost the same as 
its predecessor. The Socialists 
may perhaps gain a few votes, 
but taking everything together 
the Radical-Socialists, despite 
their mistakes and errors, will 
keep the upper hand. Whatever 
may be thought regarding recent 
events, it appears that M. Gail- 
laux, the only financier whom 
the Chamber can show to-day, is 
to remain the leader of French 
policy, with a small addition of 
choler and bad temper. 

Gttillaume. 



This report clearly shows the dangerous reaction pro- 
duced by the German Military Law on the feelings of the 
French people. Even in Germany, people who thought 
calmly foresaw this effect and uttered insistent warnings 
regarding the consequences of this new and provocative 
step on the fatal path of armaments. The Army Bill 
was already the manifest expression of the resolution 
of the rulers of Germany to embark on a European war : 
they were no longer concerned to avoid this " inevitable " 
war, but only to strengthen their military situation in 
such a way that victory would be assured. From their 
point of view, which was that of being decided on war, 
it was a matter of indifference what military and national 
reactions their Army Bill evoked in France. These 



M 



162 THE CRIME 

reactions were in fact welcome to them, for they poured 
further oil on the fire, and promised to hasten still more 
the outbreak of the world-conflagration which was bound 
to come some day. Moreover, these results furnished the 
special advantage that they enabled the authorities in Ger- 
many to appeal to militaristic and nationalistic tendencies 
in France, and to represent the French as the party that 
provoked the world-war, whereas in fact they were merely 
the party provoked. 

That neither the French nor the English were willing 
to risk " the horrible gamble of war," that there was not 
even in France any feeling of confidence in English assist- 
ance, that the actual leader of French policy, even after 
the results of the first electoral scrutiny of 1914, remained 
the absolutely pacific Caillaux — all these facts are confirmed 
by the Belgian Ambassador three months before the 
outbreak of war. This, however, is all in favour of the 
Entente Powers, and frees them from any suspicion of 
having intended or provoked war. 

From Guillaume's report of June 9th, 1914 (No. 116), 
the following passage is specially interesting : 

No. 116. 

Paris, le 9 juin 1914. Paris, June 9th, 1914. 

. . . Eat-il vrai que le Cabinet . . . Is it true that the Petro- 

de Petersbourg ait impose au pays grad Cabinet has pressed on the 

V adoption de la loi de trois ans et country the acceptance of the law 

peserait aujourdliui de tout soil regarding the three years' period 

poids pour en obtenir le maintien ? of military service, and that it is 

to-day exerting its whole weight in 
demanding its maintenance ? 

Je n'ai pu parvenir a obtenir I have not been able to obtain 

des lumieres sur ce point delicat, any light on this delicate point, 

mais il serait d'autant plus grave but it would be all the more 

que les homines qui dirigent les grave inasmuch as the men who 

destinees de l'Empire des Czars direct the destiny of Russia 

ne peuvent ignorer que l'effort must know that the effort de- 

demande ainsi a la nation fran- manded of the French people is 

caise est excessif et ne pourra se too great and cannot be long 

soutenir longtemps. . . . maintained. . . . 

In June, 1914, the Belgian Ambassador in Paris is still 
without information on the delicate point whether the 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 163 

Petrograd Cabinet had or had not forced her French 
ally to the acceptance of the Three Years Law. Herr 
Schiemann is wiser and better informed in this respect : 
he knows, in fact, that that law had already been imposed 
in the summer of 1912 on Poincare, at that time Prime 
Minister, when he was in Petrograd. This omniscient 
writer, this busybody, must have had at his disposal listeners 
endowed with the gift of sharp hearing at all the doors 
of the diplomatic Cabinets in Europe, always reporting 
more than the initiated themselves knew. 



I have elsewhere already referred to the penultimate 
report of Baron Beyens, dated June 12th, 1914 (No. 118). 
Here it may again be pointed out that the triumph of 
French Radicalism and Socialism at the elections of 
1914 evoked great satisfaction among the peace-loving 
elements in Germany also, while it produced, as a matter 
of course, great disappointment among the Pan-Germans. 

The French Parliamentary elections in April, 1914, 
took place directly on the issue : For or against the three 
years' period of service; for or. against a policy of rap- 
prochement and understanding with Germany. The united 
Socialists had conducted their electoral campaign by 
means of an effective cartoon which showed the hapless 
Marianne overwhelmed under the weight of artillery, 
painfully staggering to the abyss to which she was being 
driven by a General. The adherents of the three years' 
period of service, on the other hand, had chosen for their 
poster the bearers of the Prussian pickelhaube who, by 
the gigantic increase in their army in the preceding year, 
were seeking to oppress France, and could only be re- 
strained from their criminal plans by new exertions on 
the part of the Republic. 

The bitterest opponents of the maintenance of the Three 
Years Law were the Socialists under Jaures and the 
Radicals under Caillaux. Both parties gained enormous 
successes immediately on the first electoral scrutiny on 
April 26th, 1914. The Socialists alone received 280,000 new 
votes (out of a total of 1| million Socialist votes). Caillaux, 
the most hated and the most attacked opponent of the 

m 2 



164 THE CRIME 

three years' period of service, was elected at the first 
scrutiny by an enormous majority. The leading French 
pacifist, Senator D'Estournelles de Constant, had himself 
led the campaign on his behalf in his electoral district. 
According to the statements of nationalistic papers like 
the Temps and the Matin, which are certainly free from 
suspicion, out of 8| millions of votes which were given, 
only 4f millions were in favour of the maintenance of 
the Three Years Law, while the other 3| millions were 
for weakening the existing law or for the restoration of 
the two years' period of service. 

Moreover, it cannot even be said that all the electors 
or candidates who advocated the maintenance of the 
three years' period of service intended thereby to give 
expression to nationalistic or anti-pacifist sentiments. 
There were countless leading men in France who had 
devoted their whole life to the support of a Franco- 
German understanding and to the realisation of pacifist 
ideas in general, who nevertheless, confronted by the 
continually increasing military power of Germany, 
confronted by the increasingly presumptuous and threaten- 
ing action of Pan-Germanism, saw no other way of 
escape for the threatened French Republic than to deter 
their dangerous neighbour from an attack, by strongly 
arming to the utmost limit of their strength. Thus, 
for example, Leon Bourgeois not only voted in the French 
Senate for the Three Years Law, but in a manifesto to 
his party during the election of 1914 demanded the main- 
tenance of this law. How firm must have been the con- 
viction entertained by wide and authoritative circles of 
France on the subject of the bellicose intentions of Germany, 
when so eminent a pacifist as Bourgeois defended such 
far-reaching measures of defence. 

If we deduct from the majority of votes in favour 
of the Three Years Law all those electors who, like 
Bourgeois and countless others, were absolutely in favour 
of a peaceful rapprochement with Germany, but considered, 
in view of the experiences of the past, that such a rap- 
prochement was without any prospect of success, and 
considered, therefore, that a thorough preparation for a 
successful defence of the country was inevitable, we may 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 165 

infer from the French elections of 1914 this statistically- 
demonstrable conclusion : The great majority of the 
French people, the leading men of France, were unre- 
servedly in favour of the maintenance of the peace of 
Europe ; they abhorred war, but they wanted to be 
secured, as far as possible, against a hostile attack. It 
was only regarding the method of obtaining this security 
that a difference of opinion existed. Some (of the school 
of thought of Jaures and Caillaux) were still sufficiently 
optimistic to believe in the possibility of a peaceful under- 
standing with Germany. Others (represented by Bour- 
geois, Briand and Barthou) were pessimists ; they knew 
and recognised the powerful war currents in Germany, 
they knew that the Emperor had for some considerable 
time been won over to the ideas of the war-party, and they 
naw that France's deliverance lay not in unprofitable 
attempts to reach an understanding, but only in the 
greatest possible perfection of its equipment for defence. 
The second class saw more clearly than the first. This, 
however, does not affect the fact that both groups were 
equally assiduous to serve the cause of the maintenance 
of peace. 

The result of the elections was an explicit message of 
peace on the part of France, and, moreover, it promised 
to lead to a revision of the oppressive Three Years Law. 
This law was, as Baron Beyens expressly emphasises in 
his report of June 12th, 1914 (No. 118), France's answer 
which followed, " tit for tat," on the German Army Bill. 
If it is the case that now, as a result of the new elections, 
a coalition party had come into power which, regardless 
of the continuance of the increase in the strength of 
Germany's army and the effects thereby produced, was 
prepared to alleviate and weaken the French counter- 
measure, the Three Years Law, and was further in a 
position to do so, — surely this fact must impress on every 
unprejudiced mind the conviction which Baron Beyens 
expresses in his report in the words : " The majority of the 
French people certainly does not want war." The Belgian 
Ambassador, it is true, discusses the question whether 
the introduction of the Three Years Law, as a reply to 
the German Military Law, was or was not an expedient 



166 THE CRIME 

measure. He regards, however, as beyond discussion 
" the growth of the idea which is falsely disseminated 
or uncritically accepted by the best minds in this country 
(Germany) that war is inevitable in the near future, be- 
cause France ardently desires it and is feverishly arming 
to prepare herself for it." 

No. 118 is the last descriptive report of public opinion 
from a Belgian pen — before the outbreak of the conflict 
■ — to be found in the German collection. The concluding 
number, 119, dated July 2nd, 1914, already deals ex- 
clusively with the Austro-Serbian dispute. Beyens' report 
of June 12th, 1914, gives, in my opinion, the coup de grace 
to the German chauvinistic legend that French chauvinism 
was responsible for the war. It is German chauvinism that 
is denounced as the falsifier and as the poisoner of springs, 
the German public as the uncritical follower of that 
" nationalist " invention which seeks to transfer the guilt 
to the other side. This is the historical truth, and the 
German Government have by their publication uninten- 
tionally rendered this truth a priceless service. 

It will here be objected : If the German Government 
have published material which is so unfavourable for 
their own purpose, how then can you accuse them of 
having sought out reports in a one-sided and prejudiced 
manner with the object of falsifying the truth ? The 
answer is very simple. In the whole collection there is 
not a single report which exclusively contains material 
unfavourable to Germany. The unfavourable observa- 
tions and statements which I have emphasised are scattered 
about in reports which contain a greater or less amount of 
matter favourable to Germany, and for this very reason 
have been selected for printing. The favourable passages — 
a point to which I have already referred — are always 
emphasised in heavy type, and for this reason I have taken 
the liberty of following the same system in my extracts, 
and have emphasised in italics the passages favourable to 
my thesis. It was impossible to risk in Berlin a direct 
falsification of the individual reports, and they were there- 
fore compelled to take the unfavourable into the bargain 
along with what was favourable. The result is that the 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 167 

collection which has been compiled for the purpose of white- 
washing the German statesmen contains many shadows 
alongside much light — shadows which, so far as I know, 
no one has hitherto taken the trouble to seek out and 
again place in their true light. I am the first to undertake 
this painful labour, and I believe that in doing so I have 
served the cause of historical truth. 



THE METHOD AND THE RESULT OF MY INVESTIGATION. 

In order to remove in advance any misunderstanding 
and any malicious charge against my " extracts from the 
extracts," I define once again the method and the result 
of my investigation : 

1. The considerations tending to incriminate the Entente 
Powers in the more remote antecedents of the war furnished 
the governing motive in making a selection from the 
ambassadorial reports. This collection, representing a 
selection merely, possesses no value as evidence, if only 
because of its numerically demonstrable defects and gaps. 
I know, and expressly confirm the fact, that the collection 
of reports, in the form in which it exists, contains a large 
number of considerations reflecting on the policy of the 
Entente in the period before the war. The passages in 
question are reproduced universally in the apologetic 
literature of Germany. I have no occasion to quote 
them once more. Anyone who is interested in the matter 
may read them in the literature of the war or in the 
original collection. 

My method is thus differentiated from that of the Foreign 
Office in the decisive point, that I expressly admit the 
existence of numerous passages which are unfavourable 
to the Entente Powers, whereas the Berlin Foreign Office 
compiles its collection in a one-sided manner, as if unfavour- 
able reports on German policy had never emanated from 
Belgian Ambassadors. I expressly admit that the picture 
contained in the printed reports has two sides, that it is 
neither absolutely favourable nor absolutely unfavourable 
to one party or the other. The German Government, on 
the other hand, maintain that they are able to produce 
an entirely favourable picture in corroboration of their 



i68 THE CRIME 

innocence, and in doing so they falsify the truth, even 
if it is only their own tendencious collection of documents 
that is consulted. My method of examination is open 
and honest, that of the Foreign Office is tortuous and 
dishonest. 

2. Since what is favourable to Germany has already 
been extracted and published, I must be allowed to gather 
together here what is unfavourable to Germany and favour- 
able to the Entente Powers, in order in this way to show 
the two-sided character of the picture. 

I have on several occasions emphasised that in repro- 
ducing the quotations in question I have nevertheless 
aimed at the utmost degree of objectivity, and that I have 
reproduced along with the passages in the reports which 
are favourable to the Entente Powers many which are 
apparently unfavourable, and which for this reason are 
printed in heavy type in the German collection, and I can 
leave it to the reader to test the accuracy of my assertion by 
examining the German collection of reports. At the same 
time, I do not deny that the object of the extracts which 
I have given in the foregoing pages is in the first place 
to correct the one-sided picture of the contents of the 
Belgian reports which is given by German apologetic 
literature in its usual compilations, and secondly to arrive 
at the real contents of these reports — in so far as they 
are included in the German collection of documents — 
by considering the two opposing pictures. 

According to the view expressed by the Belgian diplo- 
matists, the real picture shows that on both sides, intra 
et extra muros, sins were committed by the groups of 
European Powers, and that therefore the offence on the 
two sides is compensated, — at the least compensated, 
unless indeed the critical and attentive reader infers 
from the one-sided German collection of documents 
itself a certain excess of guilt against Germany. For 
the purpose of my demonstration I am not concerned 
with this preponderance. In the second chapter of 
J' accuse, " The Antecedents of the Crime," and in the 
second volume of The Crime, I have myself endeavoured 
to prove that even the more remote antecedents of the 
war show a vast excess of guilt on the side of Germany 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 169 

and Austria. The evidence produced by me in support 
of this assertion is scarcely anywhere affected by the 
Belgian ambassadorial reports, much less is it weakened 
by them. Indeed, the most important points from the 
more remote antecedents — the Hague Conferences, the 
Anglo-German negotiations for an understanding, and 
much else — on which I base my proof of guilt from the 
period before the war, are passed over in silence in the 
Belgian reports, so far as they are published by the German 
Government. The reports from three capitals are entirely 
absent. But even if the collection did not show these 
gaps and defects which in fact it does reveal, my docu- 
mentary proof would not be weakened or refuted by 
diplomatic reports dealing with public opinion. 

Therefore I say that for my thesis of accusation it is 
a matter of indifference whether the Belgian Ambassadors, 
even if all their reports were given to us unabbreviated, 
recognise or fail to recognise this preponderance of guilt 
on the part of Germany. The mere confirmation of the 
fact that the Belgian reports, so far as they are published, 
more or less balance guilt against innocence in the case 
of the two groups of Powers is sufficient to deprive the 
defenders of Germany of the right to appeal to this col- 
lection i^of documents as evidence of Germany's inno- 
cence. 

This holds, as has been said, for the collection of docu- 
ments in its present form. What would be shown by the 
picture furnished by the complete reprint of all the Belgian 
ambassadorial reports from the six European capitals 
during the years from 1905 to 1914, and especially of 
those written in the last days before the outbreak of war ? 
Even the reports which are printed show approximately 
the same degree of guilt on the two sides. Would not the 
total contents of all the reports furnish a considerable 
preponderance against the Central Powers ? Is it going 
too far to give expression to the presumption and the 
suspicion that for this very reason eleven-twelfths of all 
the reports have been omitted — that this course was 
adopted because they feared that in place of the present 
picture, which displays both light and shade, a coal-black 
picture would be brought to light, in which the despots 



170 THE CRIME 

of Germany and Austria would alone figure as the " black 
men " of Europe ? 

3. I have already pointed out in the course of this in- 
vestigation to what the charge against the Entente 
Powers contained in the Belgian reports is in essence 
restricted. It is not warlike intentions that the Belgian 
Ambassadors ascribe to them, but merely careless political 
actions which, far ricochet, might feed the bellicose 
tendencies existing in Germany. The Entente occasion- 
ally fed Pan- Germanism, instead of starving it and allow- 
ing it to perish for lack of sustenance. This is the under- 
lying note of the Belgian reports : The " isolation " 
goaded the already dangerous beast of Pan-Germanism 
into barking and biting ; it would therefore have been 
better to abandon this policy of isolation. The danger 
of war — in this there is unanimous agreement in the 
Belgian reports, apart from a few of Greindl's observations 
— the danger of war in no way threatened from the side 
of the Entente Powers, but without meaning to do so 
these Powers conjured up this danger in following at times 
a policy which might result in strengthening the bellicose 
elements in Germany and in finally giving them the upper 
hand. 

When all is said, it is not easy to see how and in what 
direction the Belgian collection of reports is supposed to 
support the defence of the German Government : 

It in no way contributes to the real history of the 
crime, the history of the critical twelve days. 

While it furnishes contributions to the antecedents 
of the war, these prove nothing in favour of Germany 
and against the Entente Powers. They show at 
most a balance of guilt on the two sides, a charge 
of approximately the same gravity brought against 
both groups of Powers. In so far as concerns the 
charge against the Entente Powers, the collection 
of reports is, however, void of any force as evidence 
both on formal and substantial grounds — on formal 
grounds because of its tendencious compilation and 
because of its shortcomings and gaps ; on sub- 
stantial grounds because of the absence of the factor 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 171 

which would alone be decisive for the guilt of the 
Entente Powers, namely, the intention to make an 
armed attack on Germany. 

The German Government have thus proved nothing in 
either direction. The only result which remains from their 
publication is the fact that the authors of the great crime 
are once again seeking, as so often in the past, to falsify 
truth in their favour by the perversion and suppression of 
historical facts, and to transfer the guilt from themselves 
to others. This attempt, which here again fails, is only 
a new sign of their consciousness of guilt. 

A State of Tension is not Equivalent to Wa e. 

I have thus come to the end of my investigation into 
the ambassadorial reports published by the German 
Government. Even if nothing is considered apart from 
the one-sided selection of reports, the result of the balancing 
of accounts in no way reveals a balance of assets in 
Germany's account ; it is in the most favourable event 
an agreement of debit and credit items, leaving for neither 
party a balance as debtor or as creditor. 

Let us assume that the result was not what it in fact 
is, that the 1,237 reports which (on the most conservative 
estimate) are missing were also exactly similar in tenor 
to those which are printed, and that the sum total of all 
the reports showed (what the printed reports do not show) 
that the Entente Powers did in fact bear a greater re- 
sponsibility than the Central Powers for the state of 
European tension in the period before the war. Even 
if we accept this conclusion (refuted though it is by all 
the dissertations and demonstrations in my first and 
second works, and though it is in contradiction with the 
truth), would it yield the slightest suggestion of an excul- 
pation of Germany and Austria from the charge of having 
deliberately and intentionally provoked this European 
war which broke out in the summer of 1914 ? 

To this question there is only one answer : No. 

A state of tension is not the same thing as war. Europe 
has passed through countless states of tension in the last 
half -century, and yet, since 1870-71, no war has ever 



172 THE CRIME 

broken out between the great States of Europe. Strained 
relations which threatened war repeatedly existed between 
France and Germany, between Austria and Russia, 
between England and France, between Russia and Eng- 
land, between Austria and Italy, etc. On every occasion 
it has been found possible to relieve the tension, sometimes 
from incident to incident, and sometimes once for all 
by means of international arrangements, alliances, ententes, 
etc. Countless disputes — in many cases even such as, 
in the customary language of diplomacy, are represented 
as " questions of life or death," of national " prestige," 
and national " honour," — have been settled by the 
peaceful path of understanding, of compromise, of con- 
ciliatoriness on both sides. Even the Austro-Serbian 
dispute — more readily, indeed, than many which pre- 
ceded — could easily have been settled peacefully and 
by arbitration, given the least measure of good-will, 
as I have shown at length in a hundred passages in my 
books. Even this state of tension, which was insignificant 
when compared with former disputes, could have been 
removed without trouble and in the shortest space of 
time, if the will for a peaceful solution had existed in 
Berlin and Vienna. If the great and profound conflicts 
of interest between England and France, between Russia 
and England, between Austria and Russia during the 
earlier Balkan imbroglios, between Austria and Italy in 
all the questions relating to the Adriatic ; if the competing 
interests of Germany and France, of Germany and Eng- 
land, in Asia and Africa and other parts of the globe — 
in part even shortly before the outbreak of the present 
war — could be brought to a settlement by treaties based 
on compromise, then surely the small points of difference 
between the Austrian Ultimatum and the Serbian answer 
could have been adjusted much more easily and much 
more quickly — always assuming that those in authority 
in Vienna and Berlin were anxious for such an adjustment. 
Strained relations, rivalries, conflicts of interest are no 
more to be extirpated from the lives of States in their 
relationship to each other than from the lives of private 
individuals within the various States. Between the 
citizens of a State these are adjusted by amicable agree- 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 173 

ment or, if this does not succeed, by a judicial decision. 
It is true that between States there exists as yet no power 
to give such a judicial decision, but even here there are 
adequate means of arriving at a peaceful settlement 
without recourse to arms : in the first place, there is the 
path of direct agreement between the parties concerned ; 
in the second place, the mediation and the good services 
of disinterested Powers ; in the third place, the convocation 
of the Court of Arbitration at The Hague which was 
instituted for this purpose, and in appropriate cases 
the Hague Commissions of- Inquiry. There is, as will 
be seen, do lack of pacific methods of diminishing tension 
between States. The party who engenders the tension 
does not therefore produce war. He only is guilty of 
war who makes a peaceful solution impossible, who makes 
use of the existing tension to break the peace, who instead 
of disentangling the Gordian knot cuts it with the sword, 
as was done by Germany and Austria in the summer of 
1914. 

It would therefore be possible to concede without 
concern what the German Government seeks to infer from 
the Belgian ambassadorial reports (but is not in fact to 
be found there), namely, that the Entente Powers were 
chiefly responsible for the state of European tension. 
This admission would not, however, take away one iota 
from the guilt of Germany and Austria, who rejected all 
means whereby the tension might have been peacefully 
removed, and thereby made it inevitable that the dispute 
should be decided by arms, who finally themselves brought 
about the catastrophe by their declarations of war. 



The begetter of a state of tension is not, I said, by any 
means the begetter of war. He who puts powder in a 
powder-barrel is not by any means to be regarded in the 
same way as he who applies the glowing spark. He 
who has filled an enclosed reservoir with water is not to 
be put on the same level as the man who opens the sluices 
and allows the destructive deluge to pour over the fields. 

To take an illustration from private life, let us take 
the case of two neighbours in the country between whom 



174 THE CRIME 

strained relations have arisen as a result of prolonged 
boundary disputes, rivalries and bickerings. In the end, 
the patience of one gives way : he arms his servants, pro- 
vides them with torches, and falls upon his neighbour 
with fire and sword. He carries out this violent attack, 
notwithstanding that his neighbour was ready once for 
all to settle all disputes in an amicable manner — by a 
judicial decision, by arbitration, or by the mediation of 
impartial third parties. Has the aggressor, in excusing 
his action, any right to appeal to the strained relations 
as having occasioned his attack ? No one would admit 
the force of such an excuse. There would be only one 
possible excuse for the attack : the assertion, supported 
by evidence, that the neighbour who had been the subject 
of attack was himself resolved to attack, and was indeed 
on the point of attacking the present aggressor. To 
anticipate this immediate and certainly imminent attack 
by a counter-attack is a right which may, in case of 
necessity, be conceded to the threatened private individual 
as the " right of self-help," it being presupposed that it 
was as a matter of fact impossible for him to procure 
the necessary protection in a normal and lawful manner. 
In other words, the natural and lawful right of " defence," 
which in itself only exists as against " a present attack 
in violation of the law," and is therefore a defensive right, 
might as an exception, in entirely special circumstances, be 
so far extended that an immediately imminent attack in 
the future might also be repelled by an anticipated act 
of defence, that is to say by " prevention." 1 

I have elsewhere fully explained the presuppositions 
and limitations of such prevention (see The Crime, Vol. II, 
Chaps. I and II). They hold good for States just as 
much as for the private individual ; indeed in the former 
case they hold good in a much higher degree, since from 

1 Apart from the case of " defence," the German Imperial 
Criminal Code (Section 54) states that actions are innocent when 
committed "in a state of unmerited necessity which cannot be 
avoided in any other way, with a view to obtaining deliverance 
from a present danger to body or life of the actor or one belonging 
to him." Under the idea of a present danger to body or life may 
be included the immediately imminent and certain attack of another. 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 175 

their preventive actions much graver consequences may 
ensue for whole countries, and for whole quarters of the 
globe. Under no circumstances, either in private or 
international life, is an existing state of tension recognised 
as an excuse for beginning preventive action. The 
imminently threatening attack from the other side is 
the sole consideration which, in case of necessity, may 
be advanced in exoneration of preventive action — if, 
indeed, preventive wars are under any circumstances 
to be admitted as permissible, a view which I for my 
part reject. 

As we have seen, the Belgian ambassadorial reports 
in no way support the view that the German Empire 
was threatened with an attack from the Entente Powers. 
They prove nothing more than an electrically-charged 
state of tension in Europe, which, like so many previous 
conditions of a similar character, could have been over- 
come in all sorts of ways. Even if I were prepared to 
admit that the responsibility for producing this tension 
rested in a preponderating measure on the Entente Powers 
— a doctrine which I dispute on the ground of all the evi- 
dence collected in my books — there is still a complete 
absence of any justification for the provocation of this 
war by Germany and Austria. The argument, briefly 
stated, is this : " You have isolated me ; you have diplo- 
matically checkmated me ; you are guilty of the existing 
tension in Europe, and for this reason I am starting this 
most fearful of all wars, transforming the most flourishing 
regions of Europe into a heap of ruins, and condemning 
millions and millions of men to death, mutilation, hunger 
and misery " ; such reasoning will be approved by no 
European of the twentieth century who feels morally, 
rightly, or even only humanely. Not even in the darkest 
times of earliest barbarism would it have met with sym- 
pathy. 

The Barbarians went out to conquer territory when 
they had not sufficient space on which to live, sufficient 
territory to provide them with the means of support, 
when they hoped to find in other countries better and 
pleasanter conditions of life. These were the motives 



176 THE CRIME 

which once led the Huns, the Goths and the Langobards 
into the rich and fruitful plains of Western Europe. 
Lack of room, lack of the means of life, urged them to 
conquest. Can Germany, prosperous and powerful, enjoy- 
ing until the outbreak of war a gigantic wave of develop- 
ment both economically and culturally, a land almost 
without any emigration, indeed requiring for the cultiva- 
tion of her soil hundreds of thousands of foreigners year 
by year — can Germany put forward in defence of her 
policy of expansion even that excuse which was available 
for the barbaric nations of the early Middle Ages ? Can 
she assert that her population had no sufficient room for 
development in their own country, no sufficient possibility 
to play their part in the world ? Certainly not ! What 
then is the meaning of this triumphant and pompous 
production of the Belgian ambassadorial reports, which 
at the worst assert merely a diplomatic isolation of Ger- 
many — and even this without truth — but which show not 
a trace of an economic encirclement or strangulation, 
of any restriction on the freedom of development, of any 
ligature of the vital arteries of the German people ? What 
is the meaning of all the noise ? Is W T illiam II in the 
twentieth century to be allowed a casus belli which an 
Attila in the fifth century would never have dared to 
put before his people as a ground of war ? So long as 
the authorities in the Foreign Office fail to prove to us 
that Germany was to be not merely " isolated," but 
subjected to an armed attack by England, Russia and 
France, so long will they fail to justify their own armed 
attack in the eyes of their contemporaries and of posterity 
— even if we were prepared to recognise the German 
theory of prevention as justified in itself. 

The Belgian ambassadorial reports — even if it were 
their purpose to do so — would in no way alter the firmly 
fixed conviction of the whole civilised world, drawn from 
a thousand other sources, that Germany and Austria 
bear the chief responsibility for the state of European 
tension before the war. Assuming, however, that it 
were not so — assuming that the Entente Powers bore 
an equal or even a preponderating degree of responsibility 
for the electric charging of the atmosphere, nevertheless 



BELGIAN AMBASSADORIAL REPORTS 177 

he still remains the incendiary who cast to the wind all 
the methods of diminishing the tension, who by his 
precipitate decision brought about the conflagration. 
The decisive point remains the act of will which brought 
about the war. Only a certain and immediately imminent 
attack could have justified it as a case of necessity, — 
not, however, diplomatic occurrences of any kind what- 
ever, whether described as encirclement, isolation, or by 
any other fine name. 



CHAPTER II 
THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 

Since in Germany the Belgian Ambassadors are credited 
with such an absolutely authoritative and " objective " 
judgment on European events, their authority must be 
recognised, not only for the more remote antecedents of 
the war, but also for the history of the immediate out- 
break of war. If Guillaume, Lalaing, Bey ens, etc., are 
presented to us as classical witnesses for the diplomatic 
history of Europe from February, 1905, down to July 2nd, 
1914, they must also be accepted as equally classical 
witnesses for the history of the conflict from July 23rd 
to August 4th, 1914. 

What, however, is the judgment of the Belgian Am- 
bassadors on the history of this conflict ? Do they in 
this case also express themselves more or less unfavourably 
regarding the policy of the Entente Powers ? Do they 
in this case also stand more or less on the side of Germany ? 
On which of the great European Powers do they lay the 
responsibility for the outbreak of war ? 

These are the questions which we have now to investi- 
gate by reference to the two Grey Books published by 
the Belgian Government and to the aforementioned work 
of Baron Beyens. If this investigation yields an unfavour- 
able result so far as Germany and Austria are concerned, 
the value of the whole collection of Belgian ambassadorial 
reports published by the Berlin Foreign Office will be 
seriously impaired. It is a matter of indifference what 
these reports may contain, whether they are genuine or 
false, whether they are complete or incomplete; it does 
not matter whether they make an equal apportionment 

178 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 179 

of the guilt in respect of the period before the war or 
assign it solely to one or the other of the groups of Powers ; 
if the investigation and the examination of the Belgian 
publications regarding the history of the critical twelve 
days prove that the Belgian statesmen attribute the 
outbreak of the war exclusively to the two Central Powers, 
Germany and Austria, then there will be raised up in 
condemnation against these Powers a series of new judges, 
whose verdict will serve to strengthen that of the whole 
neutral world. Indeed, their verdict of condemnation 
has even greater weight than that of other neutrals : 
he who, up to July, 1914, passed so favourable a verdict 
on Austro-German policy and so unfavourable a verdict 
on Anglo -Franco-Russian policy as, according to the 
assertion of the Foreign Office, is supposed to be furnished 
by the Belgian ambassadorial reports, can certainly not 
be said to harbour any prejudice in favour of the Entente 
Powers ; his verdict of guilt is doubly weighty, because 
it comes from the pen of a Germanophile, who until the 
commission of the gigantic crime had felt the utmost 
sympathy towards the criminal and would never have 
credited him with such an action. When a friend says 
of his friend that he is a knave and a malefactor, his 
judgment is more crushing than if it had been expressed 
by his enemy. 

It is therefore of great importance to hear the views 
of those same Belgian Ambassadors, whom Germany 
produces as witnesses for the period before the war, on 
the real conflict out of which the war arose, and on this 
occasion to give a hearing to those Ambassadors also 
whose reports the Berlin Foreign Office completely sup- 
presses in its publication. 



I give below a series of extracts from the two Belgian 
Grey Books in the original French text. In so far as I 
reprinted the ambassadorial reports published by the 
German Government, it was necessary to reproduce 
them in two languages, in agreement with the German 
publication, in the original and in the official German 
translation. On the other hand, in reprinting extracts 

K 2 



180 THE CRIME 

from the Belgian Grey Books, I thought it possible to 
dispense with the literal translation of the French original 
reports, which would have encumbered my book un- 
necessarily. In the case of most of my readers I 
may assume a knowledge of the French language, and 
moreover, after every important report I give in a 
compressed form a statement of the contents, the 
accuracy of which can be tested by reference to the 
French text. 

In making selections, the point from which I have 
started has been to leave aside as far as possible the war 
between Belgium and Germany which arose out of the 
violation of Belgian neutrality, and to restrict myself 
essentially to the verdict of the Belgian statesmen on the 
guilt and responsibility for the European war. The 
war between Belgium and Germany was a consequence 
of the European war ; its origin is clear to everyone ; 
the exclusive guilt of Germany, the violator of neutrality, 
is indisputable, and was even admitted by Herr von 
Bethmann himself on August 4th, 1914. It is unnecessary 
that I should reproduce the views of the Belgian diplo- 
matists on the violation and devastation of their country, 
the destruction of their cities, the annihilation of their 
flourishing industries, the violent death and deportation 
of thousands of innocent civilians without respect to age 
or sex, without considering whether the hapless victims 
were or were not dangerous — I need not repeat their views 
on all these barbarities perpetrated in the innocent country, 
and later shamelessly denied with abuse. The crime 
committed against Belgium has been condemned by the 
whole world, and the judgment of Belgian statesmen on 
this matter is easily understandable. 

For my investigation the only question that matters 
is this : 

At what judgment did the Belgian Ambassadors 
arrive regarding the origin and the immediate author- 
ship of the European war ? To whom did they 
attribute the responsibility for it ? Did they in this 
case also, as in the history of events before the war, 
distribute the responsibility among all the Powers, 
or did they point with accusing finger to certain 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 181 

individual Powers as the criminals who were alone 
guilty ? 

These are the questions which are to be answered by 
the following extracts. 

A. 

BELGIAN GREY BOOK I. 

On July 24th, one day after the delivery of the Austrian 
Ultimatum, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
already sees approaching the danger of a European war. 
Thus even at this stage he also regards the Ultimatum 
as a suspicious sign of the will for war on the part of 
Austria. On July 24th, 1914, he sends to his representa- 
tives in the great European capitals a declaration of the 
Belgian Government's neutrality which is to be delivered 
to the foreign Governments concerned at the moment 
when, in the opinion of the Foreign Office at Brussels, 
the prospect of a Franco-German war becomes more 
threatening. 

No. 2. 

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, 
aux Ministres du Boi a Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint- 
Petersbourg. 

Bruxelles, le 24 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Le Gouvernement du Roi a' est demande si, dans les circonstances 
actuelles, il n'y aurait pas lieu d'adresser aux Puissances qui ont 
garanti son independance et sa neutrality, une communication des- 
tinee a leur confirmer sa resolution de remplir les devoirs internationaux 
que lui imposent les traites, au cas ou une guerre viendrait a eclater 
aux frontieres de la Belgique. 

II a ete amene a la conclusion qu'une telle communication serait 
prematuree a l'heure presente, mais que les evenements pourraient 
se precipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps de faire parvenir, au 
moment voulu, les instructions opportunes a ses representants a 
l'etranger. 

Dans cette situation, j'ai propose au Roi et a mes collegues du 
Cabinet, qui se sont rallies a ma maniere de voir, de vous dormer, 
des a present, des indications precises sur la demarche que vous 
auriez a faire si Veventualite d'une guerre franco -allemande devenait 
plus menacante. 



i8a THE CRIME 

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre signee, mais non dat^e 
dont vous aurez a dormer lecture et a laisser copie au Ministre des 
Affaires 6trangeres si les circonstances exigent cette communication. 

Je vous indiquerai par telegramme le moment d'agir. 

Le telegramme vous sera adresse a 1'heure ou la mobilisation de 
Varmee beige sera d6cretee, si, contrairement a notre sincere espoir, 
et aux apparences de solution pacifique, nos renseignements nous 
amenaient a prendre cette mesure extreme de precaution. 

Davignon. 

A report from Beyens, the Ambassador at Berlin, 
dated July 27th, 1914 (No. 6), runs as follows : 

No. 6. 

Telegramme adresse par le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi & Berlin 
a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etranglres. 

Berlin, 27 juillet 1914. 

D'apres un telegramme du Charg6 d'Affaires Britannique a 
Belgrade, le Gouvernement serbe a cede sur tous les points de la note 
autrichienne. II admet meme l'immixtion de fonctionnaires au- 
trichiens si celle-ci peut s'accorder avec les usages du droit des gens. 
Le Charge d'Affaires Britannique estime que cette reponse devrait 
satisfaire VAutriche dans le cas ou celle-ci ne voudrait pas la guerre. 
Neanmoins, l'impression est plus favorable ici aujourd'hui, surtout 
parce que les hostilites contre la Serbie n'ont pas commence. Le 
Gouvernement Britannique propose l'intervention de l'Angleterre, 
de l'Allemagne, de la France et de l'ltalie d Saint-Petersbourg et 
d Vienne, pour trouver un terrain de conciliation. L'Allemagne seule 
n'a pas encore repondu. L'Empereur decidera. 

Beyens. 

From this report of the Ambassador at Berlin the 
following is to be noted : 

1. That the Serbian Government in their answer had 
agreed to all the essential demands of Austria, and 
even to the intervention of Austrian officials in the internal 
affairs of Serbia, so far as this was in conformity with 
international law ; 

2. That Grey's Conference-proposal, which aimed at a 
simultaneous exercise of pressure on Vienna and Petrograd, 
had been accepted by the three disinterested Powers, 
France, Italy and England, but had not even been answered 
by Germany. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 183 

Davignon's note of July 31st, 1914 (No. 9), confirms the 
statement of France that no incursion of French troops 
into Belgium would take place, and that France would 
in no event incur the responsibility of being the first 
to violate Belgian neutrality. In this the Belgian Minister 
repudiates the German invention which seeks to explain 
the German invasion of Belgium by reference to similar 
intentions on the part of France. Davignon's confirma- 
tion is all the more valuable inasmuch as in the same 
note this Belgian Minister also expresses his full confidence 
that Germany will respect Belgian neutrality — a confidence 
which, as is known, was so bitterly deceived two days 
later, on the evening of August 2nd, by the delivery of 
the German Ultimatum. 

In Note No. 11 of the same day Davignon again re- 
peatedly expresses his equal trust in all the neighbouring 
Powers — a confidence which does more honour to his 
heart than to his understanding. 

The German Ultimata to Belgium. 

The German Ultimatum to Belgium of the evening of 
August 2nd (No. 20), as well as the Belgian answer of 
the morning of August 3rd (No. 22), are well known. 
In J'accuse I have already described the preposterous 
demand of Germany, in violation of international law, 
to be allowed to march unhindered through Belgium, 
and the proud answer given by the small threatened 
country. Every sentence of the German Ultimatum 
was a violation of the treaties of 1839 and 1870, which 
guaranteed Belgian neutrality and independence, and at 
the same time a violation of the Hague Convention of 
October 18th, 1907, signed by Germany, which, 

1 forbids any belligerent Power conducting troops 
through the territory of a neutral Power, and, 

2 describes the armed resistance of the neutral 
Power against such a violation of neutrality as not 
being a hostile action. 

The German Ultimatum demanded not merely an un- 
molested passage, but stated further that any resistance 



184 THE CRIME 

to such a passage would have as a consequence that 
Belgium would be considered as an enemy and treated 
accordingly. The threat against the Belgian Government 
which was expressed in the Ultimatum of the evening of 
August 2nd was modified two days later, on August 4th, 
in a statement to the English Government that in the 
event of English neutrality Germany would annex no 
Belgian territory, even if Belgium should offer armed 
resistance to the passage (meme en cas de conflit arme 
avec la Belgique, PAllemagne n'annexera sous aucun 
pretexte le territoire beige. Grey Book I, No. 36, also 
Blue Book, No. 157). 

The duplicity of this diplomatic game is extremely 
characteristic of the whole method of action pursued by 
the Berlin Government. Towards the Belgians they re- 
served a free hand for the eventual adjustment of the rela- 
tions between the two States according to the decision of 
arms (see Ultimatum of August 2nd, Grey Book I, No. 20). 
To the English, however, whom they wanted by every 
means to restrain from any participation in the war right 
down to the English declaration of war on the evening of 
August 4th, they promised the unconditional and un- 
impaired restoration of Belgian territory, whether or not 
Belgium resisted the German invasion. 

These tricks of transformation were once again practised 
in the second Ultimatum addressed to Belgium on August 
9th, 1914 (No. 60), after the conquest of Liege. After it 
had been seen that the Belgian fortresses and the Belgian 
army had offered a stronger resistance than had been 
expected in advance, the attempt was made to facilitate 
the further passage by more far-reaching promises for the 
future. Now the German Government suddenly stated 
that they were 

ready for any compact with Belgium which can in any way be 
reconciled -with their conflict with France. Germany gives once more 
her solemn assurance that she has not been animated by the intention 
of appropriating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an 
intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to 
evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so. 
(Grey Book I, Enclosure to No. 62.) 

The Chancellor in his speech of August 4th also made the 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 185 

famous promise : " The wrong we thereby commit (that 
is in the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and 
Belgium) we will try to make good as soon as our military 
aims have been attained." When the Chancellor gave 
this solemn promise — on the afternoon of August 4th — it 
was already clear that Belgium was offering armed resist- 
ance to the German invasion. Thus on three occasions, 
first of all to the English Government, then by the mouth 
of the Chancellor before the German Parliament and the 
whole world, and for the third time in the second Ultimatum 
to Belgium of August 9th, Germany gave a solemn promise 
that even in the event of a conflict with the Belgian army 
she would at the end of hostilities restore Belgian territory 
and Belgian independence unimpaired. By such an act of 
restoration the crime involved in the violation of neutrality 
in defiance of international law would not be cancelled, 
but at least the second crime would be avoided — the crime, 
that is to say, of inflicting on the neutral State the punish- 
ment of annexation and deprivation of rights for a 
resistance allowed by international law. It is well known 
that in Germany no one in the authoritative circles and 
parties has felt any qualms of conscience against the 
second breach of law, which offends not only the clear 
provisions of the treaties of 1839, 1870, and 1907, but also 
the thrice-repeated promises of the German Government. 



Here again I should not like to omit a reference, 
already made cursorily in my first book, to the amusing 
incident enacted in the Foreign Office at Brussels during the 
night from August 2nd to 3rd. This was the night between 
the delivery of the German Ultimatum (7 o'clock on the 
evening of August 2nd) and the Belgian answer (7 o'clock 
on the morning of August 3rd). The German Ambassador, 
Herr von Below-Saleske, could not refrain from disturbing 
the night rest of Baron van der Elst, the General Secretary 
in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in informing him 
(at 1.30 a.m.) that French dirigibles had thrown bombs 
and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier 
in violation of international law, since war was not yet 
declared. Baron van der Elst, who was apparently not 



186 THE CRIME 

robbed of his composure by this nocturnal attack, quite 
coolly asked the German Ambassador where these incidents 
had taken place. " In Germany," replied Herr von Below. 
" Then why does your Excellency make this communica- 
tion to me ? " " Because these acts which are contrary to 
international law," replied the German Ambassador, 
" are calculated to lead to the supposition that other 
acts contrary to international law would be committed 
by France." Conclusion of the conversation ! 1 

The conclusions to be inferred from this conclusion are 
not difficult to draw. I have already drawn them in 
J' accuse. Herr von Below had simply been commissioned 
by his Government to exercise pressure on the decisions 
of the Belgian Government by these legendary attacks, and 
also by the allegation of French acts of aggression to 
explain in advance the declaration of war against France 
which was to be delivered on the following evening. This 
explains the nocturnal encounter. As always and every- 
where happened to the Berlin diplomatists, they believed 
that they were quite unusually cunning and showed them- 
selves to be quite unusually simple. Long before the 
bombs of the Niirnberg airmen were documentarily shown 
to be a pure invention, I pointed out in my first book that 
the contradiction between the various German versions 
regarding France's hostile actions in itself deprived the 
German assertions of any credibility. The declaration of 
war against France speaks of aviators' bombs which had 
been dropped at various places in Germany; Herr von 
Below-Saleske speaks of dirigible airships as having been 
guilty of this aggressive action. He also speaks of a 
cavalry patrol. Finally Herr von Bethmann, in his 
speech of August 4th, widens the circle of lies by asserting 
that " aviators dropping bombs, cavalry patrols and 
French infantry detachments appearing on the territory 
of the Empire " had committed enormities, and he pathe- 
tically appeals to his credulous hearers in the Reichstag, 
" France thus broke the peace and actually attacked us." 
Thus the war of defence was constructed, and to-day the 
hapless German people still believe in this legend. 

i Grey Book I, No. 21. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 187 



Belgium and the Guaranteeing Powers. 

Davignon's Note to his foreign representatives, dated mid- 
day August 3rd (No. 24), reports that the French Ambassa- 
dor in Brussels had offered the Belgian Government the 
military support of France with a view to the maintenance 
of neutrality " if the Belgian Government were to appeal 
to the French Government as one of the Powers guarantee- 
ing their neutrality." Davignon thankfully received these 
offers, but remarked " that the Belgian Government were 
making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the 
Powers and that they would decide later what ought to be 
done." The same attitude was assumed by the Belgian 
Government towards that of England, which also had 
offered military assistance " should Belgium so desire " 
(No. 28). 

Further, the Belgian King, in his telegram addressed 
to the English King on August 3rd (No. 25), merely asked 
the English Government for diplomatic intervention 
(intervention diplomatique) to safeguard Belgian neutrality. 
It was not until after the actual violation of Belgian 
territory on the morning of August 4th that the Belgian 
Government asked the guaranteeing Powers, France, 
Russia and England, for armed assistance against the 
invading enemy (Nos. 39, 40, 42, 43). 

Davignon's Note of August 5th (No. 43), which contains 
the Belgian appeal for the assistance of the guaranteeing 
Powers, is also interesting in another respect, in so far 
as it throws light on the grounds and the presuppositions 
of the English declaration of war against Germany. It 
is there stated : 

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of 
attitude was caused by an Ultimatum from Great Britain giving 
Germany a time limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian 
territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. 

Here the English Ultimatum to Germany is expressly 
interpreted in the sense to be deduced from Goschen's 
report of August 8th (Blue Book, No. 160) and in accord- 
ance with the interpretation given in the relevant sections 



188 THE CRIME 

of my first and second book : England did not forthwith 
declare war against Germany because of the invasion of 
Belgium which took place on the morning of August 4th, 
but first of all — stating a definite time limit — she demanded 
the evacuation of Belgian territory and the respect of 
Belgian neutrality (evacuer le sol beige et respecter la 
neutralite). This furnishes a new witness for my assertion 
and my demonstration that it was nothing else than the 
violation of Belgian neutrality which was the ground of 
war in the case of England, and that this ground of war 
could still have been removed on the evening of August 
4th by agreeing to the English demand for evacuation. 
This one indisputable fact in itself is alone sufficient to 
destroy the German lie that England wanted, prepared, 
and instigated the European war. If, on the evening of 
August 4th, instead of flatly declining the demand for 
evacuation through Herr von Jagow, the Chancellor had 
acquiesced in this demand, and if the German General Staff 
had issued instructions on the subject to the troops who 
were in Belgium, England would not have entered the war 
— could not have entered the war — since the only ground for 
war given by her would have been eliminated. This 
demonstration is supported, in addition to all other con- 
siderations, by Davignon's Note of August 5th. 

The Suspected Consignment of Corn. 

In conclusion I would further mention a slight incident 
out of the first Grey Book which is extremely characteristic 
of the under handedness, or let us rather say of the meanness, 
of the methods adopted by German diplomacy. When 
Sir Edward Goschen, the English Ambassador, asked Herr 
von Jagow, on July 31st, for an answer to the English 
inquiry whether Germany, like France, was prepared 
to respect Belgian neutrality in the event of a Franco- 
German war, Jagow, as is well known, gave the evasive 
answer that he must first consult the Emperor and the 
Chancellor. He doubted, however, whether they were 
prepared to give any answer, since any reply would disclose 
a certain amount of the German plan of campaign. 

On this occasion Herr von Jagow emphasised that 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 189 

" certain hostile acts have already been committed by 
Belgium ; as an instance of this, a consignment of corn 
for Germany had been placed under an embargo already " 
(Blue Book, No. 122). No. 79 of the Grey Book, together 
with four enclosures, is devoted to this incident of the 
embargo. From these it appears that by an error in the 
customs at Antwerp a cargo in transit intended for Germany 
had been treated as an export and was accordingly 
detained. On the complaint of the German Ambassador 
on July 31st, the cargo was at once permitted to be exported 
to Germany (see the letters of the Belgian Minister 
Davignon to the German Ambassador of August 1st and 
3rd ; Exhibits 2 and 3 of No. 79). 

This trifling affair would have been quite harmless and 
undeserving of mention if Herr von Jagow had not cited 
it in order to prove to the English Ambassador the 
hostility of the Belgian Government. The extremely 
evil conscience of the authorities in the Wilhelmstrasse 
is revealed in this incident. On July 31st Jagow of course 
already knew that Belgium, like the tree in the forest 
which is marked for felling, was branded with the black 
cross. Even then he was labouring to open proceedings 
against the unfortunate country on account of infidelity 
and conspiracy against Germany — proceedings which, 
at a later date, and indeed down to the present day, have 
been conducted by such unclean and pettifogging methods. 
The Antwerp consignment of corn stands on the same level, 
so far as Belgium is concerned, as the Niirnberg airmen's 
bombs in the case of France, and the story of the Cossack 
invasion in the case of Russia. The gigantic conspiracy 
against the innocent Germany had to be conjured up as 
a bugbear before the German people, and to complete this 
picture even the innocent consignment of corn at Antwerp 
was not despised. 

B. 

BELGIAN GREY BOOK II. 

So far as concerns the judgment of the Belgian diplo- 
matists on the question of the guilt and the authorship 



i 9 o THE CRIME 

of the war, the second Belgian Grey Book furnishes much 
more ample and valuable material than the first. If not 
in the case of the more remote, at any rate in that of the 
more immediate antecedents of the war, it has the merit 
of filling up the lacunae intentionally left in the German 
collection of ambassadorial reports — intentionally in the 
interests of their demonstration. 

In an earlier section I have already referred to Nos. 1 
and 2 of the second Grey Book, the Paris report of February 
22nd, 1913, and the Berlin report of April 2nd, 1914. As 
there observed, these reports are omitted in the German 
collection of reports, and their omission characterises in 
the clearest manner the system which has been followed 
in the German compilation. With regard also to the more 
remote history of the war (1905-1914) it is, I again repeat, 
a matter of extreme regret that the Belgian Government 
has not more fully completed, or was unable more fully 
to complete, the lacunas in the German collection. If they 
had only published the same numbei of reports (now 
missing) as have been published by the Berlin Foreign 
Office, that is to say, 119 against 119 ; if, in particular, 
they had produced the ambassadorial reports from Vienna 
and Petrograd which the German Government have 
entirely omitted, the complete picture would presumably 
have assumed an entirely different appearance as a result 
of even such a restricted publication. This presumption 
is strengthened by the contents of the second Belgian Grey 
Book, in which not merely the Ambassador at Berlin 
but also the Ambassadors at Petrograd and Vienna are 
allowed to express their views, but, unfortunately, only 
from the end of July, 1914. All the Belgian Ambassadors 
whose reports are printed in the Grey Books are in agree- 
ment in the crushing verdict which they pass on the Central 
Powers, so far as the immediate antecedents of the war 
are concerned. The fact that the German Government 
omitted from their collection the reports from Vienna and 
Petrograd — (though these reports must also have been 
found at Brussels) — that is to say, the reports from the 
capitals most concerned in the gravest conflicts before the 
war, arouses an insistent suspicion that more particularly 
the Ambassadors in these two capitals arrived at a 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 191 

judgment on the policy of Germany and Austria in the 
more remote period before the war which was just as 
unfavourable as that entertained by them regarding the 
policy of these Powers in the period of conflict immediately 
preceding the war. 

The Belgian Ambassadors in Berlin, Paris, and London 
whose views are given in the Grey Books are exactly the 
same as those whose reports dating from the period before 
the war have been published by the German Government : 
for Berlin, Baron Beyens ; for Paris, Baron Guillaume ; for 
London, Count Lalaing. To these are now added in the 
Belgian publications : for Vienna, Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele, for Petrograd, Count Buisseret-Steenbecque 
de Blarenghien, and further certain Charges d' Affaires who 
occasionally represented the Ambassadors. 

The authority which the German Government attributes 
to the Belgian Ambassadors in judging the more remote 
period before the the war cannot be withheld from them 
in the case of the immediate antecedents of the war also. 
If the ambassadorial reports from February 7th, 1905, 
down to July 2nd, 1914 (the period of the German publica- 
tion), are valuable documents regarded as historical 
evidence, then those reports coming from the same writers 
during the period from February 22nd, 1913, down to 
April 6th, 1915, the period of the second Belgian Grey Book, 
must be recognised as possessing equal evidential value. 
Since the German Government appeals to the " objective 
diplomatic account " of the Belgian statesmen as alleged 
evidence for their innocence of the state of European 
tension, it follows that they cannot prevent the admission 
of these same reporters as witnesses for their guilt of the 
state of European war. Whoever summons a witness 
before a court cannot recognise him in so far as his evidence 
is favourable and, on the other hand, repudiate him so far 
as his evidence is unfavourable. It is not possible to allow 
a separation of his testimony as the caprice or the advantage 
of the accused party may suggest. Cest a 'prendre ou a 
laisser. Once the witness stands before the court, whether 
he has been summoned by the plaintiff or by the defendant, 
he ceases to be a witness for either side and becomes a 
common witness of both sides, and both sides must allow 



192 THE CRIME 

what he says — whether it is agreeable or disagreeable to 
them — to have full force for or against them in all its parts. 

The Belgian Ambassadors must then be recognised as 
entirely credible witnesses in all their reports, or not at 
all credible in any of their reports. The German Govern- 
ment has to choose between these two alternatives. If 
they decide on the second alternative, they deprive them- 
selves of the alleged evidence in their favour put forward 
by them. If they decide on the first alternative, then 
they raise up new and perhaps even weightier witnesses 
in their arraignment than those who have hitherto appeared 
against them. 

How weighty, how crushing these Belgian accusations 
are from the point of view of the Central Powers will be 
shown in what follows. 

Before the Austrian Ultimatum. 

The real history of the conflict in the second Grey Book 
begins with a report from the Viennese Ambassador, Count 
Errembault de Dudzeele, dated July 22nd, 1914 (No. 3), 
and can be regarded as ended about August 6th with a 
report from Baron Guillaume, the Ambassador at Paris (No. 
28). Of the copious second Belgian Grey Book, comprising 
in all one hundred and twenty-three numbers, there are 
thus about twenty-five which call for consideration in 
connection with the immediate history of the conflict. 
These, however, are extraordinarily important and signi- 
ficant and some of them merit textual reproduction, 
either completely or in extracts. The italicisation of 
important passages is my own. 

Viennese report of Count Dudzeele of July 22nd, 1914 
(No. 3) : 

No. 3. 

Le Ministre du Roi a Vienne & M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Mrang&res. 

Vienne, le 22 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire part des renseignments que j'ai eu 
l'occasion de recueillir sur la question des relations de la Monarchic 
Austro-Hongroise avec le Royaume de Serbie. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 193 

On etait au " Ballplatz," il y a une dizaine de jours, dans des dis- 
positions fort belliqueuses, M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres et ses 
principaux conssillers tenaient un language tres agressif . On semblait 
decide a donner a la demarche a faire a Belgrade un caractere tres 
energique et, en prevoyant de la part du Gouvernement serbe le refus 
de se soumettre a toutes les conditions qu'on allait lui poser, on n'hesi- 
tait pas a admettre la necessite d'une intervention armee. Deja les 
numeros des huit corps d 'armee appeles a envahir la Serbie etaient cites, 
et on ne parlait de rien moins que d'appliquer a ce royaume le 
traitement inflige naguere a la Pologne, en partagoant son territoire 
entre les Etats voisins. II semblait que le Comte Berchtold voulait 
prendre dun seul coup sa revanche des echecs successifs que sa politique 
a subis pendant ces derniers temps. C'etait la raise en pratique 
de la theorie chere a ceux qui prechent depuis longtemps " qu,'il 
faudrait en finir une bonne fois avec la question serbe." 

Au sein du Gouvernement autrichien, il ne parait pas y avoir 
eu de protestations contre de pareils projets, et s'il en avait ete 
de memo a Budapest, il n'aurait pas ete impossible que l'Empereur, 
malgre ses dispositions pacifiques, se ralliat a des avis exprimes a 
l'unanimite. 

O'est le President du Conseil de Hongrie, accouru a deux reprises 
a Vienne, qui est venu mettre un frein a ces ardeurs belliqueuses. 
En homme d'Etat prudent et avise, le Comte Tisza a fait voir le 
grand danger qu'il y avait a se lancer a la legere dans pareille aventure, 
et il a vivement insiste pour qu'on adoptat une attitude plus 
moderee. 

En effet, il semble bien difficile a admettre qu'un conflit arme 
entre la Monarchie et sa voisine ne contiendrait pas tout au moins 
le germe d'une conflagration europeenne. La presse austro-hongroise, 
qui parle journellement de la guerre avec la Serbie comme d'un 
evenement non seulement possible, mais probable, affecte, il est vrai, 
de predire que la lutte resterait localisee entre les deux Etats. ' ' Nous 
serions moralement soutenus par l'Allemagne, dit-elle, l'Angleterre 
et la France se desinteresseront de la question, et la Russie, loin 
d'intervenir, conseillera au contraire a la Serbie de nous donner 
pleine satisfaction." Ce raisonnement est evidemment empreint 
d'un optimisme fort exagere. 

Je ne puis admettre un seul instant que le Gouvernement serbe et la 
partie eclairee du pays aient un reproche quelconque a se faire au sujet 
de Vassassinat de V Archiduc Francois -Ferdinand et de son epouse, 
comme beaucoup de personnes ici le pretendent. Bien au contraire, 
je suis convaincu que ce malheureux 6venement aura caus6 en Serbie 
une impression penible, puisqu'on y etait actuellement au contaire 
tres desireux d entretenir de bonnes relations avec V Autriche-Hongrie. 

L'Ambassadeur de Russie a Vienne, lequel part aujourd'hui en 
conge, mais se dit pret a rejoindre son poste a la moindre alerte, 
declare que le Gouvernement du Czar invitera les conseillers du Roi 
Pierre a accepter toutes les demandes qui lui seront adressees en termes 
polis et qui auront un rapport direct avec l'assassinat. II en serait 
de meme pour la dissolution de certaines societes a tendances irreden- 



194 THE CRIME 



tistes par trop accentuees. " Mais nous ne permettrions pas, dit 
M. Schebeko, qu'on fasse a la Serbie, de maniere generale, un proces 
de tendance." 

J'ai tout lieu de croire que M. Pachitch suivra la premiere partie 
de ces conseils, mais qu'il se montrera tres ferme dans le cas ou il 
s'agirait de conditions qu'il ne pourrait legalement remplir ou qui 
heurteraient de front ramour-propre national. Notamment en ce 
qui concerne la dissolution de societes, il est a remarquer que la 
Constitution serbe, tres liberale, garantit le droit d' association, et 
d'ailleurs ce ne sont pas quelques societes qui ont pour programme 
politique d'arriver a reconstituer une " Grande Serbie," mais c'est 
la population tout entiere du pays qui aspire a ce reve. 

De plus, le President du Conseil a Belgrade se rend tres certaine- 
ment compte que tout cet ensemble jougo-slave habitant le sud de la 
Monarchie se compose de Serbes, Bosniaques, Slovenes et Croates 
favorables a sa cause. Malgre leur dif£6rence de religion, ces derniers, 
fort mecontents du regime auquel la Hongrie les soumet, portent, 
en grande majorite et quoi qu'on puisse en pretendre ici a ce sujet, 
toutes leurs sympathies vers la Serbie. 

En dehors de l'intervention eventuelle de la Russie et du role 
incertain que pourrait jouer la Roumanie, il y a dans cet etat de choses 
un danger tres reel pour l'Autriche-Hongrie, et les paroles de modera- 
tion que le Comte Tisza a fait entendre le demontrent suffisamment. 
Son influence prevaudra-t-elle jusqu'a la derniere heure ? Le Comte 
Berchtold vient d'aller a Ischl pour rendre compte a l'Empereur, et 
il semble que la situation pr6sente si incertaine ne pourrait se pro- 
longer longtemps et qu'une decision devra etre prise. 

Comte Ebbembault de Dudzeele. 

Arising out of this report, which was written the day be- 
fore the delivery of the Ultimatum, the following points 
are to be noted : 

1. Even before the Ultimatum was issued, Count Berch- 
told was credited in diplomatic circles with the intention 
of taking vengeance at a stroke for the alleged " checks " 
which his policy had suffered during the late Balkan crisis. 

2. The action contemplated against Serbia was merely 
the putting into practice of the theory which had long 
been preached, that the Serbian question must once for 
all be solved by resort to force, and that if possible the 
neighbouring kingdom must be made to share the fate of 
Poland. 

3. In Vienna the dangers of a European conflagration 
arising out of the action taken against Serbia were fully 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 195 

realised ; they counted, however, on the non-intervention 
of Russia, which, it was thought, would not, for many- 
reasons, venture to oppose Germany, Austria's second. 

4. In the opinion of the Belgian Ambassador, it was 
extremely unjust to lay the crime of Serajevo at the door of 
the Serbian Government and the Serbian people, since, on 
the contrary, this event produced a highly painful impres- 
sion in Serbia itself, and the only desire in that country was 
to maintain good relations with Austria. 

5. According to the statement of Schebeko, the Russian 
Ambassador, the Government of the Tsar would advise 
the Serbian Government to comply with all the demands of 
Austria relative to the murder, and indeed to dissolve 
certain irredentist societies. 

6. So far as the Belgian Ambassador could foresee, the 
Serbian Government would promise all possible lawful 
and constitutional restrictions on nationalistic agitations 
in their country. 

7. The ferment within the Jugo-Slav elements in the 
southern part of the Double Monarchy was to be traced 
back to the common embitterment which the Serbs, the 
Bosnians, the Slovenes, and the Croats felt against the 
Hungarian regime of oppression. 

After the Austrian Ultimatum. 

Berlin report of Baron Beyens, dated July 24th, 1914 
(No. 4), that is to say, twenty-two days after the last report 
from the same Ambassador (July 2nd) published in the 
German collection : 

No. 4. 

Le Ministre du Hoi a Berlin a M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 24 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

La publication de l'ultimatum adresse bier par le Cabinet de 
Vienne a celui de Belgrade a depasse ce que les pr6visions, dont vous 
entretenait mon rapport du 16 de ce rhois, avaient imagine de plus 

2 



196 



THE CRIME 



pessimiste. Evidemment le Comte Berchtold et le Comte Tisza, les 
auteurs responsables de ce coup de theatre, out subi Vinfluence du parti 
militaire et de Vetat-major austro-hongrois. L'effet d'un tel manque 
de moderation et de mesure sera inevitablement de ramener a la 
Serbie les sympathies de la plus grande partie de l'opinion publique 
europeenne, malgre l'liorreur causee par les assassinats de Serajevo. 
A Berlin meme, a lire les journaux liberaux, on a l'impression qu'ils 
trouvent les exigences austro-hongroises excessives. " L'Autriche- 
Hongrie, dit ce matin la Gazette de Voss, aura a justifier les graves 
accusations qu'elle formule contre la Serbie et son Gouvernement, en 
publiant les resultats de rinstruction judiciaire conduite a Sera- 
jevo." 

MM. de Jagow et Zimmermann nous avaient assure, la semaine 
derniere, qu'ils ne connaissaient pas les resolutions adoptees par le 
Cabinet de Vienne ni jusqu'ou iraient ses exigences. Comment 
ajouter foi aujourdliui a cette ignorance ? II est peu vraisemblable 
que les hommes d'Etat austro-hongrois se soient d6cides a une pareille 
demarche, le coup le plus dangereux que leur diplomatie ait jamais 
risque contre un Etat balkanique, sans avoir consulte leurs collegues 
de Berlin et sans avoir obtenu V assentiment de V Empereur Ouillaume. 
La crainte et l'horreur qu'il a des regicides expliquent que l'Empereur 
ait laisse les mains libres a ses allies, malgre le risque a courir d'un 
conflit europeen. 

Que va faire la Serbie, se demandaient ce matin la plupart de mes 
collegues ? Se tourner vers la Russie, implorer telegraphiquement son 
appui ? Mais elle n'aura pas de reponse avant l'expiration de l'ultima- 
tum envoy6 par l'Autriche ? La Russie devra s'entendre prealable- 
ment avec la France et, dans une intention pleine d'astuce, le Cabinet 
de Vienne a attendu pour faire eclater Forage le moment oit, M. Poincare 
et M. Viviani naviguaient entre Saint-Peter sbourg et Stockholm. II 
est d'autant plus facheux que la note austro-hongroise ait revetu 
cette forme comminatoire que l'Ambassadeur de Russie a Vienne, 
d'apres ce que j'ai appris, avait declare recemment au Comte Berch- 
told que son Gouvernement appuierait les reclamations de l'Autriche- 
Hongrie aupres du Cabinet Pachitch, si ces reclamations etaient 
moderees. 

Aujourd'hui une nouvelle crise est ouverte, qui rappelle celle de 
1909, apres 1'annexion de la Bosnie et de l'Herzegovine. Tout 
ce qu'on peut esperer, c'est qu'elle ne se denouera pas d'une fa§on 
plus tragique, malgre les desirs belliqueux de V etat-major autrichien 
partages peut-etre par celui de Berlin. Le meilleur conseil a donner a 
la Serbie serait d'invoquer la mediation et l'intervention des Grandes 
Puissances. 

Baron Beyens. 

Arising out of this report, the following points are to be 
noted : 

1. Count Berchtold and Count Tisza are the responsible 
authors of the theatrical coup involved in the Austrian 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 197 

Ultimatum ; they acted under the influence of the Austro- 
Hungarian military party and of the General Staff. 

2. The unbounded character of the Austrian demands 
will draw to the Serbs the sympathies of Europe, in spite 
of the horror caused by the deed of Serajevo. 

3. Even the Liberal Press of Germany states that the 
Austrian demands are excessive. 

4. The assurance of the Berlin Foreign Office, that they 
had had no knowledge of the Viennese decisions and de- 
mands, could not be believed : it was highly improbable 
that the Austro-Hungarian statesmen would ever have 
decided on the most dangerous step which their diplomacy 
had ever risked against a Balkan State, without consulting 
their Berlin colleagues and obtaining in advance an assur- 
ance of the Emperor William's concurrence. " The fear 
and the horror which the Emperor has of regicides explain 
why he has left his allies a free hand in spite of the risk of 
a European war." 

5. The Viennese Cabinet with meditated cunning awaited 
the moment when Poincare and Viviani were sailing between 
Petrograd and Stockholm in order to make it impossible 
for France and Russia to arrive at an understanding 
before the expiration of the time limit in the Ultimatum. 
The menacing form of the Austrian Note is all the more 
serious inasmuch as the Russian Ambassador in Vienna 
had shortly before expressed to Count Berchtold the readi- 
ness of his Government to support the Austrian demands 
in Belgrade, provided merely that they were not exces- 
sive. 

6. The present crisis resembles the crisis in connection 
with the annexation of Bosnia in 1909, ond it is to be hoped 
that it will not end more tragically than that, " in spite of 
the bellicose desires of the Austrian and perhaps also of the 
German General Staff." The best advice for Serbia is to 
seek the mediation of the Great Powers. 

Viennese report from Count Dudzeele of July 25th, 1910 
(No. 5): 



198 



THE CRIME 



No. 5. 



Le Ministre du Roi a Vienne a M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etrang&res. 

Vienne, le 25 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

La situation a pris brusquement un caractere tres grave. On 
s'attendait evidemment a une demarche prochaine de l'Autriche- 
Hongrie aupres de la Serbie. Mais la note remise le 23 de ce mois par 
le representent de la Monarchie a Belgrade entre les mains du D r 
Paccu, Ministre interimaire des Affaires Etrangeres; formule des 
demandes plus etendues et pose des conditions plus dures que je we le 
prevoyais. 

La presse ici est unanime a dire que les conditions posees a la Serbie 
ne sont pas de nature a porter atteinte a son amour-propre et a sa 
dignit6 nationale et qu'elle peut et doit par consequent les accepter. 
Mais cette meme presse reconnait implicitement a quel point ces 
conditions sont rigoureuses puisqu'elle n'exprime qu'un tres faible 
espoir de voir le Gouvernement du Roi Pierre s'y soumettre. Sans 
parler de Vhumiliante declaration a inserer au Journal Officiel et de 
I'ordre du jour a Varmee, il y a, par exemple, le paragraphe 5 qui 
constituerait evidemment une ingerence excessive dans les affaires 
du pays. Ce serait la mise complete de la Serbie sous la tutelle de la 
Monarchie. 

Certes un refus pourrait avoir au point de vue international les 
plus graves cons6quences. II peut provoquer un conflit europeen 
et occasionner au point de vue economique des pertes enormes. 
Dans peu d'heures on apprendra le sens de la reponse de la Serbie, 
mais il est extremement peu probable qxCelle soit de nature d donner 
satisfaction. D'ailleurs le Roi Pierre et son Gouvernement provo- 
queraient une revolution dans le pays s'ils montraient quelque vel- 
leite de faire de pareilles concessions. C'est ce dont on doit evidem- 
ment se rendre compte au Ballplatz et il semble bien aussi qu'on 
n'a pos6 des conditions aussi dures que parce qu'ainsi on esperait 
qu'elles seraient ref usees, parce qu'on voulait " enfinir une bonne fois 
avec la Serbie." 

Comte Ereembault de Dudzeele. 

Arising out of this report, the following points are 
to be noted : 

1. The demands contained in the Austrian Ultimatum 
were of such a harsh and far-reaching character as had never 
been foreseen by the Belgian Ambassador. Even the 
Viennese Press recognises this, as it expresses only a faint 
hope that the Austrian demands will be accepted. The 
demand that a humiliating statement should be included 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 199 

in the official journal and in a Royal Army Order, as well as 
the fifth demand in the Ultimatum, represent excessive 
intrusions in the internal affairs of the Serbian country, 
and signify that Serbia would be completely placed under 
the tutelage of the Monarchy. 

2. The acceptance of such demands is very improbable ; 
it would evoke a revolution in Serbia. It appears that 
such harsh conditions have been put forward at the 
Ballplatz for the very reason that they would be rejected. 
They wanted " once for all to finish matters with Serbia." 

Berlin report from Baron Beyens of July 25th, 1914 
(No. 6): 

No. 6. 

Le Ministre du Rot a Berlin a M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etrange'res. 

Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

La situation ne s'est pas aggravee depuis hier, ce qui ne veut pas 
dire qu'elle se soit amelioree. 

Comme symptomes defavorables, il faut noter d'abord le langage 
tenu a la Wilhelmstrasse aux Membres du Corps diplomatique : le 
Gouvernement Imperial approuve la demarche du Gouvernement 
austro-hongrois a Belgrade et ne trouve pas que la forme en soit 
excessive. II faut en finir avec les complots sanguinaires et les menees 
revolutionnaires qui s'ourdissent en Serbie. MM. de Jagow et 
Zimmermann ne parleraient pas ainsi s'ils rCavaient recu a cet effet 
les ordres de VEmpereur, decide dans un interet de confraternity 
dynastique a soutenir jusqu'au bout l'Autriche-Hongrie at accessible 
a la crainte bien legitime qu'inspirent les attentats contre les Personnes 
Roy ales. 

II est a remarquer de plus que la presse allemande, a l'exception 
bien entendu des journaux socialistes, parait revenue du premier 
etonnement cause par la note austro-hongroise. Elle fait chorus a 
la presse de Vienne et de Budapest et envisage froidement V eventualite 
d'une guerre, tout en exprimant Fespoir qu'elle restera localisee. 

Enfin l'opinion se repand de plus en plus parmi mes collegues — 
et je la crois fondee — que c'est moins de desir de venger la mort de 
l'Archiduc heritier et de mettre un terme a la propagande panser- 
biste que le souci de sa rehabilitation personnelle comme homme d'Etat 
qui a pousse le Comte Berchtold a envoyer a Belgrade cette note 
incroyable et sans precedent diplomatique. Du moment que son amour- 
propre et sa reputation sont en jeu, il lui sera bien difficile de reculer, 
de temporiser et de ne pas mettre ses menaces a execution. 



200 THE CRIME 

Les indices favorables sont nioins apparents. Cependant ils 
meritent d'etre signals. Sans parler de l'opinion publique europeenne, 
qui ne comprendrait pas la necessite d'en venir aux armes pour 
resoudre iin confiit dont le reglement est ineontestablement du do- 
maine de la diplomatie, il parait impossible de ne pas tenir compte 
du mouvement gen6ral de reaction et de reprobation qui se manifeste 
hors de l'Allemagne et del'Autriche-Hongrie, contre les termes memes 
de 1- ultimatum du Comte Berchtold. Le Cabinet de Vienne, qui 
avait raison dans le fond, a tort dans la forme. La demande de 
satisfactions est juste, le procede employe pour les obtenir est inquali- 
fiable. 

Quoique le Comte Berchtold ait habilement choisi son moment 
pour agir, le Cabinet anglais etant absorbe par la question du Home 
Rule et de l'Ulster, le Chef de l'Etat Francais et son Premier Ministre 
en voyage, et le Gouvernement russe oblige de lutter contre des 
greves importantes, le fait que le Ministre autrichien a cru devoir 
envoyer aux grandes Ptiissances un memorandum explicatif implique 
pour ces grandes Puissances, dans l'espece pour celles de la Triple 
Entente, le droit de repondre, c'est-a-dire de discuter, d'intervenir 
en faveur de la Serbie et d'engager des negociations avec le Cabinet 
de Vienne. Si Ton en arrive la le plus rapidement possible, un grand 
avantage sera obtenu en faveur du maintien de la paix europeenne. 
Meme une demonstration militaire hative de l'armee austro-hongroise 
contre Belgrade, apres le refus du Gouvernement Serbe d'accepter 
rultimatum, ne serait peut-etre pas \m evenement irremediable. 

Enfin l'accord n'est pas parfait entre les trois membres de la 
Triplice dans le confiit actuel. II n'y aurait pas lieu de s'etonner si le 
Gouvernement italien voulait jouer un role separe" et cherchait a 
intervenir dans l'int6ret de la paix. 

Baron Beyens. 

Arising out of this report, the following points are to be 
noted : 

1. The authorities in the Foreign Office in Berlin approve 
the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and find 
that the form of the Ultimatum also is not excessive. They 
would not speak in this strain if they had not received 
commands to this effect from the Emperor, who is resolved 
" to extend his support to Austria-Hungary to the end." 

2. In the diplomatic circles of Berlin the opinion is more 
and more gaining ground that in the case of Count Berch- 
told it was less the struggle against Pan-Serbian propaganda 
than anxiety for his own personal rehabilitation as a states- 
man that was the governing motive when he dispatched 
to Belgrade this " incredible Note, which stands without 
precedent in diplomatic history." " From the moment that 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 201 

his vanity and his reputation are at stake, it will be very 
difficult for him to draw back, to temporise, and to fail 
to put his threats into execution." 

3. In the whole of Europe outside Germany and Austria 
there was manifested a general disapproval of the manner in 
which the Viennese Government had put forward their 
demands. " The demand for satisfaction is justified ; the 
manner in which it is sought to obtain it is beyond descrip- 
tion." 

4. Count Berchtold has intentionally chosen the moment 
when the English Cabinet was occupied with the Home Rule 
question, and the Russian Government by extensive 
strikes, and when those in power in France were on tour. 
The communication of the Ultimatum with an explanatory 
memorandum can only imply the right of the Great Powers 
to answer and to initiate negotiations with the Viennese 
Cabinet. 

5. The Belgian diplomatist already counts on a refusal 
of the Austrian demands by the Serbian Government and 
on action by the Austrian army against Belgrade ; he 
considers, however, that even this occurrence would not 
constitute an irreparable step. 

Petrograd report of July 24th (No. 7) signed by the 
Belgian Charge d' Affaires, B. de l'Escaille, who represented 
the absent Belgian Ambassador. This is the Charge 
d' Affaires whose report of July 30th was intercepted by the 
German Government in Berlin (see German Documents 
on the Outbreak of War, p. 42, and Taccuse, p. 255). 

No. 7. 

Le Charge d' Affaires de Belgique a Saint-Petersbourg 
a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. ( Telegramme. ) 

Saint-Petersbourg, le 26 juillet 1914. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a declare hier que la Russie ne 
permettra pas que rAutriche-Hongrie ecrase la Serbie, a laquelle 
cependant des conseils de moderation ont ete envoy is l'engageant a 
ceder sur les points de rultimatum ayant caractere juridique et non 
politique. Le Gouvernement Russe estime que la situation est 
tres grave. 

B. de l'Escaille. 



202 THE CRIME 

The report confirms that Russia had sent counsels of 
moderation to Belgrade advising them to comply with all 
the demands of the Ultimatum of a juridical character. 
Russia could not in any case be an unmoved spectator of 
an annihilation of Serbia. 

Berlin report of Baron Beyens of July 26th (No. 8): 

No. 8. 

Le Ministre du Roi a Berlin & M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 26 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Ce que j'ai a vous dire au sujet de la crise est si grave que je me 
decide a vous faire parvenir ce rapport par un courrier special. Les 
rapports que j'ai confies a la poste avec la crainte qu'ils ne fussent 
lus par le cabinet noir allemand contenaient necessairement des 
appreciations beaucoup plus optimistes. 

Des conversations repetees que j'ai eues hier avec l'Ambassadeur de 
France, les Ministres des Pays-Bas et de Grece, le Charge d'affaires 
d'Angleterre, resulte pour moi la presomption que l'ultiniatum a la 
Serbie est un coup prepare entre Vienne et Berlin ou plutot imagine 
ici et execute a Vienne. C'est ce qui en constitue le grand danger. 
La vengeance a tirer de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc Heritier et de la 
propagande panserbiste ne servirait que de pretexte. Le but pour- 
suivi, outre l'aneantissement de la Serbie et des aspirations jougo- 
slaves, serait de porter un coup mortel a la Russie et a la France, 
avec Vespoir que V Angleterre resterait a Vecart de la lutte. 

Pour justifier ces presomptions, je dois vous rappeler l'opinion 
qui regne dans l'etat-major allemand, a savoir qu'ime guerre avec la 
France et la Russie est inevitable et prochaine, opinion qu'on a reussi 
a faire partager a VEmpereur. Cette guerre, ardemment souhaitee 
par le parti militaire et pangermaniste, pourrait etre entreprise 
aujourd'hui, estime ce parti, dans des circonstances extremement 
favorables pour PAllemagne et qui ne se presenteront probablement 
plus de si tot : " L'Allemagne a termine ses renforcements militaires 
pr6vus par la loi de 1912 et, d'autre part, elle sent qu'elle ne peut 
pas poursuivre indefiniment avec la Russie et la France une course 
aux armements qui fmirait par la ruiner. Le Wehrbeitrag a ete 
une deception pour le Gouvernement Imperial, auquel il a montre la 
limite de la richesse nationale. La Russie, avant d'avoir aeheve 
sa reorganisation militaire, a eu le tort de faire etalage de sa force. 
Cette force ne sera formidable que dans quelques annees ; il lui 
manque maintenant pour se deployer les lignes de ohemins de fer 
necessaires. Quant a la France, M. Charles Humbert a revele 
l'insufnsance de ses canons de gros calibre ; or, c'est cette arme qui 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 203 

deciders, parait-il, du sort des batailles. L'Angleterre enfin, que, 
depuis deux ans, le Gouvernement allemand cherche non sans quelque 
succes a detacher de la France et de la Russie, est paralysee par ses 
dissensions intestines et ses querelles irlandaises." 

^existence d'un plan concerte entre Berlin et Vienne est prouvee 
aux yeux de mes Collegues et aux miens par l'obstination qu'on met 
a la Wilhelmstrasse a nier qu'on ait eu connaissance avant jeudi 
dernier de la teneur de la note autrichienne. C'est aussi jeudi 
seulement qu'elle a ete connue a Rome, d'ou proviennent le depit 
et le mecontentement montres ici par l'Ambassadeur d'ltalie. 
Comment admettre que cette note destinee a rendre la guerre immediate 
et inevitable, tant a cause de la durete excessive de ses conditions 
que du court delai laiss6 au Cabinet de Belgrade pour s'executer, ait 
pu etre redigee a l'insu du Gouvernement allemand et sans sa colla- 
boration active, alors qu'elle entrainera pour lui les consequences 
les plus graves ? Ce qui prouve encore le parfait accord des deux 
Gouvernements, c'est leur refus simultane de prolonger le delai laisse 
a la Serbie. Tandis que la demande de prolongation formulee 
par le Charge d' Affaires de Russie a Vienne etait ecart6e hier au Ball- 
platz, ici, a la Wilhelmstrasse, M. de Jagow eludait des demandes 
analogues apport6es par les Charges d' Affaires russe et britannique, 
qui reclamaient au nom de leur gouvernement respectif l'appui du 
Cabinet de Berlin en vue de decider l'Autriche a laisser a la Serbie 
plus de repit pour repondre. Le desir d'hostilites immediates et 
ineluctables etait le meme a Berlin et a Vienne. La paternite du plan 
et la suggestion des procedes employes sont attribues ici, dans le 
monde diplomatique, en raison de leur habilete meme, dignes d'un 
Bismarck, a un cerveau de diplomate allemand plutot qu'autrichien. 
Le secret a ete bien garde et l'execution poursuivie avec une rapidite 
merveilleuse. 

Notez que, si le but secret des hommes d'Etat des deux Empires 
n'est pas reellement de generaliser la guerre et de forcer la Russie 
et la France a y prendre part, mais seulement d'aneantir la puissance 
de la Serbie et de l'empecher de poursuivre son travail occult e de 
propagande, le resultat sera le meme. II est impossible que la pre- 
vision de ce resultat ait echappe aux yeux clairvoyants des dirigeants 
de l'Empire allemand. Dans l'une comme dans l'autre de ces 
suppositions, V intervention de la Russe parait inevitable ; ils ont du 
envisager froidement cette complication et se preparer a soutenir 
energiquement leurs allies. La perspective d'une guerre europeenne 
ne les a pas fait hesiter un instant, si le desir de la dechainer n'a 
pas ete le mobile de leur conduite. 

Depuis hier soir les relations diplomatiques sont rompues entre 
l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie. Les evenements vont se precipiter. 
On s'attend ici a ce que le Roi, le Gouvernement et l'armee serbes se 
retirent dans lapartiedupays nouvellement annexee etlaissent sans 
combat les troupes autrichiennes occuper Belgrade et la contree 
avoisinant le Danube. Mais alors se pose la question angoissante : 
Que fera la Russie ? 

Cette question troublante, nous devons aussi nous la poser et nous 



204 THE CRIME 

tenir prets aux pires eventualites, car le conflit europeen dont on parlait 
toujours en se flattant de l'espoir qu'il n'6claterait jamais devient 
aujourd'hui une realite menacante. 

Le ton de la presse officieuse allemande est plus mesure ce matin et 
laisse entrevoir la possibility d'une localisation de la guerre, mais 
settlement au prix du desinteressement de la Russie, qui se conten- 
terait de l'assurance que l'integrite territoriale de la Serbie serait 
respectee. Ce langage n'a-t-il pas pour but de donner quelque satis- 
faction a l'Angleterre et aussi a 1' opinion allemande qui, malgre 
les manifestations austrophiles d'hier soir dans les rues de Berlin, 
reste alarmee et pacifique ? En tout cas le denouement, quel qu'il 
soit, de la erise ne semble pas devoir se f aire attendre. 

Baron Be yens. 

From this report the following appears : 

1. The Austrian Ultimatum — in the opinion of Baron 
Beyens — is " a stroke agreed upon between Vienna and 
Berlin, or rather a stroke conceived in Berlin and executed 
in Vienna." The murder of the Archduke and the repres- 
sion of Pan-Serbian propaganda are only pretexts. " Apart 
from the annihilation of Serbia and of Jugo-Slav aspirations 
the aim which is being followed is to give Russia and 
France a mortal blow, in the hope that England will remain 
out of the struggle. In order to justify this supposition 
I must — such are the words of Beyens to his Minister — 
recall the prevailing view in the German General Staff, 
according to which a war with France and Russia is in- 
evitable and imminent — a view which has been successfully 
communicated to the Emperor also. The war that is 
thus so ardently desired by the military party and the Pan- 
Germans could to-day be provoked under unusually 
favourable conditions for Germany, more favourable 
than would be likely to recur at an early date. Germany 
has completed the increase in her military strength provided 
by the law of 1912, and on the other hand she feels that she 
cannot indefinitely continue the competition in armaments 
with Russia and France without being completely ruined. 
The ' Defence-contribution ' provided a disappointment 
for the Imperial Government, since it revealed to it the 
limits of national wealth. Russia committed the mistake 
of displaying her strength before she had completed her 
military reorganisation. In a few years Russia's strength 
will be formidable. At the present moment she still 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 205 

lacks the necessary railways for its development. As 
regards France, Charles Humbert has revealed the insuffi- 
ciency of her guns of high calibre. It is, however, this very 
weapon which presumably will decide the fate of battles. 
Lastly, England, which the German Government have for 
two years been endeavouring to detach from France and 
Russia, not entirely without success, is paralysed by her 
internal disputes and her Irish difficulties." All these 
considerations — according to Beyens — induced the military 
party in Berlin to press this time for the outbreak, at last, 
of the European war. 

2. " The existence of a plan agreed upon between Berlin 
and Vienna is, in my opinion and that of my colleagues, 
proved by the stubbornness with which any knowledge of the 
tenor of the Austrian Ultimatum before last Thursday (the 
day of its delivery) is denied in the Wilhelmstrasse. . . . 
How can it be believed that this Note, calculated to provoke 
war immediately and inevitably — because of the exceptional 
harshness of its conditions as well as the short time-limit 
given for the answer of the Belgrade Government — how 
can it be believed that such a Note could have been com- 
posed without the knowledge and without the active 
collaboration of the German Government, whom it could 
not fail to involve in the gravest consequences ? The 
complete agreement between the two Governments is 
further proved by their simultaneous refusal to prolong 
the time-limit. . . . The desire to begin hostilities, 
immediately and inexorably, existed in Berlin and Vienna 
alike. The paternity of the plan and the suggestion of the 
procedure to be followed in detail are ascribed in the 
diplomatic world here, because of its cleverness which is 
worthy of a Bismarck, rather to the brain of a German 
than an Austrian diplomatist. The secret has been strictly 
kept, and the execution carried out with wonderful 
rapidity." 

3. The Belgian Ambassador also considers the possi- 
bility, in which he personally at any rate does not believe, 
that the Berlin and Viennese Governments had not in- 
tended to provoke a general European war forthwith. But 
even in this case he regards them as equally guilty, since 



206 THE CRIME 

they were with certainty bound to foresee such a war as a 
consequence of their action. "It is impossible that the 
prospect of such a result can have escaped the clear eyes 
of the leaders of Germany. Whichever hypothesis is 
accepted, the intervention of Russia appears inevitable ; 
they (the authorities in Berlin) have certainly viewed this 
complication unmoved, and prepared themselves to give 
energetic support to their ally. The prospect of a European 
war did not occasion a moment's delay, even if the desire 
to provoke the war may not have been the motive of their 
action." 

The supreme importance of this Note from the Berlin 
Ambassador is at once obvious. This Note in itself dis- 
poses of the whole documentary collection of the Berlin 
Foreign Office. On July 26th, that is to say two days be- 
fore the outbreak of the Austro-Serbian war and long before 
the publication of the diplomatic correspondence, the 
Belgian diplomatist with unusual acumen already dis- 
entangles all the threads of the Austro-German criminal 
conspiracy. Events did, in fact, take place exactly in 
accordance with the account here given by Beyens, and all 
the later evidence which has appeared — as brought to- 
gether in T accuse and The Crime — has only confirmed the 
diagnosis of the Belgian diplomatist. Poor Herr von 
Bethmann and Herr von Jagow ! It would have been 
better for you if you had not appealed to Belgian diplo- 
matists to testify to your innocence. You would now have 
been spared from hearing the " objective," but for this 
reason all the more crushing, verdict of guilt passed on 
your criminal policy of war by " the representatives of a 
State which is only indirectly concerned with world- 
politics, so to speak, merely as spectators." 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 207 

Viennese report of July 26th, 1914 (No. 9) : 

No. 9. 

Le Ministre du Roi a Vienne a M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etranghres. 

Vienne, 26 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

La reponse du Gouvernement serbe a la note austro-hongroise a 
et6 consideree par le Repr6sentant de la Monarchic autro-hongroise 
a Belgrade comme insuffisante, ainsi que j e l'avais prevu. Le General 
Baron de Giesl a immediatement quitte son poste avec tout son per- 
sonnel ; des deux cotes la mobilisation est ordonnee et la guerre est 
imminente. 

Les conditions si rigoureuses de la susdite note, le refus d'entrer 
a leur sujet en discussion quelconque, la duree si courte du delai 
accorde semblent bien demontrer que le 'point auquel on en est arrive 
est precisement celui qu'on voulait ici atteindre. II est evident que 
V action entreprise par le Gouvernement austro-hongrois a ete entiere- 
ment approuvee a Berlin. Certaines personnes vont meme jusqu'a 
pretendre que le Comte Berchtold a ete encourage et pousse dans 
cette voie par le Gouvernement allemand, qui ne reculerait pas devant 
le danger d'une conflagration generate et prefererait entrer actuelle- 
ment en lutte avec la France et la Russie insumsamment preparees, 
tandis que, dans trois ans, ces deux Puissances auraient achev6 
leurs transformations militaires. 

Les journaux autrichiens ont reproduit hier un communique 
publie par l'agence telegraphique de Saint-Petersbourg disant que 
les evenements survenus entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie ne 
pouvaient pas laisser la Russie indifferente. 

D'autre part, le Charge d' Affaires de Russie a fait hier au " Ball- 
platz " une demarche officielle pour obtenir en faveur de la Serbie 
une prolongation du delai, qui lui a ete poliment refusee. 

Ces faits ne sont pas sufnsants pour pouvoir predire avec certitude 
que le Gouvernement du Czar prendra, a main armee, fait et cause 
pour la Serbie. Mais, d'autre part, il parait bien difficile d'admettre 
que la Russie assistera impassible a un complet ecrasement de cet 
Etat slave. 

Or, a Belgrade, ou une soumission entiere aurait tres probablement 
provoque une revolution et mis la vie du Souverain et de ses ministres 
en danger, on doit avoir eu en vue de gagner du temps. II est a 
supposer que la reponse apportee par M. Pachitch au G6neral Giesl 
faisait de notables concessions pour une grande partie des conditions 
formulees, notamment celles en relations avec l'assassinat del'Archi- 
duc Franfois-Ferdinand, et il ne faudrait pas desesperer de la possi- 
bilit6 d'arriver a un compromis si les Puissances, animees du sincere 
desir de maintenir la paix, faisaient tous leurs efforts pour atteindre 
ce resultat. II serait hautement desirable qu'il en fut ainsi. Mais 
Vattitude si decidee de V Autriche-Hongrie et le soutien que lui prete 



208 THE CRIME 

VAllemagne ne laissent malheureusement sous ce rapport qu'un 
assez faible espoir. 

Comte Ebbembatjlt de Dudzeele. 

Arising out of this report, the following points are to be 
noted : 

1. The harshness of the Austrian demands, the refusal 
of any discussion, the fixing of such a short time-limit 
for an answer, all prove that from the outset the intention 
had been to arrive at a rupture in diplomatic relations. 

2. *' It is clear that the action undertaken by the Viennese 
Government was fully and completely approved in Berlin." 
It has, indeed, been frequently assumed that in what he 
did Count Berchtold was encouraged and spurred on from 
Berlin. The German Government would in no way shrink 
back from the danger of European war, indeed they would 
prefer to have war with France and Russia to-day, when they 
are insufficiently prepared, rather than in three years' 
time, when these Powers will have completed their military 
transformations. 

3. The Russian request for a prolongation of the time- 
limit has been " politely refused " at the Ballplatz. It is 
scarcely possible to believe that Russia will stand quietly 
aside while the small Slav State is being crushed. In 
spite of all this, the maintenance of the peace of Europe 
would still be possible if " the resolute attitude of Austria- 
Hungary and the support which Germany gives her did not 
leave but a very faint hope in this direction." 

Berlin report of July 27th, 1914 (No. 10). 

No. 10. 

Le Ministre au Boi a Berlin a M. Davignon, 
Ministre cles Affaires Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 27 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Au milieu des appreciations contradictoires que j'ai recueillies 
aujourd'hui dans mes entretiens avec mes Collegues, ll m'etait bien 
difficile de me former une opinion exacte sur la situation telle qu'elle 
se presente au bout de la troisieme journee de crise. J'ai pense 
que le plus sur etait d'en causer avec le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat lui- 
meme, mais je ne suis parvenu a voir M. Zimmermann qu'a 8 heures 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 209 

du soir et, a peine rentre a la Legation, je vous transmets le compte 
rendu de notre conversation, sans avoir meme le temps d'en prendre 
copie, car je veux que cette lettre parte par le dernier train du soir. 

Voici ce que m'a dit le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat : 

" Ce n'est pas a notre instigation et d'apres notre conseil que 
l'Autriche a fait la demarche que vous savez aupres du cabinet de 
Belgrade. La reponse n'a pas ete satisfaisante et aujourd'hui 
l'Autriche mobilise. Elle ira jusqu'au bout. Elle ne peut plus 
reculer sous peine de perdre tout son prestige a l'interieur comme a 
l'exterieur de la Monarchie. C'est pour elle maintenant une question 
d'existence, d'etre ou de ne pas etre. II faut qu'elle coupe court 
a la propagande audacieuse qui tend a sa desagregation interieure, a 
l'insurrection de toutes les provinces slaves de la vall6e du Danube. 
Elle a enfin a venger d'une facon eclatante l'assassinat de l'Archiduc 
heritier. Pour cela la Serbie doit recevoir, au moyen d'une expedi- 
tion militaire, une severe et salutaire lecon. Une guerre austro- 
serbe est done impossible a eviter. 

" L'Angleterre nous a demande de nous joindre a elle, a la France 
et a l'ltalie, pour empecher que la lutte ne s'etende et qu'un conjiit 
n'eclate entre VAutriche et la Bussie, ou plutot la proposition britan- 
nique visait un reglement pacifique du conflit austro-serbe pour qu'il 
ne s'etendit pas a d'autres nations. Nous avons repondu que nous 
ne demandions pas mieux que de l'aider a circonscrire le conflit 
en parlant dans ce sens a Petersbourg et a Vienne, mais que nous ne 
pouvions pas agir sur VAutriche pour V empecher oV infliger une punition 
exemplaire a la Serbie. Nous avons promis a nos allies de les y aider 
et de les soutenir, si une autre nation cherche a y mettre obstacle. 
Nous tiendrons notre promesse. Si la Russie mobilise son armee, 
nous mobiliserons immediatement la notre et alors ce sera la guerre 
generale, une guerre qui embrasera toute l'Europe centrale et meme 
la peninsule balkanique, car les Roumains, les Bulgares, les Grecs 
et les Turcs ne pourront pas resister a la tentation d'y prendre part 
les uns contre les autres. 

" J'ai dit hier a M. Boghitschewitsh (c'est l'ancien charge d'affaires 
de Serbie, tres apprecie a Berlin et malheureusement transfere au 
Caire ; il est de passage ici) que la meilleur conseil que je puisse 
donner a son pays, c'est de n'opposer a l'Autriche qu'un simulacre 
de resistance militaire et de conclure la paix au plus vite, en acceptant 
toutes les conditions du Cabinet de Vienne. J'ai ajoute que, si une 
guerre generale eclate et qu'elle tourne au profit des armees de la 
Triplice, la Serbie cesserait vraisemblablement d'exister comme 
nation ; elle sera rayee de la carte de l'Europe. Mieux vaut ne pas 
s'exposer a une pareille eventualite. 

" Cependant je ne veux pas finir cet entretien par une note trop 
pessimiste. J'ai quelque espoir qu'une conflagration generale pourra 
etre evitee. On nous telegraphie de Saint-Petersbourg que M. 
Sazonow est plus dispose a juger froidement la situation. J'espere 
que nous pourrons le dissuader d'intervenir en faveur de la Serbie 
dont l'Autriche est resolue a respecter Fintegrite territoriale et l'inde- 
pendance a venir, une fois qu'elle aura obtenu satisfaction." 



210 THE CRIME 

J'ai objecte a M. Zimmermann que d'apres certains de mes Collegues 
qui avaient lu la reponse du Cabinet de Belgrade, celle-ci etait une 
capitulation complete devant les exigences autrichiennes, auxquelles 
satisfaction etait donnee avec des restrictions de pure forme. Le 
Sous-Secretaire d'Etat m'a repondu quHl n'avait pas connaissance de 
cette reponse et que d'ailleurs rien ne pourrait empecher une demon- 
stration militaire de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Telle est la situation. 

Baron Beyens. 

Arising out of this report, the following is to be noted : 

1. Zimmermann, who was then Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, denied to the Belgian Ambassador that the 
action taken by Austria was to be attributed to the instiga- 
tion and the advice of Berlin. 1 For Austria — so con- 
tinued the Under-Secretary of State — it was now a question 
of to be or not to be. She would and must give the Serbs 
a severe and salutary lesson. England had suggested 
a pacific intervention of the four disinterested Powers. 
While Germany wished to localise the conflict, she would 
not prevent Austria from inflicting punishment on Serbia. 
If Russia mobilised, Germany also would mobilise, and that 
meant a European war. In other words, Austria could 
mobilise and wage war to any extent she might choose ; 
but should Russia also mobilise as a counter-measure, 
then this on the Prusso-German theory of international 
law would be a casus belli. 

2. The Belgian Ambassador drew the attention of the 
German Under-Secretary of State to the fact that the Ser- 
bian answer — according to the statements of people who 
had read it — amounted to a complete capitulation to the 
Austrian demands, only with the addition of a few purely 
formal limitations. Zimmermann replied — at 8 o'clock 
on the evening of July 27th ! — that he did not yet know 
the Serbian answer, but that in any case he could not 
prevent the military action of Austria. 

1 In J 'accuse (p. 170) and in greater detail in The Crime (Vol. I, 
p. 244) I have already inquired into the true value of this subterfuge. 
The revelations of Dr. W. Muehlon, the former director of Krupp's, 
which became known in the spring of 1918, after the completion of 
The Crime, completely confirm the fact that the diplomatic and 
military conspiracy of Germany and Austria had already been agreed 
upon in all its details at a meeting held in Berlin before the begin- 
ning of the Emperor's northern tour. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 211 

As we know, Herr von Jagow feigned ignorance on this 
same point in a conversation with Jules Cambon, the French 
Ambassador, on the same day, July 27th (Yellow Book, 
No. 74). The fitting answer which the Frenchman gave 
the German Secretary of State when he had resort to this 
preposterous prevarication may be read in the Yellow 
Book and in J" accuse (p. 307). On July 27th the German 
Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State 
maintain that they had not yet read the Serbian answer, 
which had been delivered to the Austrian Ambassador 
in Belgrade on the evening of July 25th. On this answer 
the fate of Europe depended. If in truth the gentlemen 
in Berlin were still unacquainted with it two days later, 
then they were guilty of an act of wanton omission for which, 
having regard to the portentous significance of the Serbian 
memorandum, there is no adequate parliamentary expres- 
sion. If, however, as may with certainty be assumed, 
they knew the answer and merely did not want to know it, 
then they not only lied, but lied with stupidity ; for their 
denial of any knowledge proves that they desired to avoid 
any discussion of the answer, because no honest man would 
recognise it as furnishing sufficient ground for the provo- 
cation of a war with Serbia in consequence, and, resulting 
out of this, the provocation of a European war. The denial 
of any knowledge of the most important message of peace 
— two days after its official delivery — merely amounts to 
the confession of the unconditional desire for war and of the 
agreed war-conspiracy between the two Central Empires. 

$ afe $ ♦ * 

Davignon's Note of July 27th, 1914 (No. 11), addressed 
to the Belgian Ambassador in Vienna : 

No. 11. 

M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrang&res, 
au Ministre du Roi a Vienne. (Telegramme.) 

Bruxelles, le 27 juillet 1914. 

J'ai recu votre rapport du 25 de ce mois. Veuillez telegraphier 
ou en est la mobilisation et quand les hostilites pourraient commencer. 
Votre collegue a Berlin ecrit le 26 qu'a son avis VAllemagne et 
V Autriche-Hongrie ont prevu ensemble toutes les consequences possibles 

P 2 



212 THE CRIME 

de Vultimatum adresse a la Serbie et sont decidees a aller a toutes 
extremites. Nous devons etre renseign.es en. vue des mesures a 
prendre. 

Davignon. 

Berlin report from Baron Beyens of July 28th, 1914 
(No. 12) : 

Le Ministre du Roi & Berlin d M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Berlin, le 28 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Les evenements marchent si rapidement qu'il faut se garder 
d'emettre des pronostics, surtout trop favorables, de crainte qu'ils 
ne soient dementis par les faits. Mieux vaut chercher a demeler 
les causes de la crise actuelle pour tacher d'en comprendre le 
developpement et d'en deviner la conclusion. 

C'est ce que j'ai essaye de faire dans mon rapport du 26 juillet. 
L 'opinion que femettais dans la premiere partie me parait toujours 
la plus foridee. Cependant je dois vous citer aujourd'hui une opinion 
differente, parce qu'elle emane d'un homme qui est a meme de bien 
juger la situation, l'Ambassadeur d'ltalie, avec lequel j'ai eu hier 
un entretien. 

D'apres M. Bollati, le Gouvernement allemand, d' accord en prin- 
cipe avec le Cabinet de Vienne sur la necessite du coup a porter a la 
Serbie, ignorait la teneur de la note autrichienne, ou en tout cas n'en 
connaissait pas les termes violents, inusites dans la langue diplomatique. 
A Vienne comme a Berlin, on etait persuade que la Russie, malgre 
les assurances officielles echangees recemment entre le Czar et M. 
Poincare au sujet de la preparation complete des deux armees de la 
Duplice, etait incapable d' engager une guerre europeenne et qu'elle 
n'oserait pas se lancer dans une si redoutable aventure : situation 
interieure inquietante, menees revolutionnaires, armement incom- 
plet, voies de communication insuffisantes ; toutes ces raisons 
devaient forcer le Gouvernement russe a assister impuissant a 1' execu- 
tion de la Serbie. Meme opinion meprisante en ce qui concerne non 
pas Varmee frangaise, mais V esprit qui regne en France dans le monde 
gouvernemental. 

L'Ambassadeur d'ltalie estime qu'on se fait illusion ici sur les 
decisions que prendra le Gouvernement du Czar. D'apres lui, il se 
trouvera accule a la necessite de faire la guerre pour ne pas perdre 
toute autorite et tout prestige aux yeux des Slaves. Son inaction 
en presence de Ventree en campagne de VAutriche equivaudrait d un 
suicide. M. Bollati m'a laisse comprendre qu'une guerre europeenne 
ne serait pas populaire en Italic Le peuple italien n'a pas d'interet 
a l'ecrasement dela puissance russe, qui est l'ennemie de l'Autriche ; 
il aurait besoin de se recueillir en ce moment pour resoudre a loisir 
d'autres questions qui le preoccupent davantage. 

L'impression que la Russie est incapable de faire face a une guerre 
europeenne regne non seulement au sein du Gouvernement Imperial, 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 213 

mais chez les industriels allemands qui ont la specialite des f ournitures 
militaires. Le plus autoris6 d'entre eux pour exprimer un avis, 
M. Krupp von Bohlen, a assur6 a un de mes Collogues que V artillerie 
russe etait loin d'etre bonne et complete, tandis que celle de Varmee 
allemande n'avait jamais ete d'une qualite aussi superieure. Ce serait 
une folie, a-t-il ajout6, pour la Russie de declarer la guerre a l'Alle- 
magne dans ces conditions. 

Le Gouvernement serbe, pris au depourvu par la soudainete de 
rultimatum autrichien, a cependant repondu, avant 1' expiration du 
delai fixe, aux exigences du Cabinet de Vienne et consenti toutes les 
satisfactions reclamees. Sa reponse a ete mal presentee, dans un 
texte trop touffu, accompagne de trop de pieces a l'appui ; elle 
forme un gros document au lieu d'etre d'une forme courte et precise. 
Elle n'en est pas moins, parait-il, tres concluante. Elle a et6 com- 
muniquee a tous les Cabinets interesses et, hier matin, a celui de 
Berlin. D'ou vient qu'aucun journal allemand ne Vait publiee, tandis 
que presque tous reproduisaient un telegramme autrichien declarant 
que la reponse serbe etait absolument insuffisante ? N'y a-t-il pas la 
une nouvelle preuve de la volonte inebranlable, tant id qu'a Vienne, 
d'aller de V avant coute que coilte ? 

Baron Be yens. 

Arising out of this report, the following points are to be 
noted : 

1. Beyens still adheres to his account of the whole affair 
as a manoeuvre agreed upon between Berlin and Vienna. 
He is, nevertheless, sufficiently objective to mention 
the somewhat divergent view of Bollati, the Italian 
Ambassador in Berlin. The latter was of the opinion 
that in Vienna and Berlin they had not presupposed the 
possibility that matters would be allowed to go as far as 
war either in the case of Russia or France ; in other words, 
that they had intended it rather as a piece of bluff than as 
a real provocation of war. In the case of Russia the 
internal unrest, the insufficient military preparation, 
etc., were accepted as sufficient reasons for assuming 
that she would remain an inactive spectator of Serbia's 
execution. Towards France they had " the same con- 
temptuous view, not with regard to the French army, but 
with regard to the spirit prevailing in French Govern- 
mental circles." This utterance of Bollati's is very interest- 
ing ; it confirms the fact that in Berlin they were convinced 
of the love of peace which inspired France, that same 
France which to-day it is sought to place in the pillory 
as the disturber of the peace and the author of the war. 



214 THE CRIME 

2. In the opinion of the most eminent experts in 
Germany, above all that of Herr Krupp von Bohlen, the 
Russian artillery is absolutely insufficient, while that of 
Germany has never reached such a high state of perfection 
as at the present moment. In these circumstances, so 
it was calculated in Germany, it would be madness for 
Russia to declare war against Germany. This account of 
the Belgian Ambassador, which is based on utterances of 
the Italian Ambassador, disposes in the first place of 
every suspicion that Russia wanted war and provoked it ; 
on the other hand, it supports the hypothesis that Germany 
calculated either on the absolute non-intervention of 
Russia, or, in the event of intervention, on an absolutely 
certain victory. 

3. The Belgian Ambassador confirms it as a character- 
istic fact that the Serbian answer of July 25th had not 
yet been published in any German newspaper on July 
28th (the day of his report), whereas nearly all the papers 
had published an Austrian telegram according to which the 
Serbian answer was " entirely insufficient." " Is this not 
a new proof of the immovable will which existed both in 
Berlin and Vienna to go forward, cost what it might ? " 

After the Outbreak of the Austro-Serbian War. 

Berlin report of July 29th, 1914 (No. 14) : 

No. 14. 

Le Ministre du Roi & Berlin & M. Davignon, 

Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

Berlin, 29 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Je profite d'une occasion sure pour vous faire parvenir des im- 
pressions que je ne confierais pas a la poste. 

La declaration de guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie a la Serbie a ete 
jugee, de l'avis general, comme un evenement tres dangereux pour le 
rnaintien de la paix europeenne. Le Cabinet de Vienne repond ainsi 
aux tentatives de conciliation de Londres et de Petersbourg ; il coupe les 
ponts derriere lui pour s'interdire toute retraite. II est a craindre 
que cette declaration ne soit considered par le Gouvernement du Czar 
comme une provocation. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 215 

Les hostility vont done commencer, mais elles pourraient etre 
de courte duree si l'Allemagne consentait a user de son influence 
but son alliee et si, de leur cote, les Serbes, obeissant aux conseils 
qu'on leur a donnees, battaient en retraite devant l'envahisseur, 
sans lui fournir l'occasion d'une effusion de sang inutile. En occupant 
Belgrade sans coup ferir, VAutriche await a la fois une satisfaction 
morale et materielle et un gage qui lui permettraient de ne pas se 
montrer intraitable. Une intervention pourrait peut-etre alors se 
produire avec quelque chance de succes. 

Ce ne sont Ik malheureusement que des hypotheses inspirees par 
le desir de prevenir une catastrophe europeenne. Mais voici un fait 
susceptible d'avoir de l'influence sur les dispositions du Cabinet 
de Berlin. Sir Edward Grey a declar6 avant-hier au Prince Lich- 
nowsky que, si une guerre europeenne eclatait, aucune des six grandes 
puissances ne pourrait y rester etrangere. En meme temps les 
journaux allemands annoncaient la mise sur pied de guerre de la 
flotte britannique. 

II est certain que ces avertissements dissiperont une illusion que 
tout le monde a Berlin, dans les cercles officiels comme dans la presse, 
se plaisait a se forger. Des articles de journaux, publics ces jours 
derniers encore a l'ouverture du conflit, respiraient la plus grande 
confiance dans la neutralite de V Angleterre. II est hors de doute que 
le Gouvernement Imp6rial l'avait escomptee et qu'il devra modifier 
tous ses calculs. Comme en 1911, le Cabinet de Berlin a ete trompe 
par ses agents mal renseignes ; aujourd'hui comme alors, il voit 
1' Angleterre, malgr6 toutes les avances, toutes les caresses diplo- 
matiques qu'il lui a prodiguees depuis deux ans, prete a passer dans 
le camp de ses adversaires. C'est que les hommes d'Etat britan- 
niques se rendent compte des perils que ferait courir a leur pays 
V hegemonic complete de VAllemagne sur le continent europeen et qu'ils 
attachent tin interet vital, non pour des motifs de sentiment, mais 
pour des raisons d'equilibre, a l'existence de la France comme grande 
puissance. 

Les journaux allemands publient aujourd'hui enfin la reponse de la 
Serbie a la note du Gouvernement austro-hongrois avec les commen- 
taires autrichiens. La faute de ce retard est imputable en grande 
partie au Charge d' Affaires serbe qui n'avait pas fait dactylographier 
le document pour en remettre des copies a la presse. L'impression 
qu'il produira a Berlin, ou Von s'obstine a ne voir que par les yeux 
de VAutriche et ou on approuve jusqu'a present tout ce qu'elle fait 
avec une complaisance inexplicable sera presque nulle. 

Par votre telegramme du 28 de ce mois, vous me demandez de 
vous tenir au courant des mesures prises en vue de la mobilisa- 
tion de l'armee allemande. De mobilisation proprement dite, il 
n'est pas encore question heureusement. Mais, comme me le disait 
hier soir un attach6 militaire, avant de mobiliser chaque Etat prend 
chez lui, sans eveiller l'attention, des mesures preparatoires : rappel 
des officiers et des hommes en conge, achat de chevaux pour les 
attelages de l'ar tiller ie et des voitures de munitions et de projectiles, 
etc. II n'est pas douteux que ces precautions n'aient ete prises en Alle- 



216 THE CRIME 

magne. Le sang-froid n'est pas moins necessaire que la vigilance. 
II ne faut rien precipiter ; le rappel, en ce moment-ci ou des efforts 
desesper6s sont faits pour la conservation de la paix, de trois classes 
de notre arm6e paraitrait ici pr6mature et risquerait de produire 
une facheuse impression. 

Baron Beyens. 

Arising out of this report, the following points are to be 
noted : 

1. The Austrian declaration of war against Serbia which 
took place on the preceding day — as the Viennese Cabinet's 
answer to the attempts of the London and Petrograd 
Governments to arrive at an understanding — is a highly 
dangerous act for the peace of Europe, and will, there is 
reason to apprehend, be viewed by the Government of the 
Tsar as a provocative action. 

2. Even yet peace could be maintained, if Austria would 
be content with the occupation of Belgrade and would 
announce her conditions after this moral and material 
satisfaction. This is more or less the substance of Grey's 
first formula of agreement, which was submitted by the 
English Secretary of State on the same day, July 29th, 
to Prince Lichnowsky (Blue Book, No. 46), and which 
thereafter did not again disappear from the diplomatic 
negotiations (it is well known that neither the German 
nor the Austrian Government ever made a positive state- 
ment in answer to this proposal of Grey's for mediation, 
as I have elsewhere proved in detail in J 'accuse and The 
Crime). 

3. In Berlin, so the Belgian Ambassador further reports — 
they still flattered themselves into believing that England 
would remain absolutely neutral, notwithstanding the 
assurances of Grey to Lichnowsky that in the event of a 
general European conflict scarcely any of the Great Powers 
could remain outside (Blue Book, No. 46). The complete 
hegemony of Germany on the Continent would be a great 
danger for England, and on the other hand England had 
a lively interest in the maintenance of France as a Great 
Power. 

4. Despite all the concessions contained in it, the Serbian 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 217 

answer, which had just been published (July 29th), will 
make almost no impression in Berlin, where matters 
are seen only through the eyes of Austria, and with an 
" inexplicable complaisance " approval is given to all that 
the Viennese Government does. 

5. Preparatory military measures (recall of officers and 
men on leave, purchase of artillery horses, munition 
wagons, etc.) have without doubt already been taken in 
Germany, although the formal mobilisation has not been 
proclaimed. 

Viennese report of July 30th (No. 16). In my opinion 
there is here a misprint ; from its contents, the report 
appears to date from July 31st : 

No. 16. 

Le Ministre du Roi a Vienne a M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etrange'res. 

Vienne, le 30 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Mes rapports de ces derniers jours ont suffisamment demontre 
que je ne parvenais pas a me procurer des renseignements precis 
sur les intentions de la Russie, a l'egard de laquelle la presse austro- 
hongroise observe d'ailleurs par ordre un complet silence. Je me 
demandais si le Gouvernement du Czar ne garderait pas une attitude 
expectante et n'interviendrait eventuellement que si l'Autriche- 
Hongrie abusait, a ses yeux, des victoires qu'elle allait remporter. 

Enfin hier soir je suis parvenu a recueillir de source certaine des 
donnees authentiques. 

La situation est presque desesp6ree et PAmbassadeur de Russie 
s'attendait a chaque instant a etre rappele. II a fait une derniere 
tentative qui a reussi a ecarter le danger immediat. L'entretien de 
Son Excellence avec le comte Berchtold a ete fort long et absolument 
amical. Li 'Ambassadeur et le Ministre ont reconnu tous deux que leurs 
Oouvernements avaient decrete la mobilisation, mais Us se sont quittes 
en bons termes. 

En sortant du " Ballplatz " M. Schebeko s'est rendu chez M. 
Dumaine, oil se trouvait egalement Sir Maurice de Bunsen. Cette 
entrevue a 6te tres emotionnante et FAmbassadeur de Russie a et6 
vivement felicite par ses collegues du sticces qu'il avait si habilement 
remport6. 

La situation reste grave, mais tout au moins la possibilite de re- 
prendre les pourparlers est donnee et il y a encore quelque espoir 



218 THE CRIME 

que toutes les horreurs et toutes les ruin.es qu'une guerre europeenne 
occasionnerait forcement pourront etre evitees. 

Je suis stupefait de voir avec quelle insouciance et en meme temps 
avec quel egoisme on s'est lance ici dans une aventure qui pourrait 
avoir pour toute l'Europe les plus terribles consequences ! 

Je remets ce rapport a un compatriote rappele au service militaire 
et je profite de cette occasion, Monsieur le Ministre, pour vous dire 
qu'a tort ou a raison la poste autrichienne a la reputation d'etre 
assez indiscrete. Dans ces conditions et vu les circonstances pre- 
sentes, vous voudrez bien m'excuser s'il m' arrive parfois de ne pas 
vous ecrire aussi ouvertement que je le voudrais. 

Comte ERREMBAtriiT de Dudzeele. 

Arising out of this report, the following points are to be 
noted : 

1. The situation was almost desperate. It was only by 
a last attempt on the part of Sch^beko, the Russian Ambas- 
sador in Vienna, that the immediate danger of war had been 
removed. In spite of mobilisation having taken place on 
both sides, the conversation between Count Berchtold and 
the Russian Ambassador has passed off in an entirely 
friendly manner. The French and English Ambassadors 
in Vienna have heartily congratulated their Russian col- 
league on his success. 

2. " I am astonished to see the insouciance and also the 
egotism with which they have here plunged into an adven- 
ture which might have the most fearful consequences for 
the whole of Europe." 



Petrograd report of July 31st, 1914 (No. 17). This 
report is signed by the Belgian Ambassador in Petrograd, 
Count Buisseret-Steenbecque de Blarenghien. It is for this 
reason of special interest, inasmuch as it immediately 
follows the report of July 30th from B. de l'Escaille, the 
Belgian Charge d' Affaires in Petrograd, the document 
intercepted in Berlin. The Belgian Ambassador, as he 
himself states in his report, had returned to Petrograd 
on the morning of July 31st, and he now describes the 
diplomatic situation as he found it in the Russian capital. 
In his account he deviates on essential points from the 
report of his representative written the preceding day : 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 219 

No. 17. 

Le Ministre du Roi a Saint-Petersbourg d M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 

Saint-Petersbourg, le 31 juillet 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

En arrivant ce matin a Saint-Petersbourg, je suis alle voir l'Ambas- 
sadeur de France ; M. Paleologue m'a dit ce qui suit : 

" La mobilisation est generale. En ce qui concerne la France, 
elle ne m'a pas encore ete notifiee, mais on ne peut en douter. M. 
Sazonow negocie encore. II fait les efforts les plus extremes pour eviter 
la guerre et s'est montre dispose a toutes les concessions. L'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Allemagne, lui aussi, a travaille de toutes ses forces, a 
titre personnel, dans le sens de la paix. Le Comte de Pourtales 
est all6 trouver M. Sazonow et l'a suppli6 d'influer sur l'Autriche. Le 
Ministre Imperial des Affaires Etrangeres lui a repondu a plusieurs 
reprises : ' Donnez-moi un moyen : faites-moi dire un mot conciliant 
quelconque qui me permette d' engager la conversation avec Vienne. 
Dites a votre alliee de faire une concession minime, de retirer seulement 
les points de Vultimatum qu 1 aucun pays ne saurait accepter.'' L'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Allemagne a toujours r6plique que son pays ne pouvait 
plus donner de conseils de moderation a l'Autriche. II est probable 
qu'a Vienne on n'admet pas que l'Empire Germanique ne prete 
pas a son alliee un appui inconditionnel. 

"A. plusieurs reprises," a continue M. Paleologue, " le Ministre 
Imperial des Affaires Etrangeres a demande au Comte de Pourtales : 
Avez-vous quelque chose k me dire de la part de votre Gouverne- 
ment ? L'Ambassadeur allemand a du repondre chaque fois 
negativement, insistant derechef pour que l'initiative vienne de 
Saint-P6tersbourg. Finalement, M. Sazonow a demande a parler 
a rAmbassadeur d'Autriche et lui a dit qiCil acceptait tout : soit la 
conference des ambassadeurs a Londres, soit la conversation ' a quatre ' 
en s'engageant a n'y pas intervenir et en promettant de se rattier a 
Vopinion des autres Puissances. Rien n'y a fait, Vienne a con- 
stamment refuse de causer ; l'Autriche a mobilise huit corps d'armee : 
elle a bombarde Belgrade. L'ltalie parait devoir r6server son 
attitude. 

" La presse patriotique russe et V element militaire observent I'un et 
V autre un calme remarquable. II ne semble pas que ce soit la pression 
sur l'Empereur de son entourage militaire qui ait decide 1' attitude du 
Gouvernement russe. On fait confiance a M. Sazonow. C'est 
V attitude extraordinaire de V Allemagne qui empeche les efforts de M. 
Sazonow d'aboutir." 

Je viens de causer egalement avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre. 
II me dit que M. Sazonow avait tente des le debut de connaitre les 
intentions du Gouvernement de Londres ; mais, jusqu'ici et malgre 
la mobilisation de la flotte anglaise, Sir George Buchanan n'a encore 
ete charge d'aucune communication de ce genre pour le Pont des 
Chantres. Les instructions de l'Ambassadeur sont d'expliquer a 



220 THE CRIME 

Petersbourg que si la Russie desire Vappui de la Grande-Bretagne, 
elle doit eviter soigneusement mime Vapparence d'etre agressive dans 
la crise actuelle. 

Ce n'est un secret pour personne que les moyens de mobilisation de 
la Russie sont beaucoup plus lents que ceux de l'Autriche. On cite 
la Bukovine comma le point par lequel l'armee russe pourrait tenter 
de penetrer sur le territoire autrichien. 

Comte C. DE BtriSSEKET-STEENBECQTJE DE BliARENGHIEN. 

Arising out of this report, the following points are to be 
noted : — 

1. The Belgian Ambassador narrates in detail what 
Paleologue, the French Ambassador, had informed him : 
" Sazonof is still negotiating, he is making the utmost 
efforts to avoid war, and is showing himself prepared for 
all concessions." So far as his personal efforts are con- 
cerned, the German Ambassador also has worked in the 
sense of peace. Unfortunately, in reply to Sazonof's 
urgent and frequently repeated requests that Austria 
should make merely the smallest concession, that she 
should merely delete from her Ultimatum the points 
which no country could accept, he has constantly replied 
that Germany could not give any more advice in Vienna 
in the direction of moderation. Probably in Vienna — such 
is the view of the French Ambassador — what is demanded is 
the unconditional support of her ally. 

2. Count Pourtales has given a negative answer to the 
repeated inquiry of Sazonof whether he had any communi- 
cation to make to him in the name of the German Govern- 
ment. Finally, Sazonof turned to the Austrian Ambassador 
and said to him that he accepted anything, whether it was 
a Conference of Ambassadors in London, or whether it 
was merely a conversation a, quatre ; he pledged himself 
not to intervene and to submit to the opinion of the other 
Powers. It was all in vain. Vienna refused all discussion, 
and instead of this she declared war and bombarded 
Belgrade. 

3. The patriotic Press and the military element in Russia 
are maintaining a remarkable composure ; it does not 
appear that the military environment of the Tsar had by 
any pressure influenced the attitude of the Russian Govern- 
ment. Confidence is felt in Sazonof. It is only the extra- 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 221 

ordinary attitude of Germany which prevents the efforts 
of Sazonof from succeeding. 

4. Until now Sazonof has been endeavouring in vain 
to learn the intentions of the London Cabinet. The in- 
structions of the English Ambassador are to state to the 
Russian Government that if Russia desires the support of 
Great Britain she must with the utmost care avoid 
even the appearance of being aggressive in the present 
crisis. 

This report of Count Buisseret, the Belgian Ambassador, 
completely disowns that of the Belgian Charge d' Affaires 
of the previous day. The Ambassador, in fact, is better 
informed regarding the diplomatic situation than his 
temporary representative. The alleged assurance of Eng- 
lish support which is supposed to have encouraged Russia 
to embark on aggressive action — such is the thesis which 
the German Government infers from the report of the 
Charg£ d'Affaires of July 30th — this alleged assurance is 
not only disowned by the Ambassador's report of July 
31st, but is transformed into something which is directly 
the reverse : if Russia wants to have England's support, 
she must not even assume so much as the appearance of 
aggressive action. The report of M. de 1'Escaille is in itself 
a document of very doubtful value regarded as evidence. 
Anyone who has studied the diplomatic events of these 
critical days by reference to the documents feels the report 
of July 30th to be a clumsy, stuttering piece of guesswork 
on the part of a subordinate diplomatic official, who is 
badly informed and confused in his vision, and who, in 
order to be unjust to no one, eagerly blames everybody 
more or less at the same time. I have shown in detail in 
J'accuse (p. 255) the inconsistency between this report 
and the situation on July 30th as established by reference 
to the documents. Now we find that the subordinate is 
disowned, point by point, by his superior officer on the very 
next day. I imagine that this is sufficient to dispose finally 
of this evidence which is alleged to speak in favour of the 
exoneration of the German Government. 

I am sorry for Herr Helfferich and his friends, who in 
this way lose an important witness for the Crown. Herr 



222 THE CRIME 

Helff erich attaches so much value to the letter of the Belgian 
Charge d' Affaires, that he further makes it serve his ends 
by a false translation of a decisive sentence. De l'Escaille 
writes : " Aujourd'hui on est fermement convaincu a 
St. P^tersbourg, on en a meme l'assurance que l'Angleterre 
soutiendra la France." Helfferich translates the last words 
thus : that England will " go with her on the side of 
France " (auf der Seite Frankreichs mitgehen wird). Cor- 
rectly translated, it is said that England will uphold, 
support, maintain, defend France. In Mole's Lexicon 
" defend " (verteidigen) is also expressly given as the mean- 
ing of " soutenir." The Belgian Charge d' Affaires thus 
speaks merely of a defensive support of France by England, 
while the German Secretary of State transforms it into an 
aggressive "taking of sides " with France. The difference is 
obvious and important. Now, however, the whole evidence 
comprised in the report of the Charge d' Affaires of July 
30th collapses, in consequence of the report of the Belgian 
Ambassador of July 31st. 

Arising out of the Viennese report of July 31st (No. 19), 
the fact, already well known, may be noted that neither 
Austria nor Russia regarded mobilisation on both sides as 
aggressive actions against each other or as a casus belli. 
Count Berchtold as well as his Under-Secretary, Count 
Forgach, stated to M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, 
that Austria's general mobilisation of July 31st was not in- 
tended to represent any hostile action against Russia, and 
the Russian statesmen had also made similar declarations 
to the Austrians. 

After the German Ultimata. 
Berlin report of August 1st, 1914 (No. 20). 

No. 20. 

Le Ministre du Roi a Berlin a M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etranghres. 

Berlin, l er aout 1914. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

Je profite d'une occasion sure pour vous ecrire et vous donner 
quelques renseignements confidentiels sur les derniers evenements. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 223 

A 6 heures du soir, aucune reponse n'etait encore arrivee ici de 
Saint-Petersbourg, a l'ultimatum du Gouvernement Imperial, 
M. de Jagow et M. Zimmermann se sont rendus alors chez le Chancelier 
et chez 1'Empereur, afin d'obtenir que l'ordre de mobilisation generale 
ne futpas donne aujourd'hui. Mais ils ont du se heurter a V opposi- 
tion irreductible du Ministre de la Guerre et des chefs de Varmee qui 
auront represents a 1'Empereur les consequences funestes d'un 
retard de 24 heures. L'ordre a ete lance immediatement et porte 
a la connaissance du public par une edition speciale du Lokal Anzeiger. 
Je vous l'ai telegraphic tout aussitot. 

Les journaux officieux et semi-officieux, les petits discours tenus 
par 1'Empereur et par le Chancelier et toutes les proclamations offici- 
elles qui vont paraitre chercheront a rejeter la responsabilite de la guerre 
sur la Russie. On ne veut pas douter encore dans les spheres 
dirigeantes de la bonne foi du Souverain ; mais on dit qu'il a ete 
circonvenu et amene savamment a croire qu'il avait fait le necessaire 
pour le maintien de la paix, tandis que la Russie voulait absolument 
la guerre. 

Je vous ai ecrit que 1'Ambassadeur du Czar n'avait pas recu de 
confirmation officielle de la mobilisation generale russe. II l'a apprise 
par M. de Jagow, hier a une heure, mais ne voyant pas venir de 
telSgramme lui communiquant la nouvelle, il l'a mise formellement 
en doute. M. de Pourtales a-t-il pris pour une mobilisation totale 
ce qui n'etait que des preparatifs de guerre ou bien cette erreur a-t-elle 
ete commise volontairement a Berlin ? On se perd en suppositions. 

II etait impossible que la Russie acceptat l'ultimatum allemand 
avec le delai trop court, presque injurieux, qu'il comportait et l'obliga- 
tion de demobiliser, c'est-a-dire de cesser tous preparatifs de guerre 
aussi bien sur la frontiere autrichienne que sur la frontiere allemande, 
alors que VAutriche avait mobilise la moitie de ses forces. Quant au 
Gouvernement de la Republique, il avait l'intention de ne faire aucune 
reponse a l'AUemagne, ne devant rendre compte de sa conduite qu'a 
ses allies, m'a dit 1'Ambassadeur de France. 

Avec un peu de bonne volonte du cote de Berlin, la paix pouvait etre 
conservee et V irreparable empeche. Avant-hier, 1'Ambassadeur 
d'Autriche a Saint-Petersbourg declarait a M. Sazonow que son 
Gouvernement admettait de discuter avec lui le fond de sa note a la 
Serbie, qu'il prenait l'engagement de respecter l'integrite territoriale 
de son adversaire, qu'il n'ambitionnait meme pas de reprendre le 
Sandjak, mais qu'il n'admettrait pas seulement qu'une autre puis- 
sance se substituat a lui vis-a-vis de la Serbie. M. Sazonow repondait 
que sur cette base il etait possible de s'entendre, mais qu'il preferait 
que les negociations fussent conduites a Londres, sous la direction 
impartiale du Gouvernement britannique, plutot qu'a Saint-Peters- 
bourg ou a Vienne. En meme temps, le Czar et 1'Empereur d'Alle- 
magne echangeaient des telegrammes amicaux. Le Gouvernement 
allemand semble avoir machine ce scenario pour aboutir a la guerre 
qu'il veut rendre inevitable, mais dont il cherche a rejeter la respon- 
sabilite sur la Russie. 

Baron Be yens. 



224 THE CRIME 

Arising out of this report, the following interesting facts 
are to be noted : 

1. After the expiration of the time-limit specified in the 
Ultimatum addressed to Russia — on the afternoon of 
August 1st — a struggle arose in the entourage of the 
Emperor between his civil and his military advisers. The 
civil government wished a postponement of the general 
mobilisation ; the War Minister and the army chiefs, how- 
ever, insisted on immediate mobilisation, since a postpone- 
ment, even if for twenty-four hours only, might have fatal 
consequences. They succeeded in imposing their will 
upon the Emperor. 

2. All official and semi-official utterances, including 
the personal addresses of the Emperor and the Chancellor 
to the people, seek to transfer the responsibility for the war 
to Russia. The Emperor personally has, it is said, been 
circumvented and cunningly persuaded to believe that he 
has done everything necessary for the maintenance of 
peace, but that Russia absolutely wanted war. 

3. The acceptance of the Ultimatum with the short, 
almost insulting, time-limit and with the summons to 
demobilise against Austria as well, although this latter 
country had herself mobilised, was impossible. " With the 
least trace of good- will on the part of Berlin, peace could 
have been preserved and the irreparable prevented." After 
the Austrian Government at the last hour had stated its 
readiness to discuss with the Petrograd Government the 
material substance of their Ultimatum (le fond de sa note 
a la Serbie), after Sazionof had accepted the discussion on 
this basis and had proposed its continuance in London 
" under the impartial leadership of the English Govern- 
ment," a peaceful understanding could easily have been 
reached, if Germany had desired such an understanding. 
" The German Government appears to have set this 
scenario in train, in order to arrive at the war which they 
wish to make inevitable, the responsibility of which, how- 
ever, they desire to transfer to Russia." 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 225 

It will be recalled that in J' accuse (p. 162) I con- 
sidered that the contrasted action of the Berlin and the 
Viennese Governments from July 31st onwards permitted 
two possible explanations, although only one was probable. 
After many days of refusal, Vienna, on July 31st, expressed 
for the first time her readiness to enter real negotiations 
on the subject in dispute, and also to accept English " medi- 
ation." (Red Book, No. 50.) On the preceding day, July 
30th, Count Berchtold was prepared to give to the Russian 
Government " explanations " and " subsequent elucida- 
tions " of his demands, but he was not prepared to " depart 
in any way " from the points contained in the note. (Red 
Book, No. 50.) The negotiations on the substantial 
points at issue thus finally contemplated by Vienna on 
July 31st were then frustrated by Berlin's action in putting 
forward the question of mobilisation, and by her Ultimata 
of the same day, and in this way Berlin made war inevit- 
able. Did a conflict really exist between the two allies, or 
was their divergent action an agreed game with the parts 
assigned to the players ? I decided for the latter alternative, 
and on this point the Belgian Ambassador in Berlin 
concurs in my view. 



After the Outbreak of the European War. 

From the Viennese report of August 2nd (No. 24) it is 
to be noted that the English Cabinet continued its efforts 
to arrive at an understanding until the last minute (apres 
avoir continue jusqu'a la derniere minute ses tentatives de 
conciliation) and that England's further attitude will depend 
on the course of events. 

Berlin report of August 5th (No. 25. According to the full 
account of the situation given by Baron Beyens on Septem- 
ber 21st, 1914. Grey Book II, No. 51, the conversation 
between the Belgian Ambassador and Jagow, which in 
No. 25 is assigned to August 5th, appears to have taken 
place on Tuesday, August 4th, at 9 a.m.) : 



226 THE CRIME 

No. 25. 

Le Ministre du Roi a Berlin a M. Davignon, 
Ministre des Affaires Etrang&res. (Telegramme.) 

Berlin, le 5 aout 1914. 

J'ai ete recu ce matin a 9 heures par le Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres. II m'a dit: " Nous avons ete obliges par necessite absolue 
de faire a votre Gouvernement la demande que vous savez. C'est 
pour FAllemagne une question de vie ou de mort. Pour n'etre pas 
ecras6e, elle doit ecraser d'abord la France et se tourner ensuite 
contre la Russie. Nous avons appris que V armee francaise se preparait 
a passer par la Belgique pour attaquer notre flanc. Nous devons la 
prevenir. Si l'armee beige ne fait pas sauter les ponts, nous laisse 
occuper Liege et se retire sous Anvers, nous promettons, non seule- 
ment de respecter l'independance beige, la vie et les proprietes des 
habitants, mais encore de vous indemniser. C'est la mort dans 
Fame que l'Empereur et le Gouvernement out du se r6soudre a cette 
determination. Pom' moi, c'est la plus penible que j'ai eu a prendre 
de toute ma carriere." 

J'ai repondu que le Gouvernement beige ne pouvait faire a cette 
proposition que la reponse qu'il avait faite sans hesiter. Que diriez- 
vous de nous, si nous cedions a une pareille menace de la France ? 
Que nous sommes des laches incapables de defendre notre neutrality 
et de vivre independants. La Belgique entiere approuvera son 
Gouvernement. La France, contrairement a ce que vous dites, a 
promis de respecter notre neutralite, si vous la respectez. 

Pour reconnaitre notre loyaute, vous faites de la Belgique le 
champ de bataille entre la France et vous. U Europe vous jugera 
et vous aurez contre vous V Angleterre, garante de notre neutrality. 
Liege n'est pas aussi facile a enlever que vous le croyez. 

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, presse par moi, a avoue 
que nous ne pouvions pas r6pondre a la demande allemande autre- 
ment que nous l'avons fait et qu'il comprenait notre reponse. II a 
repete a plusieurs reprises son chagrin d'en etre arrive la. C'est, 
dit-il, une question de vie ou de mort pour 1' Allemagne. 

J'ai repondu qu'un peuple, comme un individu, ne peut vivre 
sans honneur. J'ai ensuite declare etre pret a quitter Berhn avec 
mon personnel. 

M. de Jagow m'a r6pondu qu'il ne voulait pas rompre les relations 
diplomatiques avec nous. 

J'ai dit : c'est done a mon Gouvernement a prendre une decision 
et j'attends ses ordres pour vous reclamer mes passeports. 

Baron Beyens. 

Arising out of this report, the following is to be noted : 

Baron Beyens emphatically repudiates the assertion of 
Herr von Jagow that France was on the point of marching 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 227 

through Belgium and of attacking Germany, if Germany- 
had not anticipated this attack. On the contrary, France 
had promised to respect Belgian neutrality. " Europe will 
pass judgment on Germany and you will also have against 
you England as a guarantor of our neutrality." . . . Jagow 
himself admitted in this interview that he understood 
the answer of Belgium, which could not have been different. 



From the London report of August 5th (No. 26) it 
appears that even on that day — after England's declaration 
of war against Germany — there still existed no definite 
views or agreements regarding the nature and the extent 
of England's military co-operation on the Continent. 
At the French Embassy in London the possibility that the 
English army might not co-operate on the Continent 
(la non-cooperation de l'arme'e anglaise) was still being 
considered. It was only the appeal of the Belgian Govern- 
ment on August 5th for the military assistance of the three 
guaranteeing Powers that led to a definite promise of mili- 
tary assistance by land (No. 27). 

All this contradicts in the most striking manner the 
aggressive conspiracy, asserted by Germany to have 
existed, in which Belgium is said to have been a conscious 
participator. 

The London report of August 7th, 1914 (No. 29), 
in connection with Asquith's speech in the House of 
Commons on August 6th, expresses itself in a crushing 
manner regarding the " infamous proposal " which Ger- 
many had made to the English Government to the dis- 
advantage and behind the back of Belgium. The moment 
the neutrality of Belgium had been violated the friends 
of peace in England were beaten. Even the most pacific 
Englishman had felt it to be his bounden duty to support 
the small and hapless nation which was fighting for its 
honour and independence. The original intention of the 
English Government, to offer assistance only by sea, had 
been repressed by public opinion, which demanded the 
dispatch of a land army to the Continent. The whole of 
England was enthusiastic for Belgium, for its King and its 

Q 2 



228 THE CRIME 

people. " If King Albert appeared in London he would be 
borne in triumph through the streets." 

The Paris report of August 8th (No. 30) makes it clear 
that only now were the advanced post of the French army 
on Belgian soil, and that not until four days had elapsed 
would the bulk of the French army be by the side of that 
of Belgium. The English also needed about four days 
more to be on the spot. All this is plain proof of the fact 
that while the German attack on Belgium had been most 
carefully prepared, the defence of the hapless country by 
the Entente Powers had only been provided for in the most 
defective manner. And these same Entente Powers, 
whose troops were not even in Belgium four days after 
the German invasion, are supposed long years before to 
have devised an Anglo-Franco-Belgian aggressive conspiracy 
against Germany 1 



In two reports dated from England on September 21st 
and September 22nd, 1914 (Nos. 51 and 52), Beyens gives 
an interesting retrospect of the last events in which he 
took part before his departure from Berlin. Arising out of 
these reports, the following is to be noted : 

In the conversation which Beyens had with Herr von 
Jagow on the morning of August 4th — after the entrance 
of German troops into Belgium — the latter repeated the 
familiar and purely military grounds which made the 
passage through Belgium " a question of life or death " 
for Germany. France had to be crushed as quickly as 
possible so that the German armies could then be turned 
against Russia. The Franco-German frontier was too 
strongly fortified to permit of its penetration ; there was 
no other course left for the German armies but to strike 
through Belgium at the heart of France before Russia had 
completed her mobilisation. 

It will be observed that here again Jagow spoke like a 
general and not like a statesman. Such language and such 
reasoning in the mouths of responsible statesmen, when 
responsible acts of State are in question, furnish one of the 
characteristic marks of Prussian-German militarism which 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 229 

it is rightly proposed to curb and render innocuous for the 
future. 

At the same time Jagow could not refrain from testifying 
in honour of the Belgians : " Germany has no reproach 
to make against Belgium, whose attitude has always been 
perfectly correct " (l'Allemagne n'a aucun reproche a 
adresser a la Belgique, dont l'attitude a toujours ete tres 
correcte). " So much the worse," retorted the Belgian 
diplomatist, " that in return for our loyalty you propose to 
make use of our country as a battlefield for your quarrel 
with France, as a battlefield for Europe. We know what 
devastation and ruin a modern war brings with it. Have 
you thought well of that ? " 

The most interesting point in the report of September 
22nd (No. 52) is the conversation which Beyens had on 
August 5th, shortly before his departure, with Zimmermann, 
the Foreign Under-Secretary. This conversation among 
other topics touches on the important question of principle 
involved in " the policy of alliances which has led to this 
result " (the European war), and from this point of view 
deserves special treatment, which I have given to it else- 
where. 1 Further, on this occasion Herr Zimmermann, 
like his chief, Jagow, on the preceding day, — though 
certainly without meaning to do so — characterised Prussian 
militarism in a way which reveals in an appalling light 
the enormous dangers it involves, and its fatal power at 
the decisive moment. The following are the relevant 
passages of the report : 

No. 52. 

Hove (Sussex), le 22 septembre 1914. 

. . . M. Zimmermann a repondu seulement que le Departement 
des Affaires Etranglres etait impuissant. Depuis que l'ordre de mobili- 
sation avait ete lance par l'Empereur, tous les pouvoirs appartien- 
nent a l'autorite militaire. C'etait elle qui avait juge que 1' invasion 
de la Belgique etait une operation de guerre indispensable. J'espere 
bien, a-t-il ajoute encore avec force, que cette guerre sera la derni&re. 
Elle doit marquer aussi la fin de la politique des alliances qui a abouti 
a ce resultat. 

1 See my essay" League of Nations or Alliance of Nations " in the 
Freie Zeitung (Bern) of May 25th, 1918. 



230 THE CRIME 

J'ai conserve de cet entretien rimpression que M. Zimmermann 
m'avait parle avec sa sincerit6 habituelle, que le Departement des 
Affaires Etrangeres, des Vouverture du conflit austro-serbe, avait ete 
partisan d'une solution pacifique et qu'il n' avait pas dependu de lui 
que ses vues et ses conseils n'eussent pas prevalu. Je crois meme 
aujourd'hui, contrairement a ce que je vous ai ecrit dans le premier 
moment, que MM. de Jagow et Zimmermann disaient la verite 
quand ils nous assuraient a mes collegues et a moi qu'ils n'avaient 
pas connu a l'avance le texte meme de 1' ultimatum adresse par 
l'Autriche-Hongrie a la Serbie. Un pouvoir superieur est intervenu 
pour precipiter la marche des evenements. C 'estT ultimatum de l'AUe- 
magne a la Russie envoye a Saint-Petersbourg, au moment meme 
ou le Cabinet de Vienne montrait des dispositions plus conciliantes, 
qui a dechaine la guerre. Quant a l'espoir exprime par M. Zimmer- 
mann que cette guerre serait la dernier e, il.faut 1' entendre dans le 
sens d'une campagne victorieuse par V Allemagne. Le Sous-Secr6taire 
d'Etat, malgre la crainte visible que lui inspirait la coalition des 
ennemis de son pays, est trop Prussien pour avoir doute a ce moment- 
la de la victoire finale. . . . 

What is here advanced in exoneration of the civil 
government is at the same time the gravest accusation 
against the military government. The confidant of the 
Chancellor and of the Foreign Secretary says in so many 
words that the civil government had sought for a peaceful 
solution of the conflict. However — such is the Belgian 
Ambassador's interpretation of Zimmermann's further 
utterances — " a higher power had intervened to precipi- 
tate the course of events. Germany's Ultimatum to Russia, 
dispatched to Petrograd at the very moment when the 
Viennese Government showed signs of a more conciliatory 
disposition, unchained the war." This train of thought 
in the Under-Secretary Zimmermann, which was left with 
Beyens as the " impression " derived from the conversation, 
agrees almost exactly with the account which I gave and 
supported in J'accuse as the expression of my personal 
views regarding the course of events. The civil powers 
still hesitated before the last decisive step. The military 
power threw its sword in the scale ; by the arts of persua- 
sion and surprise and by every kind of pressure and threats 
it drew the Emperor within its power ; it urged him to the 
Ultimatum to Russia, and then, passing beyond the threat 
contained in the Ultimatum, forced him to the declaration 
of war. In the decisive hours militarism gained the victory. 
The military government was the originator and instigator 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 231 

of the disaster ; the civil government was the guilty execu- 
tive organ. 

From the report of the Belgian Ambassador in Con- 
stantinople, dated October 31st, 1914 (No. 60), telling of the 
outbreak of war between Turkey and the Entente Powers, 
the following sentence is to be noted : — 

The (Turkish) Press has received an Order to publish a commu- 
nique, as a result of which the public are to be induced to believe 
that Russia began hostilities. This manoeuvre has been dictated 
by Germany, and recalls the similar manoeuvre applied on an early 
occasion by which an attempt was made to make France responsible 
for the violation of Belgian neutrality. 



PRUSSIAN-GERMAN WAR LAW. 

In this work I intentionally pass over the long explana- 
tions in the Belgian Grey Books which are occupied with 
the German accusations according to which the Belgian 
population, by a franc-tireur war waged in violation of 
international law, occasioned the incredible atrocities and 
barbarities inflicted on the civil population of a neutral 
country. The investigation of these questions forms a 
subject apart, in no way closely connected with the subject 
which I have discussed, viz. : " Who is responsible for 
the European War ? " The Belgian Government has 
published a copious, officially documented collection of 
papers on these matters. Apart from earlier publications, 
they have in the last place published a third Grey Book 
of 500 large pages which, relying throughout on official 
records, gives an unspeakably appalling picture of the whole- 
sale murder of thousands of Belgian civilians, men, women 
and children. It is sufficient to read the lists of places, 
divided into provinces, in which civilians were murdered 
and the number of victims noted in each place in order 
to form some idea of the frenzied rage of the Germans in 
this neutral country which, on Jagow's testimony, had 
always observed a correct attitude towards Germany. 
In each of the places in question all the massacred inhabi- 
tants are given with their names, rank, residence and age. 
In Dinant this list of names comprises no fewer than 606 



232 THE CRIME 

persons (of whom 11 are under 5 years and 30 are over 70 
years of age) — in all 535 men and 71 women. In Louvain 
and some smaller places there are 210 civilians mentioned 
by name as having been killed, including 186 men and 26 
women, among these 3 children under 5 years of age, 
7 men over 70, and 4 over 80. In Andenne over 100, in 
Aerschot 155, in Hadelin 61, in Tamines 336 civilians 
were killed. In my book I have already referred to 
Cardinal Mercier's pastoral letter dated Christmas, 1914, 
which cites 13 priests as having been killed in the diocese 
of Malines alone, and no fewer than 30 in the dioceses of 
Namur, Tournai, and Liege, all of whom Mercier mentions 
by name. 

As I have said, I do not propose to enter more fully 
within the scope of my work into this subject of German 
barbarities in Belgium, and reserve for a later occasion a 
final investigation of this question. One point, however, 
I will emphasise : The barbarities committed by the 
German troops are in general in no way denied by the 
German Government ; they are, on the contrary, explained 
and justified by reference to alleged franc-tireur acts on 
the part of the Belgian population. Should individual acts 
of this nature have taken place, the fact would be only too 
easily explicable, when we consider the plight of the 
unfortunate population who were suddenly confronted 
with the invading hordes, the devastation of their fields 
and woods, the destruction of their towns, the ruin of their 
peaceful country. Instead of understanding the state 
of mind and the spirit of the population who were unex- 
pectedly attacked and innocently exposed to all the horrors 
of war, and instead of acting accordingly, the German 
army followed the rigid Prussian principle of war : If 
civilians offer resistance to armed force or injure it in any 
other way, the principle that every man can be made 
responsible only for his own actions, which is otherwise 
generally valid, at once ceases to have any force. There 
thus appears the monstrosity of collective responsibility 
according to which every individual has also to answer for 
the actions of all others. The lives of thousands of un- 
happy inhabitants of Belgium have been sacrificed to 
this monstrous theory of punishment and deterring, 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 233 

a theory dating from the times of darkest barbarism, which 
appears to the conscience of the present-day civilised world 
as monstrous as the slaughter or the enslavement of con- 
quered nations in antiquity. It is in contradiction not 
merely to the modern consciousness of right, but also to 
the positive prescriptions of modern international law. 

Article 50 of the Hague Convention of October 18th, 
1907, on the Laws and Customs of War by land, prescribes : 

" No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, can 
be inflicted on the population on account of the acts 
of individuals, for which it cannot be regarded as 
collectively responsible." 

Article 46 provides : 

" Family honour and rights, individual lives and 
private property, as well as religious convictions and 
liberty must be respected. Private property cannot 
be confiscated." 

An exception to the international provision which has 
prevailed for centuries, that war is waged not against 
the civil population in the enemy country, but only against 
the enemy armies, only arises when the country attacked 
is actually occupied, "when it is actually placed under the 
authority of the hostile army. The occupation applies 
only to the territory where such authority is estab- 
lished and in a position to assert itself" (Art. 42). 

If the attacked country or the part of the country in 
question is not yet occupied, if it has not yet " actually 
passed into the hands of the occupant " (Art. 43), the 
population which " on the enemy's approach, spontaneously 
take up arms to resist the invading troops " are to be 
regarded as belligerents, — it being pre-supposed merely 
that they carry arms openly and observe the laws and 
customs of war (Art. 2.) 

From these provisions it follows that even if the Belgian 
population had at times seized arms against the invading 
Germans, their action, according to international law, 
would have been the legitimate defence of their native soil, 
and the defenders should have been treated as a belligerent 



234 THE CRIME 

party, in the same way as enemy soldiers. The wholesale 
murder of men, women and children, of the grey-headed and 
of babies at the breast, would still have been murder in 
violation of international law, even if all those who had 
been slaughtered had been convicted of bearing arms 
against the invading enemy. What judgment is to be 
passed on the deeds of the German army in view of the 
fact that these deeds, openly and without shame, are justi- 
fied merely by the shortcomings of individuals alleged to 
be guilty ? 

There are in existence a great number of orders and 
instructions from the higher command of the army which 
give expression to the principle of collective punishment 
as if it were something which is entirely a matter of course. 
As one example among many, I will merely print one pro- 
clamation of the Army Commander von Biilow, dated 
August 22nd, 1914-, which I have before me in the French 
text only. The proclamation was affixed in Liege on the 
day mentioned : 

Armee-Oberkommando Le 22 aout 1914. 

Abteilung II b. N° 150. 

Aux Autorites communales 
de la 
Ville de Liege. 

Les habitants de la ville d'Andenne, apres avoir proteste de leurs 
intentions pacifiques, ont fait une surprise traitre sur nos troupes. 
C'est avec mon consentement que le General en chef a fait bruler 
toute la localite et que cent personnes environ ont ete fusillees. 

Je porte ce fait a la connaissance de la Ville de Liege pour que les 
Liegois se representent le sort dont ils sont menaces, s'ils prenaient 
pareille attitude. 

Ensuite, il a ete trouve dans un magasin d'armes a Huy des pro- 
jectiles " dum-dum " dans le genre du specimen joint a la presente 
lettre. Au cas que cela arrivat, on demandera rigoureusement 
compte chaque fois des personnes en question. 

Le General-Commandant en chef 

von Bulow. 

Here we have the principle of collective punishment in 
its utter nakedness : Because inhabitants of the town are 
alleged to have made a treacherous attack on German 
troops, the whole town was burned down and " about " 100 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 235 

persons shot (the German authorities did not, as a rule, 
enter upon the real, authentic determination of the facts). 
This is entirely in agreement with the German " Customs of 
War by Land," which hold as an instruction to be followed 
in military practice, but it is in contradiction with the 
simplest commands of humanity and justice and with the 
provisions of the Hague Convention which were signed 
by Germany herself. 



The three Belgian Grey Books, the above-mentioned 
work of Davignon, the books of Waxweiler and many 
other publications contain a wealth of evidence in support 
of the fact that the Belgian Government from the 4th of 
August onwards issued the strictest and most detailed 
instructions to the population of the country to refrain 
under severe penalties from any struggle, any provocation, 
any open meeting, any bearing of arms. The Belgian 
Minister of the Interior, Berryer, on August 4th, 1914, 
issued a circular instruction to all the governmental 
and communal authorities of the kingdom, which was 
publicly affixed in 2,700 communes and published every 
morning in large type on the first page of all the Belgian 
papers. This instruction warns the population against 
any hostile or provocative action towards the invading 
German troops, with detailed information as to what the 
population had to do, and what they had to omit, and with 
a grave reference to the serious consequences which the 
actions of individuals might bring upon all their fellow- 
citizens. 

These ministerial instructions were further amplified 
by special instructions from the Burgomasters in the 
individual communities. In particular Max, the Burgo- 
master of Brussels, — who, as is known, has been in a 
German prison for years — summoned the population to 
surrender any arms in their hands at the police station 
and obtain a receipt in return — a summons which was also 
issued by all the other communal authorities. (See Grey 
Book II, No. 71, with enclosures.) 

It was this very measure of precaution which gave rise to 
the charge preferred by the German Government that the 



236 THE CRIME 

Belgian Government, long before the German invasion, 
had organised a general conflict on the part of the civil 
population against the invading enemy, and that wholesale 
depots had been found where every rifle bore the name of 
the possessor for whom it was intended. This refers to 
the private arms collected by the authorities which the 
individual owners had given up in exchange for a receipt, 
and which were designated with the name of the owners so 
that they might at a later date be properly restored. 

It will be seen to what absurd inventions the German 
Government was forced in order to surround the unspeak- 
able horrors of the German troops towards the Belgian 
civil population with a certain appearance of justification. 
The very designation of the weapons with the names of the 
owners proves that they were intended for non-use and not 
for use. Or is it by any chance customary in arsenals to 
attach to arms in advance the names of the soldiers who 
are to bear them in battle ? In spite of this absurdity, this 
accusation appeared to the German Government sufficiently 
credible to cause it to be incorporated by the German 
Emperor in his telegram to President Wilson. 1 In address- 
ing the President of the United States, the Emperor William 
also accuses the Belgian Government " of having openly 
incited the whole population to armed resistance, which 
had been prepared long in advance and in which even 
women and priests took part." All this is exactly the 
reverse of the truth : the official proclamations and 
instructions of the Belgian Government, the local authori- 
ties and the heads of the communes, which are printed in 
the three Belgian Grey Books and in the works of Wax- 
weiler and Davignon, prove that a civil population was 
never more energetically and effectively restrained from 
resistance to an invading conqueror (so natural and in 
itself so humanly comprehensible) than was the Belgian 
population by the Belgian authorities. 

The alleged atrocities committed by Belgian civilians 
towards wounded Germans, the gouged-out eyes, the 
dissevered members, etc., which the German Press of incite- 
ment paraded for months, have also remained legends for 

1 Printed, in part, in Davignon 's expose to his foreign missions of 
December 30th, 1914 (Grey Book II, No. 71). 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 237 

which not the slightest proof has ever at any time been 
produced. Even official Commissions appointed in Ger- 
many to investigate such cases have been unable to find 
any evidence that the eyes of wounded Germans or prisoners 
in Belgium were gouged out even in a single case. In 
many hospitals unfortunate soldiers were found who 
had lost their eyesight in battle — in a single hospital at 
Frankfort-on-the-Main there were no fewer than twenty- 
nine blinded — but not one of these was the victim of 
subsequent mutilation. All had lost their sight as a result 
of gunshot wounds. (Grey Book II, No. 107.) 

To illustrate by one example how far belief can be given 
to such an accusation against the Belgian population, the 
Kolnische Volkszeitung and Vorwarts made special inquiry 
into this very matter of the gouged-out eyes. In the case 
of both papers the result was equally negative. The 
semi-official Kolnische Zeitung, relying on the alleged report 
of a doctor, had put forward the assertion that unfortunate 
men whose eyes had been gouged out were to be found, 
more especially in the hospitals of Aix-la-Chapelle, as 
also a nurse whose breasts had been cut off. Kaufmann, a 
German ecclesiastic, thereupon made inquiries in all the 
thirty-five hospitals in Aix-la-Chapelle, and ascertained 
that not a single wounded man with his eyes gouged out, 
and no woman with her breasts cut off, was there or had 
ever been there. Kaufmann submitted the result of his 
inquiries in a letter to the Kolnische Volkszeitung dated from 
Aix-la-Chapelle, November 26th, 1914. 

The inquiries of Vorwarts in the hospitals at Hanover 
and Berlin (Charite) led to the same negative result. 1 



As has already been observed, it would lead too far, and 
would lie outside the scope of this work, if I were to specify 
and investigate more fully all the accusations brought 
by Germany against the Belgian population, all the acts of 
plunder, arson and massacre which the German armies 
on their part committed in the hapless country. The 
German crimes are documentarily so clearly established 
that any doubt on the question can scarcely appear justified. 

1 See, for all the above, Grey Book II, No. 108, with enclosure. 



238 THE CRIME 

They are attributable less to the excesses of individuals 
than to the special barbaric Prussian principle that the 
population must be intimidated by fear and terror and 
restrained in advance from any act of resistance ; that 
the ruthless application of all means calculated to promote 
the security of the army is not only a right, but also a duty 
of every commander. In furtherance of this higher end, 
it is unnecessary to inquire who is guilty and who is inno- 
cent ; the innocent must, in fact, pay the penalty along 
with the guilty — indeed, if necessary, instead of the guilty. 
The Prussian-German law of war, as it is taught in the 
book of instructions, " Customs of War by Land," is, as 
a matter of course, entirely approved by the German 
teachers of international law and by the German intellec- 
tuals. In an article in the Kolnische Zeitung of February 
10th, 1915, the well-known writer, Walter Bloem, expounds 
with true German professorial profundity and in an entirely 
naive manner the psychological aims and effects of this 
military theory of deterring. In doing this he betrays not 
a trace of consciousness that he is thereby repudiating the 
fundamental principles of Christian morality and political 
justice, but that he is even outdoing Jehovah, the old God 
of Vengeance, who, indeed, demanded in expiation an eye 
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, but not the eye and the 
tooth of the innocent in expiation of the crime of the 
guilty. According to Bloem, the innocent must suffer 
with the guilty, and indeed, if these latter cannot be dis- 
covered, instead of the guilty — not because a crime has 
been committed, but in order to prevent further crimes. 
It is the theory of the " warning-signal " which is so warmly 
defended by this German writer, in agreement with the 
whole of German war literature. The burning of Louvain, 
Dinant, Aerschot, Termonde, Battice, Andenne, etc., the 
massacres in these places, costing the lives of thousands of 
innocent people, are not for these men of feeling ends in 
themselves, they are not punishments for crimes which 
have been committed, but merely means to an end, namely, 
that of preventing further crimes. Brussels and Antwerp, 
Ghent and Ostend — so runs the argument — may well be 
thankful to those kind Germans for the barbarities which 
they committed in other towns in the first days of the 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 239 

invasion. By these " warning-signals " the inhabitants 
of Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent and Ostend were guarded from 
any temptation to offer resistance, and thus their lives and 
property were saved. 

That is the " theory of deterring " in an even crasser 
form than is to be found in the procedure of the criminal 
courts of the earliest Middle Age. It was only the severity 
of the punishment, the barbarity of the visitation, 
which would, on these mediaeval views, restrain others 
from the commission of similar crimes. The presupposition 
of punishment was, however, in every case demonstrated 
guilt. No tribunal of the Inquisition, no torturing judge, 
has ever fallen upon the idea that the innocent must also 
be punished in order to prevent crimes in future. This 
theory of political punishment has been reserved for 
Prussian militarism and its intellectual abettors. This is 
the German " Kultur " with which it is proposed to bless 
the world. 

France and Belgian Neutrality. 

From the second Belgian Grey Book, No. 119, with its 
enclosure, still appears to me worthy of mention in con- 
cluding this investigation, which extends, as I have said, 
in its essence, not to the phenomena of the war, the indivi- 
dual actions of the belligerent parties, but to the origins 
and the authorship of the war. It contains a Note from 
Davignon, the Belgian Foreign Minister, addressed to his 
representatives abroad, directed against the German asser- 
tion that France, as was known from a sure source, was to 
march through Belgium along the Meuse by Givet and 
Namur in order to attack Germany from this side. This 
assertion, which was advanced in the German ultimatum 
of August 2nd, was repeated by the famous General von 
Bernhardi in the American paper The Sun, and was ex- 
plained on military grounds. Davignon's Note of April 
10th, 1915, is directed against this insinuation which is 
irreconcilably opposed to the formal statement of the 
French Government to the Belgian and English Govern- 
ments (July 31st). In proof of the erroneousness of this 
German assertion the Belgian Minister produces an 



240 THE CRIME 

official French communication regarding the concentration 
of French troops at the beginning of the war. 

In this official statement of the French Government we 
read as follows : 

Annexe au N°. 119. 

La France et la neutralite de la Belgique. 

LA KEPONSE DE LA FBANCE ATJX MENSONGES ALLEMANDS. 

Dans un article publie par un j ournal americain, le general allemand 
von Bernhardi, revenant sur les origines de la guerre, pretend 
etablir que la concentration francaise et la presence a notre aile 
gauche de nos forces principales demontrent la resolution arretee 
du Gouvernement francais de violer, de concert avec la Grande- 
Bretagne, la neutralite beige. 

A cette allegation du general von Bernhardi, le plan de concen- 
tration francais r6pond peremptoirement. 

I. — Notre plan de concentration. 

La totalite des forces francaises, en vertu du plan de concentration, 
etaient orientees, quand la guerre a ete declar6e, face au nord-est, 
entre Belfort et la frontiere beige, savoir : 

T' e armee : entre Belfort et la ligne generale Mirecourt-Luneville ; 

2 e armee : entre cette ligne et la Moselle ; 

3 e armee : entre la Moselle et la ligne Verdun- Audun-le-Roman ; 

5 e armee : entre cette ligne et la frontiere beige ; 

La 4" armee etait en reserve a l'ouest de Commercy. 

Par consequent, la totalite des armies francaises etait orientee face 
a VAllemagne, et rien que face a V Allemagne. . . . 

II. 

. . . S'il y avait eu de sa part premeditation, ce brusque deplace- 
ment de nos troupes n'aurait pas ete necessaire et nous aurions pu 
arriver a temps pour interdire a 1'ennemi, en Belgique, le passage de 
la Meuse. 

Un detail peut servir d' illustration a cette argumentation peremp- 
toire : notre corps de couverture de gauche, le deuxieme, c'est-a-dire 
celui d' Amiens, etait, en vertu du plan de concentration, non point 
face a la frontiere beige, mais dans la region de Montmedy-Longuyon. 

III. — La concentration de Varmee anglaise. 

Quant a 1' armee anglaise, son concours ne nous a ete assure qu'a 
la date du 5 aout, c'est-a-dire apres la violation de la frontiere beige 
par les Allemands, accomplie le 3 aout (Livre Jaune, page 151). 

La concentration de Varmee britannique s'est effectuee en arriere de 
Maubeuge, du 14 au 21 aout. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOKS 241 

IV. — Ordres divers concemant les intentions 
du Gouvernement francais. 

Le 30 juillet, le Gouvernement francais, malgre les mesures mili- 
taires de l'Allemagne, donne l'ordre a nos troupes de couverture de 
se maintenir d 10 kilometres de la frontiere. 

Le 2 aout, une seconde instruction prescrit a nos troupes de laisser 
aux Allemands l'entiere responsabilit6 des hostilites et de se borner 
a repousser toute troupe assaillante penetrant en territoire frangais. 

Le 3 aout, un nouveau telegramme prescrit d'une facon absolue 
d'eviter tout incident sur la frontiere franco-beige. Les troupes francaises 
devront s'en tenir eloignees de 2 d 3 kilometres. 

Le meme jour, 3 aout, un nouvel ordre confirme et pr6cise les 
instructions du 2 aout. 

Le 4 aout, un ordre du Ministre de la Guerre porte : 

" L'Allemagne va tenter par de fausses nouvelles de nous amener 
a violer la neutrality beige. II est interdit rigoureusement et d'une 
mani&re formelle, jusqu'd ce qu'un ordre contraire soit donne, de 
penetrer, meme par des patrouilles ou de simples cavaliers, sur le 
territoire beige, ainsi qu'aux aviateurs de survoler ce territoire." 

Le 5 aout seulement, a la demande du Gouvernement beige 
(formulae le 4), les avions et les dirigeables francais sont autoris6s 
a survoler le territoire beige et nos reconnaissances a y penetrer. 

Arising out of this statement, the following points are 
to be noted : 

1. At the beginning of the war the whole of the French 
forces was concentrated exclusively between Belfort and 
the Belgian frontier, that is to say, on the French eastern 
frontier opposite Germany. 

2. After the entry of the Germans into Belgium it was 
necessary to carry out a rapid displacement of a part of 
the French troops in a northern direction. The whole 
plan of concentration had to be modified with this end in 
view. 

3. It was not until after the violation of Belgian neutrality 
that the French Government were assured of the military 
support of the English army, the concentration of which 
was completed behind Maubeuge in the period from August 
14th to August 21st. 

4. On July 30th the order was issued to the French 
troops on the frontier to keep at a distance of ten kilometres 
from the German frontier. On August 3rd a similar order 



242 THE CRIME 

was issued to remain from two to three kilometres distant 
from the Belgian frontier. On August 4th the Minister for 
War issued the strictest injunction that Belgian territory- 
should under no circumstances be entered upon or flown 
over, not even by patrols. The order was based on the 
assumption that Germany by the dissemination of false 
information desired to convict the French of having been 
the first to violate Belgian neutrality. 

5. It was not until Wednesday, August 5th, after the 
formal request of the Belgian Government for military 
assistance, that French troops were given permission 
to enter on Belgian territory. 

These military facts, the accuracy of which is certainly 
better known to no one than to the German General 
Staff, are in exact agreement with the diplomatic occur- 
rences ; their reliability is confirmed by the course of the 
war in the first weeks, by the complete surprise of the 
French northern army, which had been hastily brought 
together, and by the impetuously victorious German 
campaign until close beneath the walls of Paris. The 
military facts so ascertained are not without significance 
for the question of guilt. Had France wanted war and 
intentionally provoked it — as every quill-driver in Germany 
from the celebrated professor of history down to the most 
miserable journalistic hack now maintains — the French 
General Staff would certainly have made arrangements 
during the twelve critical days for the invasion of the 
German armies from Belgium, the systematic preparation 
for which was no secret to any military expert in Europe, 
and they would not have exposed themselves to this danger- 
ous surprise. In Paris they neither wanted nor — till the 
last moment — considered this war possible. This explains 
the military negligence which is expressed in the dis- 
position of the French troops. 



CHAPTER III 

BARON BEYENS' BOOK : 
" GERMANY BEFORE THE WAR " 

For various reasons this book deserves special interest 
and detailed treatment : first, because it is written by the 
man who, as Greindl's successor, represented the Kingdom 
of Belgium in Berlin during the last two years before the 
outbreak of the war, and who is quoted in the German 
collection — with eleven reports — as a reliable and credible 
observer of European affairs ; secondly, because the 
contents of the book itself reveal to us not merely an intelli- 
gent, a highly cultured, and an elegant author, but above 
all a shrewd and keen observer of men, one with an 
accurate knowledge of the conditions and tendencies in 
Germany ; thirdly, because the book discusses, with a 
complete knowledge of the subject, the more remote as well 
as the more immediate antecedents of the war, and thus 
forms a valuable amplification of the documentary material 
published by the German Government, which breaks 
off on July 2nd, 1914. 

From the side of Germany it may possibly be urged 
against the book written by Baron Beyens, who, as is 
known, was later the Belgian Premier, that it did not 
appear until after the outbreak of the war, in 1915, and 
that it has inevitably been prejudiced by the fate which 
the author's country met at the hands of Germany. This 
objection is not, however, tenable. Nowhere in the book 
are there to be found any statements which are in direct 
contradiction with Baron Beyens' reports from 1912-1914 
which are printed by the Foreign Office. The Belgian 
diplomatist nowhere disowns in his book what he had said 
in his reports from Berlin, even if, as was natural after the 

243 R 2 



244 THE CRIME 

enormous crime of the intentional provocation of war by 
Germany had become manifest, he brands much more 
sharply the tendencies in the direction of war existing at 
the Imperial Court, in military circles and among the 
authoritative parties of Germany, than he had done at the 
time of his residence in Berlin, when, indeed, he had recog- 
nised the dangerousness of Prussian-German militarism 
and chauvinism, but had not considered it possible that 
this incitement to war could achieve any success with the 
peace-loving German people. 

The attitude assumed by the Belgian Ambassador to- 
wards the question of the authorship of the war from the 
beginning of the conflict, indeed from the assassination 
of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, is already apparent 
from the last report of July 2nd published in the German 
collection, which I have discussed above in the first 
section. In the second section I have submitted to a 
detailed treatment Baron Bey ens' later reports down to 
his departure from Berlin, so far as they are published in 
the Belgian Grey Books. Until the contrary is proved, it 
may be assumed that these subsequent reports were 
also found by the German authorities in Brussels. That 
these were not published along with the others is pre- 
sumably merely due to the fact that the contents of these 
later reports, after July 2nd, must obviously have been 
m terms very unfavourable to Germany. 

The German Government, the publisher of these tenden- 
ciously compiled documents, is thus in no way justified in 
reproaching Beyens' book with having been written 
at a later date in a spirit of prejudice. Since it must have 
knowledge of all its discoveries, including those documents 
which were not published, it will be an easy matter for it 
to ascertain that the Belgian diplomatist's book is merely 
a connected account of the thoughts and observations 
contained in his reports when taken in their entirety. 

Deceptions and Disillusionments. 

For the rest, in view of untenable objections of this 
nature, I should like once for all to make the following 
observations : 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 245 

1. We are familiar with the fact that Baron Greindl, 
Beyens' predecessor, had in general expressed himself 
in favourable terms regarding German policy, and on the 
whole had regarded it as pacific. Let us assume that 
Greindl had not retired from office in the spring of 1912, 
but had experienced as Ambassador in Berlin the develop- 
ment of the Austro-Serbian conflict and its extension to a 
European war. Would he have maintained unaltered his 
favourable verdict on the German Emperor, the German 
Government, and the authoritative classes in Germany ? 
I am convinced that he would have fundamentally revised 
this judgment, he would have said Pater peccavi, and, 
assuming that he was an honest man, he would have 
assigned the authorship of the war to the two Central Powers, 
exactly as was done by all his colleagues in all the European 
capitals. 

2. This assumption regarding the attitude which it 
might have been foreseen would be assumed by a man even 
so philo-Germanic in sympathy as Greindl, when confronted 
with the brutal fact involved in the provocation of war, 
leads us to a general consideration which is applicable to 
all the Belgian ambassadorial reports. How often does 
it happen to each of us in life that we are surprised by the 
action of a man whom we would never have credited with 
anything similar ! A merchant lives for years in the 
most intimate relations with an agent or a cashier, to whom 
he gives his completest confidence, and whom he would 
never have considered capable of a dishonourable act. 
Suddenly he discovers that the man, whose absolute 
fidelity and trustworthiness he had never doubted, has 
for. years been deceiving, cheating and robbing him in the 
most shameful manner. A husband lives in long and 
undisturbed harmony with his wife, of whose fidelity he 
has never entertained the slightest doubt. Suddenly he 
discovers that she has had one lover after another and that 
she has shamefully gambled with his honour and her own. 
Life is full of such disillusions. If it is possible in the closest 
and most intimate private intercourse so to conceal one's 
true character that the most familiar comrade in life or 
in the workshop has no idea of the double life of his fellow- 



246 THE CRIME 

being, how much more easily is it possible to deceive other 
men regarding one's true aims and intentions in the field of 
diplomacy, where, as is known, language serves only to 
conceal thoughts ! 

This possibility of continued deception was present in a 
very special degree in Berlin. In one of the last conversa- 
tions which King Leopold II had before his death with 
Baron Beyens he advised him if he should ever go to 
Berlin " to beware of German civilities " (de me defier 
des amabilites allemandes). In many places in his book 
Beyens sketches in eloquent words the fascinating qualities 
which the Emperor William showed in personal inter- 
course ; his infectious amiability, his brilliant conversation 
which enabled him to appear in the light of a universal 
genius, at home in all subjects ; his dramatic capacities 
which enabled him, according to his particular aims, to 
make his hearer believe what he wished him to believe ; 
his expansive warmth when he desired to appear warm, 
his cutting coldness when he desired to be withering 
and menacing. The reader should refer to the account 
given by Beyens where he relates how the Emperor William, 
on the occasion of his visit to Brussels in October 1910, 
in the company of the Empress and of Princess Victoria 
Louise, gained the sympathies of all by the feelings of 
friendship, apparently springing from his heart, which he 
entertained for the Belgian Royal House and the Belgian 
people ; how, apparently without any malicious arriere 
pensee he admired the beauty and the wealth of the Belgian 
capital, the magnitude of Belgian industry, the splendour 
of the country villas that fringed the roads ; how he was 
touched by the sympathetic reception which the population 
accorded him. " Jovial, affable, enthusiastic in turn, 
and constantly breaking into his guttural laugh, he ran up 
and down the whole gamut of his nature. His hearers 
were spellbound. How could they have failed to be con- 
vinced that the great Emperor was a benevolent Titan ? " 
For thirty-two years the Emperor William had not seen 
Belgium ; he could not express sufficient enthusiasm for 
the splendid and brilliant impression which this prosperous 
country made upon him. When from the balcony of the 
Hotel de Ville in Brussels — the building in which the 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 



247 



Burgomaster Max, who was imprisoned at the beginning 
of the war, resided — he looked down on the famous Grande 
Place with its artistic facades, and the crowd closely 
pressed together, he could not refrain from exclaiming to 
the Empress : " We did not expect anything so beautiful." 
Baron Beyens adds to his graphic account of the Imperial 
visit the ironical observation that it was somewhat rash 
to parade all one's wealth so trustfully to a foreign ruler 
who is the master of an army of five million soldiers. 

The autumn visit of 1910 was a return of the visit paid 
to Potsdam by the Belgian King and Queen in the spring 
of the same year. As the Emperor was ill on this occasion, 
the Crown Prince read at the Court dinner the address 
of welcome, which specially referred to the fact that a 
German Princess was Queen of Belgium, and that in this 
way the bonds of relationship between the two royal 
families and the historical memories between the two 
countries were still further strengthened. In his reply 
to the toast King Albert praised the proved love of peace 
of the Emperor William, who devoted all his thoughts 
to the well-being of his subjects and to the peaceful develop- 
ment of Germany. It was in this seductive light of a 
peace-Emperor, a Titus or a Solomon, that the fascinating 
personality which adorned the German Imperial throne 
then appeared to the Belgian King and the Belgian people. 
Need it cause any surprise if the Emperor William also 
appeared as the guardian of the peace of Europe to the 
Belgium diplomatists in Berlin who were constantly 
exposed to this personal charm ? 

3. To this personal influence of the Emperor, who was 
on his guard against showing the change which had taken 
place in recent years in his mind, more particularly to 
the Belgians, whose benevolent neutrality he hoped to 
gain without fail in the event of a war — to this personal 
impression produced by the Emperor there was further 
added, as a reinforcing factor, the attitude of the 
various Chancellors and Foreign Secretaries who, as we 
know, were not from the beginning adherents of the war 
party, but were assiduous, whenever possible, to obtain 
by means of diplomatic negotiations the aims of further- 



248 THE CRIME 

ance of power and of expansion which were present to their 
minds also. As I have elsewhere pointed out, Prince 
Biilow and Bethmann-Hollweg were in no way Pan- 
Germans. By their political actions, however, and even 
more by their omissions, they constantly brought grist 
to the mill of the Pan-German movement ; by their 
policy of armaments they constantly rendered more acute 
the state of European tension ; by their refusal of any 
international organisation they defeated the possibilities 
of a peaceful understanding ; at times, when it suited 
their purpose in connection with their proposals as to arma- 
ments, they even instigated Pan-German chauvinism 
through their semi-official Press, and thus, without being 
direct inciters to war, they were yet the abettors of these 
inciters. Since, however, the accredited diplomatists in 
Berlin had in the nature of things to deal with the states- 
men of the Wilhelmstrasse, but not with the war ministers 
and the chiefs of the General Staff, still less with the noisy 
company of the Pan-German League or with the editors 
of the Jingo Press, it need occasion no surprise that these 
diplomatists received from the utterances of the leading 
statesmen, as well as from the personal action of the 
Emperor, the deceptive impression that there was no reason 
to apprehend a danger of war from the side of Germany. 
This impression is the decisive note in Greindl's reports, 
while Beyens, who was gifted with keener and more pene- 
trating vision, refers in the last two years before the war 
to many indications of the grave growth of chauvinism 
with its incitement to war, and of its increasing influence 
on German politics. 

4. The credulous error of Belgian diplomatists regarding 
the fundamental tendency of German politics is all the 
more explicable, inasmuch as these observers could rightly 
confirm the existence of an absolute love of peace in the 
great mass of the German people, from high finance down 
to the simple labourer. The overwhelming majority of 
the German people itself had even in July 1914 no idea 
how far the peaceful soil of Germany had already been 
undermined by the war-intriguers ; how the Emperor 
himself had already been won in principle to the idea of a 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 249 

war by his military environment, by the war-party led 
by the Crown Prince, by the forces interested in a war, 
Junkerdom and Agrarianism, which more than any other 
circles possessed his ear ; how it was merely a question of 
waiting for the most favourable moment in order to strike 
with the greatest assurance of success. Of all this the 
great mass of the German people had still no idea a few 
weeks before the war. It was only the wirepullers and the 
initiated who knew what was to come sooner or later. How 
is it to be expected that the Belgian diplomatists who 
learned only from hearsay all the important negotiations 
between the Great Powers, who had little opportunity 
or occasion to penetrate into the secret mine-passages at 
the Imperial Court, who believed in the obvious love of 
peace of the people in all its labouring classes, and in the 
love of peace which was displayed by the rulers, the 
Government and the Governmental Press — how is it to 
be expected that these Ambassadors should have been 
better informed regarding the flame of war which was glow- 
ing under the ashes of peace than the German people itself, 
whose life and well-being were involved in the question 
of war or peace ? 

It is not surprising that it was just the Belgian Ambassa- 
dors, whose favourable judgment must have been of special 
importance to the German despots on account of their 
selfish designs on this neutral country, who fell more easily 
than other diplomatists into the trap so cunningly set for 
them, and paid to the German Emperor as well as to the 
German Government honourable testimony which after- 
wards was so grimly disowned by the event. They were, 
in fact, deceived, or rather they allowed themselves to be 
deceived ; and the acknowledgment that this is the case 
may detract from their reputation for astuteness, but not 
from their honesty. To-day, like the merchant who has 
been robbed by an agent of many years' service, they are 
no doubt exclaiming : "I would never have believed 
it of the man." Is the deceit itself cancelled by this 
acknowledgment of shortsightedness, of credulousness 
shown towards a deceiver ? On the contrary, the deed 
remains as it was, but its monstrousness is further 
accentuated by the hypocrisy, by the prolonged viola- 



250 THE CRIME 

tion of confidence with which it was prepared and 
executed. 

5. In their Grey Books the Belgian Government have 
brought together a series of facts — and Bey ens also goes 
into this point in his book — which show the deliberate 
denial of any evil intention existing in the governmental 
circles of Germany towards the neutral country. Prince 
Billow, Bethmann Hollweg, Kiderlen, Jagow, Heeringen, 
Flotow, Below-Saleske — Chancellors, Secretaries of State, 
War Ministers, German Ambassadors in Brussels, have one 
and all constantly given solemn and sacred assurances 
that Germany had no thought of touching so much as a 
hair of their neutral neighbour. Indeed Herr von Below- 
Saleske went so far as to assure Davignon, the Belgian 
Minister, in the course of August 2nd, that Belgium could 
look with full confidence to her Eastern neighbour — on 
that same 2nd of August on which at 7 o'clock in the even- 
ing he delivered the monstrous Ultimatum to the Belgian 
Minister. 1 Up to the last moment the game was un- 
scrupulously carried on in Berlin and Brussels with con- 
cealed cards, and now they seek to present to us, as wit- 
nesses of their innocence, these men who — less clearsighted 
than credulous — were the victims of their deceit ! 

The Belgian Grey Books I and II give us the unanimous 
and crushing verdict of guilt on those in power in Germany 
and Austria, written by those same Ambassadors who, before 
the last crisis, had in part paid to the German and Austrian 
statesmen a more favourable testimony, acting under the 
influence of explicable error and of comprehensible short- 
sightedness. Bey ens' book adds a new and important 
corner-stone to the edifice of guilt. All these Belgian 
publications contain this silent acknowledgment : What 
we said in former times in favour of German and Austrian 
policy is now given the lie by the later actions of their 
statesmen. To-day we know what then we did not know, 
namely, that the true disturbers of the peace did not sit 
in Paris, in London, or in Petrograd, but were to be found 
in Vienna and Berlin. 



1 See Grey Book I, Nos. 19, 20. 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 251 



Opinions and Views in Germany. 

I now consider a few interesting points from Bey ens' 
book : 

The Belgian diplomatist analyses in an exhaustive manner 
the opinions and views of the various social and professional 
classes in Germany, as he had had an opportunity of study- 
ing them during his two years' residence in Berlin. Berlin 
high finance was entirely — without exception — a convinced 
adherent of peace. " Industrious Germany wished to 
live on good terms with France. Peace was essential 
to business, and German financiers, in particular, had 
every interest in keeping up their profitable connection 
with their French colleagues." Wholesale and retail 
industry as well as wholesale and retail trade, working 
in part by means of borrowed capital, also needed quiet 
and credit. Any external complication was bound to 
involve them in difficulties and might possibly ruin 
them. The great freighters of Hamburg and Bremen were 
necessarily, as a matter of course, adherents of peace, since 
the first presupposition of their undertakings was peaceful 
intercourse at sea. Even the high aristocracy whose names 
are chronicled in Gotha were — by virtue of their family and 
social relations with the corresponding circles abroad, 
especially in England and France — entirely in favour of 
the maintenance of European peace. 

It was only a small minority in Germany who were 
eager for war. The militarists and Pan-Germanists of 
the school of Treitschke and Bernhardi, the manufacturers 
of cannon and armour plate, above all the Prussian Junkers 
and Agrarians, whose only hope for an improvement in 
their social and economic position lay in war ; certain 
groups among the " intellectuals " whose heads had been 
turned by the ascent of the new German Empire, and who 
believed that the Germanic race were called, during the 
next period of history, to rule the world with their efficiency 
in arms, their culture, their industrial and technical supe- 
riority — these were, as the Belgian diplomatist rightly 
recognised, the classes in the German people, few in number, 
who wanted a war, who considered it necessary for the 



252 THE CRIME 

further ascent of Germany. The great mass of the German 
people were absolutely peace-loving. 

When I call up the picture of this tranquil people, going steadily 
about its business every weekday, or comfortably seated every 
Sunday at the cafe tables and drinking the national glass of beer, 
I can remember nothing but those placid faces, on which violent 
passions, antipathy to the foreigner, and even the feverish stress of 
the battle for existence, had left none of those marks which I 
have sometimes observed elsewhere as a looker-on at the human 
crowd. . . . 

How is it that this same nation responded as one man to the call 
of its Emperor and hurled itself with enthusiasm at its enemies ? 
Because it thought it had been challenged, and that the frontiers, 
the welfare, the very existence of the Empire were in danger. Middle - 
class citizens, Socialist workmen or peasants, all were convinced that 
they were defending their country against the attack of Tsarism 
combined with warlike France and perfidious Albion ; that the war 
had been desired, prepared, planned by the Powers of the Triple 
Entente impelled by an ignoble envy of a traditional hatred. The 
Imperial Government's master-stroke lay in showing the Austro- 
Serbian crisis in this light to German credulity, and in appearing 
itself as the blameless guardian of peace. (Beyens, pp. 185, 186.) 

The Belgian diplomatist draws attention in this passage 
to a chronological sequence of facts which throws an 
interesting light on the preparation of the great lie of the 
attack. The Ultimatum to Russia expired on August 1st 
at 12 noon. The declaration of war against Russia took 
place on the evening of August 1st at 7.10 p.m. As early 
as August 3rd the German White Book, in a finished state, 
was deposited at the office of the Reichstag with the note : 
Closed on August 2nd, midday. Incomplete and defective 
as this book of 47 pages may be, it nevertheless appears 
impossible that, in the short space of time from the even- 
ing of August 1st to midday on August 2nd, such a book, 
with all its explanations, documents and compilations, 
can have been written, set up, corrected and printed. The 
book had, in fact, already been prepared beforehand during 
the last days of the crisis, presumably after the decisive 
Crown Council of July 29th, after the Emperor and his 
Counsellors had firmly decided on war, no matter what 
events might supervene, no matter what concessions and 
proposals for an understanding should be made by the 
Entente Powers. 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 253 



Aims of the German War of Aggression. 

Bey ens sees the governing motive of this German war of 
aggression less in economic considerations than in aims of 
power. In the forty-four years of peace since the Franco- 
German War the economic development of Germany in 
any case guaranteed the German Empire — even without 
a war — a gradual economic hegemony in Europe, which, 
with progressive extension at the same rate, would pre- 
sumably have arisen to a world hegemony : 

A prolonged era of peace was required if the vigorous development 
of the national resources was to continue. This is an incontestable 
truth which cannot be repeated too often. Moreover, a prolonged 
era of peace would have enabled the Germans, by virtue of their 
genius for organising, their methodical ways, and their capacity 
for hard work, to become the leading nation in almost every sphere of 
international competition, owning the main sources of industrial 
production and holding the unquestioned economic supremacy of 
Europe. Yet they have been mad enough to make a bid for this 
supremacy by a war that is utterly at variance with the progress of 
civilisation! (Beyens, p. 98.) 

In the opinion of the Belgian diplomatist, Weltpolitik, 
but without a war, would have been the true aim of the 
efforts of Germany. This aim. however, did not satisfy 
the hunger for power, the dreams of world-conquest, of 
the Pan-Germans ; it did not satisfy the ambitious Caesarean 
plans of the Emperor William, who, with increasing age 
and under the increasing pressure of his environment, 
became more and more alienated from the peace-ideals 
of his first period of government, who felt more and more 
the call implanted within him by Providence to lead to 
a new and higher level of power in the world the Empire 
which had again been reunited by his ancestors. For 
Beyens this war is not an economic but a political war : 

The merciless war waged against us by the Kaiser's troops is above 
all, in my humble opinion, a political campaign. Economic causes 
have been grafted upon the primary cause, but the part they have 
played is a subordinate one. The schemes framed in Berlin are no 
longer wrapped in the haze that once surrounded them, but reveal 
themselves to us in clear outline. What was the object of hurling 
two million men at France, while the Russian armies were held in 



254 THE CRIME 

check, and the Austrians were sent to annihilate Serbia ? To crush 
once for all the military Power that stood in the way of German 
imperialism ; to deprive Russia of all concern in European affairs ; 
to seize for Germany the whole coast-line of the North Sea ; to 
make her a Mediterranean Power by annexing French Africa : to 
dissolve the Balkan alliances and deal the death-blow to Slav hopes ; 
to give Austria the suzerainty of the Balkan peninsula ; finally, to 
hold undisputed sway at Constantinople and in Asiatic Turkey as 
far as the Persian Gulf. ... A few decisive battles, it was thought, 
would be enough to enslave Continental Europe, and to build up, 
on the basis of that "Mid European Confederation" of which the 
German intellectuals speak quite openly to-day, the political 
supremacy of Germany, while England would be left isolated, an 
easy prey to her rival in a later campaign. (Beyens, pp. 213-214.) 



The German Military Law and the French Three 
Years Law: The Falsification of Dates." 

The last German Military Law was for Beyens merely 
the last preparatory measure for the long-projected 
European war. There is for him not the slightest doubt 
that this law had an aggressive character (caractere 
agressif). On March 18th, 1913, the law was deposited 
at the office of the Reichstag ; on June 30th the financial 
provision was approved by the Reichstag, and the whole 
Law was thus made secure. The French Three Years Law 
was not the cause, but the consequence, of the German 
Military Law ; its introduction did not take place until 
after the introduction of the German Military Law, its 
acceptance not until August 1913. Reyens rightly 
points out the deliberate falsification of dates which the 
German chauvinistic Press, under the leadership of Schie- 
mann, has undertaken in the discharge of a high mission 
with a view to reversing the sequence in time of the two 
Laws and representing the German Law as the consequence 
of the French : 

The law reviving the three years' term of military service was the 
immediate answer of the Republican Government to the Bill demand- 
ing such great sacrifices from the German taxpayer, in order that the 
crushing superiority of the Imperial Armies might be assured. 
When all doubts as to the passing of the French Bill were removed, 
Germany's first thrill of surprise at this counterblast was turned to 
genuine indignation. ... In certain drawing-rooms, the revival 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 255 

of the three years' service was spoken of as a challenge to Germanism ! 
A password went the round of the newspapers : dates were to bo 
confused, and the French Bill was to be represented as earlier than 
the German. This flagrant lie was blazoned abroad by the whole 
Press, with the exception of the Socialist organs, as a damning accusa- 
tion against France. Dr. T. Schiemann, in the Kreuzzeitung, 
went so far as to maintain that the three years' term had been forced 
upon M. Poincar6 by the Tsar during the visit of the President (then 
Foreign Minister) to St. Petersburg in the previous year. . . . 
Whether this conscious incitement of Teuton jingoism would lead 
to grave results was a question that in the eyes of a foreign observer 
depended on the length of the simultaneous Parliamentary debates 
over the Bills in Paris and Berlin. (Beyens, pp. 231-232.) 

Apart from the competing military measures, the atmo- 
sphere of Europe was for other reasons charged with elec- 
tricity in the spring of 1913. The incidents of Nancy and 
Luneville — in themselves quite insignificant trifles — were 
exploited to the utmost by the German Press of incitement, 
in order to poison the feeling existing between the two 
countries. In addition, there were the exuberantly 
patriotic festivals in commemoration of the war of libera- 
tion, which were intentionally designed to familiarise the 
German people more and more with the idea of a new war 
of liberation, which would in reality be an aggressive war. 

In the Yellow Book (Enclosure to No. 2) there is printed 
a German secret report, dated March 19th, 1913, the 
genuineness of which, so far as I know, has never been dis- 
puted by the German Government. This report, written 
by a German official for a higher German official, contains 
a section on the " aims and obligations of our national 
policy," which gives an admirable account of the tendencies 
pursued in the Military Law and in everything connected 
with it. It is there stated : 

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education 
of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1913 made greater sacrifices. 
It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our 
hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. We 
must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our 
armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. 
We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is 
a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. 
We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to 
avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We 
must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful 



256 THE CRIME 

armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations an 
outbreak should be considered as a relief, because after it would come 
decades of peace and prosperity as after 1870. We must prepare 
for war from the financial point of view ; there is much to be done in 
this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, 
but there are many things which cannot be concealed. 

In this sense and in this style all the details of the future 
provocation of war were cunningly and subtly laid down 
in advance : even the insurrections in Egypt, Tunis, 
Algiers and Morocco, the manner in which they were to be 
precipitated and conducted, were included in the calcu- 
lation. The small States, Belgium and Holland, must 
either follow Germany or they must be subdued (domptes). 
Switzerland is a sufficient protection in the south. In the 
north-west it will be necessary to advance against France 
through Belgium. When once war shall have broken 
out " we will then remember that the provinces of the 
ancient German Empire, the county of Burgundy and a 
large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French ; 
that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces 
are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national task 
to restore to Germany what she once possessed." 

The World-War for the Purposes of Booty and 

Conquest. 

This secret German report agrees, as we see, in every 
point with the account emanating from the Belgian Am- 
bassador, both as regards the means for provoking the 
war and making it popular with the German people and 
as regards the war aims. Beyens calls this war in plain 
words a world- war for the purpose of booty and conquest 
(guerre mondiale de rapines et de conquetes) — a war which in 
democratic countries like England and France would never 
have been planned by the Governments nor approved by 
the representatives of the people. Only the existence 
of so docile a Parliament as the German Reichstag, only 
the absence of any truly democratic Government controlled 
by Parliament, made it possible that so intelligent and peace- 
loving a people should have complied with the caprice, 
ambition, and evil policy of an autocrat and allowed 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 257 

itself to be drawn into a European war. The foreign critic 
rightly finds the primary ground of all Germany's diffi- 
culties in the absence of democratic institutions and methods 
in the government of Germany. The absence of any 
ministerial responsibility ; the independence of the Imperial 
Government of the decisions of the Reichstag ; the fact that 
the sole decision regarding war or peace rests with the 
Emperor, subject to the mere concurrence [even this is in 
certain cases excluded) of the Bundesrat, a body which 
leads merely a spectral existence in view of the influence 
of Prussia ; the fact that the small Conservative party 
(only 43 among 397 representatives) really possesses, by 
virtue of its control of Prussia, the decisive power in the 
Empire as well, so that no Chancellor can hold office 
for any length of time against the will of the Junkers and 
Agrarians — all these circumstances, and many others 
similar in character, in the opinion of the Belgian states- 
man, make Prussia and Germany, despite the democratic 
suffrage for the Reichstag, merely a veiled autocracy. 
They furnish the explanation of the fact that so criminal 
a war of aggression could be begun by the Emperor and 
his Government and could be approved by the Parliament 
and the people. 

For Bey ens there is not the slightest doubt that the 
European war had been absolutely decided upon 
between the Emperor William and the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand ever since the winter of 1911-12, after the 
Kiderlen treaty of November, 1911. It is true that the 
Austrian ally was more impatient than his German mentor. 
After the peace of Bucharest, Austria was already anxious 
to strike, demanded a revision of the treaty of peace in 
favour of Bulgaria (who even then had secretly bound 
herself to her Austrian neighbour), and endeavoured once 
more to wrest other parts of the territory which they had 
conquered in the war from the hated Serbs, whom she had 
barred by her intransigeant action from the desired access 
to the Adriatic. At that time, in the summer of 1913, 
the Emperor William still exercised a moderating and 
restraining influence towards the Austrian demand for 
war. In doing so, he had a double object in view, first 
to regain the waning sympathies of Turkey by recognising 

s 



258 THE CRIME 

her possession of Thrace and Adrianople, which had been 
reconquered during the second Balkan War, and above all 
not to begin the European war until German preparations 
were completed down to the last ship's rivet and the last 
gaiter-button, until the Kiel Canal was completed and the 
effects of the new Army Bill had become manifest. Further, 
he had no desire to prejudice the position with the old King 
Carol of Rumania, whom the Emperor William regarded 
as a sure ally in the future European war. This explains 
his resistance to the desire of the Viennese Government 
to secure a revision of the situation, his intervention on 
behalf of the Bucharest Treaty which brought him the 
famous telegram from King Carol : " Thanks to you, the 
peace will remain a definitive one." Hence also the nega- 
tive result of the Austrian inquiry in Rome which is 
known to us from Giolitti's revelations. 1 

In the last year before the war the meetings between the 
German Emperor and the successor to the Austrian throne 
became astonishingly more frequent. The two Princes 
met in Berlin, in Miramare, in Konopischt ; at the place 
last mentioned, where their last meeting took place, the 
Emperor was indeed accompanied by Tirpitz, the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, a fact which evoked such lively comments 
throughout the European chancelleries that the German 
Ambassador in London was instructed to give the English 
Foreign Secretary an assurance that the presence of the 
Admiral in the castle of the Bohemian Prince was void of 
political significance. On the occasion of one of the last 
visits of the Archduke to the Emperor's residence, his im- 
perial host, as we know from the Belgian ambassadorial 
reports and from Bey ens' books, called after him at the 
station, as the train was leaving, the significant words : 
" Above all, no silly mistakes." 2 Everything down to the 
smallest detail was prepared for the great blow. " All 
that was wanted was a pretext. As Dr. Schiemann had 
pointed out in the Kreuzzeitung, however, Germany could 
have a war with France merely by letting Austria fly at 
Serbia's throat." 3 Oh Schiemann, thou " foreboding angel" ! 

1 J* accuse, p. 121 

2 See Beyens, p. 251, and Belgian Documents, No. 96. 

3 See Beyens, p. 269. 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 259 

Here again the Kreuzzeitung professor appears as a sure 
prophet, in whose case it is true prophesying was all the 
more easy, inasmuch as he was one of the initiated, and 
had merely to foretell what had been confided to him as 
the future intention of the great criminal conspiracy. 

Man proposes, but God disposes. Now, after the assas- 
sination of his trusty ally, the Emperor William had to 
carry out alone what hitherto he had thought to execute in 
concert with the Archduke ; it was this very assassination 
which was to provide him with the pretext for striking 
the blow — the pretext which had been so passionately 
awaited and which would never present itself again in so 
effective a form and in such a favourable moment. After 
the overwhelming news had been brought to him at the 
Kiel regatta, the Emperor William, with admirable presence 
of mind, at once devised the catchword with which in the 
sequel the common war action of Germany and Austria 
was pursued and on which the consent of Germany to all 
the steps of the Viennese Government was based — the phrase 
" It is a crime against Germanism." l It is true that at the 
beginning of July he went on his usual northern tour, but, 
as the Belgian diplomatist assures us, he was kept informed 
of all the steps prepared by the Viennese Government, 
and indeed before its delivery the Austrian Ultimatum 
was telegraphically brought to his knowledge by his Viennese 
Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky. " His departure for 
the north had been merely a snare, a device for throwing 
Europe and the Triple Entente off the scent, and for lulling 
them into a false security." 2 

Beyens constantly asserts as his personal conviction 
that the issue of an Ultimatum so completely unacceptable 
— couched, moreover, in such an unprecedentedly brutal 
form — could not possibly have taken place on the part of 
the Viennese Government without previous consultation 
with their Berlin colleagues and without the consent 
of the Emperor. All the denials of the authorities 
in Berlin are unable to move the Belgian diplomatist 
from this conviction. " The key of the situation was in 
Berlin." On July 26th Beyens had already sent to 
Brussels the report mentioned elsewhere (Grey Book II, 
1 Beyens, p. 276. 2 Ibid., p. 278. 

8 2 



2 6o THE CRIME 

No. 8) in which he explained the suspicion of a conspiracy 
planned in all its details between Vienna and Berlin. 
How much even then, in this critical moment, optimistic 
views regarding the love of truth and the integrity of 
German statesmen prevailed in the soul of the Belgian 
diplomatist is proved by the observation in his book (page 
282) that while he contemplated a passage through certain 
Belgian territories on the part of the German troops, 
he had never thought of a thoroughgoing occupation 
of his hapless country, plotted a long time in advance, 
he had never thought of such a barbarically cruel and 
pitiless war waged against an innocent population. His 
understanding and his feelings alike revolted against such 
an assumption. 



The Crown Prince. 

Interesting and apt is the character sketch which the 
Belgian diplomatist draws of the German Crown Prince : 

The Crown Prince has the soul of a fighter, or at any rate he prides 
himself on that quality. At an official dinner, where he sat next 
to the wife of an Ambassador from one of the Entente Powers, he 
could not think of anything more clever and gallant to say than 
that it was his cherished dream to make war and to lead a charge at 
the head of his regiment. (Beyens, p. 63.) 

This anecdote is confirmed by the violent and bellicose 
utterances of the young hen to the throne which I have 
quoted in various passages in my book. Beyens passes 
in review all the familiar acts of the Crown Prince's fronde ; 
his open opposition to the Kiderlen treaty ; his farewell 
address to the Danzig Hussars ; his intervention on behalf 
of the military heroes of Zabern, who had gained such a 
glorious victory over a lame shoemaker and a few harmless 
civilians ; his provocative intervention in the question of 
the Brunswick succession which publicly offended his 
brother-in-law and his father alike. For the Belgian 
diplomatist, who had for several years the opportunity 
of observing events at the Imperial Court and in the 
Imperial family, the most outstanding trait in the char- 
acter of this young man is his ambition, his desire to 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 261 

make himself popular and to be talked about. So far 
as the Pan-German, militaristic and reactionary circles 
were concerned, he was, moreover, completely successful 
in this respect. Ever since the day when he bestowed his 
open applause from the tribune of the Reichstag on the 
philippics of Herr von Heydebrand, the " uncrowned 
King of Prussia," against the Moroccan policy of the 
Chancellor, and thus opposed the policy of his Imperial 
father, which was still a peaceful policy — ever since that 
day he had been " the hope of the reactionary party and of 
the military caste." I have endeavoured to explain 
in my books the psychological reaction produced upon the 
father by this constantly increasing popularity of the son 
in what had always been the most influential circles in the 
Court and society of Prussia. In the rivalry for popularity 
between the father and the son, in the continual 
playing- off of the youthful and reckless plunger against 
the hesitating and cautious " Peace-Emperor who always 
barks but never bites," I found one of the psychological 
motives leading to the fatal transformation of the Emperor 
William in the years from 1911 to 1914 and to his resolute 
conversion to the thought of war. 1 

The Belgian diplomatist takes the gloomiest view of the 
future of the German Empire under the rule of a man like 
the present Crown Prince : 

It is not difficult to imagine what would become of the Empire 
under the Crown Prince's rule. He too, like his father, but with less 
intelligence, will wish to be at the helm, and, by the sheer force of his 
will as monarch by divine right, to stem the rising tide of popular 
demands, growing ever hungrier and stormier under the sweeping 
blast of Socialism. . . . Thus there is a prospect of bitter struggles 
between a ruler of the Crown Prince's type and a Reichstag that is 
half or three -fourths Socialist, assuming indeed that these struggles 
do not begin long before he comes to the throne. (Beyens, p. 67-68.) 

It appears to me that here again the view of the Belgian 
diplomatist is not far wrong. Woe to the German people, 
woe to Europe, woe to the world, should a Prince on whom 
rests the curse of countless millions one day be in a position 
to carry with him to the German Imperial Throne his 
ambition, his lust for war, his greed for power, to act con- 

1 See J' accuse, p. 125. 



262 THE CRIME 

tinually as causes leading to new and unending shedding 
of blood. May a kind fate, still better, however, the insight 
and the strength of the re-awakened German people, 
protect us from such future manifestations of the " grace 
of God " ! . . . 

Even the Emperor William himself appears not to have 
looked forward with special confidence to the future rule 
of his son. As throwing a new and interesting light on 
the conflicts between father and son which had become 
known, Beyens relates a small incident which took place 
at a Court ball in Berlin in February 1914, that is to say, 
a few months before the outbreak of war. The Emperor 
William complained to various diplomatists, among whom 
was the Belgian Ambassador, on the subject of his repeated 
fruitless attempts to arrive at a better understanding 
with France : the French Press frustrated all these efforts by 
the unmeasured attacks daily made upon Germany. (From 
this observation it will again be seen how difficult it is 
for monarchs to recognise the truth ; the Emperor William 
appears to have had no idea of the German war Press and 
the Press of incitement, which surpassed that of France 
a hundredfold in malice and above all in influence.) After 
this diatribe against the Paris Press the Emperor continued 
in a very earnest tone : " They had better take care in 
Paris — I shall not live for ever ! " This was thus a dis- 
tinct reference to his successor's love of war, although at 
the same time a veiled assurance of his own love of peace, 
which was menaced with failure only by reason of the 
provocations of the other side — altogether a skilful pre- 
paration for coming events, which, according to the 
certain conviction of the Belgian observer, had even 
then assumed an immovably firm shape in the soul of the 
Emperor. 

The Triple Entente a Defensive Alliance. 

The unconditional love of peace of the Entente Powers, 
the absence of any thought of war or aggression in London, 
Paris, or Petrograd, the efforts made by the rulers and 
Governments of the Entente Powers to overcome all friction 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 263 

and tension within and without Europe by following the 
peaceful path of an understanding, and in this way to set 
a term to the insane competition of armaments — all these 
are for the Belgian statesman indisputable historical facts. 
For him there existed in Europe only one Great Power 
within whose borders the spirit of war had attained a 
dangerous influence, in which the will for war — with 
the object of achieving an extension of power and the 
foundation of a continental hegemony — had taken solid 
form in a decision for action. That Power was Germany. 
For ten years after the dismissal of the founder of the Ger- 
man Empire, " the Bismarckian policy of consolidation 
and defence had been kept up by the mediocre successors 
of the irascible recluse of Varzin. After this, other ambi- 
tions came into play, and the counsels of the ex-Chancellor 
were gradually forgotten by the new generation of politi- 
cians, diplomats, professors, writers, and soldiers whp 
aspired to lead Germany towards loftier goals. Their 
successful influence upon the mind of the Sovereign became 
perfectly apparent at the moment when he reached the 
zenith of his career." x 

The year 1913 — the completion of twenty-live years 
of the Emperor William's government — is for the Belgian 
historian the decisive point at which the Emperor William 
looked on the first part of his task as a ruler as having been 
fin shed. This was the ascent of Germany to an unpre- 
cedented level of economic prosperity, to a pre-eminent 
position of military power both on land and sea ; on the 
completion of the first stage, he now proceeded to the second 
and greater part of his task, for which the first had merely 
been preparatory — the extension of the German sphere 
of power and dominion, first of all over Central Europe, 
and then, as against England, over the countries beyond 
the sea and the oceans of the world. A war impetuously 
begun, and brought to a conclusion with the old Prussian 
celerity, lasting for three or at most six months, was to be 
the surely effective and not too painful method of arriving 
at the aim of the Imperial ambition. The sacrifices in life 
and in property which a short and victorious war would 
impose upon the German people would be made good 
1 Beyens, pp. 27-28 



264 THE CRIME 

a hundredfold by the further extension of German pros- 
perity, by the acquisition of enormous war-indemnities, 
which on this occasion would be estimated not at 5 
milliards but at 50 milliards of marks. 

It is only thus, only by reference to a war-plan conceived 
long in advance, that Bey ens is able to explain the passive 
resistance which the Emperor and his Government opposed 
to all attempts to arrive at an amicable solution of the 
Austro-Serbian and later of the Austro-Russian conflict : 

Without any hesitation, the verdict of history will make him 
answerable for the di asters that have overwhelmed Europe. If we 
carefully read and compare the documents relating to the brief 
negotiations carried on during the Austro-Serbian crisis, we find 
ample proof that it was within William II' s power, up to the last 
moment, to say the word that would have prevented war. So far 
from doing this, he sent his Ultimatum to Russia, and thus let loose 
the deluge at the moment which he had chosen. (Beyens, p. 53.) 

According to the testimony of the Belgian diplomatist, 
the Triple Entente, in the period before the war as well as 
during the last crisis, harboured " the most peaceful 
intentions. . . . The desire to provoke a war, therefore, can 
only be imputed to that Government and that nation which 
were arming to the teeth for battle and for conquest." 
Beyens in no way denies that nationalistic tendencies 
existed in France also, and Pan-Slav tendencies in Russia ; 
he constantly repeats, however, that these tendencies 
in the two countries were in no way directed to a European 
war, as was the Pan-German movement in Germany ; 
and further — a point in which they were also differentiated 
from the Pan-German movement — they possessed no 
manner of power or influence to give the Governments of 
Russia and France a bellicose direction. Beyens entirely 
agrees with my thesis that the Triple Entente was merely 
a defensive union of the three Great Powers which, judging 
from all the weather-signs, were bound to expect sooner 
or later the outbreak of the storm of war from the side of 
Germany. 

The Belgian diplomatist in no way believes in a policy 
of encirclement pursued by King Edward, in the sense 
of a violent strangulation of German freedom of 
development and movement. Indeed, he does not even 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 265 

assume that the German statesmen, who invented the con- 
spiracy of encirclement and aggression with a view to 
explaining their policy of power and armament and who 
made the German public believe in this invention, were 
ever themselves convinced of the existence of any aggressive 
intentions in the Entente Powers. They made use of 
the spectre of encirclement for their political aims, for the 
continuous increase of the strength of their land and sea 
forces, for their refusal of any treaty agreement regarding 
the restriction of armaments, etc. But the Biilows and the 
Bethmanns never believed in the bogey which they con- 
stantly presented to the German people, which their 
followers still show on the political puppet-stage day after 
day to their terrified auditors. " Did Prince von Biilow," 
asks Bey ens, " seriously believe at the time that Edward 
VII and M. Delcasse had devised the Machiavellian scheme 
of isolating Germany and encircling her with a network of 
alliances, in order to crush her one day under the weight 
of a European coalition ? At all events, he succeeded in 
making the German public adopt this theory, and it still 
prevails to-day in Berlin. A very different impression is 
conveyed to those who have carefully followed the tortuous 
path of Imperial statesmanship." (Beyens, p. 224.) 

The German " Revenge for Agadir ! " 

The Belgian diplomatist proves his dissenting view in 
detail in considering the diplomatic events of the last 
decade, in particular the Moroccan conflict, which, in 
agreement with his old friend Herr von Kiderlen, he repre- 
sents in no way as a failure, but rather as a success for 
German diplomacy. What Germany had in view in sending 
the " Panther " to Agadir — the attainment of territorial 
compensation in Africa for giving France a free hand in 
Morocco — what Herr von Kiderlen described in his gro- 
tesque expression in the words " If one wants to eat 
peaches in January one must pay for them " — this 
the German Government did indeed obtain in full measure 
in the treaty of November 4th, 1911. The " Protectorate 
over Morocco " was expressly conceded to the French 
Government by the exchange of letters between 



266 THE CRIME 

Kiderlen and Carabon which accompanied the conclusion 
of the treaty. The equivalent given by France consisted 
in the maintenance of the full freedom of trade and equality 
of trading rights for all competing nations in Morocco, in 
the free export of minerals, and above all in the cession of 
those portions of the French Congo which were of great 
importance for the rounding- off and the exploitation 
of the German possessions in West Africa. Moreover, the 
contingent enforcement of the French right of pre-emption 
on the Belgian Congo which was granted to France by the 
Congo Act of February 26th, 1885, while it was not actually 
transferred to Germany, was nevertheless by Article 16 of the 
last Moroccan treaty so restricted, that Germany in fact 
obtained a kind of control over the exercise of this right of 
pre-emption. 

Nothing, in B evens' view, was more unjust and more 
unfounded than the indignation which broke out in the 
German chauvinistic Press, in the Defence and Navy 
Unions regarding the " national humiliation " involved 
for Germany in the Moroccan treaty. Kiderlen's skill 
and his love of peace had saved Germany and Europe from 
a war ; as a reward for this, the unfortunate Secretary of 
State was bespattered with mud by the War and the Jingo 
Press. From this time onwards the calls for war, for a 
violent bursting asunder of the alleged encirclement, 
for revenge for Agadir, were heard more violently than ever. 
In this sense the present war might indeed be called a war of 
revenge. As the French after 1866 — wrongly — exclaimed 
" Revanche pour Sadova ! " — as after 1870 they — rightly 
— exclaimed " Revanche pour 1' Alsace-Lorraine !" — so, after 
1911, the war intriguers lustily shouted " Revanche pour 
Agadir," and they continued shouting until their cries 
reached the Imperial Throne, until the ears of the German 
people tingled and their tortured brains in the end really 
believed that they must have vengeance for a wrong which 
no one had done them. 



The Emperor William his own Chancellor. 

Beyens considers that there was no possibility that the 
French Republic would ever have begun a war for the 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 267 

reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine. In his well-founded con- 
viction all the military preparations of France were merely 
protective measures against the powerful neighbour 
by whom they were constantly menaced. In the brain of 
the German Emperor, however, there had become firmly 
fixed the idea to which he gave expression on all possible 
occasions — the idea that all Frenchmen were haunted with 
the idea of a war of revenge. 

The recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, an achievement which most 
sons of France had banished to the limbo of their patriotic dreams, 
and only saw now and then as a distant mirage, seemed to him, 
in his obstinate self-deception, the secret aim towards which most 
French statesmen were striving. The sanguine and gullible pacifism 
of the French Radicals and Socialists in their opposition to the three 
years' term of military service was entirely left out of his calcu- 
lations. (Beyens, p. 39.) 

The Belgian Ambassador considers it difficult to believe 
in the sincerity of a view which is so violently opposed to 
the truth. He puts it forward as a question on which 
doubt may be entertained whether the Emperor was really 
so badly informed regarding the tendencies in France, 
or whether it merely suited him to put in the foreground 
these alleged hostile and bellicose tendencies in order in 
this way to prepare a pretext for his later attack. 

That the Emperor Yfilliam was very badly informed 
regarding the tendencies in foreign countries is for the Bel- 
gian observer an indisputable fact. It is attributable to 
the capricious choice, resting on personal fancy or sympathy, 
with which the Emperor filled the most important diplo- 
matic posts. " Positions of the highest importance have 
accordingly been given to men of very little experience." 
Apart from defects in diplomatic capacity and experience 
which are frequently to be found, Beyens also accuses a 
section of the German representatives abroad of being 
deficient in independence and character. The " high- 
born " men, who owed their brilliant positions to the per- 
sonal good-will of William II, naturally sought to show 
themselves worthy of this good- will by making the Emperor's 
train of thought as far as possible their own, and by re- 
shaping their real impressions in conformity with the 
preconceived ideas of their master. The Emperor was in 



268 THE CRIME 

fact, to his own and his country's undoing, faithful to the 
saying which he uttered after Bismarck's withdrawal 
• — he was " his own Chancellor," and above all he was his 
own Minister for Foreign Affairs. To combine this difficult 
and responsible function with all the other political and 
courtly burdens which rest on the shoulders of a German 
Emperor, a King of Prussia, the head of a numerous family 
of princes, etc., far exceeded the strength of one individual, 
even if he were equipped with high intelligence and force 
of will. Qui trop embrasse mal etreint. 

The consequences of this excessive strain on his own 
capacities are to be found in the grave errors committed 
all along the line with regard to the attitude of the European 
Powers towards a German war of aggression. Belgium's 
compliance, the neutrality of England, of Italy and of 
Rumania were counted upon, and everywhere the calcu- 
lation was false. The Emperor William was properly 
informed neither with regard to the views of the Govern- 
ments nor those of the peoples. His miscalculation, based 
on incorrect considerations, has brought him and his coun- 
try into the terrible and unforeseen position of having 
to wage, not a six months' victorious campaign which 
was confidently reckoned upon, but a prolonged war of 
exhaustion against four European Great States and several 
smaller States with Japan and America as well — a war 
which, despite all military " victories," will yet end with a 
gigantic material and above all a gigantic moral deficit 
for Germany. AH these miscalculations the Belgian 
diplomatist sets down directly to the personal account of 
the Emperor. He who has taken the helm in hand is 
responsible if the ship takes a fatal course. 

The only praise which Beyens bestows upon Prince 
Billow is that he secured, at any rate for some years until 
his withdrawal from office in July 1909, a greater degree of 
restraint in the Imperial mania for speaking and writing, 
following on the famous scandal of the Daily Telegraph 
interview of November 1908, which evoked even in moderate 
circles in Germany a storm of indignation against the ever- 
lasting personal interventions of the Emperor in foreign 
policy. After the departure of Prince Biilow, it is true 
that there was no longer the wholesome counterpoise of 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 269 

the Chancellor against the dangerous impulses of the 
Emperor, but there was at any rate still in office a Foreign 
Secretary, Herr von Kiderlen, — once an intimate friend 
of Bismarck's family and a gifted pupil of the Bismarck- 
Holstein school of diplomacy — who did not allow inter- 
ference with his work from above, and with his inborn 
South German roughness was able to ward off from his 
department any direct imperial interference. After Kider- 
len's death (at the end of 1912) this barrier also was 
removed, and the floods of Imperial eloquence and officious- 
ness could again pour themselves freer than ever over the 
country and over the world, unhampered and unprevented 
by the weakest and most characterless of all Chancellors 
who have ever occupied the palace in the Wilhelmstrasse 
and by the most incompetent and helpless of all the Secre- 
taries of State who have ever held this responsible office. 

Bethmann and Jagow. 

Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow naturally came 
very badly off in the picture gallery of the authoritative 
personalities in Prussia and Germany drawn by the Belgian 
diplomatist : 

The rise of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg to the position of Chancellor 
of the Empire has been a triumph for the bureaucracy. In looking 
for shoulders strong enough to bear the massive heritage of Bismarck, 
the Emperor, after applying in turn to the army, to the higher 
aristocracy, and to diplomacy, was bound to fall back upon the 
Prussian official caste. . . . Herr von Bethmann is first and foremost 
the Emperor's right-hand man, or rather the Emperor's proxy ; for 
the real Chancellor, although the fact is disguised by constitutional 
fictions, is the sovereign himself. Caprivi, with his independent nature, 
and Biilow, with his keen desire to maintain his personal prestige, 
had disappointed William II. From Bethmann Hollweg, it would 
seem, there is nothing of the sort to fear. He will always attempt 
to shield the Emperor's actions with his own constitutional respon- 
sibility. He would cheerfully go to the stake and become a burnt- 
offering to public opinion, if such a sacrifice were needed for the 
saving of his master's reputation. In Berlin he is known as the 
philosopher of Hohen-Finow, this being the name of his estate. . . . 
Above all a philosopher in his indifference or want of resolution where 
ethics and politics are concerned. His readiness to bow to the fiats 
of the Imperial will might more properly earn him the name of courtier- 
philosopher. For the matter of that, they are all courtiers in Berlin 



270 THE CRIME 

— all, that is to say, who on any rung of the ladder seek to be honoured 
with the favour or the confidence of the sovereign. (Beyens, 
pp. 80-82.) 

Beyens does not regard Kerr von Bethmann as an 
unconditional desirer of war and inciter to it. " His 
personal preferences made him lean towards a peaceful 
solution, but this weak man let his hand be forced by the 
war party, and bowed, as usual, to the will of the Emperor." 
England's intervention in the war was, for the Chancellor, 
a terrible disillusionment. All his efforts, before and during 
the crisis, had been directed to keeping England neutral, 
without, however, thereby imposing any restrictions on 
Germany's freedom of action. These hopes collapsed 
on August 4th, and now " the Philosopher of Hohen- 
Finow was transformed into an irascible Teuton ; all 
the Prussian violence that ran in his veins, mingled with his 
Frankfort blood, suddenly came to the surface, and the 
professional calm of the statesman, accustomed to control 
his nerves, gave place to a dramatic outburst of anger." 



How far the Belgian diplomatists could be deceived and 
were in fact deceived in the judgment formed by them 
regarding the leading men in Berlin, down to the moment 
when the true character of the actors appeared in the actions 
themselves, is proved, inter alia, by the painful surprise 
which Baron Beyens experienced as a result of the attitude 
of Herr von Bethmann in the question of Belgian neutrality. 

It was a sad disillusion for those who, thinking that they knew 
Bethmann Hollweg, would never have regarded him as an un- 
scrupulous politician. If he could not be a great Minister, he might 
at least have endorsed Prussia's signattue and guarded the honour of 
the young German Empire. A mere nod from the Emperor was 
enough to make him the zealous vindicator of a crime. His language 
in this tragic crisis was that of a Court sycophant without courage 
or conscience, not that of a statesman. In spite of his philosophy, 
he resigned himself to an act that disgraced Germany, and thus 
played the part, not of a patriotic and independent thinker, but of 
a courtier-philosopher. (Beyens, p. 87.) 

Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, fares slightly 
better than his superior, the responsible Chancellor in 
the judgment passed upon him by the Belgian diplomatist. 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 



271 



It is, not entirely without reason, allowed in his favour 
that, in accordance with the Constitution of the German 
Empire, he is not a responsible Minister, but merely the 
executive organ of the Chancellor with whom alone rests 
responsibility, and that essentially, having regard to his 
whole intellectual and moral structure, he did not have it 
in him to resist the double pressure of the Emperor on the 
Chancellor, and of the Chancellor on the Secretary of State. 
Jagow's feeble debut on the occasion of the debate in the 
Reichstag on the incident at Nancy — his attitude of 
bravado towards the French Government, obviously 
assumed on instructions from above (an attitude which 
appeared entirely out of place in view of the conciliatory 
demeanour of the Minister Barthou, and was, moreover, 
in almost ridiculous contrast to the eloquent maladroitness 
of the new Secretary of State) — this unfortunate debut 
in itself revealed to the impartial observer that German 
diplomacy was still on the downward grade. The tendency 
of the Imperial leader of foreign policy, in the interests of 
his own authority and independence, to look less for talent 
and character in the selection of his executive organs than 
for docility and compliance with the higher will, became 
constantly more marked after Kiderlen's death and Jagow's 
succession to office. 

There was only one point on which Herr von Jagow 
resembled his skilful and energetic predecessor ; this was 
in his supercilious contempt for the small States and for 
their representatives at the Berlin Court. The regular 
weekly receptions at the Berlin Foreign Office, to which in 
former times the envoys of smaller States were also 
graciously admitted,were in more recent times discontinued. 
It was left to these Ambassadors to communicate by tele- 
phone or by letter if they had any urgent matter to discuss. 
The treatment of their countries was in agreement with 
that of their persons : the spirit of Bernhardi and of his 
comrades in thought hovered over the waters of the Wil- 
helmstrasse : the time of small States, the time of neu- 
tralities, is past ; any of the small States refusing to adhere 
to one or other of the Great Powers will be pitilessly crushed 
in the struggle between European rivals ; the ambition 
in a European small State to possess great colonies outside 



272 THE CRIME 

Europe is no longer justified and is no longer practicable ; 
only the great have the right to become still greater ; the 
small must submit to this compulsion of fate. 

This train of thought, which swayed the whole Pan- 
German Press, also governed the authorities in the Wil- 
helmstrasse and led them to those compromising indis- 
cretions of which we are informed in Baron Beyens' report 
of April 2nd, 1914 (Grey Book II, No. 2). Despite all 
this, the Belgian diplomatist ascribes no direct inten- 
tions towards war even to the German Secretary of 
State : according to the wishes of this statesman, the im- 
perialistic expansion of Germany was, wherever possible, 
to take place along the path of peaceful delimitation of 
spheres of interest, not along the path of blood and violence. 
The charge to which Herr von Jagow, the subordinate, 
and Herr von Bethmann, his superior, are alike exposed 
is merely this, that they submissively acquiesced in the 
method of war in place of the method of peace, as soon 
as their impatient master, under the pressure of his military 
entourage, considered that the time had come to attain 
at a stroke what would otherwise have required a long and 
laborious process of development. Lack of will and 
character in one of the most critical moments of the history 
of the world — that is the inexpiable and heavy crime with 
which the Belgian " objective " critic rightly charges the 
German statesmen. 

War Intriguers in Germany. 

The real seat of the war party was not in the Foreign 
Office in the Wilhelmstrasse, but in the building of the 
General Staff at the Konigsplatz, in the Ministry of War 
in the Leipzigerstrasse, in the military cabinet of the 
Emperor in the Imperial castle. These three military 
courts formed the headquarters, the central point of all 
the efforts for war which were constantly being nourished 
and promoted by the Pan-German Union and its associated 
organs throughout the whole country. In these three 
military courts all the threads of the preparation for war 
were brought together ; they formed the connecting link 
between the irresponsible intriguers in the country and the 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 273 

highest responsible authorities whose task it was to speak 
the decisive word at the appropriate moment, to give the 
signal for striking the blow. 

The Belgian observer summarises the thoughts and 
aims of the Prusso-German war party, which, though not 
formally organised as a party, was yet more powerful 
than any constituted party, in the following fitting resume : 

Soon after the opening of the twentieth century there began to 
appear, chiefly in Prussia, a steady drift of opinion in favour of fresh 
European conflicts. The adherents of this creed were known abroad 
under the comprehensive name of " war party." They were drawn, 
in the first place, from the Field-Marshals and " Colonel-Generals " 
(Generalobersten),the Generals on the active list, the Aides-de-Camp of 
the Emperor, the hotheads of the Staff, and the more ambitious 
officers of all grades. To these must be added the retired army 
men, reactionary squireens who lived on their estates, and saw the 
ever-growing taxation accompanied by a rise in the national wealth, 
in the standard of comfort and luxury, while their own incomes 
could not show a corresponding advance. These malcontents held 
that a little blood-letting would be of great service in purifying and 
strengthening the social body, and in restoring to the patrician caste 
that preponderance which was its due, and which seemed likely to 
be usurped by the self-made plutocrats of industry and commerce. 
(Beyens, pp. Ill, 112.) 

It would not be possible to describe better than is here 
done by the Belgian diplomatist the central and starting 
point of the prolonged subterranean war movement in 
Germany, the seat of the evil, the destructive bacillus. 
The instigators of the crime are the military and Junker 
circles here described. For the deed itself the Emperor 
William and his Government are responsible. The other 
strata of the population, drawn from the " burgerlich " and 
intellectual circles who followed the car of war and occasion- 
ally helped to push it on, are to be claimed as the abettors 
and instigators of those who really perpetrated the deed ; 
as such they also have a sufficiently heavjr burden of guilt 
to bear before their people and before the world. With a 
few honourable exceptions, the whole German people is how- 
ever guilty of having failed to recognise in time the dangers 
which menaced it in constantly increasing measure from the 
military ambition of its Emperor, from the supineness 
of its Government, from the criminal incitement of a small 
but powerful minority. He who is born blind is to be 



274 THE CRIME 

pitied. But he who allows himself to be blinded and 
deceived, instead of opening his eyes and penetrating the 
hellish work of deception, is to be condemned ; he himself 
bears a large part of the responsibility for his own fate. 
When will the German people recognise its true enemies, 
when will it raise its voice of accusation and its sword of 
judgment against those who have so shamefully deceived 
it and who have led it to destruction ? 



The Bosnian Annexation Crisis. 

To the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina — that 
inconsidered and entirely superfluous act of violence on the 
part of Count Aehrental — Baron Beyens rightly ascribes 
enormous importance, as an event which not only evoked 
an urgent danger of a European war at the time, in the 
winter of 1908-9, but also engendered an enduring state of 
tension between the Great Powers, which contributed in no 
small degree to the outbreak of the present war. Despite 
the enforced assent of the Serbian Government, the 
antagonism between Austria and Serbia was rendered more 
acute by the challenge to the Pan-Serbian national move- 
ment. The powerful empire of the Tsars, whose historical 
interest in Balkan questions, whose close relations to the 
small Serbian Slav State, could not be obliterated by a 
stroke of the pen on the part of the authorities in the 
Ballplatz, was bound to feel as a humiliation the necessity 
of surrendering before the ruthless threats of the German 
Government, who placed themselves unconditionally behind 
their Austrian ally. 

Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador in Petrograd, 
was even then called upon to play the role which later on 
fell to him in the summer of 1914, the role of the man with 
the mailed fist, whose duty it was to confront Isvolsky, 
the Foreign Minister, with the alternatives : " Either 
you give way, or else there will be a European war." 
Russia, as is known, chose the first alternative, inasmuch as 
neither then nor later did she want a European war. She 
recognised the annexation of Bosnia, but the successful 
pressure exercised by the German Government left behind 
a wound which, thanks to the marked love of peace of the 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 275 

Tsar Nicholas, remained without dangerous influence on 
the relations between Germany and Russia. 

Baron Beyens' narrative also confirms the account which 
I have elsewhere given of the diplomatic incidents during 
the Bosnian crisis. At that time Austria and Germany 
did all in their power to kindle to a new conflagration the 
dangerous Eastern Question, which had been laboriously 
settled at the Congress of Berlin by the masterly hands 
of a Bismarck, a Beaconsfield, and an Andrassy — to a 
conflagration which threatened to set the whole of Europe 
in flames. It was only the sincere love of peace existing in 
England and France arid the almost humiliating compliance 
of Russia which then preserved the peace. The version 
to the contrary which is now disseminated by the German 
Government — as if it were Germany who was then the 
preserver of peace, and the Entente Powers who, at any 
rate in intention, were the disturbers of the peace — is 
only one of those numberless lies with which the Berlin 
Government seek to excuse or cloak their crime. 

The attempt at intimidation which succeeded so well 
against Russia in the winter of 1908-9 may have been present 
to the minds of the authorities in the Berlin Foreign 
Office as a model to be followed in the summer of 1914, 
when they instructed Count Pourtales, exactly in the same 
way and almost in the same words as six years before, to 
place before the Minister Sazonof the alternatives : " Either 
you agree to the ' localisation ' of the conflict, in other 
words, you will look on with indifference while Serbia is 
being crushed by the Austrian Army, or else we mobilise 
— and in our case mobilisation is the same thing as war." 
Remembering the incidents of 1908-9, the Chancellor and 
his Secretary of State up to a certain point may have 
believed in the success of this game of bluff, and in any 
case they hoped that it would succeed. They counted, 
however, without their host. The annexation at that time 
of two provinces which had been in the possession of Austria 
for thirty years, though contrary to law, was still a peaceful 
annexation, and Russia could, if need were, approve it ; 
but the present design to crush by the exercise of military 
force an independent country which, without any reason 
or proof, was held responsible for the murderous action of 

t 2 



276 THE CRIME 

two youthful fanatics, a country, moreover, which had 
offered the Viennese Government the most extreme satis- 
faction and humiliation, was an act of war so frivolous 
and brutal in its nature that it could not be looked upon 
in silence by a Great Power which, like Russia, was directly 
concerned. For this reason the manoeuvre of intimidation 
which had proved effective in the past was bound to fail. 

But on other points also the Chancellor and his subordi- 
nates miscalculated, if it be the case that they hoped for a 
peaceful issue of their diplomacy. Their calculations were 
false for the simple reason that the military circles in the 
environment of the Emperor, and in the end the Emperor 
himself — at any rate after the Crown Council of July 29th 
— neither hoped nor desired that German diplomacy 
should have a peaceful issue, that is to say that Russia should 
give way. On this occasion the military and the militarists 
at the German Imperial Court wanted war at all costs, 
and they would have experienced the greatest dis- 
appointment had Sazonof and his Imperial master yielded 
to Count Pourtales' attempts at intimidation. A desire 
for peace in Berlin, if it is at all possible to speak of it 
anywhere, may have existed in the Wilhelmstrasse, but not 
in the Imperial castle, not in the building of the General 
Staff, not in the War Ministry. These authorities were, 
however, the only ones that mattered in the absolutist and 
militaristically governed Prussian-Germany. 

Count Berchtold. 

The Belgian Ambassador deals extremely severely — 
justifiably severely — with his Austrian colleague, Count 
Berchtold. In his view Bollati, the Italian Ambassador 
in Berlin, also agrees. Count Berchtold was less concerned 
with revenge for the murder of the Archduke and the 
security of his country against Pan-Serbian dangers than 
with obtaining personal satisfaction for the rebuffs which, 
in his opinion, he had suffered in his Balkan policy. The 
satisfaction of almost all the Austrian demands in the 
Turkish-Balkan treaty of peace of May 30th, 1913, did not 
satisfy this statesman, who was as vain as he was incom- 
petent. He considered that the moment had come to 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 277 

crush Serbia completely and thus by an imposing stroke 
transform into eulogies the criticisms to which he was 
exposed on many sides in Austria : 

The Viennese populace was beside itself with joy at the announce- 
ment of an expedition against Serbia, which, it felt sure, would be a 
mere military parade. Not for a single night were Count Berchtold's 
slumbers disturbed by the vision of the Russian peril. He is, 
indeed, at all times a buoyant soul, who can happily mingle the dis- 
tractions of a life of pleasure with the heavy responsibilities of power. 
His unvarying confidence was shared by the German Ambassador, 
his most trusted mentor. We can hardly suppose that the Austrian 
Minister shut his eyes altogether to the possibility of a struggle with 
the Slav world. Having Germany as his partner, however, he deter- 
mined, with the self-possession of a fearless gambler, to proceed with 
the game. (Beyens, pp. 285-286.) 

The utter reprehensibility and the extreme dangerous- 
ness of secret diplomacy appear in these observations of 
the Belgian Ambassador ; the levity, the vanity, the 
desire for revenge of a diplomatic gambler, these miserably 
human — all too human — motives are sufficient to lead to 
the first fatal steps to the enkindlement of a world con- 
flagration, if the counterbalancing weight of public control, 
of Parliamentary co-operation, of approval by the people, 
is absent. 

The Belgian diplomatist cannot regard seriously the 
attempt of the German Government to localise the Austro- 
Serbian conflict. " This claim amounted to depriving 
Russia of her historic role in the Balkans." 

Austria's promise to respect the territorial integrity 
and the future of Serbia as an independent State is regarded 
by Beyens as utterly insufficient, in view of the demands 
comprised in the Ultimatum, which already contained the 
gravest intrusions on the sovereignty of the small State, 
and above all in view of the opening of war, the special aims 
of which, regarded as a " punitive expedition," were left 
completely in the dark. The degradation of Serbia into 
the position of a vassal State, the re-establishment of a 
situation similar to that which existed under King Milan of 
unhappy memory, appear to him to have been the un- 
acknowledged aims of the Austrian punitive expedition. 



278 THE CRIME 



THE "WEEK OF TRAGEDY." 

I need not here enter more fully into the narrative of 
the events of the " week of tragedy," as Bey ens calls the 
twelve critical days. His narrative agrees on all points 
with the explanations given in my first and second books. 
I should only like to emphasise a few points from Beyens' 
book which are of interest for the question of responsibility. 



On the sudden return of the Emperor from his Northern 
tour, Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, could 
not refrain from expressing, his regret at this step. In the 
view of the Belgian statesman, the Imperial Government, 
represented at this moment by the Chancellor and the 
Foreign Secretary, probably still desired the maintenance 
of peace. The sudden return of the Emperor appeared to 
be attributable to the persuasion of his military entourage 
and to the direct and baneful influence of Tschirschky, 
the Viennese Ambassador. Even at this moment expres- 
sion was given to the antagonism between the responsible 
Civil Government and the irresponsible Military Govern- 
ment, which at a later date, on July 29th, led at Potsdam 
to a victory of the military party and to the shameful 
submission of the Civil Government. Bethmann's bid 
for neutrality made to Goschen on the night of July 29th, 
immediately after the return of the Chancellor from Pots- 
dam, is interpreted by Beyens exactly as I have interpreted 
it, as an indication of the definitive decision for war in 
accordance with the conclusions arrived at in the Crown 
Council. In this Crown Council military considera- 
tions had overcome and checkmated all others. This 
was expressly admitted next day by Herr von Jagow 
to Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador : " The army 
chiefs insisted, for any delay is a loss of strength for the 
German army " (Yellow Book, No. 109). 

In agreement with his military advisers, the Emperor 
William desired to avail himself of circumstances which 
he had awaited very impatiently " and which fickle fortune 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 279 

might never again offer to his ambition." Apart 
from the moral aspect of the conflict, which enabled the 
Emperor to pose as the judge and avenger of a 
fearful crime, these favourable circumstances were, in the 
opinion of Baron Beyens, the existing military inferiority 
of Russia and France. The reorganisation of the army 
in Russia, the perfection of her artillery, the completion of 
new strategic railways in the West, all these, so it was 
calculated, would be finished at the earliest in 1917. The 
French Three Years Law also would not begin to exercise 
its influence until about that date. England would pre- 
sumably remain neutral, especially as her hands were 
bound by the confusion in Ireland, which was just hastening 
to a civil war. Thus it was a case of " Now or never ! " 
That was the watchword which in the Potsdam Crown 
Council of July 29th led the military party to victory, 
and the Emperor to his decision for war. 

II 

The information which Beyens gives regarding the 
situation on July 30th, as it was that day represented to 
him at the Foreign Office, is both interesting and new. 

Austria will reply to Russia's partial mobilisation with a general 
mobilisation of her army. It is to be feared that Russia will then 
mobilise her entire forces, which will compel Germany to do the 
same. (Beyens, p. 302.) 

This intimation from the Foreign Office is confirmed by 
the communications, in almost the same terms, which Herr 
von Jagow made to the French Ambassador on the same 
day (Yellow Book, No. 109). This is important evidence 
in support of the demonstration given by me elsewhere 
regarding the sequence of the mobilisations 1 : Russia's 
partial mobilisation, which was a consequence of the Aus- 
trian partial mobilisation and of the Austro-Serbian war, 
was followed, in the night from July 30th to July 31st, 
by the Austrian general mobilisation. This was followed 
on July 31st by the Russian general mobilisation, and this 
latter was followed on the same day by the proclamation 

1 See The Crime, Vol. I. p. 337 et seq. 



2 8o THE CRIME 

of the " danger of war," and on the next day by the general 
mobilisation in Germany. 

This sequence of the mobilisations, which was documen- 
tarily proved by me and which we now find confirmed by 
the Belgian Ambassador and intimated in advance by the 
authorities in the Wilhelmstrasse in the presence of several 
witnesses, cuts away the last prop, as I have already shown 
elsewhere, from the German legend of the Russian attack, 
and consequently from the Russian authorship of the 
war. Even if a casus belli is regarded as being given by 
a general mobilisation , a measure of security which 
can be combined with the most intensive peace efforts, 
and in this case was in fact so combined, Austria, by her 
previous general mobilisation, had given this casus belli, 
and not Russia, which merely answered the Austrian 
mobilisation. 1 Even if, as is done by many German writers, 
the Austrian and the Russian general mobilisations are 
referred to the same point in time, and accepting at the 
same time the Prussian militaristic theory that mobilisa- 
tion is equivalent to war without regard to the diplomatic 
action taken by the States which are mobilising, then, even 
proceeding from these premises, which are untenable in 
fact and in law, it would still be inadmissible to draw from 
the simultaneous mobilisation of Austria and Russia con- 
clusions disadvantageous to the latter State. Beyens 
also rightly draws attention to the earlier Balkan crisis, 
during which Austria and Russia had stood opposed to 
each other for months, armed and ready for war, without 
mobilisation being regarded by either of the sides as a 
ground for war, and without war, in fact, arising. Beyens 
saw also, in the resumption of direct negotiations between 
Vienna and Petrograd on July 31st, a ray of hope for the 
maintenance of peace — a ray of hope which again was 
clouded solely by the absolute will for war of the Emperor 
William and his military counsellors : 

We had reckoned without our host. The German Emperor 
willed otherwise. Suddenly, at the instance of the General Staff, 
and after a meeting of the Federal Council, as prescribed by the 

1 See, with regard to all the details connected with the Russian 
mobilisation, my pamphlet which appeared in January, 1918, 
" The Revelations of the Process Suchomlinov " (Trosch, Olten). 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 281 

Constitution, he issued the decree of Kriegsgefahrzustand (Imminence 
of War). This is the first phase of a general mobilisation. (Beyens, 
p. 303.) 

The faithful Lokal-Anzeiger, which on the previous day, 
July 30th, had prematurely gossiped about the decisions 
of the Potsdam Crown Council and had announced the 
general mobilisation of the army and the navy, and for 
this reason had been confiscated 1 (at that time they were 
still interested in keeping information as to the true 
position secret) — the Lokal-Anzeiger on the afternoon of 
July 31st now scattered abroad in a special edition the 
news, which flew like wildfire through the town, that 
" Russia wants war. In Petrograd, the general mobilisa- 
tion of the army and the navy has been ordered. For 
this reason the Emperor William has proclaimed the 
' threatening danger of war,' in answer to the challenge 
which Russia has directed against Germany." 

I have already spoken elsewhere of the vain endeavours 
of Jagow and Zimmermann to postpone the German 
general mobilisation, which as we know was decreed at 
5 o'clock on the afternoon of August 1st, and of the un- 
bending resistance which the War Minister and the Army 
chiefs offered to any postponement. 

From this last act of the tragedy note should be made of 
the well-merited eulogy which Beyens bestows on the 
attitude of the French Ambassador during the whole 
crisis. " The attitude of M. Cambon was admirable. 
Throughout these terrible days, nothing has been able to 
affect his coolness, his presence of mind and his insight." 
In this praise of their colleague Beyens and Goschen, who 
left Berlin together, were entirely at one. 

Ill 

The speeches of the German Emperor and of the Chan- 
cellor to the people of Berlin on the evening of July 31st 
are described as misleading and the publications of the 
German Government as wily, their object being 
to kindle a patriotism rather slow to take fire. . . . That the mass 
of the German people, unaware of Russia's peaceful intentions, should 

1 See Orange Book, No. 62. 



282 THE CRIME 

have been easily deluded is no matter for astonishment. The upper 
classes, however, those of more enlightened intellect, cannot have been 
duped by the official falsehoods. They knew as well as we do that 
it was greatly to the advantage of the Tsar's Government not to 
provoke a conflict. In fact, this question is hardly worth discussing. 
Once more we must repeat that, in the plans of William II and his 
generals, the Serbian affair was a snare spread for the Northern 
Empire before the growth of its military power should have made it 
an invincible foe. (Beyens, p. 308.) 



IV 

Beyens also considers the much-discussed question whether 
the action of England in immediately taking up a position 
on the side of the Entente Powers — a course which, as we 
know, was from the beginning urged on the English Govern- 
ment by Russia and France — would have been likely to 
deter Germany from her warlike undertaking. The Belgian 
diplomatist is inclined to the view that Grey's tactics, in 
promising neither his support to one side nor his neutrality 
to the other, was the more correct. The assumption 
by England from the outset of an attitude against Germany 
and Austria — that is to say, as a party to the dispute, 
and not as a sincere mediator of peace — would more than 
ever have aroused the furor teutonicus, of Agadir memory, 
and would have urged the Emperor, in the interests of his 
prestige and his popularity, to an even speedier opening 
of the war. Apart from this point of view of external 
politics, Beyens also recognises the difficulties with which 
the English Government were confronted in their own 
country, in public opinion, in Parliament, and even among 
their own colleagues in the Ministry. The assumption 
by Great Britain of an attitude in favour of the Entente 
Powers, so long as the conflict still bore the character of a 
Balkan conflict, would never have received the acqui- 
escence of public opinion and of the Parliament in England. 
Only when European war had broken out, when the interests 
of all Great Powers, including Great Britain, were at stake, 
when the existence of France as a Great Power was 
threatened and the neutrality of Belgium violated — only 
then could the English Government be sure of the almost 
unanimous concurrence of the whole country when they 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 283 

declared war against the frivolous author of the war and 
the violator of neutrality. 

The whole of the Belgian diplomatist's discussion of 
Grey's policy, be it observed, is based on the obvious con- 
viction that no one desired and strove more earnestly 
and insistently for the maintenance of peace than did the 
English Government. The discussion turns solely round 
the expediency of the means which were designed to lead 
to this end. The Belgian diplomatist denounces in the 
most scathing terms the attempt of the German statesmen 
and of their Press to accuse England of warlike intentions 
and of having been parties to a conspiracy to make war 
against Germany. " The events leading up to the present 
war have revealed to us the honesty and scrupulousness 
of British diplomacy, side by side with the bad faith of 
German diplomacy ; and they have thrown ample light 
upon the loyalty of Great Britain and her Ministers, as 
contrasted with the double-dealing of Germany and her 
Imperial functionaries." 



BELGIAN NEUTRALITY. 

As is to be expected, the Belgian statesman deals fully 
with the question of Belgian neutrality, its violation by 
Germany, and the alleged grounds which are supposed to 
justify this violation. From this part of the book also I 
may restrict myself to emphasising a few noteworthy 
points, since I have elsewhere discussed all these questions 
exhaustively. 



Belgium, a Country Subject to Parliamentary 
Government. 

The lying invention that Belgium had years ago forged 
with England or France a conspiracy against Germany is 
refuted by Beyens by means of the same arguments as 
those which I have used in the corresponding chapters of 
my books. He draws, however, special attention to the 
fact that Belgium is a country strictly governed on Parlia- 
mentary principles, in which every governmental act of 



284 THE CRIME 

the Monarch requires for its validity the counter-signature 
of the Ministry (according to Article 64 of the Constitution), 
and every Ministry is again responsible to Parliament for 
its actions. lEven if King Leopold or King Albert had been 
willing to conclude so dishonourable a treaty with England 
or with France in violation of all their interests, " neither 
would have found a Minister to countersign such a secret 
convention." Belgium had entertained the same friendly 
and trustful spirit (esprit amical el confiant) towards all 
the Powers, and even a military convention permitted by 
international law — concluded solely with the object of 
defending the neutral country against frivolous attack — 
would never have received the assent of a Belgian Minister 
or Parliament. 

An interesting fact, hitherto unknown, is mentioned by 
Beyens in refuting the German charge of conspiracy, so 
far as this relates to the conversation between the English 
Military Attache Bridges and the Belgian General Jung- 
bluth. Jungbluth had received an invitation to attend the 
English manoeuvres which took place in the course of 1912 
after the conversation in question ; he declined this invi- 
tation, however, in order to avoid any unfavourable inter- 
pretation which might be placed on the presence of a 
Belgian General at the English manoeuvres. 

Belgium's " Faithlessness." 

On August 4th, 1914, Herr von Bethmann plainly admit- 
ted, without any qualifications, the wrong done to Belgium. 
Later on, when they had rummaged about with some 
success in the archives at Brussels, he modified his utter- 
ances of August 4th, which in spite of all their brutality 
were at least honest, in the sense that even then he had 
possessed indications of Belgian perfidy, but that now 
only had he found proof. 

Beyens rightly points out the incredibility of the account 
thus given by Bethmann. Had the Chancellor on August 
4th possessed even the slightest and weakest indications of 
Belgian faithlessness, he would certainly not have omitted 
to produce it in exoneration of Germany's action. In the 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 285 

same way, Herr von Jagow, on the morning of August 4th, 
when Beyens called him to account for the invasion of 
Belgium (Grey Book II, No. 51), would certainly not have 
been content to appeal merely to the strategic necessity 
of the German invasion ; he would certainly not have 
approved as a " private individual " Belgium's answer 
refusing the German Ultimatum, if he had known of any 
actions of the Belgian Government which could have served 
to justify or excuse the action of Germany. No, the 
appeal to all these documentary discoveries and their 
perverted interpretation merely represent a further stage 
on the pathway of lies upon which the German rulers and 
governors entered, destitute of scruple and of conscience, 
on July 31st, 1914, the day of birth of the most recent 
German " war of liberation " : 

Once Herr von Bethmann Hollweg had entered boldly on the track 
of falsehood, in order to salvage the shipwrecked honour of his 
country, he soon made remarkable progress. He had the audacity 
to tell some American pressmen, who had come to Berlin in order 
to find out the truth about the horrors of this war, that after the first 
encounters Belgian girls amused themselves by gouging out the 
eyes of wounded German soldiers. Did he fully grasp the infamy of 
these unsupported charges ? All the private honesty of the Hohen- 
Finow philosopher will not atone for his public calumnies. (Beyens, 
pp. 321-322.) 

The Belgian Military Law. 

In May 1913 the Belgian Parliament accepted the law 
which introduced universal military service and effected 
in consequence a considerable increase in the peace and 
war strength. In a secret sitting of the Chamber of 
Deputies, de Broqueville, who was then Minister for War, 
had referred to the plans of the German General Staff — 
known to all the General Staffs — which anticipated a 
passage through Belgium in the event of an attack on France. 
Beyens, who had then been Ambassador in Berlin for about 
a year, reports the unfavourable impression which this 
increase in Belgium's military forces produced in the circles 
of German officers. If the German General Staff had not 
even at that date firmly intended to overrun the neutral 
country, either in kindness or by violence, if Germany's 
only concern had really been merely to secure defence 



286 THE CRIME 

against France from the north-west, then the extension 
of Belgium's protective measures could not have failed 
to be a source of gratification in Berlin. On the occasion 
of his visit to Switzerland in the autumn of 1912, the 
Emperor William had himself complained of the defective 
protection of his Empire on the north-west, whereas he 
considered as absolutely secure the protection afforded 
in the south by the Swiss Confederation. If, notwithstand- 
ing this, the increase in the strength of the Belgian army 
was looked at askance in German military circles, the 
reason was merely that it was not protection against France 
for which they were looking, but a passage through Belgium, 
with as little resistance as possible, leading to the destruction 
of France. By kindness, by means of flattering words, by 
personal amiability on the part of the Imperial "charmeur," 
in the end even by a threatening reference on the part 
of the German General Staff 1 to the irresistible German 
elan, the attempt was made to render the Belgians gradually 
" ripe for slaughter," to accustom them gradually to the 
idea that it would be better and more prudent to subject 
themselves to the irresistible German Colossus than to offer 
unavailing resistance. On the failure of all these calcu- 
lations and attempts to exert influence, the disillusions 
they had suffered were avenged on the unfortunate victim 
which was robbed not merely of its soil, its freedom and 
its independence, but was also persecuted to death with 
countless tortures and martyrdoms. 

The Bargaining on the Subject of Belgium. 

The various stages of the bargaining with England 
which Herr von Bethmann initiated on the subject of 
Belgian neutrality are conscientiously described by Beyens, 
and he rightly emphasises the infamy involved in the fact 
that all these negotiations on the part of Germany were 
carried on behind the back of the chosen victim and without 
the knowledge of the Belgian Government, who were only 
informed of the incidents and duly warned by England. 

1 See Yellow Book, No. 6 ; Report from Cambon of November 
22nd, 1913, regarding King Albert's visit to the Imperial German 
Court. 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 287 

(a) On the occasion of Bethmann's first offer on July 29th 
(Blue Book, No. 85) Belgium's " integrity " after the end 
of the war was guaranteed, " if she had not sided against 
Germany." 

(b) In the Ultimatum of August 2nd (Grey Book I, 
No. 20) Belgium's " possessions and independence " are 
guaranteed " in full," in the event of her maintaining an 
attitude of " friendly neutrality." On the other hand, 
her treatment " as an enemy " is contemplated should she 
" oppose the German troops." 

(c) In Jagow's Note to Lichnowsky of August 4th (Blue 
Book, No. 157) the German assurances are again modified 
to the effect that " even in the case of armed conflict with 
Belgium, Germany will under no pretence whatever annex 
Belgian territory." 

(d) In the Chancellor's speech on the afternoon of 
August 4th, when Belgium's military resistance had already 
become a fact, the assurance was nevertheless given that 
they would " make good the wrong " they had committed, 
and if England would remain neutral, they would " not 
violate the territorial integrity and independence of 
Belgium." 

I have already considered elsewhere this series of changing 
offers and assurances. Even if these assurances had not 
emanated from Germany, the violator of treaties, they 
would appear devoid of value, if only because of their 
chameleon-like change of colours. They have in the 
interval been shown to be entirely without value. Accord- 
ing to the plain meaning and the text of Jagow's despatch 
to Lichnowsky mentioned above, any idea of an annexation 
of Belgian territory under any pretence whatever was 
excluded on the side of Germany. Jagow's assurance was 
in no way made dependent on England's remaining neutral. 
Nevertheless, the decisive authorities in Germany to-day 
regard the guarantee of integrity given on August 4th, 
1914, like the treaty of neutrality of 1839, as a scrap of 
paper, and they have not the remotest idea of being hindered 
by such a promise in giving effect to their intentions as to 
annexation. 



288 THE CRIME 



The Menace to Holland. 

The reference to Holland contained in Jagow's despatch 
appears to me to be important and specially worthy of 
mention. So far as I know, this point has not yet been 
emphasised in the literature of the war with the clearness 
which it deserves — not even in the Dutch Press, although 
Holland's future is most sensitively affected by this 
question. 

Jagow explains the sincerity of his assurances with 
regard to the non-annexation of Belgian territories as 
follows : 

Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly 
pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It 
is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory 
without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at the 
expense of Holland. (Blue Book, No. 157.) 

This explanation, in itself entirely logical, opens extremely 
gloomy prospects for the future of Holland. As I have 
elsewhere proved, 1 the annexation of Belgium in whole or 
in part, in some more or Jess veiled form, has long been a 
settled question among those authorities in Germany 
whose, voice is decisive : the only question is whether, 
and, if so, how far, the military course of the war will 
afford them the possibility of giving effect to their dark 
plans against Belgium. If they succeed in doing so, it 
appears — in accordance with the explanation contained 
in the Note of August 4th — that the independence and the 
inviolability of Holland are also gravely imperilled. 

The first wrong would presumably in the issue lead to 
a second wrong. Following Jagow's example, the German 
annexationists would say : " What good is Belgium to us 
if we do not get Holland as well ? " 

It is astonishing that in this most imperilled of all 
neutral countries, in the kingdom of Holland, there are 
still people who do not recognise or do not want to recognise 
the dangers with which a German victory menaces their 
country. J' accuse had a great success in Holland ; in a 
few weeks over 40,000 copies of the Dutch edition were 

1 See The Crime, Vol. III. 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 289 

sold. Nevertheless, there have been even there blindly 
credulous people, chiefly among the intellectuals, who 
have refused to recognise the truth of my book, and 
have launched out against the author with the heaviest 
artillery, and at times even with the bitterest insults. 
One of the most purblind among these opponents, a doctor 
in Amsterdam, has denied that I am a " truth-loving 
German " and has called me a " degenerate subject." I 
pass over all these attacks with contempt, in the sure 
consciousness that I have not merely subjectively sought 
for the truth, but also that I have objectively found and 
proclaimed it. I lament, however, those unhappy subjects 
of a free and democratic community, which for the present 
has still been spared by Pan-Germanism and Prussianism, 
who do not know better how-to protect and cherish their 
independence acquired in the bitter struggles of past 
centuries, who even now, with Belgium's case before their 
eyes, refuse to see from what side the gravest dangers 
threaten their country — who (like the German people, 
as if they were already Germans) have been taken in by the 
lie of the German war of defence, Belgian faithlessness, 
etc. They will, I fear, observe their error only when the 
knife is at their own throat, when the axe is laid at the 
root of their independence and freedom. Jagow's uncon- 
scious confession of August 4th ought to open the eyes of 
these blind and confiding men. 



It is a fact familiar to all that the German annexationists 
had long ago — even before this war — directed their 
attentions not merely to Belgium, but also to Holland. 
Had Belgium complied with the demand contained in the 
German Ultimatum, had she offered no resistance to the 
German passage, had she observed the benevolent neutrality 
demanded of her, the thanks for her submissiveness would in 
all probability have been that, after a victorious termina- 
tion of the war, the Belgians, in a manner as friendly as 
insistent, would have been invited to enter the German 
Empire first of all as part of the German Zollverein, and 
then later, with progressive Germanisation, to sacrifice on 
the altar of the great neighbouring German Empire her 

u 



290 THE CRIME 

military and political independence as well as her economic 
independence. The heavy burden of the Congo, which, 
on the familiar theory of Bernhardi and Jagow, was too 
oppressive for the shoulders of so small a neutral State, would 
at once, out of friendliness, have been transferred to the 
robuster shoulders of the German Atlas. It is now pro- 
posed to shorten this wearisome process of strangulation 
(that is to say, if they can), now that Belgium has offered 
resistance and has defended her honour and her indepen- 
dence with her arms in her hand, and at one stroke to bar 
the Anglo-French " door of invasion " and incorporate in 
the German territory what had been the " deploying 
grounds " of the Entente armies. In the event of a German 
victory, the Dutch, however, will in all probability — it is 
not, indeed, necessary to be a prophet to predict this 
future — be subjected to the slow process of strangulation 
which would have been applied against a compliant 
Belgium. 

It is an old demand of Pan-Germany that the mouths 
of the Rhine, the outlet of the greatest German river, 
must by law and nature be in German hands. The North 
Sea coast, which would, as a result, pass into the possession 
of the German Empire, is a necessary completion and con- 
tinuation of our insufficient access to the seas of the world. 
The old German Emperors also regarded the Netherlands 
as one of their peculiarly valuable domains. Will so 
favourable an opportunity of realising the Pan-German 
dreams ever recur as that now presented after a vic- 
torious war, which will make us masters of the Antwerp 
Harbour and of the Belgian North Sea coast ? That this 
is no fantastic dream, but very real thoughts and 
intentions, was clearly enough given to be understood by 
Zimmermann, the Under Foreign Secretary, later the 
Foreign Secretary, on the occasion of a conversation with 
Troelstra, the Dutch Socialist. Probably Zimmermann 
himself regretted his indiscretion as soon as his words 
had passed his lips ; apart from this there is, however, 
sufficient circumstantial evidence that authoritative circles 
enteitain the thought and the hope of politely inviting 
the kingdom of Holland, after the end of a victorious war, 
to enter first of all the German Zollverein, whereafter all 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 291 

the rest would follow — as indicated in the programme for 
an understanding with Belgium which is outlined above. 

As has already been remarked, Pan-German literature, 
in the period before the war, always represented the idea 
of a gradual association of Holland as an essential point 
in the programme for the " Greater Germany " which was 
the object of their efforts. During this war, it is true, the 
Pan-Germans have in this respect become more prudent 
than many occupying official positions, as, for example, 
King Ludwig of Bavaria, who here again, as on so many 
other points, chattered so com promisingly out of school. 
King Ludwig, the enfant terrible among German Princes, 
the immortal discoverer of the fact that France and Russia 
declared war against us, has openly and publicly put it 
forward as a German war aim that we must obtain posses- 
sion of the mouths of the Rhine. The Netherlands can 
only be saved from becoming vassals to the Germans if 
the Pickelhaube is prevented from emerging victorious 
from the war. 

A Letter of King Albert. 

One further fact hitherto unknown, reported by Beyens, 
deserves to be mentioned. Three days before the Ulti- 
matum King Albert addressed a personal letter to the 
Emperor William, in which he appealed to the Emperor's 
many assurances of friendship and testimonies of favour 
towards his person and his country, and gave expression 
to his confidence that the neutrality of Belgium would be 
respected by Germany. To this letter no direct answer 
was sent. The answer was given bj^ the Ultimatum and 
the invasion of the neutral country. 

Belgium Dies, but does not Surrender. 

Beyens believes that, as in so many other matters, the 
German Government were mistaken in their judgment of the 
probable Belgian attitude towards a German Ultimatum. 
They reckoned with something approaching certainty on 
a submission of the weak to the strong. A heroism, a 
sense of honour, a craving for freedom and independence, 

u 2 



292 



THE CRIME 



such as was manifested in the actual behaviour of Belgium 
and expressed in the proud refusal of the infamous demand 
contained in the Ultimatum — such idealism in a people 
true to its treaties and devoted to its honour was not 
included as a factor in the German calculation. 

The supposition of the Belgian diplomatist appears to 
be not unfounded. The most recent German psychology 
— this bastard offspring of Mother Germania, descended 
from Prussian militarism, Teutonic insolence and economic 
pride — the most recent German psychology, which recog- 
nises its own pursuit of power as the only justified 
idealism, while it has nothing but a contemptuous shrug 
of the shoulders for the rights and the freedom of others, 
could not imagine that a small and feeble people — like the 
Spartans against the Persians, like the Dutch against the 
Spaniards — would seize their arms in defence of their 
honour and independence and exclaim to the overwhelming 
intruder : " Belgium dies, but does not surrender ! " 
The same struggle for freedom which, when waged by the 
Prussians a hundred years ago against the Imperial French, 
is rightly a glorious page in the history of the Prussian 
people, which in song and story is rightly held up to the 
young as a shining example of patriotism — this same 
struggle for freedom becomes a crime, an outrage worthy 
of death, when it is waged by the Belgian people against 
the German invader. It is not merely the Belgian army, 
but also the citizens of Belgium, their possessions, their 
dwellings and their towns, that must pay for this misdeed. 
Murder and arson, plunder and deportation, are the proper 
punishments for these offences. This is the new German 
Idealism, as it has been inoculated into the brave German 
people by fifty years' domination of Prussianism and 
Hohenzollernism . . . 

The German statesmen and military authorities did 
not believe in the true idealism as it was made manifest 
in the Belgian defence of the Fatherland. They were so 
little prepared for this, that on the occasion of the attack 
on Liege they did not even have in position the heavy 
artillery needed for the destruction of the strong forts, 
and in the absence of these it was necessary to order three 
army corps of the advance guards to the murderous work 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 293 

of carrying it by storm. According to Bey ens, this terrible 
mistake involved the sacrifice of 36,000 dead. After 
Liege was stormed in blood, ten days were needed in order 
to reorganise the decimated besieging army and to continue 
the advance with the artillery which had been brought up 
in the interval. These interesting facts are reported to 
us by Beyens. He does not, however, mention the grati- 
fying fact that, with the sacrifice of 30,000 human lives, 
General Emmich gained the title of the " Conqueror of 
Liege," the Iron Cross of the First Class, and a special 
eulogy from the mouth of the Emperor. 



The Chief Actors in the Drama. 

The Belgian diplomatist ends his book with a fine 
psychological analysis of the persons and groups represent- 
ing the chief actors in this awe-inspiring drama. 

Let us hear how he describes the Emperor : 

A Sovereign, coming at an early age to the most conspicuous 
throne in Europe, already too sure of his own talents, fretting with 
impatience to rule without restraint or guardianship, pacific both 
by instinct and by reason, but of a helmeted and mail-clad pacifism, 
which loved to vent itself in needless threats. The same Prince, 
twenty -five years later, puffed up with pride over the marvellous 
expansion of his country (in which he had certainly borne his share 
by keeping the peace), but gradually won over to the schemes of 
conquest and of domination whispered into his ear ; ill-informed, 
for want of accurate reports and of personal discernment, as to the 
state of public feeling among his neighbours, and as to their capacity 
for resistance ; ready, without any qualms, to seize the first oppor- 
tunity of starting a war in which victory seemed to him certain 
and the risks hardly worth counting ; the responsible author, since 
he wields a despotic sway, of all the horrors and disasters around us, 
bred by the relentless militarism and the boundless ambition of a 
dynasty that deems itself called upon to govern the world. (Beyens, 
p. 355.) 

The state of mind of the German people, which allowed 
itself to be driven into this war by skilful and unscrupulous 
intriguers, is described by the Belgian diplomatist in 
terms as appropriate as those applied to those whom he 
describes as the seducers of the people : 



294 THE CRIME 

A disciplined, credulous, and hard-working nation, concerned 
above all with earning its daily bread, pacific for the most part, or 
rather indifferent to foreign affairs, until the day when, on the 
strength of official assurances, it believed itself to be attacked, and 
in peril of losing its work, its national honour, its very existence. 
A lying vision, yet hard to banish from its gaze ; an erroneous 
belief, which will drive it, until the bitter end, to face the most dire 
suffering and to endure the most cruel sacrifices. The future will 
teach us whether it will not demand later on a heavy reckoning 
from those who have played it false. (Beyens, pp. 356-7.) 

The small minority who had supplied the spiritual 
material for the plans of the Emperor and his military 
environment, who had provided the intellectual foundation 
for their edifice of power, and are still ardently seeking 
every day to " explore " anew the deeper national- 
psychological, ethnographical and economic causes of this 
brutal absolutist, militaristic and dynastic outburst of 
violence — this minority of German intellectual leaders, 
who in their doctrinaire vanity cannot see the surface 
for sheer depth, cannot see the wood for the trees, who 
of all the classes of the German people have played the 
most ludicrous role, and to the tragedy of the hour have 
added the comic interlude of their professorial antics — 
into their origin also the Belgian observer conscientiously 
inquires. He explains their connection with the Prussian 
historical school of Treitschke, Sybel, Droysen, etc., and 
summarises his apt description in the following resume : 

A minority drawn from the intellectual and governing castes, 
dreaming of victory and aggrandisement, with a passionate desire 
to see the colossal fabric of German supremacy towering to the 
heavens, steeped in a limitless hatred or disdain for those who have 
not the honour to be Germans. From the very opening of hostilities, 
the morbid conceit of the scholars and men of science was unveiled 
in clear outlines through those amazing manifestoes on the rights 
that the superior science, organisation, strength, and culture of 
Germany empower her to claim. In my opinion, however [so 
Beyens adds], it would be a mistake to look upon this select band 
as typical of the nation, just as it would be wrong to make all 
Germany answerable for the misdeeds of her brutal soldiery, and for 
the frightful war waged \>y the military and naval chiefs. (Beyens, 
p. 357.) 

The book of the Belgian statesman concludes with highly 
pessimistic views regarding the future of Germany, which 



BARON BEYENS' BOOK 295 

will not so quickly awake from its tragic dream of triumph 
and world dominion. With all the greater joy and con- 
fidence does the patriot look forward to the future lot of 
his own country. No Belgian, whether he has been forced 
to take the road of exile or has led a pitiable existence 
under the domination of the oppressor, need lose courage. 
From the bells of the town-houses and of the churches 
the hour of freedom will one day be proclaimed, even if its 
coming be late. The iron monster which has trampled 
the unfortunate country will be beaten down, and with 
greater fervour than ever before the common mother will 
press to her heart her misused and scattered sons. To 
each one his country will merely become all the dearer 
the more it has suffered, and the more bravely it has over- 
come all its tribulations. 



CHAPTER IV 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 

I may summarise in the following sentences the result 
of my investigation into the Belgian documents : 

1. The collection of Belgian documents published by 
the Berlin Foreign Office is tendenciously compiled and 
full of lacunas : it contains only reports from the three 
capitals Berlin, Paris and London, and not a single report 
from Petrograd, Vienna or Rome. Further, the reports 
from the three first-mentioned capitals are not complete : 
they have been chosen exclusively with a view to 
making public everything favourable to Germany, and 
suppressing everything that is unfavourable. So far as 
unfavourable matter was included in the reports, it was 
because it could not be suppressed, since, though it was 
possible capriciously to omit reports, it was not possible 
arbitrarily to suppress portions of the reports which were 
printed. 

2. Even this tendenciously compiled and entirely defec- 
tive collection of reports does not give the slightest support 
to the view that the Entente Powers, either individually 
or collectively, had entertained or evinced bellicose offensive 
intentions against the Central Powers. Even if the 
collection of reports, as it exists, is accepted as expressing 
the views of Belgian diplomacy, the object involved in the 
union of the Entente Powers was in no way to crush 
Germany in an economic, a political, or a military sense ; 
it was merely the creation of a diplomatic and military 
counter-weight against aggression and against dangers 
which, in the view of the Entente Governments, and as 

296 



CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 297 

was apprehended by them, threatened the peace and the 
equilibrium of Europe from the side of Germany. The 
purpose and the aim of the Triple Entente were not the 
establishment of a preponderance of the Entente Powers, 
but the maintenance of equilibrium among the European 
Great Powers ; the object was not to suppress or strangle 
Germany, but to bring back this overweening Power to 
the ground of equal rights and of equal respect for the 
interests of all. 

3. Since the Belgian ambassadorial reports come to an 
end long before the Austrian Ultimatum, they furnish no 
information and no judgment regarding the crisis which 
led to the present European war. They cannot therefore 
be applied as a basis for the assertion that Germany was 
attacked and is waging a defensive war. But further they 
do not serve even to explain a preventive war, since this 
has as a necessary presupposition the existence on the 
other side of an intention to attack. Such an intention 
to attack has, however, nowhere been asserted or even 
suggested by the Belgian Ambassadors. 

4. The only result that emerges from the reports is that 
a state of tension is shown to have existed for years between 
the Great Powers and that this state of tension was con- 
stantly increasing. In many passages in their reports 
the Belgian Ambassadors inevitably ask the question : 
Who is responsible for this state of tension ? Who is 
more, who is less responsible ? Even if these questions 
were answered against the Entente Powers and in favour 
of Germany and Austria, such an answer would not 
furnish Germany with any justification for her action in 
relieving the diplomatic tension by resort to war, and in 
cutting through the Gordian knot instead of disentangling 
it. The answer given by the Belgian diplomatists to 
these questions is, however, by no means in the sense 
which I have assumed as a hypothesis. My collection of 
extracts, the one-sided tendeDcy of which I openly admit, 
which I have expressly contrasted with the equally one- 
sided tendency of the German collection of reports — my 
extracts show that it is possible, even from the defective 
German collection of documents, to find at least as much 



298 THE CRIME 

pointing to the European tension being attributable to 
the Central Powers as there is for the view that the Entente 
Powers were responsible. 

Even if we considered only the 119 ambassadorial reports 
published by the German Government, passing over all 
the proved objections which can be urged against the 
German collection of documents, we should nevertheless, 
even in the most unfavourable case, arrive at the following 
result : For the state of European tension existing in the 
years before the outbreak of war all the Great Powers, 
those of the Triple Alliance as well as those of the Triple 
Entente, would more or less bear an equal measure of 
responsibility. For the outbreak of the European war, 
on the other hand, the Central Powers would, as before, 
continue to be the parties solely responsible. The guilt 
derived from the more remote antecedents of the war would 
be compensated ; the guilt from the immediate antecedents 
would leave a debit balance standing exclusively against 
the Central Powers. 

This is the conclusion — exonerating for the Central 
Powers only so far as the more remote period before the 
war is concerned — at which we arrive if we accept as 
evidence the German collection of reports in its present 
form, and nothing else. If, however, we inquire into the 
history of Europe in recent years in the light of all the 
material at our disposal, we arrive, even in the case of the 
more remote antecedents, at a result which is in all respects 
unfavourable to Germany and Austria. 

In the long chapters in my two books of accusation on 
the " Antecedents of the Crime ' n I have proved that 
Germany and Austria, in addition to the exclusive guilt 
for the outbreak of this war, also bear by far the prepon- 
derating share of the responsibility for the state of tension 
which prepared the ground for this war and made its 
outbreak possible. That this preponderance of responsi- 
bility did in fact rest on the side of the Central Powers 
would in all probability have been apparent from the 
Belgian ambassadorial reports as well, had these reports 
been published in their entirety from all the capitals 
1 See J 'accuse, pp. 26-134 ; The Crime, Vol. II. 



CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 299 

and without a prejudiced selection. Given such a com- 
plete and unfalsified picture, there would in all probability 
have emerged, even in the case of the more remote ante- 
cedents of the war, an enormous debit balance against 
Germany and Austria in place of the present apparent 
balancing of various accounts. 

5. It is inadmissible to divide the evidence, according 
as it is favourable or unfavourable to one party or the 
other. Once the witness stands before the Court, he 
becomes a common witness for both parties, irrespective 
of which of the two parties has summoned him before the 
Court. The prosecution as well as the defence must allow 
all his depositions — subject to criticism in detail — to have 
force against them. This general principle of procedure 
holds also in the case of the great criminal pleas in which 
the guilt of the present war is to be determined. The 
party which produces the reports of Belgian Ambassadors, 
as selected by himself, as exonerating evidence in his own 
favour, must also allow other reports of the same Ambas- 
sadors which implicate him to be valid evidence against 
him. The notes printed in the first and second Belgian 
Grey Books, so far as the three capitals Berlin, London 
and Paris are concerned, are written by the same men 
as the reports contained in the German collection. The 
German Government must at once allow the reports in the 
Grey Books written by their own witnesses to be produced 
against them. But the reports from the other Ambassadors 
in the other capitals — which the German collection leaves 
entirely aside — must also be recognised by the German 
Government as credible testimony, since they cannot 
possibly describe one group of Belgian Ambassadors as 
giving an " objective diplomatic account of international 
politics " and refuse this description to the other group. 

While the German collection of documents is exclusively 
occupied with the more remote antecedents of the war, 
and scarcely touches on the acute crisis of the summer 
of 1914 in its first beginnings (the last report dates from 
July 2nd, 1914), the Belgian Grey Books deal almost 
exclusively with the essential history of the conflict which 
begins with the Austrian Ultimatum of July 23rd, 1914, 
and ends with the invasion of Belgium on August 4th. 



3 oo THE CRIME 

The German collection of documents deals with what I 
call in my books the " Antecedents of the Crime " ; the 
Belgian Grey Books deal with what I describe as " The 
Crime." Whoever is a credible witness for the ante- 
cedents of the Crime must also be so for the history of the 
Crime. In order to give a complete picture of the views 
of Belgian diplomacy on this war and its antecedents, it 
was therefore necessary to amplify the German collection 
of reports by reference to the Belgian Grey Books and the 
book written by Baron Beyens, the last Belgian Ambas- 
sador, who was later Prime Minister. 

What, however, is proved by these Grey Books and by 
Beyens' work ? 

They furnish against Germany and Austria a plain and 
unconditional answer in the affirmative to the question of 
guilt and an absolute acquittal of England, Russia and 
France. There is no hesitation, no indulgent distribution 
of light and shade, no compensating charges against both 
sides, there is no non liquet. No, like a sure and certain 
blow of a hammer, the unanimous verdict of all the Belgian 
Ambassadors is : 

Germany and Austria are alone and exclusively 
guilty of having deliberately and intentionally pro- 
voked the European War. 



The result of my investigation into the Belgian 
documents must be a bitter disappointment to the authori- 
ties of the Foreign Office who burrowed about among 
the archives at Brussels for exonerating evidence in support 
of Germany's innocence. The " fat morsel " with which 
it was hoped to stop the mouth of public opinion through- 
out the world has turned into a pitiful and lean war-ration. 
The expected exoneration has become a new and annihil- 
ating incrimination. To the already too numerous accusers 
from foreign and neutral countries there have been added 
new and even more inexorable accusers. If the men like 
Beyens, Lalaing and Guillaume, whom the German Govern- 
ment themselves summoned as witnesses for the defence, 
now appear in a solid phalanx with their other colleagues 



CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 301 

at the bar of the World's Court of Justice as witnesses for 
the prosecution against Germany, the accused who so 
inconsiderately selected their compurgators have only 
themselves to blame. With Goethe's " Zauberlehrling," 
who insolently conjured up the evil water-spirits and 
could not again exorcise them, the criminals who threaten 
to drown in the flood of the evidence of their guilt will 
exclaim with wailing and with wringing of the hands : 

The need, Lord, is great ! 
The spirits I summoned 
I cannot allay. 



INDEX 



Adriatic, the, 89 

Aegean Islands, 149 

Aehrenthal, Count, 42, 43, 274 

Aerschot, 232, 238 

Albert, King, 228, 284, 286, 288, 

291 
Algeciras, 93, 97 
Alsace-Lorraine, 125, 126, 127 
Andenne, 232, 238 
Anglo-Belgian conspiracy, the 

alleged, 82 
Anglo-German negotiations, 33-35 
Angola, 160 
Antivari, 153 

Asia Minor, 64, 65, 89, 115 
Asquith, Mr., 57, 99, 227 
Austrian Ultimatum, 202 et seq. 



Baghdad Railway, the, 29, 52, 65 

Balkan League, the, 117 

Balkan war, attitude of the Entente 

Powers during, 114 et 

seq. 
Balkans, the, 26, 30 
Baltischport, 43, 63, 121, 122 

BELGIAN DOCUMENTS 303 



Barbarities committed by German 

troops, 232-34 
Barnardiston, Colonel, 58, 82 
Barthou, M., 165, 271 
Bassermann, Herr, 21 
Battice, 238 
Belgian Congo, 80 
Belgian King and Queen's visit to 

Potsdam, 247 
Belgian Military Law, the, 285-86 
Belgian neutrality, 283 et seq. 
Belgium and the Guaranteeing 

Powers, 187-88 
Belgium, the bargaining on the 

subject of, 286-87 
Belgium's " faithlessness," 284-S5 
Belgrade, 31, 41, 67, 202, 216 
Below-Saleske, Herr von, German 

Ambassador, 75, 185, 

186, 250 
Berchtold, Count, 68, 152, 193, 194, 

196, 199, 200, 207, 208, 

217, 218, 222, 225, 276 
Berlin high finance in favour of 

peace, 251 
Bernhardi, Herr von, 21, 79, 80, 

110, 239 
Berryer, M., 235 
Berteaux, M., 47 
Bethmann, Herr von, 4, 11, 54, 74, 

75, 79, 91, 99, 108, 110, 

117, 150, 186, 270, 272, 

278, 284, 285, 286, 287 



3°4 



INDEX 



Beyens, Baron, 6, 7, 60, 61, 62, 75, 
84, 85, 112, 114, 119, 
129, 138, 145, 147, 152, 
165, 166, 178, 182, 191, 
195, 199, 202, 208, 212, 
214, 222, 226, 228, 257, 
273, 274, 277 et seq. 

Bismarck, Prince, 26, 40, 43, 108, 
139, 203, 268, 269 

Bloem, Walter, 238 

Boer war, the, 19 

Boghitschewitsh, M., 209 

Bollati, M., 212, 213, 276 

Bosnia, 27, 41, 44, 51 

Bosnian crisis, the, 25-33, 41, 42, 
44, 89 ; attitude of the 
Entente Powers during, 
144 et seq. ; 274 

Bourgeois, M. Leon, 164 

Briand, M., 165 

Bridges, Mr., 58, 284 

Buchanan, Sir George, 219 

Budapest, 68, 193, 199 

Buisseret-Steenbecque de Blareng- 
hein, Count, 191, 218, 
219-20 

Bulgaria, Tsar of, 40 

Billow, Prince, 16, 34, 35, 41, 91, 
234, 265, 268 

Bunsen, Sir Maurice de, 152, 217 



Class, Herr, 21 

Congo, 64 

Constantinople, 145 

Corn, the suspected consignment of, 

188-89 
Courtney of Penwith, Lord, 93 
Crown Prince, the, 247, 249, 260, 

261, 262 



D 



David, Dr., 109 

Davignon, M., 75, 76, 181-82, 183, 

187, 192, 211-12, 235, 

236, 239, 250 
De Broqueville, M., 285 
Delcasse, M., 11, 46-49, 106, 115, 

134, 139, 140, 142, 157, 

265 
Deschanel, M., 115, 134 
D'Estournelles de Constant, M., 164 
Dinant, 231, 238 
Doumergue, M., 158 
Ducarne, M., 58, 82 
Dupuy, M. Jean, 115, 134 



E 



C 



Caillaux, M., 104, 111, 113, 114, 

140, 141, 142, 161, 162, 

163, 165 
Cambon, Jules, 17, 18, 65, 77, 78, 

150, 211, 266, 278, 281, 

286 
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 

14, 15, 16 
Cappadocia, 65 
Carol, King of Rumania, 258 
Casablanca, 19, 20, 105 
Central Africa, 89 
Cherbourg, 33 
Churchill, Mr. Winston, 62 



Edward, King, 2, 22, 38, 47, 50, 
86, 88, 92, 93, 97, 122, 
264 

Elst, Baron van der, 185 

Emperor William, 2, 22, 33, 42, 89, 
97, 108, 121, 135, 148, 
150, 176, 196, 197, 236, 
246, 257 et seq. 

English Liberal Government, pacific 
character of the, 97 

English Ultimatum to Germany, 
the, 187, 188 

Entente Powers, attitude of the, 
during the Bosnian 
annexation crisis and 
the Balkan war, 144 et 
seq 



INDEX 



3°5 



Errembault de Dudze'ele, Count, 
191, 192-94, 198, 207-8, 
217-18 

Escaille, Baron de 1', 201, 218,221, 
222 

Etienne, M., 17, 18 



F 



Fallieres, M., 22, 33 

Fashoda, 61 

Favereau, Baron de, 47 

Fez, 97 

Flushing, 73 

Forgach, Count, 222 

France and Belgian neutrality, 
239-42 

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 68, 
150, 193, 207, 244, 257 

French Three Years Law, the, 
and the German Military 
Law, 155 et seq. : the 
falsification of dates, 
254-56 



G 



Germany Before the War, Baron 
Beyens' book, 6, 60, 
243 et seq. 

Germany, small minority of, in 
favour of war, 251 

Germany, war intriguers in, 272-74 

Giesl, General, 207 

Giolitti, M., 4, 258 

Goschen, Sir Edward, 61, 152, 187, 
188, 278 

Greindl, Baron, 10, 12, 16, 18, 19, 
21, 28 ; on the Bosnian 
crisis, 30-32 ; 34-37, 
38-43, 75, 81, 82, 85, 
92, 119, 120, 121, 122, 
123-24,126,128,132-33, 

136, 143, 145, 170, 245 
Grey, Sir Edward, 20, 31, 34, 36, 

49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 99 
et seq., 123, 128, 136, 

137, 148 et seq., 215, 
216, 282, 283 

Guaranteeing Powers, the, and 
Belgium, 187-88 

Guildhall, German Emperor's visit 
to the, 22 

Guillaume, Baron, 80, 105, 111-12, 
113, 131, 134, 139, 140, 
142, 146, 155, 157, 
160, 192 



George, King, 38, 52, 157 

German chauvinists, the, 130 et 
seq. 

German Empress, 22 

German Mili tary Law, the, an dthe 
French Three Years 
Law, 155 et seq. : the 
falsification of dates, 
254-56 

German " revenge for Agadir," the, 
265-66 

German troops, barbarities com- 
mitted by, 232-34 

German Ultimatum to Belgium, the, 
183-86 

German war of aggression, aims of 
the, 253-54 



II 



Hadelin, 232 

Haldane, Lord, 33 ; visit to Berlin, 

55, 56, 58 
Hardinge, Sir A., 51 
Hardinge, Sir C, and the Bosnian 

crisis, 28-29 
Heeringen, Herr von, 74 
Helfferich, Herr Doctor, 9,89, 221, 

222 
Helmolt, Herr Prof. 46 
Heritier, Archduke, 202 
Herzegovina, 27 ; annexation crisis, 

274 
Hesse, 39 

X 



3 o6 



INDEX 



Heydebrand, Herr von, 261 
Hohenberg, Duchess of, 68 
Holland, the menace to, 288-91 
Home Rule question, the, and 

Ulster, 200, 201 
Hotzendorff, Conrad von, 68 
Humbert, M. Charles, 202, 205 



Ischl, 194 
" Isolation 
Isvolsky, M. 



of Germany, 88 et seq. 
2, 26, 31, 42, 43, 65, 



82, 119, 122, 274 



Lalaing, Count, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
55-56, 80, 92, 101-3, 
136-37, 157, 191 

Lansdowne, Lord, 49, 93, 94 

Law, Mr. Bonar, 99, 137 

Leghait, M., 13, 22 ; reports of, 
23-24, 26-27, 144-45 

Leopold II, King, 246, 284 

Liberal Government, English, paci- 
fic character of, 98 

Libyan war, 108 

Lichnowsky, Prince, 89 n ; 215, 
216, 287 

Liege, 232, 234 

Louvain, 232, 238 

Luxemburg, 185 

Luneville, 105 



Jagow, Herr von, 11, 74, 77, 78, 79, 
109, 150, 153, 188, 196, 
199, 203, 211, 223 et seq., 
270, 271, 272, 278, 279, 
285, 287, 288 
Jaures, M., 163, 165 
Jungbluth, General, 58, 284 



K 



Kassaba, 65 
Kaufmann, Herr, 237 
Keim, Herr, 21 
Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr von, 39, 

51, 112, 146, 148, 149, 

265, 266, 269 
Kiel, 17, 18 
Klobukowski, M., 75 
Konopischt, 258 
Krobatin, M., 68 
Kriiger, P., 61 
Krupp von Bohlen, Herr, 213, 214 



M 



Macedonia, 40 
Malines, 232 
Manchuria, 20, 124 
Marschall, Freiherr von, 61 n. 
Maubeuge, concentration of British 

Army behind, 241 
Max, M., 235, 247 
Mercier, Cardinal, 232 
Mesopotamia, 40 
Metz, 108 
Milan, King, 277 
Millerand, M., 140, 142 
Miramare, 258 
Moiiis, M., 47 
Montenegro, 120, 153, 154 
Morocco, 21, 59, 88, 124, 132, 134, 

139 
Moscow, 41 
Mozambique, 160 
Muehlon, Dr. W., 210 
Muhlberg, Herr von, 18 



INDEX 



307 



N 

Namur, 232 
Nancy, 105 
Napoleon III, 37, 108 



Ogier, M., 133 



Paccu, Dr., 198 

Pachitch, M., 194, 207 

Paleologue, M., 219, 220 

Persia, 39 

Peter, King, 198 

Petrograd, 31, 37, 41, 51, 120, 157, 

163, 190 
Pichon, M., 22, 105, 106, 107 
Poincare, M., 105, 112, 118, 140, 

142, 145, 146, 156, 158, 

163, 196, 197, 212 
Potsdam, 33 ; interview at, 38-43 ; 

45, 46, 49 
Pourtales, Count, 41, 219, 223, 274, 

275 
Prussian-German War Law, 231 

et seq. 



R 



S 



Sazonof, M., 5, 39, 42, 43, 51, 62, 
69, 119, 120, 147, 148, 
150, 219 et seq., 275, 276 

Schebeko, M., 194, 195, 217, 218, 
222 

Schiemann, Prof. Dr., 3, 4, 9, 10, 
28, 118, 121, 122, 128, 
163, 258 

Schoen, Freiherr von, 35, 107 

Serajevo, 60, 85, 196, 197 

Serbia, 27, 30, 33, 68, 120, 149, 150, 
182, 194, 197, 199, 200, 
209 

Skutari, 120 

Smyrna, 65 

Stewart, English spy, 55 

Strassbourg, 108 

Syria, 64 



Tamines, 232 

Tirpitz, Herr von, 258 

Tisza, Count, 194, 196 

Toul, 108 

Tournai, 232 

Transvaal, 20, 124 

Triple Entente, the, and the main- 
tenance of peace, 121 ; 
a defensive alliance, 
262-5 

Tripoli, 89 

Troelstra, Dr., 290 

Tsar Nicholas, 4, 22, 33, 39 et seq. 
119, 121, 122 

Tschirschky, Herr von, 259, 278 

Turkey, 65, 141 



Reval, 20, 22, 30, 38 ; the aggressive 
conspiracy of ? 121-30 
Reventlow, Herr, 21 
Richthofen, Freiherr von, 47 
Rouvier, M., 48 
Russia's love of peace, 119-20 



U 



Ulster and the Home Rule question, 
200 



3 o8 



INDEX 



V Wilson, President, 236 

Windsor Castle, German Emperor 
Verdun, 108 an( l Empress's visit to, 

Victoria, Queen, 52 22 

Viviani, M., 107, 150, 196, 197 



W 



Walfisch Bay, 55 

War intriguers in Germany, 272-74 Zabern, 260 

Waxweiler, M., 235, 236 ' Zimmermann, Herr, 196, 210, 223, 

" Week of Tragedy," the, 278-83 229, 230, 278, 281 



FEINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN Br R. CLAY AND SONS, LTD., 
BRUNSWICK STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E., AND BUNGAT, SUFFOLK 



'THIS BOOK WILL STAND FOR CENTURIES." 

THE CRIME 

By the Author of "J'ACCUSE" 

Translated by ALEXANDER GRAY 

"Never in the history of the world has a greater 
crime than this been committed. Never has a crime 
after its commission been denied with greater effrontery 
and hypocrisy."— J'ACCUSE. 

VOL. I. THE GRIME 

VOL. II. ANTECEDENTS OF THE GRIME 

VOL. III. WAR AIMS 



" When Germany recovers from her madness of Prussianism one ot 
the few things left her to rejoice in will be this — that the most 
ruthless of all the exposures of her sin comes from a German hand. 
The writer here re-traverses the ground of his previous work in the 
light of the production of the German apologists, particularly 
Helfferich and Bethmann-Hollweg himself, and with a remorselessness 
that would seem to render further reply impossible, exhibits the 
innumerable paltry omissions, corruptions, mutual contradictions and 
stark fabrications that appear in their attempts to bolster up a 
hopeless case. If there is still anyone in this country who doubts 
that Germany and Austria did deliberately seek war and ensue it, 
whilst all the Entente countries with almost incredible forbearance 
strove for peace, it is his duty to read here and be convinced.'' — Punch. 



HODDER AND STOUGHTON, PUBLISHERS, LONDON, E.C. 4 



The BISHOP OF LONDON says: 

" If I am not mistaken ' J 'Accuse ! ' in years to 
come, will be an accusing finger of the civilised 
world, pointing to Germany, as Nathan pointed 
to David, saying, 'Thou art the man.'" 

J'ACCUSE! 

BY A GERMAN 

Translated by ALEXANDER GRAY 

" This is the most thorough and closely-reasoned analysis we have 
yet seen of the events which led up to the great war, and, because it 
is the most thorough and closely reasoned, it constitutes also the most 
powerful indictment of Germany and her subordinate ally. That 
this indictment should have been drawn up by a German lends 
additional and dramatic force to it." — Times. 

" Of the many books that have been already written about the War 
and its causes, and of that greater number, at which the imagination 
boggles, that will be written in the future, I doubt whether any will 
have a greater significance for the student than J' ACCUSE ! . . . 
JACCUSE ! is not only an absorbingly interesting volume but one of 
great permanent value ; and its anonymous author deserves the 
gratitude of all right-thinking men for the high moral courage that 
has inspired his work." — Punch. 

" It is a valiant and very powerful attempt made by a German to 
pierce the black, solid walls of misrepresentation behind which his 
countrymen are sitting in the dark." — Spectator. 

" The most remarkable book that has been written about the war is 
JACCUSE ! ... It is a book that ought to be read by us all. It is a 
reasoned indictment of Germany and Austria, based upon documental 
evidence, not upon rhetoric or sentiment. The point of view is not 
British, or French, or Belgian, or Serbian, or Russian. It is purely 
German. If there be any man among us whose conscience is troubled 
by the sophistries of Mr. Bernard Shaw or Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, 
let him study this impeachment of the criminals who are convicted of 
the greatest crime in history." — James Douglas in The Star. 

HODDER AND STOUGHTON, PUBLISHERS, LONDON, E.C. 4 



"Sir Arthur Conan Doyle has given us a classic." — Sir W. Robertson Nicoll 

The First Volume of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's History of the War 

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN 
FRANCE AND FLANDERS 1914 

With Maps, Plans and Diagrams. THIRD EDITION. 7/6 net. 

"Sir Arthur Conan Doyle has given us a classic. His book on the 
British Campaign in France and Flanders during 1914 will never be superseded. 
It must be read by everyone and kept at hand for constant consultation by all 
who make a serious study of the war." — Sir W. Robertson Nicoll in the 
British Weekly. 

"After reading every word of this most fascinating book, the writer of this 
notice ventures, as a professional soldier, to endorse the author's claim, and 
even to suggest that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle has understated the value of a 
book which will be of enormous help to the student of this wondrous war 
as a reliable framework for his further investigations." — Colonel A. M. 
Murray, C.B., in the Observer. 

" A book which should appeal to every Briton and should shame those who 
wish to make of none effect the deeds and sacrifices recounted in its pages." 
— Professor A. F. Pollard in the Daily Chronicle. 

The Second Volume of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's History of the War 

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN 
FRANCE AND FLANDERS 1915 

With Maps, Plans and Diagrams. SECOND EDITION. 7/6 net. 

"If any student of the war is in search of a plain statement, accurate 
and chronological, of what took place in these dynamic sequences of onslaughts 
which have strewn the plain of Ypres with unnumbered dead, and which 
won for the Canadians, the Indians, and our own Territorial Divisions 
immortal fame, let him go to this volume. He will find in it few dramatic 
episodes, no unbridled panegyric, no purple patches. But he will own himself 
a much enlightened man, and, with greater knowledge, will be filled with much 
greater pride and much surer confidence." — Daily Telegraph. 

" The success of the first volume of the history leaves the reception of this 
continuation beyond doubt. Nor are the causes of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's 
popularity as a military historian far to seek. He is readable, lucid, correct, 
and terse. He knows his subject, and he never loses his sense of per- 
spective. . . . Both because he combines imagination with caution, and has 
had free access in compiling his book to official records, every statement he 
makes can be relied upon." — Westminster Gazette. 

" Sir Arthur has limited himself to a painstaking record of operations in 
the field. His second volume comes up to the standard set by the first, and 
cannot be neglected by any student of the v,ar." — Professor A. F. Pollard 
in the Daily thron.c e 

HODDER AND STOUGHTON, PUBLISHERS, LONDON, E.C. 4 



The Third Volume of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's 
History of the War 

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN 
FRANCE AND FLANDERS 1916 

With Maps, Plans and Diagrams. 7/6 net. 

" We gave praise, and it was high, to the first and second volumes of 
' The British Campaign in France and Flanders.' We can give the same to the 
third, and more, too. For the whole of this volume is devoted to the 
preliminaries and the full grapple of the Battle of the Somme — a theme far 
surpassing everything that went before in magnitude and dreadfulness, but also 
in inspiration for our own race and in profound human import of every kind." — 
Observer. 

" The book is quite a masterpiece of detailed information which the author 
has been at immense pains to obtain and which is the more interesting because 
it is mostly new to the public. ... It is a well-balanced, faithful account, 
which everyone should read, of the great Somme Battles in which our newly- 
raised armies played so glorious a part." — Tmth. 



The Fourth Volume of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's 
History of the War 

THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN 
FRANCE AND FLANDERS 1917 

With Maps, Plans and Diagrams. 7/6 net. 

'•If Sir Arthur can complete the remaining two volumes with the same zest 
and truth as is exhibited here, it will indeed be a work which every student who 
fought in France in the Great War will be proud to possess on his shelves." — 
Sunday Times. 

" It will find with others of the series a permanent place in all military 
libraries, as a reliable work of reference for future students of the war." — 
Observer. 

" The merits of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's History have been so widely and 
so variously acknowledged that it is not necessary again to recapitulate them. 
He is one of the most readable of all military foundations . . . his technical 
foundation is thoroughly sound, and his work is a standing proof that to be 
sound there is no need to be dull. In this fourth volume there is a mass of 
information carefully gleaned and not less carefully sifted, which has not 
appeared in official communiques." — Westminster Gazette. 

HODDER AND STOUGHTON, PUBLISHERS, LONDON, E.C. 4 



